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ABSTRACT 
 
The global economy is controlled by an ‗international economic–legal regime‘ (hereinafter 
―IELR‖), in which international economic institutions (hereinafter ―IEIs‖) are the major non-
state actors. They provide the rules of the game for the interaction of the States in an 
international economic scenario. These IEIs, through their institutional capacity, enhance 
certainty and predictability within the IELR, thereby passively supporting stable and a balanced 
growth of global economy. 
This thesis argues that opportunities to achieve stable and balanced growth, in which both the 
financial and the real side of the economy grow, can be improved if the IEIs increase their focus 
on the relationship between the Economic Cycle and the IEIs‘ institutional role.  This argument 
is developed by analysing the relationship between the IEIs‘ institutional role and the Economic 
Cycle, first describing the Economic Cycle, and then clarifying the functioning of the IEIs in 
their institutional role. To narrow the scope of this research, this thesis takes two IEIs as case 
studies; namely, the IMF and the WTO.    
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I. Introduction  
 
This thesis answers the question: can the institutional role of the IEIs increase the chances of 
achieving more stable and balanced growth of the global economy? The answer is provided in 
the form of an analysis of the relationship between the IELR and the achievement of balanced 
and stable growth through the International Economic Cycle. The principal contribution of this 
thesis is to systematically analyse the current regime (IELR) through a liberal institutionalist lens 
and its effect on the Economic Cycle.  
Over the last couple of decades, the global economy has expanded significantly. This expansion 
is accompanied by the substantial interdependence of national economies, resulting in it 
difficulty for the states to control cross-border economic activities. These cross-border economic 
engagements fall within the sphere of global governance
1
 and call for the regulation of 
international economic relations in order to tackle this issue. These issues are dealt by means of a 
wide variety of principles, rules, standards and norms, mostly created by the different IEIs and, 
over a period of time, these global regulations have evolved into a regime (IELR) based on 
politics, economics and law. 
The concept of the IELR is based on liberally institutionalised rational cooperation among the 
sovereign states for collective gain in the form of IEIs. These IEIs, being the most important non-
State actors, operate within the international economic framework through an international legal 
framework or international institutional framework or both (referred to as ‗mechanism‘ in the 
                                                 
1
 For an interesting discussion of interdependence and globalization theories (and a useful bibliography), see Zürn, 
M. (2002) ‗From Interdependence to Globalization‘, Handbook of International Relations, Editors: Carlsnaes, W., 
Risse, T., Simmons, Beth A. London: Sage, p. 235-254. 
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figure below) to achieve an end result; that is, the more stable and balanced growth of the global 
economy. See the figure below, which explains the concept in graphic form.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
 
To explain and analyse the above-mentioned concept, this thesis takes two IEIs as a case study; 
namely, the IMF and the WTO. The reason for choosing these IEIs is very simple; in the current 
regime (IELR), these IEIs contribute the most in the context of the Economic Cycle. The IMF 
has a leading role in the process of setting the rules of the game for the global financial sector 
whilst the WTO is the most prominent in dealing with international trade issues.  
The thesis is divided into three sections. The first section establishes the theoretical foundations 
of the dissertation and the evolution of the IELR. The second section discusses the institutional 
role of the IMF in achieving stable and balanced growth within the global economy. The third 
section explores the WTO‘s institutional role in producing a more stable and balanced growth in 
the global economy.  In sections two and three, the emphasis is on the way in which these 
institutions operate and enhance the certainty and predictability of the rules of the game. 
IELR 
          Main Actors                                 Mechanism                                           Result 
International 
Legal 
Framework 
 
Stable and 
Balanced Growth 
of Global 
Economy 
 
IEIs (Based on 
Liberal 
Institutionalism) 
International 
Economic 
Framework 
 International  
Institutional 
Framework 
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Section one: Conceptual Framework and Evolution of the IELR 
This section of the thesis takes a Liberal Institutionalist viewpoint to analyse the IEIs as a forum 
for organised, rational cooperation between states for collective gain. It discusses the institutional 
role of the IEIs in terms of their legislative and normative capacity, executive and administrative 
authority, and judicial and quasi-judicial functioning.  
The international economic framework is also addressed, through the model of the Economic 
Cycle. According to the Economic Cycle, economic growth is achieved through development of 
global financial sector (Patrick‘s supply lead hypothesis)2, which in turn stimulates international 
trade, which then reinforces economic growth and leads to the development of the financial 
sector (Patrick‘s demand followed hypothesis)3.  The Economic Cycle is then used to analyse the 
IEIs‘ institutional framework and the way IEIs generate the stable and balanced growth of the 
global economy by stimulating the components of the Economic Cycle to create certainty and 
predictability. 
In addition, for a better understanding of the IELR, this section also documents the historical 
background to the current regime and the way in which it evolved to its current stage. Its 
historical background and evolution allows us to analyse the current regime in the context of its 
evolving nature, which provides room for criticism and adaptability within the IELR. For this 
purpose, Chapter Three takes into account events starting with World War I, the Bretton Woods 
system, the creation of the WTO which evolved from the International Trade Organisation 
(hereinafter ITO), then to GATT and then the WTO. As the IMF and the World Bank have not 
undergone any significant structural changes, they are not discussed in depth. 
                                                 
2
 Patrick, H.T., (1966) ‗Financial Development and Economic Growth in Underdeveloped Countries‘, Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 14, No. 1, p.174–89 
3
 Ibid 
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Section Two: The IMF  
Section two of the thesis analyses the IMF‘s institutional role in stimulating the Economic Cycle 
through the promotion of certainty and predictability in the global economic scenario. It provides 
in-depth analysis of the legal framework and institutional role of the IMF, focusing on its 
legislative and normative, and executive and administrative authority.  
As a result, section two shows that the IMF currently plays an important institutional role even 
though it does not explicitly acknowledge this. It is highly involved in devising the rules of the 
game for the international economic scenario, thereby structuring the IELR. The argument put 
forward here is that the effectiveness of the IMF is limited by its refusal to openly acknowledge 
this institutional role, whereas an acknowledgement that it performs this institutional role would 
allow it to fulfil its objectives more effectively.  
The main reason for the IMF not explicitly acknowledging its institutional role is that it does not 
want to reveal its realist aspect within the liberally institutionalised IELR.  It makes and 
promotes global regulations; however, its focus is on achieving the end result without 
highlighting its rule-making role. In spite of an absence of democratic values within the IMF‘s 
framework,
4
 its membership effectively follows the IMF; this is due to the non-existence of any 
substitute organisation to help in times of desperate monetary need.  
                                                 
4
 In the current discussion this thesis supposes, indeed contends, that the most significant democratic values are the 
following: first, equivalent respect for the essential benefits of all persons; second, decision-making regarding public 
order via principles, mutual consideration; and third, common respect for people as those who are guided by reason. 
Keohane, Robert O. and Buchanan, Allen (2006). The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions. Ethics and 
International Affairs, 20(4): 405-437. Kern Alexander and other have put forward a slightly different view for more 
or less the same issue that is the global governance. They might see IELR as subject of global governance. 
According to them, global governance of financial system should have three main principles; i) efficiency in 
creating effective regulatory rules and standards, ii) accountability in the decision making structure and chain of 
command, iii) and legitimacy, meaning that these subjects to international regulatory standards have participated in 
some meaningful way in their development. See, Chapter I: Managing Systemic Risk, The rational for International 
financial regulations, in Alexander, Kern, Dhumale, Rahul, and, Eatwell, John, (2005). ‗Global Governance of 
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However, even if this institutional role was fully acknowledged, the IMF would remain 
handicapped by its institutional structure, which gives excessive control to wealthier States 
(specially the US).  As a result, the IMF is not well-designed to properly fulfil its institutional 
role. 
This section is divided into two chapters, namely; the IMF and its Legal Framework (Chapter 
IV) and the institutional role of the IMF in achieving stable and balanced growth of the global 
economy through the International Economic Framework (Chapter V). The purpose of this 
section is to show that the IMF has an institutional role and it actively participates in the global 
regulation-making and implementation process. However, the IMF does not explicitly express its 
institutional role and thus it loses the opportunity to improve upon it and squanders any chance 
of enhancing its contribution towards achieving a more stable and balanced growth of the global 
economy. 
Section Three: The WTO 
Section three of the thesis carries out a similar analysis of the WTO‘s institutional role in 
stimulating the Economic Cycle by promoting certainty and predictability in the global economic 
scenario, thereby leading to the more stable and balanced growth of the global economy. It 
comprehensively analyses the WTO‘s legal framework and its institutional role in the form of its 
legislative/normative, executive/administrative authority and quasi-judicial functioning.  
This section emphasises the fact that the WTO is currently the most effective IEI in the IELR, 
and does not suffer from the structural problems faced by the IMF.  It therefore calls for the 
enhancement of the WTO role, especially in financial sector development, to allow it to play an 
                                                                                                                                                             
Financial Systems, The International Regulation of Systemic Risk.‘ Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: 
September 2007. 
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even larger part in enhancing the certainty and predictability of the rules of the game in the 
international economic framework.  
The unidentified institutional role of the IMF has evolved over a period of time,
5
 thus it has some 
key structural deficiencies which are significant hurdles to its operating optimally in the context 
of the IELR. These structural deficiencies are decision-making with realistic insight; focusing 
more on legal transplant than on legal harmonisation; and the lack of an effective adjudicating 
system. Section two argues that if changes were made to address these key institutional structural 
deficiencies, then idealistically, the IMF could contribute much more effectively towards the 
IELR and the Economic Cycle. However, realistically, such extensive institutional modifications 
to the IMF are unlikely because the dominant powers (mainly the US) would not relinquish their 
influence in the formation of global financial regulations easily or readily.   
As discussed above, there are practical implications in making modifications to the institutional 
structure of the IMF. Thus, section three argues, on the basis of practicality, that the WTO, by far 
the most effective IEI in the IELR to affect the international Economic Cycle, could practically 
enhance its role in financial sector development, and in doing so, the WTO could become the 
optimal IEI in the IELR. It could, in fact, lead the IELR.  
For this purpose, this section demonstrates the comprehensive institutional role of the WTO as 
part of the IELR. As the international economic cycle takes into account both the financial sector 
and international trade, so this section highlights the WTO‘s institutional role in the development 
of both. However, greater emphasis is placed on the contribution of the WTO in the development 
of the financial sector. Popular opinion regarding the WTO is that it only deals with trade issues 
                                                 
5
 The IMF has evolved as an important IEI in context of financial global regulation. This evolution of the IMF‘s role 
took place because there was and still is a vacuum or need for global financial regulations and there is no other IEI 
to do this job. Thus even with a realist approach and lacking democratic values, it is followed (possibly due to legal 
transplant) widely in the liberally institutionalized global economy because there is no viable alternative. 
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and has nothing to do with the development of the financial sector. This viewpoint is totally 
refuted by underlining the WTO‘s contribution in the development of the global financial sector. 
The WTO‘s contribution to financial sector development is less significant in comparison with 
the IMF; nevertheless, any contribution made by the WTO does not face problems of legitimacy, 
accountability and respect for democratic values.  
An obvious question arises here; why can the WTO be reformed yet the IMF cannot? Given that 
the US has a vested interest in not allowing the WTO to be used as a way of circumventing its 
hegemony of the IMF, the answer to this question is easy. The US is the most dominant country 
in the organisational structure of the IMF and has a power to veto anything. Therefore, any move 
to address US dominance can be vetoed by the US itself. On the other hand, the WTO is a liberal 
institution which respects democratic values and so the collective free will of the WTO 
membership could push for the enlargement of the WTO‘s role in financial sector development. 
The US has no veto in the WTO so if the member countries so wish, they can call for the 
increased role of the WTO. 
A slight modification of the role of the WTO in the context of financial sector development 
would only involve a more realistic and practical approach, as compared to the major structural 
changes necessary within the IMF. If this were to happen, then the soft laws (global regulations)
6
 
would not lack democratic values and would also be subject to the WTO adjudication process.  
The WTO‘s Committee on Trade in Financial Services contributes towards global financial 
regulation in the form of soft laws, but on a very small scale. It simply needs to contribute more 
to the financial sector and this does not require big structural changes. Therefore, this section 
calls for the enhancement of the WTO‘s institutional role in the context of financial sector 
                                                 
6
 The expansion of the role of the FSC of the WTO in the creation of soft laws in the short term and could also be 
made part of the hard binding commitment in the longer term.  
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development as a more viable, practical and realistic solution to the current dilemma within the 
IELR, i.e. regarding legitimacy and the effectiveness of the rules of the game.
7
  
For this purpose, section three is divided into three chapters; Chapters VI, VII and VIII. Chapter 
VI examines the legal framework of the WTO, whilst Chapter VII deals with the institutional 
role of the WTO in the promotion of international trade, albeit briefly, since the institutional role 
of the WTO and overall promotion of the international trade are uncontested and require no 
substantial change. Chapter VIII focuses on the institutional role of the WTO in the development 
of the global financial sector and calls for the expansion of its institutional role in this area. 
 
  
                                                 
7
 A very good proposal for a structure of global financial system is put forwards by well-known scholars who take 
into account both, legitimacy and accountability. However, it is too good to be adopted because it calls of enormous 
cooperation and collaboration of all the participants of IELR. See generally, Chapter 5: Strengthening the global 
financial system through institutional and legal reforms, in  Alexander, Kern, Dhumale, Rahul, and, Eatwell, John, 
(2005). ‗Global Governance of Financial Systems, The International Regulation of Systemic Risk.‘ Published to 
Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007. 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The increasing pace of international economic activities and the mounting interdependence of 
national economies have made it difficult for governments to implement policies in relation to 
the growing number of cross-border economic activities. These economic activities sometimes 
lie outside the territorial control of the national government and sit within the domain of global 
governance.
8
 
These trends, which may have resulted from globalization
9
 (or vice versa) necessitated the need 
for regulating international economic relations. In reality, these regulations, rules, norms etc, do 
exist but in the form of an amalgamation of politics, economics and law at international level. 
The complex interaction of these disciplines has created an ‗international economic-legal 
regime‘ (hereinafter ―IELR‖) at international level.      
To develop a theoretical understanding of this new dimension of IELR, we need to take a 
multidimensional approach in order to best explain this trend. That is, it should take into account 
all the constituents of IELR (such as International Relations
10
, International Law
11
 and 
International Economics).  
                                                 
8
 For an interesting discussion of interdependence and globalization theories (and a useful bibliography), see Zürn, 
M. (2002) ‗From Interdependence to Globalization‘, Handbook of International Relations, Editors: Carlsnaes, W., 
Risse, T., Simmons, Beth A. London: Sage, p. 235-254. 
9
 Globalization definition by Holm and Sorensen: the ‗intensification of economic, political, social and cultural 
relations across boarders‘. [Holm, H. and Sorensen, G., (1995) ‗Introduction: What has Changed‘, Whose World 
Order: Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War, Editors: Holm, H. and Sorensen, G., Boulder: Westview, 
p. 1; and also see, Braithwaite, J. and Drahos, P., (2000) ‗Global Business Regulation‘, Cambridge University Press, 
p. 8] Globalization result from the interdependence of national economies or it is the other way around that the 
globalization causes interdependence of national economies. 
10Hereinafter ―IR‖. 
11Hereinafter ―IL‖. 
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The concept of IELR can be better understood using the example of a cooking recipe.  Just 
suppose International Economic Institutions (hereinafter ―IEIs‖) have the main ingredients to 
bake a cake of global, balanced and stable economic growth. There are two ways to bake this 
cake; one is using the international institutional framework (based on IR) process and the other 
one uses the international legal framework process (based on IL). Both of these techniques if 
applied (together or separately) to the international economic framework, result in a delicious 
cake of stable and balanced growth of the global economy. See the figure below, explaining the 
concept in graphic form.  
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above figure tries to explain the concept presented in this thesis. This thesis takes IEIs as an 
organised, rational cooperation between states for collective gain and these IEIs are viewed 
through the Liberal Institutionalist‘s lens. The thesis then takes IEIs as the main non-state actors 
in the IELR. These IEIs then act within the international economic framework through an 
IELR 
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international legal framework or international institutional framework or both (referred to as 
‗mechanism‘ in the above figure) to achieve an end result, that is, a more stable and balanced 
growth of the global economy.     
This thesis, for a better theoretical understanding, will discuss in detail the main constituents of 
the IELR. In order to do that, this chapter will look into theories based on IR, IL and 
international economic aspects. For this purpose, this chapter is divided into three main parts; A, 
B and C. Part A of this chapter talks about the main actors in the IELR and their institutional role 
through which they create certainty and predictability. Part B is dedicated to the 
mechanism/process through which these IEIs operate in the international economic framework.  
Thus this part will discuss the international institutional framework (based on IR), international 
legal framework (based on IL) and the international economic framework. Finally, part C is the 
conclusion.  
The concept of the international institution used in this thesis needs to be clarified and discussed. 
Therefore, the following part of this subheading is dedicated to the term ‗international 
institution/IEIs‘ and then their institutional role.           
A. Main Actors in the IELR 
As mentioned earlier, this thesis takes IEIs as the main non-state actor in the IELR. Before 
moving on to discuss the mechanism through which these IEIs use the international economic 
framework to result in a more stable and balanced growth of the global economy, we need to 
clarify the term ‗international institutions‘ and their role in creating the certainty and 
predictability of the rules of the game in the economic scenario that is the IELR. Therefore this 
subheading will discuss the international institutions, their institutional role and the relationship 
of certainty and predictability of the rules of the game within the economy. 
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1.  International Institutions/Organisations 
The theories which are to be discussed in this chapter are all about the reasoning behind and need 
for the cooperation of states within the global system which forms the IELR. There are many 
approaches but most of them arrive at more or less the same conclusion: the states cooperate with 
each other to develop an understanding of their interaction with each other. The most common 
method of this co-operation between the states is through the international 
institutions/organisations.
12
 
As mentioned earlier that this thesis looks into the global economic scenario and at the 
cooperation of states for a more organised and better interaction of states within it. This 
interaction (based on interdependence) relies considerably on IEIs, which have evolved into a 
regime governing the interaction of independent states within the global economic system.  
There is slight confusion about the term ‗institutions‘ in economic literature that are the 
institutions itself the rules of the game or they set the rules of the game for the interaction of 
states in the global economic system.
13
 North, a prominent scholar in the area of institutions and 
                                                 
12
 The term international institutions and international organisations are used as interchangeable words. According to 
Simmons and Martin, the distinction between institutions and organisations is secondary if the research, does not 
involve informal organisations. Simmons, B. and Martin, L., (2002) ‗International Organizations and Institutions‘, 
Handbook of International Relations, Editors: Carlsnaes, W., Simmons, Beth A., Risse, T. 
13
 John Mearsheimer defines institutions as ‗sets of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and 
compete with each others‘ [Mearsheimer, John J., (1994/95) ‗The False Promise of International Institutions‘, 
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 5-49.].  Bromley, ―institutions are the means whereby the collective control 
of individual action is given effect.‖ [Bromley, Daniel W., (2006) ‗Sufficient Reason: Volitional Pragmatism and the 
Meaning of Economic Institutions‘, Woodstock, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 31].  ―[I]nstitutions are the 
rule of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape the human 
interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic.‖ 
[North, Douglass C., (1990) ‗Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance‘, Cambridge University 
Press.]. Williamson refers to institutions as ―[G]overning structures‖ [As quoted in, Nelson, R.R. and Sampat, B.N., 
(2001) ‗Strands of Institutional Analysis‘, Journal of Economic Behavior & Org., Vol. 44, p. 31–54]. ―[W]idely 
common and predictable patterns of behavior in a society, including generally shared habits of thought as well as of 
action.‖ [Veblen, T., (1915) ‗Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution‘, Macmillan, New York. As quoted in, 
Nelson, R.R. and Sampat, B.N., (2001) ‗Strands of Institutional Analysis‘, Journal of Economic Behavior & Org., 
Vol. 44, p. 31–54] John R. Commons, a prominent economist defined an institution as something which tell 
individuals what they ―must or must not do, ... what they may do without interference from other individuals, ... 
what they can do with the aid of collective power, ... and what they cannot expect the collective power to do in their 
behalf.‖ [Commons, John R., (1957) ‗Legal Foundations of Capitalism‘, Madison : University of Wisconsin Press.] 
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economic growth, considers institutions as the rules of the game itself (which includes both 
formal and informal rules) and distinguishes it from the organisations which he asserts are a 
group of people compelled by some mutual drive to attain common goals, and which could be 
political bodies,
14
 economic bodies,
15
 social bodies
16
, and educational bodies
17
.
18
 
However, this thesis takes institutions and organisations as interchangeable terms. The reason for 
not distinguishing between these two terms is that it is secondary to the purpose of my thesis, as I 
am only looking into formal international organisations.
19
 
In the context of international organisations, scholars have, in general, agreed that for any entity 
to qualify as an international organisation, it must have certain characteristics and these 
characteristics are as follows;
20
 
 Its membership must be composed of states and/or other international organisations; 
 It must be established by treaty; 
 It must have an autonomous will distinct from that of its members and be vested 
with legal personality; and  
 It must be capable of adopting norms applicable to its members. 
                                                 
14
 Parliament, political parties, a city council, a regulatory body, etc. 
15
 Firms, trade unions, family farms, cooperatives, etc. 
16
 Churches, clubs, athletic associations, etc 
17
 Schools, universities, vocational training centers, etc 
18
 North, Douglass C., (1990) ‗Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance‘, Cambridge 
University Press. 
19
 According to Simmons and Martin, the distinction between institutions and organisations is secondary if the 
research, does not involve informal organisations. Simmons, B. and Martin, L., (2002) ‗International Organizations 
and Institutions‘, Handbook of International Relations, Editors: Carlsnaes, W., Simmons, Beth A., Risse, T. 
20
 This definition of international institutions/organisations is taken from Amerasinghe, C. F., (2005), ‗Principles of 
the Institutional Law of International Organizations‘, Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law. 
Cambridge University Press, p 10 and also used by Philippe Sands, P., Klein, P. (2001) ‗Bowett's law of 
International Institutions‘, London: Sweet & Maxwell, p. 16; see also Morgenstern, F., (1986), ‗Legal Problems of 
International Organizations‘, p19; see also, Schermers, Henry G. and Blokker, Niels M. (1995) ‗International 
Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity‘, 3rd ed, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague,  p. 45-46; see also, Seidl-
Hohenveldern, I., (1965) ‗Legal Personality of International and Supranational Organizations‘, Egyptian Review of 
International Law, Vol. 21, p. 66. 
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The international institutions/organisations which this thesis analyses as the main constituents of 
the IELR (other than states) are based on the criteria mentioned above. This international regime 
analysis gained momentum in the early 1970s. The main focus was on the principles, procedures, 
rules, and norms that govern the expected behaviour of states in an international context.
21
 The 
current IELR which evolved during the past couple of decades focuses on the rules of the game 
regarding the behaviour of states between each other in the context of economic relations. The 
IEIs lay down the legal foundations of the international economic system.
22
 
This economic regime provides legal certainty and predictability and guides its constituents 
according to its rules. At international level, it permits states to plan their economic activities 
with less uncertainty.
23
This regime concept is materialised through a global legal 
structure
24
based on international institutions and multilateral treaties which reduces uncertainty 
and increases predictability. This legal certainty aspect is covered by the IEIs as they provide a 
legal structure, through their organisational framework, to the global economy. In this context, 
there are three ways in which IEIs provide a legal structure
25
 to the global economy through their 
institutional capacity: .firstly, in their legislative and normative capacity; secondly, through their 
                                                 
21
 Krasner, Stephen D. (ed.) (1983) ‗International Regimes‘, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Also see, 
Haggard, S. and Simmons, Beth A., (1987) ‗Theories of International Regimes‘, International Organization‘, Vol. 
41, No. 3, p. 491-518. 
22
 Economic institutions comprise and define the legal foundations of any economic system. [Bromley, Daniel W., 
(2006) ‗Sufficient Reason: Volitional Pragmatism and the Meaning of Economic Institutions‘, Woodstock, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 31]. However, the author takes economic institutions as rules of the game 
and also setter of these rules. This thesis only looks institutions as the setter of the rule of the game.  
23See Maxeiner, James R., (2006) ‗Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: U.S. Legal Methods and the Rule of 
Law‘, VAL. U. L. REV., Vol. 41, p. 517, 522. [hereinafter Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America].   
24
Gessner asserts that along with the legal structures social structures also contribute to legal certainty. By legal 
structures he means state law and international law which includes multilateral agreements. [Gessner, V., (1998) 
‗Globalization and Legal Certainty‘, Emerging Legal Certainty: Empirical Studies on the Globalization of Law, 
Editors: Gessner, V., Budak, Ali C. Aldershot: Dartmouth.] 
25
 As a general principle of European legal systems, structure is where: ―(1) laws and decisions must be made 
public; (2) laws and decisions must be definite and clear; (3) decisions of courts must be binding; (4) limitations on 
retroactivity of laws and decisions must be imposed; and (5) legitimate expectations must be protected.‖ See 
Maxeiner, James R., (2007) ‗Legal Certainty: A European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy?‘ 15 
Tulane J. Int‘l & Comp. L. p. 541, 545–46. 
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executive and administrative authority; and thirdly, through judicial and quasi-judicial 
functions.
26
 This above-mentioned institutional role or contribution towards global economic 
certainty is discussed in the latter part of this chapter. However, at this stage it becomes 
inevitable to discuss the relationship between certainty and predictability within the economy. 
Thus the following subheading sheds some light on this aspect.   
2. Certainty and Predictability of the Rules of the Game and the 
Economy 
 
The certainty and predictability of the rules of the game result from an effective functioning of a 
regime; however, at this point it becomes important to look into the relationship of the certainty 
and predictability of the rules of the game within economic development. This aspect of 
economics and certainty and predictability of laws is discussed below.  
There are four different approaches adopted by the scholars in discussion of the certainty of law 
and economics:
27
 (1) classical sociology of law
28
; (2) law and development
29
; (3) economic 
sociology
30
; and (4) institutional economics
31
. All of these approaches, one way or another, 
                                                 
26
Gessner asserts that the legal structures contribute to legal certainty. By legal structures he means state law and 
international law which include international organisations. Gessner, V., (1998) ‗Globalization and Legal Certainty‘, 
Emerging Legal Certainty: Empirical Studies on the Globalization of Law, Editors: Gessner, V., Budak, Ali C. 
Aldershot: Dartmouth. 
27
Gessner, V., (2009) ‗Towards the Theoretical Framework of Contractual Certainty‘, Contractual Certainty in 
International Trade: Empirical Studies and Theoretical Debates on Institutional Support for Global Economic 
Exchanges. Editors: Gessner, V. Hart Publishing: Oxford; Portland, p. 7. 
28
In the classical sociology approach of law the most significant scholar is Max Weber. He asserts that the legal 
certainty ensure calculability of economic activities. Dorbeck-Jung, B., (2009) ‗Global Trade: Changes in the 
Conceptualization of Legal Certainty‘, Contractual Certainty in International Trade: Empirical Studies and 
Theoretical Debates on Institutional Support for Global Economic Exchanges. Editors: Gessner, V., Hart Publishing: 
Oxford; Portland. 
29
 See generally for law and development, Trubek, David M., and Galanter, M. (1974) ‗Scholars in Self-
Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States‘, Wis. L. Rev., 
p. 1062-102; Gardner, James A., (1980) ‗Legal Imperialism: American Lawyers and Foreign Aid in Latin America‘, 
University of Wisconsin Press; Larson-Rabin, L., (2007) ‗Happenstance and Memory: A Legacy of Law and 
Development Scholarship and Policy in Legal Education‘, Wisconsin International Law Journal, Vol. 25, No. 2, p. 
209-234. 
30
 For legal elements in the economic structure in economic sociology see generally work of Karl Marx and Karl 
Polanyi.  
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assert that the rule of law and legal certainty is essential for the economy. These above-
mentioned approaches are briefly discussed below. 
Firstapproach explaining the relationship between law and the economy is the classical 
sociology of law. The most significant scholar of this approach is Max Weber
32
. He propagates 
that legal certainty in any system ensures the calculability of economic activities within that 
system.
33
 According to Weber, law is a system with rules which are general, uniform, stable, 
clear, predictable and publicly announced. These rules are backed by the state‘s monopolised, 
organised violence.
34
 
Weber‘s view of sanctions based on a state‘s monopoly of organised violence is highly 
challenged in the global economic scenario
35
 because the current regimes are mainly based on 
cooperation and understanding between sovereign states. Moreover, international institutions are 
based on the notion that independent sovereign states have the ability to reach cooperative 
solutions to problems without the intervention of coercive action.
36
The logic behind cooperation 
is that all (the majority) of the participants will benefit from cooperation in the long run.  
                                                                                                                                                             
31
 See North, Douglass C. (1990) ‗Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance‘, Cambridge 
University Press. 
32
For an English translation of the entire three-volume text, see Weber, M., (1956) ‗Economy and Society: An 
Outline of Interpretive Sociology‘, Editors: Roth, G., Wittich, C. Trans. by Fischoff, E. et al. New York: Bedminster 
Press, 1968. 
33Weber, M., (1956) ‗Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology‘, Editors: Roth, G., Wittich, C. 
Trans. by Fischoff, E. et al. New York: Bedminster Press, 1968. Also see Dorbeck-Jung, B., (2009) ‗Global Trade: 
Changes in the Conceptualization of Legal Certainty‘, Contractual Certainty in International Trade: Empirical 
Studies and Theoretical Debates on Institutional Support for Global Economic Exchanges. Editors: Gessner, V., 
Hart Publishing: Oxford; Portland. 
34Scheuerman, William E., (1999) ‗Globalization and the Fate of Law‘, Recrafting the Rule of Law, Editor: 
Dyzenhaus, D. Oxford: Hart. Dorbeck-Jung, B., (2009) ‗Global Trade: Changes in the Conceptualization of Legal 
Certainty‘, Contractual Certainty in International Trade: Empirical Studies and Theoretical Debates on Institutional 
Support for Global Economic Exchanges. Editors: Gessner, V., Hart Publishing: Oxford; Portland. 
35
 Such as R. Axelrod.   
36
 This concept is derived on the optimistic approach adopted by Axelrod towards the ability of humans to solve 
their problems by cooperation. Axelrod, R., (2006) ‗The Evolution of Cooperation‘ (Revised ed.), Perseus Books 
Group. 
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However, Weber‘s basic idea of the law leading to the certainty of rules for the calculability of 
other participant‘s economic activities is highly relevant to this thesis. The predictability of 
economic activities within a system is based on the certainty of the rules of the game of that 
system. In the global economic aspect, the IEIs define the rules of the game for all the actors in 
the global economic system, which reduces uncertainty and increases the calculability of 
economic activities of the other participants (i.e. member states).    
A second approach relevant to this thesis was originated by Trubek and Galanter who applied 
Weber‘s concepts37 to modernization theory in the context of law and development. The notion 
of modern law is that the law that comprises rules ―to achieve social purposes‖38 and ―to advance 
in a rational way toward some knowable goal.‖39 The main purpose of law in the modernization 
theory was to utilise law as a tool to shape the social order in which ―the state exercises its 
control over the individual through law,‖ ―rules are consciously designed to achieve social 
purposes or effectuate basic social principles‖ and are ―enforced equally for all citizens, in a 
fashion that achieves the purposes for which they were consciously designed,‖ and in which ―the 
courts have the principal responsibility for defining the effect of legal rules.‖40 In other words, 
                                                 
37
 Modernization theorists made the claim that modern law (clearly articulated legal standards that provide a 
predictable framework for the resolution of disputes) is an essential prerequisite for the progression towards and 
growth of a modern market, however, Weber had studied this very connection in Economy and Society. See, Weber, 
M., (1956) ‗Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology‘, Editors: Roth, G., Wittich, C. Trans. by 
Fischoff, E. et al. New York: Bedminster Press, 1968. See also, Cao, L., (1992) ‗Law and Economic Development: 
A New Beginning?‘ Law and Development, Editor: Carty, A. New York, N.Y.: New York University Press, Texas 
International Law Journal Summer 1997. 
38Trubek, David M., and Galanter, M., (1974) ‗Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in 
Law and Development Studies in the United States‘, Wis. L. Rev. 1071. 
39Friedman, Lawrence M., (1969) ‗On Legal Development‘, Rutgers L. Rev. Vol. 24, p. 11, 30. In modern, dynamic 
systems, ―[t]he role of organized society, of government and law, is to insure that change is channeled in the right 
direction. In the modern world, governments do more than maintain order; presumably, they also solve problems. ... 
Law itself is not scared and timeless, but moves with the times. ... It is plainly manipulated by living people and by 
organized groups to secure their rights and advance their interests. People believe that law has a purpose.‖ Id. 
40Trubek, David M., and Galanter, M. (1974) ‗Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law 
and Development Studies in the United States‘, Wis. L. Rev. 1071-72. For a discussion of the seven commonly 
shared assumptions regarding the relationship between law and development, which the authors refer to as the 
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Modernization theory links modern law with predictability, rationality, and purposefulness. It 
conceives of law as a body of legal rules shaped by rational and conscious design
41
 and ―valued 
for their instrumental utility in producing consciously chosen ends.‖42 43  
If the current economic legal regime is viewed in same way in which Weber took economy and 
society, and the way in which modernization theorists implanted Weber‘s concept into the 
relationship of law and economic development, then it can be better understood. The rules set by 
the IELR are highly purpose-oriented and are planned with high rationality so that the subjects 
can calculate the possible results of their actions.   
Economic Sociology: The term institution in its sociological form is a broad one since it 
contains the set of rules and regulations that these organizations follow and which help them to 
function properly. An example would be the standard which governs property rights and labor 
relations. Hence, institutions and organizations should be treated as separate from one another 
with organizations being defined as the cooperative setup that bring together human and physical 
resources to fulfill their objective, including International Economic Organizations such as IMF, 
World Bank and WTO. ). Whereas organizations may be actors, institutions cannot.
 44
 
The economic sociology does not examine the economy broadly; in its place studies particular 
economic systems, such as, feudal economies, the economies of primitive societies, capitalist 
economies, etc.
 45
 
                                                                                                                                                             
―paradigm‖ of ―liberal legalism‖ or ―the original paradigm of law and development studies in the United States,‖ see 
id. at 1070-72. 
41See Galanter, M. (1966) ‗The Modernization of Law‘, Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth. Editor: Weiner, 
M. 
42
See Galanter, M. (1966) ‗The Modernization of Law‘, Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth. Editor: Weiner, 
M. p.155. 
43
 See, Cao, L. (1992) ‗Law and Economic Development: A New Beginning?‘ Law and Development. Editor: Carty, 
A., New York, N.Y.: New York University Press, Texas International Law Journal Summer 1997, p. 506. 
44
 Trigilia, C. Economic sociology : state, market, and society in modern capitalism. Blackwell Publishers, p17-36. 
45
 Trigilia, C. Economic sociology : state, market, and society in modern capitalism. Blackwell Publishers, p17-36. 
Rao Raza Hashim 
32 
School Of Law 
University Of Warwick 
Karl Polanyi was one of the prominent researchers in the field of economic sociology. In his 
analysis, he used the studies involving economies based on archaic principles where the 
economic exchange used to take place in the presence of non-economic principles. For instance, 
the goods produced and traded via agriculture, breeding, fishing and handicrafts was done so on 
the concept of ‗reciprocity‘ or ‗redistribution‘, unlike it is done in the modern economy on the 
basis of market trade.
46
 
The principle of reciprocity implied that the basis of the production and distribution of goods and 
services was a unified obligation towards other members of the family or tribe. This led to 
different kinds of goods being traded as well as an uninterrupted cycle of goods being 
exchanged. Whereas in the modern economy, individual actions are triggered by personal gain 
and the amount of goods produced is determined by the market equilibrium, in these societies 
this is not the case. Instead the commitments that the members of the society have towards each 
other based on the premise of reciprocity social obligations were the main driving force of the 
economic activities.
 47
 
Another common attribute of these societies was the principle of redistribution, which played 
along with reciprocity. For instance, in such a society, the societal rules would require a certain 
amount of produce to be given to the leader of the tribe. In this event, the produce would be 
stored and relocated when need be based on the amount that is prescribed to each social group. In 
this type of economic organization, it was seen that a specific division of labor was possible and 
was characteristic of large empires like ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt? Hence, when the political 
structures became more distinguished, the practice of redistribution on a large scale was directly 
linked to it. There was a ‗center‘ that defined what the obligations of the people were towards the 
                                                 
46
 Polanyi, K. (1968) Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies. New York: Doubleday. 
47
 Trigilia, C. Economic sociology : state, market, and society in modern capitalism. Blackwell Publishers, p17-36. 
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economy. As time went by, economic activity boosted and money was brought in, the economic 
behavior of people was not determined by their social obligations – it was done so by rules that 
the political powers defined which gained their significance through the religious forces. Thus, it 
is clear the any analysis of economy is very deeply interlinked with that of political structures 
where economic activity is entrenched.
 48
  
Polanyi concluded that a very essential part of European feudalism was reciprocity and 
redistribution as a means to control economic activity which constituted of a set of connections 
between the monarch, the liege-lord and the inhabitants of the estate. In spite of this, it was noted 
that the medieval period, even in Europe, led to an increase in the market being seen as a tool to 
manage economic activity, as the principles of reciprocity and redistribution became outdated.
 49
  
Not all types of exchange are those that fall under ‗market trade‘. There are three types of 
exchange depending on the kind of relationship that is present between the concerned actors. The 
first one is ‗gift trade‘ which is characterized by the principle of reciprocity that is hinged on 
social norms.
50
 The second type of exchange was ‗administered trade‘ – this included 
transactions that were heavily influenced by the prevailing political powers as was the case in the 
large empires of primitive economies.
51
  
What is significant about these types of transactions is that instead of being determined by the 
interplay of demand and supply, they are controlled by the social and political norms. Market 
trade has a specific characteristic; that it is based strictly on the demand and supply relationship. 
As time went by, market exchange gained significance. It was in the 1800s that markets where 
price is set through the interaction of demand and supply i.e. ‗self-regulating‘ markets were 
                                                 
48
 Trigilia, C. Economic sociology : state, market, and society in modern capitalism. Blackwell Publishers, p17-36. 
49
 Trigilia, C. Economic sociology : state, market, and society in modern capitalism. Blackwell Publishers, p17-36. 
50
 Polanyi, K. (1977) The Livelihood of Man, edited by Harry W. Pearson. New York: Academic Press, p 94. 
51
 Polanyi, K. (1977) The Livelihood of Man, edited by Harry W. Pearson. New York: Academic Press, p 94-95. 
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primarily used to control the (production and distribution of goods and services in the developed 
world). Consequently, social and political forces ceased to control the exchange of goods and 
services, and it was profit seeking that became the driving force. In this new setup, the political 
system became an external force that affected property rights and bargaining, whereas 
individuals carried out transactions in the economic market. Therefore, economics progressed to 
become a science once it began to be separated from social and political limitations and 
economic research was conducted based on the market rules and regulations.
 52
 
The connection between sociology and economic is primary due to uneasy interactions between 
modern rational choice theory and economic sociology. The reason being that the rational choice 
theory stresses on economics and on the other hand economic sociology focuses on social.
53
 
Economic sociologists stress on the point that social structures, cultural patterns and close-knit 
relationships are the roots of economic behaviour.
54
 Since the inception of this current regime the 
market forces based on rational choice has dominated the global economic scenario. This thesis 
relies on a rational choice concept and does not rely on the economic behaviours based on social 
structures, cultural patterns and their relationship in formation of IELR. Moreover, IELR 
originates since the inter World War period and this thesis does not go beyond that period. 
Therefore the economic sociological approach is not widely utilised in this thesis. 
Institutional Economic lead by North lays stress equally on both informal and formal 
institutions‘ efficacy for economic performance.55 Institutional economics explores the role of 
                                                 
52
 Trigilia, C. Economic sociology : state, market, and society in modern capitalism. Blackwell Publishers, p17-36. 
53
Zafirovski, Milan (2001) Reexamining economic sociology: Beyond rational choice reductionism. The American 
Sociologist. Springer New York. 
54
Gessner, V. (2009), ‗Towards the Theoretical Framework of Contractual Certainty‘, Contractual Certainty in 
International Trade: Empirical Studies and Theoretical Debates on Institutional Support for Global Economic 
Exchanges. Editors: Gessner, V. Hart Publishing: Oxford; Portland. 
55
 North, Douglass C. (1990) ‗Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance‘, Cambridge University 
Press. 
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institutions in determining economic behaviour. It highlights a comprehensive research of 
institutions and perceives markets as a consequence of the multifaceted relationships of different 
institutions (e.g. social norms, individuals, firms, states). According to institutional economics, 
individuals don‘t have perfect information and due of this they encounter uncertainty related to 
unanticipated circumstances and consequences and thus suffer transaction costs to obtain 
information. Therefore, humans create institutions in order to decrease risk and transaction costs.  
In institutional economics, institutions are taken as written (formal) and unwritten (informal) 
rules, norms and constraints that humans formulate to increase their control and lower 
uncertainty within their surroundings.
56
 Moreover, institutional economist substantially focuses 
on human understanding towards reality, which in turn outlines the institutional environment 
they build.
57
 
The concept of institutions is very broad under institutional economics and there is no consensus 
among institutionalist scholars for a definition of institutions. It includes both formal and 
informal institutions. There is no consensus on the term ‗institution‘ by the institutionalist 
scholars. Moreover, it‘s not even clear if organizations and institutions are the same thing or 
there is a substantial difference between these two terms.  
There is slight confusion about the term ‗institutions‘ in economic literature that are the 
institutions itself the rules of the game or they set the rules of the game for the interaction of 
states in the global economic system.
58
 North considers institutions as the rules of the game itself 
                                                 
56
 These include (i) written rules and agreements that govern contractual relations and corporate governance, (ii) 
constitutions, laws and rules that govern politics, government, ﬁnance, and society more broadly, and (iii) unwritten 
codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and beliefs. [C. M´enard and M. M. Shirley (eds.) (2005), Handbook of New 
Institutional Economics, 1–18. Springer. Printed in the Netherlands]. 
57
 C. M´enard and M. M. Shirley (eds.) (2005), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, 1–18. Springer. Printed 
in the Netherlands. See also, North, Douglass C. (1990) ‗Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic 
Performance‘, Cambridge University Press, p3-6.  
58
 John Mearsheimer defines institutions as ‗sets of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and 
compete with each other‘s [Mearsheimer, John J., (1994/95) ‗The False Promise of International Institutions‘, 
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(which includes both formal and informal rules) and distinguishes it from the organisations 
which he asserts are a group of people compelled by some mutual drive to attain common goals, 
and which could be political bodies,
59
 economic bodies,
60
 social bodies
61
, and educational 
bodies
62
.
63
 
There are some scholars
64
  who consider organizations as special institutions that encompass (a) 
criteria to establish their boundaries and to distinguish their members from nonmembers, (b) 
principles of sovereignty concerning who is in charge, and (c) chains of command delineating 
responsibilities within the organization.
65
 Moreover, the interaction between institutions and 
organizations that shapes the institutional evolution of an economy.
66
 If institutions are the rules 
of the game (which include both formal and informal constraints) then organizations (which are 
special type of institutions) are the players who are capable to set the rules of the game. 
                                                                                                                                                             
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 5-49.].  Bromley, ―institutions are the means whereby the collective control 
of individual action is given effect.‖ [Bromley, Daniel W., (2006) ‘Sufficient Reason: Volitional Pragmatism and the 
Meaning of Economic Institutions‘, Woodstock, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 31].  ―[I]nstitutions are the 
rule of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape the human 
interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic.‖ 
[North, Douglass C., (1990) ‗Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance‘, Cambridge University 
Press.]. Williamson refers to institutions as ―[G]overning structures‖ [As quoted in, Nelson, R.R. and Sampat, B.N., 
(2001) ‗Strands of Institutional Analysis‘, Journal of Economic Behavior & Org., Vol. 44, p. 31–54]. ―[W]idely 
common and predictable patterns of behavior in a society, including generally shared habits of thought as well as of 
action.‖ [Veblen, T., (1915) ‗Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution‘, Macmillan, New York. As quoted in, 
Nelson, R.R. and Sampat, B.N., (2001) ‗Strands of Institutional Analysis‘, Journal of Economic Behavior & Org., 
Vol. 44, p. 31–54] John R. Commons, a prominent economist defined an institution as something which tell 
individuals what they ―must or must not do, ... what they may do without interference from other individuals, ... 
what they can do with the aid of collective power, ... and what they cannot expect the collective power to do in their 
behalf.‖ [Commons, John R., (1957) ‘Legal Foundations of Capitalism‘, Madison : University of Wisconsin Press.] 
59
 Parliament, political parties, a city council, a regulatory body, etc. 
60
 Firms, trade unions, family farms, cooperatives, etc. 
61
 Churches, clubs, athletic associations, etc 
62
 Schools, universities, vocational training centers, etc 
63
 North, Douglass C., (1990) ‗Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance‘, Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
64
 Geoffrey M.Hodgson (2006), 'What Are Institutions?', Journal of Economic Issues, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC 
ISSUES. Vol. XL no. 1. 
65
 Geoffrey M.Hodgson (2006), 'What Are Institutions?', Journal of Economic Issues, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC 
ISSUES. Vol. XL no. 1. 
66
 North, D., (1994) Institutional Change: A Framework Of Analysis. Economic History, Econ WPA, revised.  
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Organizations are made up of groups of individuals bound together by some common purpose to 
achieve certain objectives.
67
 
This concept of the organizations under the institutional economics and the concept of 
institutions in the international relations is quite similar and also relevant to this thesis. This 
thesis takes take the term international institution as used in international relations and not as 
used in economics. International relation use international institutions for formal international 
organizations such as UN and its related bodies.
68
  
Whether institutions are rules of the game or they set rules of the game. This is the confusing 
part of the Institutional Economics. According to institutionalists institutions are rules of the 
game and they can also set the rule of the game. My thesis takes institutions as actor in the 
international economic scenario which set rules of the game for the international economic 
scenario.   
Moreover, the formal and informal constraints can be used for the purposes of exploring the role 
of IOs. Formal constraints take form binding commitments under treaties. On the other hand, soft 
laws could be understood in light of informal constraints. Moreover, informal constraints are also 
observed in the decision making process within the international economic institutions (IEI). 
Such as, the ‗Green Room‘ meetings within WTO. Furthermore, the ―Gentleman‘s Agreement‖ 
between US and EU for the appointment of IMF and World Bank heads could also be analyzed 
in light of informal commitments. 
So far this chapter has discussed the term ‗international institution‘ and the relationship between 
law (certainty and predictability of the rules of the game) and the economy in order to achieve a 
                                                 
67
 Geoffrey M.Hodgson (2006), 'What Are Institutions?', Journal of Economic Issues, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC 
ISSUES. Vol. XL no. 1 
68
 Beth A. Simmons (2001), International Organizations and Institutions, in Handbook of International Relations. 
Edited by 
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better understanding of the IELR. The certainty and predictability of the rules of the game are 
mainly achieved through the international institutions (within the global economy through IEIs) 
through their institutional capacity. Therefore, it becomes imperative at this stage to explain the 
term ‗institutional role‘ of the international institutions in the promotion of certainty and 
predictability in the global legal and economic scenario.  
The next part of the theoretical framework will discuss the institutional role of IEIs which is 
based on their normative capacity, their executive and administrative authority, and also includes 
quasi-judicial functions. 
3. International Institutional/Organisational Role 
The international institutional role has some significance in this thesis as it is the main 
mechanism through which the IEIs promote the certainty and predictability of the rules of the 
game in the IELR. This institutional role of the IEIs becomes even more significant when it is 
viewed as part of the international economic framework leading to the stable and balanced 
growth of the global economy.  The following part discusses the international institutional role of 
the IEIs and is inspired by discussions in Bowett‘s Law of International Institutions69 and 
International Institutional Law: Unity Within Diversity
70
 regarding the functions of an effective 
international organisation. 
By „international organisational role‟ I mean that the role played by these institutions in their 
normative capacity, executive and administrative authority, and quasi-judicial functioning, in 
order to promote predictability and certainty in international economic affairs of states. This part 
                                                 
69
Sands, P. and Klein, P. (eds), (2001) ‗Bowett's Law of International Institutions‘, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th 
ed. 
70
Schermers, Henry G. and Blokker, Niels M. (1995) ‗International Institutional Law: Unity Within Diversity‘, 3rd 
ed, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague. 
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of the theoretical chapter discusses in detail the terminology „international 
institutional/organisational role‟ as used in my thesis. The following part discusses the 
legislative and normative capacity of an international organisation (hereinafter ―IO‖) and will 
then discuss in the same manner the executive and administrative authority, and judicial and 
quasi-judicial functioning as the institutional role of IOs.   
a) Legislative and Normative capacity 
One of the constitutive elements
71
 of an IO is its capability of adopting norms (which include 
laws, rules, regulations, standards, best practices)
72
 for its constituent members.
73
 The majority 
of scholars place emphasis on the fact that the IOs are formed mainly to adopt norms in their 
areas of speciality.
74
 In the context of norms formation, IOs mostly become a forum for the 
elaboration, negotiation, and finally, acceptance of international conventions by the member 
states of that IO.  
In this thesis, the term legislative and normative are used as interchangeable terms. However, a 
reasonable amount of vigilance is required when dealing with the term ―legislative‖ in this thesis. 
This is due to two reasons; the first is that there are only a few IOs which have the capacity to 
carry out complete authoritative decision-making or in broader terms, institutional acts
75
.  
                                                 
71
 Scholars have in generally agreed that there are four constituent elements of and IO and they are as follows; ―(1) 
Its membership must be composed of states and/or other international organisations; (2) It must be established by 
treaty; (3) It must have an autonomous will distinct from that of its members and be vested with legal personality; 
and (4) It must be capable of adopting norms addressed to its members.‖ [Sands, P., Klein, P. (eds), (2001) ‗Bowett's 
law of International Institutions‘, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed. p.16] 
72
 These norms can be either mandatory or not mandatory.  
73
 Schermers, Henry G. and Blokker, Niels M. (1995) ‗International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity‘, 3rd 
ed, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, p.22. 
74
 Such as, Virally, M. (1968) 'The Sources of International Law', Manual of Public International Law, Editor: 
Sorensen, M.; Sands, P., Klein, P. (eds), (2001) ‗Bowett's law of International Institutions‘, London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 5
th
 ed. p. 261. 
75
 Sands, P., Klein, P. (eds), (2001) ‗Bowett's law of International Institutions‘, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed. p. 
261. 
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The second explanation for having reservations in the usage of the terminology "legislative" at 
the current stage of my thesis is that it can easily be confused by the legislative processes of 
sovereign national governments. The legislative process of the sovereign national governments is 
the main source of the binding laws for its constituents. Whilst the norm-making process adopted 
by the IOs results in non-binding norms for its members, if the member voluntarily commits to 
the IO, then the non-binding norms become binding for that specific member. So it would be 
misleading to take the legislative process of national governments and IOs as the same.
76
 
In the realm of IOs, norms are created (both types, binding and non-binding) through different 
forms of bodies, be they plenary (and composed of representatives of member states or of private 
individuals) or of limited composition, which gives the vague effect of a legislative process at 
global level. To explore the way in which the IOs perform their normative functions, the 
following part of the chapter will focus on the procedural aspect of the legislative or the 
normative process, the types of normative acts along with their legal effect and lastly, the 
requisite legality of such acts.
77
 
(1)  Procedural Aspects:78 
In all IOs, the approval of normative acts is dealt with through explicit procedural rules. 
Conformity with such procedural rules is a vital requirement for the legality of these acts.
79
 The 
                                                 
76
 Sands, P., Klein, P. (eds), (2001) ‗Bowett's law of International Institutions‘, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed. 
p.262. 
77
 Sands, P., Klein, P. (eds), (2001) ‗Bowett's law of International Institutions‘, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed. 
78
 Sands, P., Klein, P. (eds), (2001) ‗Bowett's law of International Institutions‘, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed. 
79
 Validity also depends on the satisfaction of requirements relating to substance. For example, Article 18(3) of UN 
Charter for the General Assembly [Article 18 allows one vote to each state the UN General Assembly. Section 2 
―Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members 
present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international 
peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members 
of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with 
paragraph 1 (c) of Article 86, the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and 
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procedure to adopt norms generally differs between IOs; however, in most cases, the norms have 
to be accepted either by the consensus of the members
80
 or a majority vote, or via a weighted 
voting system
81
. The base line in the procedural aspect of norm-making is that it should take into 
consideration the consent of its constituents.
82
 
(2) Types of Acts and Legal Effects83 
A vast range of institutional acts are adopted by or within IOs which may be achieved as the 
consequence of exercising the IOs‘ legislative or normative function. In this context, the basic 
difference should be clarified at this stage between the roles of the IO; as a forum for the taking 
up of multilateral conventions on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the role whereby it makes 
norms for itself. 
                                                                                                                                                             
privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, 
and budgetary questions.‖ And section 3 ―Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional 
categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present 
and voting.‖  
80
 The UN defines consensus as the ―adoption of a decision without formal objections and vote; this being 
possible only when no delegation formally objects to a consensus being recorded, though some delegations may 
have reservations to the substantive issue at issue or a part of it‖ (definition proposed by the UN Office of Legal 
Affairs, UNJY 1987, 174). 
81
 Weighted voting, Majority requirement. It also reflects the political situation at the time of creation of the 
organisation. See, Virally, M. (1968) 'The Sources of International Law', Manual of Public International Law, 
Editor: Sorensen, M. 
82
 The decisions made in the International organisations are based mostly on consensus amongst all parties as 
opposed to one that is forced through a vote. A direct result of this is that all the options are discussed and debates 
are conducted and the result is reached with everyone‘s consent. As a consequence, it is common to come across one 
or more of the Member States to disagree with the results, but the decision is not opposed for their own motives. 
However, many a time, most principal agreements of International Organisations are made through majority vote in 
the event the member states fail to agree to one outcome. See for example, WTO Agreement, Art. IX.1. The latter 
provision states that, ―[e]xcept as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter 
at issue shall be decided by voting.‖ However, the practice in the WTO is that a vote is never taken: see Wouters, J. 
and De Meester, B. (2007) ‗The World Trade Organization: A Legal and Institutional Analysis‘, International Law, 
Vol. I, Antwerp, Intersentia. See also, for the difference between ‗passive consensus‘ and ‗active consensus‘ in the 
WTO, Footer, M. (2005) ‗An Institutional and Normative Analysis of the World Trade Organization‘, The Hague, 
Nijhoff, p. 138–139. Also see, Wouters, J. and De Man, P. (March 2009) ‗International Organizations As Law-
Makers‘, Working Paper No. 21, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies. 
83
 Sands, P., Klein, P. (eds), (2001) ‗Bowett's law of International Institutions‘, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed. 
p 275. 
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(a) IOs as a forum for the adoption of multilateral 
conventions 
It has been noted that IOs often act as a forum for the adoption of multilateral conventions.
84
 IOs 
arrange a number of conferences in order to tackle specific issues or for the resolution of 
problems under discussion within those IOs‘ areas of speciality. Many of these conferences 
organised by IOs result in the taking up of multilateral treaties in the context of those specific 
issues discussed in conferences.
85
 
Though international relations have mostly now been institutionalised
86
, the practice of adopting 
treaties from the conferences has not ended. On the contrary, many constituent instruments of the 
IOs have been formed as a result of a multilateral convention on a specific issue. For example, 
Article 62(3) of the UN Charter states that the Economic and Social Council [hereinafter 
ECOSOC] “may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, with respect 
to matters falling within its competence.” Relying on the above-mentioned Article of the UN 
Charter, the ECOSOC prepared drafts for conventions such as the Covenants on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against 
Torture which were passed by the UN General Assembly in 1966, 1966 and 1984 respectively.
87
 
Similar provision can be found in the constituent instruments of some regional organisations, 
such as the Council of Europe
88
. Article 1 (a and b respectively) of the Statute of the Council of 
                                                 
84
 Sands, P., Klein, P. (eds), (2001) ‗Bowett's law of International Institutions‘, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed. p 
275. 
85
 See, for example, the Final Act of The Hague Peace Conference, (1899) Available at 
[http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/145?OpenDocument].   
86
 By institutionalization of international relations I mean that in current international relation scenario a number of 
international institutions exist in most of the concerned area of international relations.  
87
 Sands, P., Klein, P. (eds), (2001) ‗Bowett's law of International Institutions‘, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed. 
p 276. 
88
 The Council of Europe is an IO working towards European integration, having been founded in 1949. It has a 
particular emphasis on legal standards, human rights, democratic development, the rule of law and cultural co-
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Europe states ―The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its 
members” and “This aim shall be pursued through the organs of the Council by discussion of 
questions of common concern and by agreements and common action in economic, social, 
cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters‖89 Since its creation, it has concluded more 
than 200 conventions including some well know conventions such as the European Convention 
on Human Rights (1950)
90
. In short, it is considered that the multilateral conventions held by IOs 
are a significant platform for states to legislate on an international level.
91
 
According to the Vienna Convention (1969), conventions enjoy the status of being ordinary 
multilateral treaties,
92
 and these conventions are of a binding nature for those states which agree 
to be part of these treaties.
93
 However, this whole process of making multilateral treaties based 
on conventions held by the IOs is most commonly referred to by some scholars as “not real law-
making by IOs but rather the preparation of inter-state law-making within an IO.”94 
(b) Institutional Acts Adopted by IOs 
These are the institutional, normative acts through which the IOs operate in their specialised 
fields to accomplish the purpose of their creation. These norms may endeavour to standardise the 
action of its constituent members in accordance with the prevailing international legal order, or 
in some cases, within national legal orders where the IO is a specialised institution in a specific 
                                                                                                                                                             
operation. It has 47 member states with some 800 million citizens. It is distinct from the European Union (EU). 
http://www.coe.int/ 
89
 Available at [http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/001.htm] 
90
Available at [http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=005&CL=ENG] 
91
 Here I am talking about intergovernmental organisations. Sands, P., and Klein, P. (eds), (2001) ‗Bowett's law of 
International Institutions‘, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed. p 277. 
92
 Article 5 of Vienna Convention, (1969), Available at 
[http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf] 
 
93
 Sands, P., Klein, P. (eds), (2001) ‗Bowett's law of International Institutions‘, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed. p 
277. 
94Sommer, J. (1996) ‗Environmental Law-Making by International Organisations‘, Max-Planck-Institut für 
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, p. 638. See also Sands, P., and Klein, P. (eds), (2001) ‗Bowett's 
law of International Institutions‘, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed. p 277. 
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area. In any case, the main aim of the majority of institutional or normative acts is to ensure the 
working of the organisation itself, as it not always the main treaty or convention which created 
the IO which contains all the detailed rules for the operation of the IO.
95
 
However, in the case of institutional acts affecting others outside the IO‘s legal domain, the 
scope to do so is quite limited. Large numbers of scholars agree that any act of an IO affecting 
those outside its legal order requires to be embodied explicitly in the constituent treaty 
instrument which formed the IO and cannot be implied.
96
 
It has been noted that although the normative acts of the IOs are mostly consultative in nature in 
the context of acts affecting others beyond its internal matters, sometimes IOs make these acts 
practically binding on its members. For example, the IMF attaches conditions when funding a 
member who is in financial distress. Theoretically, these conditionalities are not binding on 
members and are merely suggestions but practically, they turn out to be binding. As the member 
country is financially distressed and vulnerable, it accepts the IMF‘s conditions in order to obtain 
funding, which is vital for that member at that stage.  
Moreover, in the past, the IMF has bound its members with institutional acts which were not 
binding on the IMF itself; for example, in 1971, when the system of exchange rate stability was 
destroyed and a new system of floating exchange rate system was introduced. To make it binding 
on its members, the IMF needed to revise its Article of Agreement (however, it was thought that 
                                                 
95
 See generally, Skubiszewski, K. (1985) ‗The Elaboration of General Multilateral Conventions and of Non-
Contractual Instruments having a Normative Function or Objective‘, Resolutions of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, 61 A.I.D.I. 30. And also, Sands, P., and Klein, P. (eds), (2001) ‗Bowett's law of International 
Institutions‘, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed. p 279. 
96
  Schermers, Henry G. and Blokker, Niels M. (1995) ‗International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity‘, 3rd 
ed, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, para. 1320.  
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it was too premature to revise the Article) but nevertheless, the Executive Directors of the IMF 
adopted the guidelines for a new exchange rate regime.
97
 
In theory these guidelines were not binding; however, practically they served as regulations until 
the amendment of Article IV of the Agreement in 1976.
98
  Even after the formal amendment, the 
Executive Directors were given powers to take up "principles"
99
 with binding effect in order to 
achieve the purpose of its creation.  
Furthermore, sometimes the normative institutional acts adopted by the IOs in the form of 
suggestions could have a binding effect on its constituents if the act concerned is part of 
customary international law.
100
 The acts are generally well-accepted customary international 
law
101
 and are simply a reaffirmation of existing customary norms of international law.
102
 These 
institutional acts remain binding, though enunciated in a non-mandatory instrument. 
(3) Legality of Institutional Acts 
IOs may put into effect the powers which have been authorised to them by their members. 
However, there are limitations to the usage of those powers, i.e. IOs can only use their authority 
within the parameters defined by its members, and it only relates to the performance of the 
                                                 
97
  Sands, P., and Klein, P. (eds), (2001) ‗Bowett's law of International Institutions‘, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th 
ed. p 288. 
98
 Sands, P., and Klein, P. (eds), (2001) ‗Bowett's law of International Institutions‘, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th 
ed. p 288. 
99
 IMF Executive Directors decision on ‗Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies‘, (1977), 6 IMF Survey p. 131. 
100
  See generally, Virally, M. (1968) 'The Sources of International Law', Manual of Public International Law, 
Editor: Sorensen, M. p. 259 and Schermers, Henry G. and Blokker, Niels M. (1995) ‗International Institutional Law: 
Unity within Diversity‘, 3rd ed, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, para. 1339; also see, Alexandrovicz, 
Charles H., (1973) ‗The Law-making Functions of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations‘, Angus and 
Robertson, Sydney, p. 8-9. 
101
 Such as, a rule of customary law in IO is that ―abstentions do not affect the concurring votes of the permanent 
members of the UN Security Council.‖ For detail see, Schermers, Henry G. and Blokker, Niels M. (1995) 
‗International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity‘, 3rd ed, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, para. 821 
and 1399. 
102
 Sapiro, M. (1995) ‗Changing the CSCE into the OSCE: Legal Aspects of a Political Transformation‘, American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 89, p. 631-2. 
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functions which are assigned to them.
103
 This means the IOs can only perform legislative or 
normative functions within the parameters laid down by its members.  In other words, all the 
institutional acts performed by the IO will only be valid and have a legal effect if they are in 
accordance with the organisational rules set by the members.
104
 This concept of the legality of 
institutional acts is applicable to all acts within the IO and in the international or domestic legal 
order.
105
 
In addition, all institutional acts should comply substantively with the objectives of the 
organisation and those acts which do not act in accordance with the substance of the creation of 
the IO are substantively illegal.
106
 However, some authors think that before terming an act 
‗illegal‘, it should also be assessed in view of the subsequent practice.107 Furthermore, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and European Court of Justice (ECJ) assert that institutional 
acts should be in accordance with the rules of the procedure. This assertion aims to bring 
stability to international relations by giving a greater level of certainty to the acts of 
intergovernmental organisations.
108
 
b)   Executive and administrative authority 
The efficacy of an IO would remain limited if its powers were curtailed to the production of 
norm. The real effectiveness of an IO lies in the execution and implementation of institutional 
                                                 
103
 Franck, Thomas M. (1992) ‗The Powers of Appreciation: Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?‘ 
American Journal of International Law, p. 520. 
104
 M Virally 'The Sources of International Law' in Max Sorensen (ed) Manual of Public International Law (1968). 
p246 
105
 Sands, P., and Klein, P. (eds), (2001) ‗Bowett's law of International Institutions‘, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th 
ed. p 292. 
106
 Sands, P., and Klein, P. (eds), (2001) ‗Bowett's law of International Institutions‘, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th 
ed. p 295. 
107
 See generally, Morgenstern, F., (1966-77) ‗Legality in International Organization‘, 48 British Year Book of 
International Law. (EXAMPLE) 
108
 Thierry, H., (1980) ―Les resolutions des organes internationaux dans la jurisprudence de la Cour internationale de 
Justice,‖ Recueil des Cours de l'Academie de Droit International de La Haye Vol. 167, p 423, as sited in Sands, P., 
and Klein, P. (eds), (2001) ‗Bowett's law of International Institutions‘, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed. p 296. 
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acts.
109
 For instance, if the implementation and the execution of institutional acts are left only to 
the members, and the members do not implement the required measures, then that IO effectively 
becomes useless. Thus, to make the implementation and execution of institutional acts effective, 
IOs need to be empowered with executive and administrative authority.  
The executive and administrative authorities of the IOs are again bound by the concept of 
legality. It aims to empower them to be able to provide assistance and supervision to members 
for the implementation of institutional acts and, in some cases, also empowers the IOs to exercise 
sanctions.
110
 These powers are vital for the implementation of the decisions of IOs so that they 
can function smoothly and achieve their goals. This aspect of the IOs‘ function is quite important 
and thus all IOs have a proper institutional structure with an administrative organ, or Secretariat, 
which has the central position in the management of the organisation and its activities.
111
 
Through this institutional structure, the IOs perform their executive or administrative functions 
so that they can manage the realisation of institutional acts and the supervision of compliance 
with those acts by the members.
112
 
IOs are nowadays engaged in much wider activities at both regional and global levels. Their 
constituent treaties and normative acts focus more on creating technical standards (such as postal 
standards), promoting peace (for example, through the framework of the UN), encouraging the  
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setting of minimum standards of behaviour (such as human rights and environment protection), 
endorsing the environment for economic development (for example, through supporting trade, 
competition and intellectual property rights), and also extending financial support (such as 
through the multilateral development banks and the IMF).
113
 
The development and promotion of global standards and rules in specific fields is mainly 
dominated by the IOs. Even though, in almost every field, standards and codes are formed by 
IOs, these standards and codes would be useless if there did not exist a system for their 
execution. Thus, an extremely important executive function of the IOs is that which is mostly 
focused on the execution, through compliance, of the standards set by IOs. Overseeing the 
compliance of standards and codes is taken into account as one of the most important functions 
of an IO.
114
 
There are no hard and fast rules regarding the overseeing authority of IOs. The way an IO 
oversees compliance with its created standard and codes depends upon the authority awarded to 
it by the treaty which created it, and by the subsequent practices adopted for this purpose. 
Generally, the overseeing authority of IOs is observed in the following forms: (i) formation and 
supervision of reporting obligation; (ii) information collection in the context of compliance; (iii) 
examination of activities; and (iv), in the case of non-compliance, implementation via different 
methods, such as, suspension of membership, sanctions, and judicial means. 
(1) REPORTING 
Generally, most of the IOs require their members to report them regarding the status of its 
compliance with standards and codes created by that IO. For example, the Trade Policy Review 
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Mechanism (TPRM) of the WTO obligates its members to submit a report to the Trade Policy 
Review Body (TPRB) for review. This report relates to all the trade practices and policies of the 
member country which are subject to the WTO Agreement.
115
 
The IMF is also a good example of an IEI in the context of surveillance. It obligates its 
membership, under Article VIII (5), to immediately inform it of any changes in exchange 
arrangements under Article IV (1).
116
 
(2) Fact finding, information collection and 
surveillance
117
 
Besides a self-initiated compliance report tendered by the members of the IO with regard to its 
commitments to the IO, IOs may gather information relating to members‘ compliance through 
different means. This authority to collect information can either be expressed or implied in the 
constituent instrument of the IO.   
IOs which are expressly empowered by their constituent treaty to collect information can obtain 
information straight from its membership. A good example of this is the UN Security Council. 
Under Article 34 of the UN Charter, the UN can obtain information in the case of a dispute or 
circumstances leading to dispute.
118
 However, Article 34 is invoked very infrequently;
119
 this is 
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because the UN requires all permanent members of the Security Council to give their approval 
for investigation. On the other hand, under implied powers, the UN General Assembly and the 
Secretary-General can ask for information from any member.
120
 
 
This practice of collecting information can also be found in IEIs, such as the WTO and the IMF. 
Both of these IOs are expressly empowered to monitor their members‘ activities in areas of 
concern. The WTO, for example, can monitor its members‘ trade policies under Article 21.5 and 
21.6 of the DSU.
121
 On the other hand, the IMF under Article lV(3) of its Articles of Agreement 
needs to conduct firm surveillance of its members‘ activities: "firm surveillances over its 
members exchange rate policies, and to adopt specific principles for the guidance of all members 
with respect to those policies. To that end each member is required to provide the IMF with the 
information necessary for such surveillance, and, when requested by the IMF, to consult with it 
on the members‟ exchange rate policies.”122 
(3) Examination / inspection  
Inspection is one step ahead of information collection as it is involves relatively more 
interference with the member countries‘ jurisdiction. In this process, the IO itself obtains facts 
directly. As inspection is intrusive in nature, its usage is quite limited and mostly leads to 
controversial debate. One common example of an IEI inspecting its members‘ territory directly is 
that of the World Bank. However, the inspecting panel might obtain the consent of the member 
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concerned. World Bank-led inspections are mostly related to investigations into the performance 
of the member country concerned in the context of projects it has financed.
123
 
(4) Enforcement powers 
 
No doubt the supervisory role of IOs is most frequently in operation and is of significant 
importance.  However, if a member is still not complying with the commitment which it made 
with the IO, then in some cases, IOs are empowered which the authority to force the member to 
comply.
124
 IOs can enforce their members‘ compliance by opting for coercive action, in order to 
guarantee the realisation of commitments owed to it by its members.
125
 Such action may be 
comprised of judicial (or quasi-judicial) measures, cultural and communication restraints, 
diplomatic and political pressure, economic and trade restrictions, and lastly, military 
measures.
126
 
c) Judicial and quasi-judicial functioning 
There are a number of ways available to resolve international disputes involving states and other 
actors within the international community. In this context, the UN has made an effort to put 
forward some peaceful means of settling disputes. Article 33 of the UN charter states some of 
these dispute settlement methods, which include negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
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arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or any other 
nonviolent channels from which the members concerned may choose.  
All of the peaceful methods available can be split into two main types: diplomatic and legal. 
Means of diplomatically-solving disputes can most commonly be subdivided into negotiation, 
consultation, mediation, conciliation, and inquiry. One important point to be considered with 
regards to using diplomatic means is that the parties to the dispute have the control to enable 
them to solve the dispute themselves, as compared to legal means in which dispute-solving 
authority is given to a third party whose decision is binding on both parties. Arbitration and 
judicial settlement are the most common ways to legally solve disputes. 
127
 
Dispute settlement will be discussed in detail later in this thesis.
128
 However, this thesis will 
focus more on international disputes settlement relating to the global economy. 
B. Mechanism/process through which IEIs strive to achieve more 
stable and balanced growth within IELR  
As shown in the figure at the beginning of this chapter, the IEIs act on the economic framework 
to achieve stable and balanced economic growth in the global economy. The mechanism through 
which these IEIs achieve the outcomes of the IELR can be explained via two pathways. These 
are the international institutional framework and the international legal framework based on IR 
and IL respectively. This part of the chapter will shed light on these pathways and the 
international economic framework on which these two operate.   
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1.  International Institutional Framework 
The IELR has evolved into an effective de facto international regime 
129
which significantly 
affects and controls the international economic activities of sovereign states. Interestingly, the 
main non-state constituents of this regime, such as IEIs, have a de jure standing with a small 
regime effect on its constituents. The cumulative effect of these de jure IEIs, due to cooperation 
and coordination with each other (including their constituents), has resulted in a de facto regime 
at international level.  
 
This synthesis of the small regimes of IEIs resulting in a bigger de facto regime can be 
understood through the international institutional framework of the IELR. This subheading of the 
theoretical framework discusses this institutional framework of the IELR and its main non-state 
constituents. For this purpose, this subheading will look into the meaning of the term ‗IEI‘s in 
this thesis and the theoretical approaches towards the IELR based on the theories of IR.
130
  
The two theories which best explain these phenomena of the IELR are Institutionalism and the 
regime theory. Institutionalism provides an explanation for the existence of IEIs which is the 
justification of the IELR at micro level. On the other hand, regime theory explains the existence 
of the IELR at macro level. 
                                                 
129
 The reason to refer IELR as a de facto regime is that it evolved in result of formation of other smaller regimes 
which were created with the intension to regulate specific area.  
130
 See, Chapter I: Managing Systemic Risk, The rational for International financial regulations, in Alexander, Kern, 
Dhumale, Rahul, and, Eatwell, John, (2005). ‗Global Governance of Financial Systems, The International 
Regulation of Systemic Risk.‘ Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007, p14. It argues that 
institutional framework is essential for standard setting and rule-making which comply with principles of global 
governance.  
Rao Raza Hashim 
54 
School Of Law 
University Of Warwick 
a) Institutionalism 
The first approach to the IELR is based on the theory of Institutionalism, based on international 
relations
131
, which endeavours to solve the problems of state behaviour in the context of the 
IELR. Institutionalism is based on the concept that norms, rules, principles and an adjudicating 
process at international level can reduce the effect of anarchy at global level and it further 
encourages states to cooperate with each other in order to achieve common goals. According to 
this theory, international institutions form an international regime through cooperation, in the 
pursuit of common ends.
132
 
The basic assumptions of Institutionalism are as follows
133
: 
1) States are the key actors in the international system. 
2) States tend to strive for power in the absence of institutions. 
3) Anarchy at international level can be modified through the institutions as 
they encourage states to cooperate in the long term in pursuit of the common 
interest. 
Institutionalism is based on the concept of cooperation which explains how states cooperate to 
achieve common ends. The cooperative behaviour of states can be better explained if we 
understand the three pathways through which states achieve cooperation amongst themselves. 
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The pathways or dimensions for cooperation are: substantive content; participation; and 
legalization.
134
 
The stance in this theory is that states understand that if they cooperate, they benefit.
135
However, 
the major hurdle in their cooperation is a lack of information which leads to uncertainty 
regarding the issue(s) on which cooperation is needed.
136
To overcome this hurdle in cooperation, 
scholars have identified three cooperative pathways to achieve effective cooperation.
137
  The 
success in achieving effective cooperation is attributed to two of the basic features of the 
cooperative pathways/dimensions (framework conventions, plurilateral, and soft law). Firstly, 
states have full freedom to limit their commitment level of cooperation; in other words, 
cooperation theory allows states to commit only to those things of which they are certain. 
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Prisoner‘s Dilemma game  Player 2  
  Cooperate Defect 
Player 1  Cooperate (4,4) (0.5, 6) 
 Defect  (6, 0.5) (1, 1) 
 
 
 However, the in international cooperation it is not always as we encounter prisoner‘s dilemma and that there are 
many other factors involved. Thus this thesis doesn‘t take Prisoner‘s dilemma as primary bases for cooperation. For 
further discussion about the prisoner‘s dilemma in the international institutional analysis see, Snidal, D. (Dec. 1985) 
‗Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes‘, The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 79, No. 4, p. 923-942.  
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Secondly, it allows states to commit further once they are comfortable with their previous 
commitment level (i.e. a progressive commitment process is followed in this approach).
138
 
Characteristics of dimensions for cooperation 
The first of the three characteristics of state cooperation is substantive content. According to this 
characteristic, the reason for cooperation and the level of commitment (i.e. what states actually 
agree to commit to in relation to the issue under discussion) is very important. The substance 
matter for cooperation should be of mutual interest, and cooperation the most rational solution to 
that issue. This is because cooperation is only possible if all parties involved in the process 
benefit from it. Moreover, a legally binding agreement is not required for cooperation if the 
subject under discussion is of high importance (such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, etc.).
139
 
The second characteristic is broad participation. Some issues require an adequate number of 
states to take part in the cooperation process so as to reap the benefits from it. Thus, in order to 
solve the issue, all the affected parties need to cooperate. For instance, issues relating to global 
environmental problems need broad participation from the states.  
The third characteristic is international legalization.
140
In this pathway for cooperation, the states 
try to legalize their cooperation process by tying themselves to cooperate. This international 
legalization process has three important characteristics which significantly lead to effective 
cooperation. These characteristics are: obligation, precision, and delegation. Obligation, here, 
denotes that states have agreed to bind themselves by certain rule(s) or commitment(s). These 
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rule(s) or commitment(s) have a legal effect on the states, that is, their acts are subject to scrutiny 
and can be questioned under the general rules, procedures, and discourse of both international 
and national law. Precision, here, means that rules or commitments must be clear cut and they 
should precisely elaborate the behaviour these rules or commitments entail, allow, or 
recommend. Delegation means that the states have agreed and bound themselves to empower 
third parties to implement, interpret, and apply the rules, to adjudicate their disputes and in 
addition, create new rules in this delegation process.
141
 
 
Three types of pathway towards cooperation
142
 
The first pathway is the Framework Convention. According to this approach, cooperation starts 
with an agreement which is moderately legalized and is adequately participated in, one which 
involves shallow substantive commitments which deepen in the long run. This type of 
cooperation is needed in which broad participation is key to reaping the benefits from the 
cooperation process. An example of an area in which such cooperation is required is the 
international environment-related laws. 
143
 
The next pathway towards cooperation is Plurilateral which involves highly-legalized deep, 
substantive commitments with limited participation but where participation increases over the 
long term. The best example is of the EU, which started with limited membership and now has a 
huge membership.
144
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The last pathway used by states for cooperation is through Soft law. According to this pathway, 
cooperation starts with broad participation and high substantive commitments but is weakly 
legalized. However, in the longer term, the legalization aspect increases. 
145
 
The table below illustrates the ideal types of pathways for international cooperation.
146
 
Table 1 
Pathways Substantive 
Content  
Participation  legalization Long Run 
Framework 
Convention 
Shallow Broad Moderated Substantive 
Content 
deepens 
Plurilateral Deep Limited Strong Participation 
expands 
Soft Law Deep Broad Weak Legalization 
strengthens  
 
The base line in the cooperative pathways is that they all lead to international cooperation. 
However, deciding which pathway to start with depends on the type of issues involved for which 
cooperation is needed.  
b) Regime theory 
The last theory to explain the phenomena of the IELR is the Regime theory in IR. This theory 
gained momentum in the 1970s with the purpose to analyse the ability of the US to sustain the 
economic regime formed after WWII. There are many approaches towards regime analysis; 
however, the regime theories can be divided into three broad schools of thought. They are 
liberalism, realism and constructivism. This subheading will discuss these different approaches 
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and then conclude which of these approaches best explains the IELR. However, before moving 
on to the above-mentioned discussion, this subheading will first explain regime terminology and 
its essential features.    
There is no straightforward explanation of what make up a regime and there are numerous 
different definitions by many scholars identifying those elements essential for a regime. 
However, the definition formulated by Krasner has been significantly accepted by many regime 
theorists.
147
 Krasner defines international regimes as “principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures
148
 around which actor expectations converge
149
 in a given issue-area.
”150
 
This definition by Krasner comes quite close to explaining the regime concept used in this thesis. 
The“principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures” of the global economy (“issue-
area”) result mostly from the institutional role played by the IEIs. Furthermore, the expectations 
of its constituents converge around this institutional role. In other words, by employing 
Krasner‘s definition and the concept of IELR in this thesis, it could be said that the principles, 
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures (in result of the institutional role of the IEIs) 
around which actors (subjects of IELR) expectations converge (due to certainty and 
predictability of the rules of the game) in a given issue-area (global economy).   
This definition is a great help, but to understand the concept and the correct approach towards 
regimes used in this thesis, we need to discuss the different approaches to regime analysis, and as 
such the following highlights different approaches towards regimes.  
                                                 
147
 Such as, John G. Ruggie, 'International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends, ' International 
Organization (V. 29, N. 3, Summer 1975), p. 570.  And, Marc A. Levy, Young and Michael Zürn, 'The Study of 
International Regimes, ' IIASA Working Paper WP-94-113 (November 1994), p. 6.  
148―Principles, norms, rules, and decision-making‖ points to the certainty of the rules of the game. 
149―[A]ctor expectations converge‖ point outs the predictability of the rules of the game aspect of a regime. 
150
 Krasner, Stephen D. (1982) ‗Foundation Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables‘, International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, p.185-205 
Rao Raza Hashim 
60 
School Of Law 
University Of Warwick 
(1)  Realist Approach 
The first approach to discuss is the realist approach. The realist stance towards international 
regimes is along these lines: the hegemon or dominant power forms a hegemonic system of itself 
and controls the essential principles, norms, rules and decision-making processes of the system; 
the strength of the hegemon or dominant power is an essential condition for other countries to 
acknowledge the formation of an international regime; the hegemon or dominant power retains 
its hegemonic system and makes the best of its dominant position by extracting maximum  
benefit from regimes; the weakening or decay of the hegemon or dominant power will result in 
changes to the international regimes of the hegemonic system.
151
 
This thesis does not approach the concept of regimes from the realist viewpoint. The reasons are 
discussed below in the form of critiques on the realist insight into regime.
152
 
Firstly, the realist thinks that the existence of a hegemon
153
 is an essential pre-requisite for an 
international regime. In the view of realists, the hegemon or the dominant power is the creator 
and sustainer of international regimes. Most of the current international regimes were formed 
shortly after World War II. In these regimes, the US was the hegemon and it has done a lot to 
sustain the existing international regimes. However, it cannot be correct to assume that 
international regimes can neither be formed nor sustained without a hegemon. Robert Keohane 
offers the best analysis in this respect. One of his books entitled After Hegemony: Cooperation 
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and Discord in the World Political Economy is based on the critique of Hegemonic Stability 
Theory (realist approach).
154
 Keohane admits the hegemon‘s role in regime creation, but 
contends that a regime can be made even without a hegemon. In fact, hegemony can assist some 
kind of cooperation, but hegemony is not at all an essential requirement for cooperation. 
Cooperation does not essentially need the presence of a hegemon once international regimes 
have been created; furthermore, post-hegemonic cooperation is also possible (discussed 
below).
155
 
The reason for cooperation without a hegemonic power is that international regimes provide 
important information and reduce transaction cost.
156
 
Secondly, the realist does not take the international regime as an independent variable. The 
realist considers power channels as the only, and vital variable in the international system. 
However, international regimes are considered a superseding variable based on state power.
157
 
Therefore, the regime itself is not an independent variable. There are two flaws in this realist 
argument. Firstly, as stated above, regimes are not always dependent on hegemonic power and 
can survive without it, which means that the international regime can contain a power structure 
within it or perhaps become a central part of an independent power structure. Keohane‘s study of 
the link between American dominance and international regimes since the 1970s can confirm 
this argument. Secondly, the international regime can be regarded as an information-providing 
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 Keohane, Robert O. (1984) ‗After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy‘, 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.100.   
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 Ibid p.31. Also see, Honghua, M. ‗Critiques of the Theory of International Regimes: The Viewpoints of Main 
Western Schools of Thought‘, Institute of International Strategic Studies, China‘s Central Party School. 
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 Keohane, Robert O. (1984) ‗After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy‘, 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.124-125 
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Rao Raza Hashim 
62 
School Of Law 
University Of Warwick 
and transaction cost-reducing body with a life of its own.
158
 Therefore, in reality, international 
regimes should be considered as an independent variable in the global economic scenario.   
The realist approach does not explain the future of international cooperation without hegemony. 
The reason why the realist approach cannot clearly explain the change of international economic 
regimes is because it did not consider the international institutions‘ role in cooperation 
realisation and improvement. Keohane contends that hegemonic cooperation is not the only 
thinkable method of cooperation and in reality, post-hegemonic cooperation does exist.
159
 
The latest example of cooperation in the global economy, in the context of financial crisis, 
resulted in the creation of the Financial Stability Board.  The reason for post-hegemonic 
cooperation is that it decreases the cost of transaction and uncertainty, and provides principles. 
Both hegemony and international regimes can contribute to cooperation, but neither one is a 
necessary or sufficient condition.
160
 
(2) Liberal Approach 
Liberalism or liberal institutionalism is the approach adopted in this thesis to understand the 
IELR concept. This approach shares some common assumptions with the realist approach 
towards the international regime; for example, states operate in an anarchic international system, 
states create regimes, regimes are established on the bases of cooperation and they promote 
international order.
161
  See the table below for a better understanding.  
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The regime theory of liberalism (or liberal institutionalism) represents the widely-held approach 
to examining international regimes. It is based on rationalism. Its basic statements are as follows: 
states are selfish, goal-seeking participants whose actions are aimed to maximise their own  
utility; it acknowledges power‘s role in international regimes, but regards international regimes 
as an independent variable in international relations; states can realise common interests in 
certain issue-areas only by cooperation; regimes are developed because participants of the global 
political scenario are convinced that with such setup they can get into mutually advantageous 
agreements that would else be hard or impractical to reach.
162
 
Table 2 
Liberal Institutionalists vs. Realist approach to the analysis of regime
163
 
Common Assumptions 
1) States operate in anarchic international system  
2) States creates regimes. 
3) Regimes are based on rationalist approach.  
4) Regimes are established on the bases of cooperation.  
5) Regimes promote international order. 
 
Competing Assessment 
Liberal Institutionalists 
1) Regimes promote common good. 
2) Regimes flourish best when 
promoted and maintained by a 
benign hegemon. 
3) Regimes promote globalizations and 
liberal world order.  
Realist 
1) Regimes generate differential 
benefits for states 
2) Power is the central feature of 
regime formation and survival. 
3) The nature of world order depends 
on the underlying principles and 
norms of regimes.  
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 Keohane, R., (1989) ‗International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory‘, 
Boulder: Westview Press, p.108. See also, Honghua, M. ‗Critiques of the Theory of International Regimes: The 
Viewpoints of Main Western Schools of Thought‘, Institute of International Strategic Studies, China‘s Central Party 
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According to this approach, the international regime as an arrangement of international 
orderliness is a significant factor of self-interest. That is, a rational state will always calculate its 
own interest or benefit in any of its international dealings. Thus, when a rational state commits 
itself to cooperate with other states, even though the cooperative arrangement is not the most 
optimal decision, it does so because the states are not in isolation and are highly interdependent 
in this globalised world and can benefit most if they cooperate. In other words, in some 
situations, the self-interested calculations of states result in a collective decisive process rather 
than an independent one.
164
 These collective decision-making processes lead to the formation of 
regimes in which sovereign nations, for the sake of their own interest, logically relinquish 
independent decision-making and opt to form regimes.
165
 
Robert O. Keohane uses the rational choice theory
166
 (based on rational functionalism)
167
 to 
explain and develop a theoretical framework which raises the basic questions of why, and under 
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 See Snidal, D., (2002) ‗Rational Choice and International Relations‘, The Handbook of International Relations, 
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Law and Future Environmental Cooperation in the Middle East‘, Denv. J. Int‘l L. & Pol‘y, Vol. 27, p. 75, 80.  
The Rational Choice Theory is based upon the assumption that the driving force behind people‘s actions is money 
and the desire to make a profit and it therefore manages to construct a proper model that depicts the actions of 
people based upon forecasting. It states that an intricate set of collective actions can be determined by the basic acts 
of single entities that comprises them. This is called ‗methodological individualism‘, and it states that: 'The 
elementary unit of social life is the individual human action. To explain social institutions and social change is to 
show how they arise as the result of the action and interaction of individuals' (Elster, J. Ed. (1986). ‗Rational 
Choice‘, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.)  
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what conditions international regimes should be formed and then gain strength.  He examines 
international regime creation within a constraint-choice framework and highlights two factors: 
the deficiency of authoritative governmental institutions in world politics and uncertainty. 
Therefore, in order to prevent things leading to a "war of all against all‖ due to the condition of 
anarchy, the main rationale of international regimes is to assist the states in forming mutually 
advantageous agreements. 
168
 
Moreover, Keohane tries to answer the question: is it beneficial to form regimes? Why is it not 
more efficient simply to avoid the regime stage and make agreements on an ad hoc basis? This is 
answered by the theories of "market failure" in economics
169
. However, Keohane explains the 
need for international regimes is due to the existence of two main factors: transactions cost and 
informational imperfections.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Rational choice theorists claim that just as economic theories aim to study the system of production, consumption 
and distribution of goods and services using money and markets as instruments, it is also possible to use similar 
tools to analyze situations where time, information, approval and prestige are entailed. 
The actions of individuals are determined by their wants based on their ‗preferences‘, according to rational choice 
theory. There is a certain set of particular restrictions and given information that influences their acts. In a way, 
preferences and constraints have a correlation like that of ‗a means to an end‘ – since individuals cannot fulfill all 
their desires, it becomes significant to study as to how they manage to balance the need to fulfill their needs as well 
as how to do it. Rational choice theory states that an individual would predict the results of various actions and 
decide which one would be most beneficial to it; the opportunity that brings the highest level of fulfillment would be 
a rational individual‘s selection (Carling, A., (1992) ‗ Social Divisions‘, London: Verso, 27; Heath, A., 
(1976) ‗Rational Choice and Social Exchange‘, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3). See also Scott, J. 
(2000) ‗Rational Choice Theory‘, Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of The Present, Editor: Browning, 
G., Halcli, A. and Webster, F., Sage Publications. 
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 This rational/functionalist discourse started with Keohane‘s After Hegemony and Krasner‘s edited volume on 
international regimes. See, Keohane, Robert O. (1984) ‗After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world 
political economy‘, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
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 Keohane, Robert O. (1982) ‗Foundation The Demand for International Regimes‘, International Organisation, 
Vol. 36, No. 2, International Regimes, p.325-355 
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 A scenario where the end result, determined by a market‘s conditions, is not the most favorable one with the 
individuals‘ utility functions and resources as given, is referred to as Market failure. This is a situation in which the 
outcome does not benefit all participants equally. Under such circumstances, these ineffective outcomes come about 
when inept powerful groups affect economic activities as opposed to conditions that would have prevailed under 
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For detailed understanding about market failure see, Arrow, Kenneth J., (1974) ‗Essays in the Theory of Risk-
Bearing‘, New York: North Holland/American Elsevier. 
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He used Ronald Coase‘s theorem to explain the need for the international regimes, i.e., by 
reversing the Coase theorem. In other words, reversed Coase provides a list of circumstances
170
 
in which regimes can assist states to take advantage from cooperation.  This list is:
171
 (a) lack of 
a clear legal framework establishing liability for actions; (b) information imperfections 
(information is costly); (c) positive transactions costs.
172
 
Regime analysis from the Liberal Institutionalist‘s viewpoint is the lens through which this thesis 
perceives the IELR. However, the IELR is a super-regime; its constituents are not only the 
sovereign states. The IEIs (with regime effect) and other transnational actors (such as MNC and 
NGOs) are also part of it. The specific emphasis of this thesis is on the IEIs as the main non-state 
contributors of the IELR.  
Therefore, through the Liberal Institutionalist‘s lens towards the IELR, the rational states 
cooperate with each other to form IEIs which have the effect of regimes, and collectively these 
IEIs form a super-regime at global level with no dominant power. The IELR, through the 
institutional framework of the IEIs, sets out the rules of the game for the global economy which 
results in certainty and the predictability of the actions of its constituents.       
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 Ronald Coase suggested in his theory that it is possible to achieve an economically efficient outcome in the 
presence of externalities – just because externalities exist does not automatically imply that the result would be 
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171
 The system can prove to be beneficial in that, abandoning the assumption that all individuals are interested in 
maximizing utility and working in their own interest, such rules be made that automatically makes it possible for 
actors to integrate these in their utility functions. This would be of immense significance in political as well as 
economic scenarios in the real-world, as Schumpeter, Polanyi, and Hirsch on show in their works based on the moral 
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However, the liberal institutionalist approach has been criticised by the Constructivists
173
.  
Constructivism argues that rationalism is the common nature of realism and liberalism, and this 
approach towards the international regimes is wrong.
174
 The approach put forward by the 
Constructivists better explains the moral values within the IELR
175
, since this aspect has been 
ignored by the both realism and liberalism.
176
 
The next part is dedicated to the international legal framework within the IELR. This is the 
second approach which acts within the international economic framework to better achieve stable 
and balanced growth of the global economy.    
2. International Legal Framework  
By international legal framework, this thesis means the legal framework which exists in the 
world. This legal framework is mostly attributed to the IL and regulates the actions of its 
constituents and creates certainty and predictability within an international system. This thesis 
takes the international legal framework as a result of the IELR. The IEIs, through the 
international legal framework, create certainty and predictability in the international economic 
framework and achieve a more stable and balanced growth of the global economy.  
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 Constructivism puts forward ideas different to traditional theories on international regimes. Firstly, it values the 
roles of subjective factors (such as culture, norms) in the creation and changes of international regimes. Secondly, it 
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The international legal framework can be explained with the help of two theories: legal pluralist 
theory and the theory of legal transplant. This thesis will not go into the detail of these theories 
as the main approach adopted in this thesis is based on the international institutional framework. 
However, the following part will briefly discuss the international legal framework and its 
relevance to this thesis.    
When rules are created by IEIs in their institutional capacities, initially they could be better 
understood with the pluralistic approach. However, once these rules, laws, standards, etc. are 
transplanted into the domestic systems of the sovereign states, then this pluralistic approach 
fades away. This transplantation of rules is sometimes quite controversial since it might be 
backed by forceful conditionalities of the IEIs. Nevertheless, the outcome of this legal transplant 
is mostly harmonised rules, standards, principles, law, etc. in the global economy. 
The next paragraphs are dedicated to the pluralistic approach to rules, laws etc. which resulted 
from the institutional role of IEIs. Then, in the same way, legal transplantation and legal 
harmonization will also be discussed.    
Legal Pluralist approach: In plain words, legal pluralism is the subsistence of more than one 
legal system within a particular territory. Plural legal systems existed mainly in former colonial 
systems, where the law of a former colonial authority subsisted in conjunction with the 
traditional legal system of that colony. During the development of this pluralist legal approach 
within the colonial system, it was common practice for certain types of matters to be dealt with 
by colonial law (such as commercial transactions) and the remaining matters were left to be dealt 
with by the local or traditional laws.
177
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 Michaels, R., (June 29, 2009) ‗Global Legal Pluralism‘, Annual Review of Law & Social Science, Vol. 5, Duke 
Law School Public Law &  Legal Theory Research Paper No. 259. 
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The growing complexity of norms within the international legal scenario makes it inevitable for 
these norms to come into contact with one another and, at times, with national legal orders.
178
 
The interaction of these independent legal orders has become an important factor in defining how 
the global legal system grows.
179
 
Many legal pluralistic scholars compare the international norms as supranational constitutions 
and strive to prove that these norms and rules are getting stronger with rapid 
interdependence.
180
They assert that the significance of a judicial system is of high importance in 
the effective functioning of global pluralistic constitutions. However, effective regimes can exist 
even without a judicial organ such as the IMF and the World Bank.
181
 
An example of a pluralistic approach in the IELR is the WTO‘s legal framework. The WTO‘s 
dispute settlement system decides cases according to the WTO legal framework and not on the 
basis of the domestic laws of sovereign states. Therefore, in this case, the WTO legal framework 
acts as superior legal system over the domestic legal systems of its members. However, both 
systems coexist at the same time.   
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 Walker, N., (2008) ‗Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative 
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pluralism, see Berman, Paul S., (2007) ‗Global Legal Pluralism‘, Southern California Law Review, Vol. 80, p. 1155, 
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 See generally, Stone, A., (2009) ‗Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes‘, Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 16, No.2, p. 621-645; Stone, A., (Summer 1984), ‗What Is a Supranational 
Constitution? An Essay in International Relations Theory‘, The Review of Politics, Vol. 56, No. 3, Special Issue on 
Public Law, p. 441-474; Hongju Koh, H., (2007) ‗Bringing International Law Home,‘ Houston Law Review, Vol. 
35, p. 623, 641-42; Berman, Paul S. (2007) ‗A Pluralist Approach to International Law‘, Yale J. Int'l L., Vol. 32, p. 
301, 322–23. 
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 Regimes facilitate on-going collective action by performing three important functions. First, regimes enable 
states to collectively establish legal rights and obligations, and in doing so, establish "legitimate standards of 
behaviour." Second, regimes lower bargaining costs: institutionalization iterates the game, lowering the cost of 
interaction over time and enhancing the capacities of players to link issues and make side payments. Third, regimes 
reduce uncertainty (information costs), by providing a forum and vocabulary for the signalling of preferences and 
intentions.[ Keohane, Robert O. (1984) ‗After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy‘, 
chapter 6, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; Snidal, D., (1989) ‗The Limits of Hegemonic Stability 
Theory‘, International Organization, Vol. 39, p. 581; see also, Stone, A., (Summer 1984), ‗What is a Supranational 
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Legal Harmonization and Legal Transplant: The main difference between legal transplant and 
legal harmonization is that one involves non-cooperative and the other cooperative adaptation 
processes.
182
 Legal transplant is the unilateral amendment of domestic rules and the adoption of 
rules in the domestic legal system and is more commonly followed by a different legal system (in 
this case, the international system). Legal transplantation reduces or tries to reduce the 
differences between legal systems through the unilateral non-cooperative effort of one system 
(domestic system).
183
 An example of legal transplantation is the soft laws (standards & codes and 
best practices) backed by IMF conditionalities.  
On the other hand, legal harmonization is a bilateral or a multilateral coordination effort by states 
to harmonize their legal systems with each other. In it, states agree on a set of objectives and 
targets and let each state align their domestic laws to achieve the set objectives.
184
 The best 
examples of legal harmonization are the EU and WTO framework of agreements.  
Looking at the IELR from the point of view of the legal pluralistic approach, we make an 
interesting observation: the major challenge caused by the IELR can be understood from a legal 
pluralistic viewpoint, such as the coexistence of a domestic legal system with an international 
legal system.
185
 In other words, the IELR as a result of the interaction of its constituents (main 
non-state constituents such as IEIs, in their institutional capacities) produces international 
economic norms, rules, and laws. This cumulative institutional effect of the IEIs (i.e. IELR) has 
produced a global legal system based on global legal pluralism. This global legal constitution 
which is, to a large extent, incorporated in the domestic legal systems through legal transplant 
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and harmonization brings predictability and certainty of the rules of the game to the global 
economy which then acts as a stimulus for the Economic Cycle.   
3. International Economic Framework  
A well-developed financial sector with an open international trade is an essential element of 
flourishing economies. Finance and trade are connected in a number of ways; however, the 
causality is not always clear.
186
 This part of the chapter endeavours to explain that trade 
expansion relies heavily on the development of a financial system and on the other hand, 
financial sector development can be considerably stimulated with international trade. Moreover, 
it is a known fact that international trade is one of the essential elements of a global economy and 
it has a substantial role in stabilising the economic wellbeing of a country (as growing exports 
can actually help crisis-effected countries to recover from a distressing economic situation).
187
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 There are three views in this context. The first view argues that financial development, which results from 
financial liberalization leads to economic growth [McKinnon, R.I., (1973) ‗Money and Capital in Economic 
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Granger-Causality Testing Of Hypotheses On Supply-Leading And Demand-Following Finance‘, Economic Notes, 
Vol. 23, No. 2, p. 308- 316]. 
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 The topic of export led growth has been enormously discussed by international trade economists and policy 
makers. Many researches have been made to study the effects of exports on the economic growth leading to 
economic stability. [Bahmani-Oskooee, M and Alse, J., (1993) ‗Export Growth and Economic Growth: An 
Application of Cointegrating and Error-Correction Modelling,‘ The Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 27, p. 35-42; 
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This section will try to establish the relationship conceivable in the form of a cycle (―Economic 
Cycle‖) involving financial sector development,188 economic growth, and international trade. In 
addition to forming a relationship, I shall (place heavy emphasis) focus on the possible direction 
of the causality. To that purpose, first of all, this part of the chapter will establish the causality 
between financial sector development and economic growth; second, the causality between 
economic growth and international trade; third, the causality between international trade and 
economic growth. Finally, I shall develop the causality between economic growth and financial 
sector development.  
This thesis then takes the Economic Cycle as a conceivable causal relationship between its 
constituents and analyses the way in which IEIs in their institutional capacity can use this causal 
                                                                                                                                                             
Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence from the ASEAN Countries‘, Economics Letters, Vol. 49, p. 329-334; 
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Taiwan‘, Applied Economic Letters, Vol. 5, p. 699-701; Giles, J. A. and Williams, C. L., (2000a) ‗Export-led 
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M. A. and Karunaratne, N. D., (2004) ‗Export and Economic Growth in Bangladesh: Has Manufacturing Exports 
become a New Engine of Export-Led Growth?‘ International Trade Journal, XVIII, p. 303-334; Tang, T.C., (2006) 
‗Export Led Growth in Hong Kong: Empirical Evidence from the Components of Exports‘, International Journal of 
Business and Society, Vol. 7, p. 30-52, among others]. The impact of export on growth originates from the 
Keynesian growth theory in which economic growth rate is affected by the rate of growth in demand. According to 
it, growth in exports signifies growth in demand, and thus enhancing economic growth. Generally scholars affirms 
that the export-led growth policy support high economic functioning.  
Liwan and Lau, documents that there is notable a direct correlation between export and GDP of all the countries 
(included in their research i.e. Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia). They argue to expand exports in order to increase 
the economic growth rate. As the domestic economy expands it will increase job prospects which raise countries per 
capital earnings and living standard. [Liwan, A. and Lau, E., (2007) ‗Managing Growth: The Role of Export, 
Inflation and Investment in three ASEAN Neighboring Countries‘, MPRA,  Paper No. 3952. Available at 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3952/] 
188
 Measures of Financial Development. The term financial development is referred as the factors, policies, and 
institutions that lead to effective financial intermediation and markets, and deep and broad access to capital and 
financial services.  See ‗The Financial Development Report‘, (2008) World Economic Forum, USA; see also, 
Calderon, C. and Liu, L., (2003) ‗The Direction of Causality Between Financial Development and Economic 
Growth‘, Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Vol. 72, No. 1, p. 321-334] Financial development is one of 
the key elements of financial liberalization. It plays a vital role in the process of financial liberalization. It is a 
necessary condition for financial liberalization [Mavrotas, G. and Kelly, R., (2001) ‗Savings Mobilization and 
Financial Sector Development: The Nexus‘, Savings and Development, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 33–66]. And for this 
chapter often uses synonymously the terms financial development and financial liberalization. 
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relationship to achieve stable and balanced growth. The collective action of these IEIs in their 
institutional capacities produces the regime effect which results in the certainty and predictability 
of the rules of the game within the global economy. The certainty and predictability of the rules 
of the game act as a stimulus in the Economic Cycle. Once the Economic Cycle is stimulated at 
any stage, it will continue its cycle and result in a more stable and balanced growth of the global 
economy.         
In order to establish the above-mentioned linkages, I shall rely on the different literatures which 
support these causalities. The following section looks into the relationship between financial 
sector development and economic growth.  
a)  Financial Development (through liberalization process) 
leading to Economic Growth  
There are three views in this context. The first view maintains that financial sector development 
leads to economic growth.
189
 The second view claims that it is economic growth that leads to 
financial sector development.
190
 The third view, however, argues that both financial sector 
development and economic growth cause one another.
191
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 McKinnon, R.I., (1973) ‗Money and Capital in Economic Development,‘ Washington DC: The Brookings 
Institution; Patrick, H.T., (1966) ‗Financial Development and Economic Growth in Underdeveloped Countries‘, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 174–89; Fry, M.J. (1973), ‗Manipulating Demand 
for Money‘, Essays in Modern Economics, Editor: Parkin, M., Longman, London. 
190
 The demand for financial development hypothesis in Patrick, H.T., (1966) ‗Financial Development and 
Economic Growth in Underdeveloped Countries‘, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 
174–89. And also see Robinson and Romer [Robinson, J., (1952) ‗The Generalization of the General Theory‘, The 
Rate of Interest and Other Essays, London: Macmillan); Romer, P.M., (1990) ‗Endogenous Technological Change‘, 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, S71-S102] in the context of impact of economic growth on financial 
development. 
191
 Granger, C. W. J., (1969) ‗Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Methods and Cross-Spectral Methods‘, 
Econometrica, Vol. 37, p. 424-438; Granger, C. W. J., (1980) ‗Testing for Causality: A Personal Viewpoint‘, 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 2, p. 329-352. Granger, C. W. J., (1988) ‗Granger Causality, 
Cointegration and Control‘, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 12, p. 551-59. Lyons, S.E. and 
Murinde, V., (1994) ‗Cointegration And Granger-Causality Testing Of Hypotheses On Supply-Leading And 
Demand-Following Finance‘, Economic Notes, Vol. 23, No. 2, p. 308- 316. 
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The expansion of different types of financial intermediation and an increase in the variety of 
channels (which might be due to the liberalization process) to make best use of savings is a basic 
component of economic growth enhancement. Financial institutions have a direct effect on the 
economy; they collect and direct savings into investment (in other words they collect and inject 
funds into productive activities). The better the financial sector, the more the efficient and 
resourceful allocation of funds as investment, based mostly on savings, acts as a stimulus for 
economic growth.
192
 The availability of all types of financial intermediaries (such as capital 
market institutions, merchant banks and finance houses or commercial and savings banks) 
increases the competition level in the financial sector which enhances the options for investors 
(who give up their liquid assets for the purpose of investment). A deficiency of these financial 
intermediaries (even a lack in numbers), might slow down investment or in some cases, might 
even cause it not to take place, which would directly affect the technological progress (which, as 
we know, is a very important factor for economic growth) which, in return, would slow down the 
growth rate. Thus, it can be deduced that there is an interaction between the development of a 
financial sector and economic growth.
193
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 Newlyn W. T. and Rowan, D. C., (1954) ‗Money and Banking in British Colonial Africa: A Study of the 
Monetary and Banking Systems of Eight British African Territories‘, Oxford University Press: Oxford. And also 
Levine R., (1997) ‗Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda‘, Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 35, No. 2, p. 688–726. 
193
 Gurley, J. and Shaw, E. (September 1955) ‗Financial Aspects of Economic Development‘, American Economic 
Review, Vol. 45, p. 515-38; Patrick, H., (January 1966) ‗Financial Development and Economic Growth in 
Underdeveloped Countries‘, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 14, p. 174-89; Porter, R., (July 
1966) ‗The Promotion of the 'Banking Habit' and Economic Development‘, Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 2, 
p. 346-66; Goldsmith, R., (1969) ‗Financial Structure and Development‘, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press; 
Morley, S., (January 1971) ‗Inflation and Stagnation in Brazil‘, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 
19, p. 184-203; and McKinnon, R.I., (1973) ‗Money and Capital in Economic Development,‘ Washington DC: The 
Brookings Institution.  
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A reasonable proportion of the literature supports the notion that financial sector development is 
quite important for escalating economic growth.
194
 The most common, and also the core 
justification given by scholars for the above-mentioned notion, is that economic growth is 
primarily contingent on investment. Investment is financed by borrowing from the deposits made 
by individuals (which include artificial persons and as well sovereign governments) with banks 
and non-bank financial institutions.
195
 
A sound financial system improves the possibilities for innovation by providing relatively better 
opportunities for R&D into the economy, and in doing so, speeds up economic growth.
196
 
Likewise, a poorly functioning financial sector decreases the opportunities for investment in 
R&D which further pushes the rate of innovation down and ultimately adversely affects the rate 
of economic growth. Therefore, a financial system is a highly significant factor in determining 
productivity, growth, and economic development
197
. 
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 See also Shaw, E., (1973) ‗Financial Deepening in Economic Development‘, Oxford: Oxford University Press; 
and Bhatia, R. and Khatkhate, D., (March 1975) ‗Financial Intermediation, Savings Mobilization and 
Entrepreneurial Development: The African Experience‘, IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 22, p. 132-58. 
195
 Dobson, W. and Jacquet, P., (1998) ‗Financial Service Liberalization in the WTO‘, Peterson Institute. 
196
 King and Levine used an endogenous growth model to study the relationship of financial systems and economic 
growth. ―An endogenous growth macro model is one in which the long-run growth rate of output per worker is 
determined by variables within the model, not an exogenous rate of technological progress as in a neoclassical 
growth model‖ see Ramsey [Ramsey F.P., (1928) ‗A Mathematical Theory of Saving‘, Economic Journal, Vol. 38, 
No 152, p. 543-59], Solow [Solow, Robert M., (1956) ‗A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth‘, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 70, p. 65-94], Swan [Swan, Trevor W., (1956) ‗Economic Growth and Capital 
Accumulation‘, Economic Record, Vol. 32, p. 334–61], Koopmans [Koopmans, Tjalling C., (1963) ‗On the Concept 
of Optimal Economic Growth‘, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Vol. 163, Cowles Foundation, Yale 
University]. Influential early endogenous growth models are Romer [Romer, Paul M., (1986) ‗Increasing Returns 
and Long-run Growth‘, Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, Vol. 94, No. 5, p. 1002-37], 
Lucas [Lucas Jr. R.E., (1988) ‗On the Mechanics of Economic Development‘, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 
22, No. 1, p. 3-42], and Rebelo [Rebelo, S., (1991) ‗Long-Run Policy Analysis and Long-Run Growth‘, Journal of 
Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, Vol. 99, No. 3, p. 500-521]. According to Hulten, an endogenous 
growth model is a model with an the assumption that the marginal product of (generalized) capital is constant, rather 
than diminishing as in classical theories. Where generalized capital includes the result of investments in R&D 
[Hulten, Charles R., (January 2000) ‗Total Factor Productivity: A Short Biography‘, NBER Working Paper No. 
W7471. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=213430]. 
197
 King, R.G. and Levine, R., (1993) ‗Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right‘, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 108, No. 3, p. 713–37. 
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According to an empirical study on the relationship between financial sector development and 
economic growth, development in the financial sector positively contributes to the rate of 
economic growth. However, the effect of the relationship between financial sector development 
and economic growth differs for different countries over time.
198
Moreover, the financial 
intermediaries play a relatively more significant role in the growth process than the capital 
markets.
199
 
Numerous research conducted by different scholars which supports the view that financial sector 
development has a positive effect on the economic growth process. In other words, the majority 
of research reaffirms the Schumpeterian hypothesis (i.e. financial development leads to real 
economic growth) and Patrick‘s supply-leading hypothesis (i.e. by increasing the supply of 
financial opportunities in the economy, there are relatively more opportunities for investors to 
invest money in the real economy, thus escalating the growth process).
200
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 De Gregorio and Guidotti conducted an empirical study on the relationship between financial sector development 
and economic growth. See for details, De Gregorio, J. and Guidotti, Pablo E., (March 1995) ‗Financial Development 
and Economic Growth,‘ World Development, Elsevier, Vol. 23, No. 3, p. 433–48. 
199
 This point was identified by Choe and Moosa in their study to examine the contribution of a financial system in 
the economic growth process with a specific reference to Korea. They came to the conclusion that the development 
in the financial sector generally leads to economic growth, moreover, they also found out that the financial 
intermediaries play relatively more significant role in the growth process than the capital markets. Choe, C and 
Moosa, Imad A., (June 1999) ‗Financial System and Economic Growth: The Korean Experience,‘ World 
Development, Elsevier, Vol. 27, No. 6, p. 1069-82.  
200
 Habibullah and Eng conducted a research to study the causal relationship between financial sector development 
and economic growth process with reference to Asian countries. Their study supports the belief that there is a strong 
link between the ﬁnancial sector and economic growth as found by King & Levine [King, R.G. and Levine, R., 
(1993) ‗Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right‘, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 3, p. 
713–37.] Their study supports that ‗ﬁnancial depth contributes more to the causal relationships in developing 
countries.‘ Their result suggests that the supply-leading growth hypothesis indicates that ﬁnancial intermediation 
promotes economic growth in the nine Asian developing nations for the period 1990–1998. It implies that the policy 
of liberalization and ﬁnancial reforms adapted by these Asian countries has shown to improve economic growth. 
Their research is in conformity with other empirical research in causality by [Calderon, C. and Liu, L., (2003) ‗The 
Direction of Causality Between Financial Development and Economic Growth‘, Journal of Development 
Economics, Elsevier, Vol. 72, No. 1, p. 321-334], [Fase, M. M. G. and Abma, R. C. N., (2003) ‗Financial 
Environment and Economic Growth in Selected Asian countries‘, Journal of Asian Economics, Vol. 14, p. 11–21.], 
and [Christopoulos, D. K. and Tsionas, E.G., (2004) ‗Financial Development and Economic Growth: Evidence from 
Panel Unit Root and Cointegration Tests‘, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 73, p. 55–74.] that ﬁnancial 
development promotes growth, thus, supporting the old Schumpeterian hypothesis and Patrick‘s supply-leading 
hypothesis. Habibullah, M.S. and Eng, Y., (2006) ‗Does Financial Development Cause Economic Growth? A Panel 
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As documented above, there is sufficient evidence from the economic literature which supports 
the idea that financial sector development leads to economic growth. As this is an important part 
of the economic cycle (showing the causal relationship between two of its components), it has 
high relevance to this concept in analysing the role played by the IEIs in their institutional 
capacity for achieving stable and balanced growth. In the same context, the next subheading will 
look into the role of economic growth in the promotion of international trade.   
b) Economic Growth promotes International Trade 
There is substantial evidence that financial sector development enhances opportunities for 
investment to take place, as investment becomes cheaper due to competitive pressure in the 
financial market. In a competitive market, where all companies have equal opportunity to access 
funds (through financial intermediaries and institutions), the general competition level in the 
economy increases. High competition pressure in the economy forces or drives the market 
players to come up with something innovative, in order to be successful or survive (survival of 
the fittest), thus as the competition level in the economy rises, market players increase their 
investment budget for R&D
201
 which allows more innovation. Again, innovation is an extremely 
significant stimulus for international trade;
202
 therefore we can deduce that higher economic 
growth would lead to an increase in international trade. 
Continuous advancement in technological knowledge through R&D is essential in order to 
sustain a positive growth rate in output per capita. This concept was shown in the Solow-Swan 
                                                                                                                                                             
Data Dynamic Analysis for the Asian Developing Countries‘, Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, Vol. 11, No. 4, 
p. 377–93. 
201
 Availability of funds due to liberalization process and higher growth level the competition among the firms 
increases so they invest more in R&D in order to introduce in methods, products etc to establish an edge on the rival 
firm. [Beiji, P., (1998) ‗Technological Change in the Modern Economy‘, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, p. 122]  
202
 Standard international trade theory supports that difference of technologies encourages or gives reason to market 
players to trade. [Dixit, A. and Norman, V., (1980) ‗Theory of International Trade: A Dual, General Equilibrium 
Approach‘, William Clowes Limited.] 
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model (also known as the exogenous growth model and Neo-classical growth model) of 
economic growth. Solow and Swan maintain that a persistent positive rate of growth in per capita 
output can only occur due to exogenous advancement in technology.
203
 
The ―New growth theory‖204 which is heavily based on the Schumpeterian concept that gives 
relatively more weight to technological innovation in the growth process (rather than to other 
factors
205
 involved in the growth process) also emphasises the significance of the impact of R&D 
in the growth of the economy.
206
 
Further empirical evidence shows that the higher the level of competition in the economy, the 
more resources will be invested in R&D, leading to higher technological enhancement.
207
 
Furthermore, other empirical research shows that firms are keen to increase their investment in 
R&D as a tool to overcome competition pressure. The intensely competitive economy forces 
firms to innovate more, therefore they invest more in R&D in order to overcome competition.
208
 
In this way, creating technological differences in the international trading scenario will act as a 
significant stimulus for trade growth. 
Now, if we look at standard international trade theory, which talks about comparative advantage, 
(i.e. differences in relative opportunity costs, and then tries to explain comparative advantage in 
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 See: Solow, Robert M., (1956) ‗A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth‘, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 70, p. 65-94 and also see: Swan, Trevor W., (1956), ‗Economic Growth and Capital 
Accumulation‘, Economic Record, Vol. 32, p. 334–61. 
204
 New Growth Theory or the Endogenous Growth Theory. See Cortright, J., (2001) ‗New Growth Theory, 
Technology and Learning: A Practitioners Guide‘, Reviews of Economic Development Literature and Practice: No. 
4 [http://www.eda.gov/PDF/1G3LR_7_cortright.pdf] 
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 Such as land, labour etc. 
206
 Fagerberg, J., Hansson, P., Lundgerg, L and Melchior, A., (1997) ‗Technology and International Trade‘, Edward 
Elgar Publishing, p. 39 and also see Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E., (1991) ‗Innovation and Growth in the Global 
Economy‘, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. And also Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E., (February 1991) ‗Technology 
and Trade‘, Discussion Paper Series, No.1134, London: CEPR. 
207
 Fagerberg conducted an empirical research on competition and R&D. Fagerberg, J., Hansson, P., Lundgerg, L 
and Melchior, A., (1997) ‗Technology and International Trade‘, Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 51 
208
 Aghion has built a model in which firms are keen to increase their investment in R&D as a tool to overcome 
competition pressure. Aghion, Philippe, Diego Comin and Peter Howitt. (2006) "When Does Domestic Saving 
Matter for Economic Growth?" NBER Working Paper No. 12275. 
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terms of differences in technologies, factory supplies, etc.), we can see that, as the economy 
grows, R&D will be improved and innovation will take place, which creates differentiation in 
technologies between countries and making room for international trade to grow.
209
 In other 
words, the greater the technological innovation (as a result of economic growth), the more room 
there will be for international trade.
210
 
So far this chapter has strived to develop a causality link between the development of the 
financial sector and economic growth and, then consider economic growth‘s role as a stimulus 
for the growth of international trade. On the same line of developing causalities, the next 
subheading will endeavour to determine the role of international trade in the economic growth 
process.    
c) International Trade promotes Economic Growth 
To explain how international trade promotes economic growth, I shall refer to the literature 
which talks about the economic gains from international trade. According to the gains from the 
trade theorem that states that a country will be better off if it can trade at any price ratio other 
than its home prices, than it would be in autarky.
 211
 A number of scholars have the same opinion 
about the common gains from trade concept. They are as follows: firstly, there are more welfare 
gains in an open economy, with absolutely no trade restrictions, than in autarky (closed 
                                                 
209
 David Ricardo is normally considered to be the founder of the classical theory of international trade. The theories 
of gains from trade and the comparative advantage are commonly affiliated with him. In this theory the most 
significant factor employed to explain international trade scenario is technology. According to the theory the 
difference in comparative costs of production is a prerequisite for the occurrence of international trade. Moreover, 
this theory asserts that the technological differences (which includes difference in techniques of production) between 
countries determine international division of labour and consumption and trade patterns. [Zhang, W., (2008) 
‗International Trade Theory: Capital, Knowledge, Economic Structure, Money, and Prices Over Time‘, Published by 
Springer.] 
210
 Dixit, A. and Norman, V., (1980) ‗Theory of International Trade: A Dual, General Equilibrium Approach‘, 
William Clowes Limited. 
211
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trade with the outside world. In the economic meaning, it is also referred to as a closed economy. 
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economy, i.e. without any trade); secondly, a partially open economy, with trade restrictions 
(such as trade tariffs, subsidies, etc.) still has higher welfare gains than autarky; and, finally, an 
open economy as compared with a partially open economy has more welfare gains provided the 
concerned economy is a small economy which cannot affect the global economy itself.
212
 
This part of the chapter will discuss in detail (1) traditional economic gains from trade, (2) gain 
from trade under new trade theory, and (3) the dynamic gains from trade. The analysis follows 
below.  
(1) The Traditional Approach: Gains from Specialisation 
Under this subheading, I shall be discussing the traditional approach towards gains from trade, 
which takes into account the laws of absolute advantage
213
 and comparative advantage
214
. I shall 
start with Adam Smith‘s theory of absolute advantage and David Ricardo‘s comparative 
advantage theory, for a better understanding of the traditional gains from trade.  
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 Samuelson, P. A., (1939) ‗The Gains from International Trade‘, Canadian Journal of Economics and Political 
Science, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 195-205; Kemp, M. C., (1962) ‗The Gain from International Trade‘, The Economic 
Journal, Vol. 72, No. 288, p. 803-819; Deardorff, A. V., (May 1979) ‗Weak Links in the Chain of Comparative 
Advantage‘, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 9, p. 197-209 and also Deardorff, A. V., (2005a) ‗Gains from 
Trade and Fragmentation‘, Research Seminar in International Economics Discussion Paper N 543, Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan; Corden, W. M., (1984) ‗The Normative Theory of International Trade‘, Handbook of 
International Economics, vol. I, Editor: Jones, R. W. and Kenen, P.B., Amsterdam: North Holland, p. 63-130; 
Markusen, J. R., Melvin, J. R., Kaempfer, W. H., and Maskus, K. E., (1995) ‗International Trade Theory and 
Evidence‘, New York: McGraw-Hill; Wong, K., (1995) ‗International Trade in Goods and Factor Mobility‘, 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
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 Henderson, W., (2006) ‗Evaluating Adam Smith: Creating the Wealth of Nations‘, London: Routledge. See also, 
Smith, A., (1986) ‗The Wealth of Nations‘, Books I-III, with an introduction by Andrew Skinner, London: Penguin 
Group, New York: Viking Penguin. 
214
 Comparative advantage can be defined as the ―low relative cost of a good compared to other countries in 
autarky‖. [Deardorff, A.V., (1998) ‗Benefits and Costs of Following Comparative Advantage‘, The Sweetland 
Inaugural Lecture, presented at the 45th Annual Conference on the Economic Outlook, Ann Arbor Michigan, 
November 20, 1997.] 
This can be explained with the help of an example of a doctor and a domestic cleaner. Suppose that the doctor is a 
better cleaner than the domestic worker. The doctor, however, earns GBP 250 / hour in her professional capacity 
while the domestic cleaner charges GBP 10 an hour. It makes economic sense for the doctor to pay the domestic 
cleaner to clean her house. (WTO (2008), World Trade Report. Available at: 
www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report08_e.pdf) 
Rao Raza Hashim 
81 
School Of Law 
University Of Warwick 
(a) Adam Smith and Absolute Advantage215 
Adam Smith, in 1776, came up with the theory of absolute advantage as a rationale for 
international trade (i.e. countries participating in trade should gain mutually from this activity 
otherwise there is no motivation for the countries to participate). The concept of absolute 
advantage can be better understood with an example. Let‘s assume that there are two states in the 
world with two commodities; each state has absolute advantage (higher in efficiency) in 
producing one of those commodities. In this scenario both the countries can put all their 
resources into producing the commodity in which they have an absolute advantage and import 
the other product in which they lack efficiency (absolute disadvantage).  
A numerical example of this would further elaborate the absolute advantage concept. Let‘s 
assume that there are two countries, Pakistan and the UK, with two commodities - cloth and 
shoes. Technologies and the cost of production of each commodity for both the countries are 
fixed. Let us suppose that the unit costs of production of cloth and shoes are correspondingly 2 
and 8 in Pakistan; while they are correspondingly 6 and 4 in UK. It can be observed that the cost 
of producing one unit of cloth (in terms of shoes) in Pakistan is 0.25 (2/8=0.25) and in the UK is 
1.5 (6/4=1.5). So, Pakistan has absolute advantage in the manufacturing of cloth (as the cost to 
produce one unit of cloth is lower in Pakistan i.e. 0.25<1.5). On the other hand, the cost of 
producing one shoe (in terms of cloth) in Pakistan is 4 (8/2=4) and in UK is 0.66 (4/6=0.66). So, 
the UK has absolute advantage in the manufacturing of shoes (as the cost to produce one shoe is 
lower in the UK i.e. 0.66<4). 
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 Zhang, W., (2008) ‗International Trade Theory: Capital, Knowledge, Economic Structure, Money, and Prices 
Over Time‘, Published by Springer. See also, Henderson, W., (2006) ‗Evaluating Adam Smith: Creating the Wealth 
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Without trade (in autarky), Pakistan, with 10 units of production, could only produce 1 unit of 
cloth and 1 units of shoes and the UK,  with 10 units, could only produce 1 unit of cloth and 1 
unit of shoes (I am assuming that preference for both products in each country is equal). Thus, 
the total world production in autarky would be 2 cloths and 2 shoes. Now, if both the countries 
specialise in the commodity in which they have absolute advantage, then the world output could 
increase. That is, if Pakistan specialises in cloth, then with 10 units of production, it could 
produce 5 (10/2) units of cloth and zero units of shoes. On the other hand, if the UK specialises 
in shoes, then with 10 units of production it could produce 2.5 (10/4) units of shoes. The total 
world output with specialisation could be 5 and 2.5 units of cloth and shoes respectively which is 
significantly higher than in autarky. Thus both the countries could easily export the abundant 
product and import the deficient product, and by doing this, both countries could easily gain 
from specialisation and trade. 
(b) The Ricardian Trade Theory216 
There is no doubt that Smith‘s concept of absolute advantage served as a basis for the early 
development of international trade; however, David Ricardo is mostly commonly recognised as 
the founder of traditional theory of international trade. He asserted that it is possible to reap far 
more gains from international trade than Smith thought of in his absolute advantage theory. In 
this context, he introduced the concept of comparative advantage as an advance in and practical 
concept of international trade in comparison with Smith‘s absolute advantage theory.  
Ricardo, in his theory of comparative advantage, asserts that the countries participating in 
international trade, without having absolute advantage in the production of any commodity, can 
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Over Time‘, Published by Springer. 
 
Rao Raza Hashim 
83 
School Of Law 
University Of Warwick 
still gain from trade if there is a difference in the cost of production between the home country 
and abroad. According to him, the rationale for international trade is the difference in the 
comparative cost of production due to technological difference (technological difference stands 
for the difference in production technique) between the nations.  
The Ricardian theory can be better explained with the help of a numerical example. Let‘s 
suppose that (1) the world consists of two countries (e.g., Pakistan and the US, (2) there are only 
two commodities (cloth and shoes); (3) with one factor of production i.e. labour, and (4) the 
production techniques (i.e. technology) of both countries are fixed. 
Suppose that the cost of production of one unit of cloth and shoes in terms of labour are 2 and 4 
in US, while they are 3 and 5 in Pakistan, respectively. As is quite clear, the US can produce 
both the products more cheaply than Pakistan and, from the absolute advantage viewpoint, there 
could be no scope for international trade. However, Ricardian theory asserts that there is still 
scope for international trade as there is possibly room for both countries to gain from trade. 
According to Ricardo, the necessary pre-condition for trade to take place is the difference in the 
comparative cost of production at home and abroad.  
The comparative cost of production is the ratio between the cost of production of one unit of the 
two products in the same country. Thus, according to the above illustration, the comparative 
costs are respectively 2/4 = 0.5 and 3/5 = 0.6 in the US and Pakistan. The ratio of production 
costs of cloth and shoes between US and Pakistan is respectively 2/3 and 4/5. It can be observed 
that the US has a comparative advantage in the production of cloth than shoes (because the US 
can produce 33% cheaper cloth and 25% cheaper shoes as compared to Pakistan).  In other 
words, Pakistan has a comparatively smaller disadvantage in the production of shoes. The 
Ricardian model of comparative advantage for international trade states that if the terms of trade 
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are greater than 0.5 and smaller than 0.6, then both countries can benefit from trade. For 
example, if the terms of trade are fixed at 0.55, which means that 0.55 units of shoes are 
exchanged for one unit of cloth, then in an open trading scenario, in the US one unit of cloth 
exchanges for 0.55 units of shoes (rather than 0.5 as in autarky) and in Pakistan 0.55 (rather than 
0.6) units of shoes is exchanged for one unit of cloth. Therefore, both countries can take 
advantage from trade provided that the terms of trade are fixed between the two comparative 
costs (i.e. between 0.5 and 0.6 in the above illustration). However, if the comparative cost is 
equal, then there would be no motive to trade whilst, on the other hand, if the terms of trade lie 
outside the comparative costs, then one of the countries will lose out if trade occurs.
217
 
(2)  “New” Trade Theory 
This sub-section discusses the ―new‖ trade theory, which focuses on the significance of intra-
industry trade and of trade between countries with same capacity and level of technology. This 
theory asserts that even countries with equal capability and technologies can increase welfare 
gain from trade by supplying a broader variety of products and services to economies at lower 
prices. This can be achieved by taking advantage of economies of scale when firms have access 
to a larger market (i.e. the combined market of both countries).  
The ―New‖ trade theory is generally attributed to Krugman218. He used a simple model of two 
countries and illustrated that countries of equal capabilities can also benefit from international 
trade by providing their consumers with more variety at lower prices. In his model, there are two 
countries (A and B).  Both countries‘ consumers prefer to have more variety, however, variety 
                                                 
217Zhang, W., (2008) ‗International Trade Theory: Capital, Knowledge, Economic Structure, Money, and Prices 
Over Time‘, Published by Springer. 
 
218Krugman, P., (1979) ‗Increasing Returns, Monopolistic Competition, and International Trade‘, Journal of 
International Economics, Vol. 9, p. 469–479. 
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comes with increased cost (as firms are operating on economies of scale, so more variety means 
working below the economies of scale equilibrium, thereby creating higher prices).  A high 
demand for variety would not enable firms to operate on economies of scale. So let us assume 
that both countries A and B are alike in every aspect and so there are no traditional comparative 
advantage reasons for trade; in the absence of trade, country A produces red, blue and pink cars 
and country B produces green, orange and black cars.  
If trade is allowed, then the countries involved in it can still reap welfare gains. This is because 
with trade, firms will produce on economies of scale which would increase production and push 
the cost down, but interestingly the consumers will be presented with more variety than in a 
situation without trade. If country A only produces red and blue cars and country B only 
produces green and black cars and trade takes place, then actually the degree of variety available 
to individual customers in each country will increase to red, blue, green and black, even though 
the world variety declines.  
In short, the ―New‖ trade theory provides three welfare gains. First, production will take place on 
a large scale so it will enable the firms to reap profit from economies of scale. Secondly, buyers 
in both countries will benefit from a greater diversity of products and services on the market. 
Thirdly, through market integration, competition levels will rise which will push prices down. 
The net effect of the ―New‖ trade theory is quite logical as it enables similar countries to trade 
with each other and yet everyone (consumers and efficient producers) gain from the trading 
scenario.  
(3) Dynamic Gains 
This subhead mainly focuses on the impact of trade on GDP growth and will review both 
practical and theoretical studies. The traditional theory of economic growth assumes that the 
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economy is isolated and external factors (such as import, export and technological differences) 
are not taken into consideration.
219
 In other words, its basic idea is that countries make and 
utilize in isolation and no trade exists between them. On the contrary, practical world growth 
experience is totally different; it reveals that all the countries are closely connected and it is 
difficult to study counties in isolation.
220
 These three facts have been underlined in the 2008 
World Trade Report.
221
 First, the global economy has grown extensively since WW II. Secondly, 
facts also reveal that the volume of global trade since WW II has grown but at an even higher 
rate than the global economy. Thirdly, the empirical data documents a strong positive 
relationship between GDP growth and trade volume growth.
222
 
Long term economic growth relies heavily on technological improvement and this can be better 
explained with the help of endogenous growth models. These growth models place heavy 
emphasis on the key factors which determine technological enhancement, which in turn lead to 
increased productivity and growth. This subsection will highlight the factors which result from 
trade (such as increased competition, learning by doing and innovation) and how they directly 
affect economic growth.
223
 
In many ways, trade can encourage and reinforce innovation, which directly affects economic 
growth. The ways in which trade affects economic growth are various: first, trade liberalization 
                                                 
219Adam Smith viewed the growth process as strictly endogenous. Lowe, A., (1954) ‗The Classical Theory of 
Economic Growth‘, Social Research, Vol. 21, p.127–158, reprinted in A. Lowe (1987), Essays in Political 
Economics: Public Control in a Democratic Society, Editor: Oakley, A., Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books. See also: 
Kurz, H. and Salvadori, N., (2003) ‗Theories of Economic Growth: Old and New‘, The Theory of Economic 
Growth: A Classical Perspective, Editors: Salvadori, N., Edward Elgar Limited, UK. 
220
 Ventura, J., (2005) ‗A Global View of Economic Growth‘, Handbook of Economic Growth - Edition 1, Editors: 
Aghion, P. and Durlauf, S., Amsterdam, North Holland: Elsevier, p. 1419-1497. 
221
(WTO (2008), World Trade Report. Available at: 
www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report08_e.pdf ) 
222
WTO (2008), World Trade Report p.64. Available at: 
www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report08_e.pdf 
223
 Baldwin, Richard E., (1992) ‗Measurable Dynamic Gains from Trade‘, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 
100, No. 1, p. 162-174, The University of Chicago Press. See also, Salvadori, N., (2003) ‗The Theory of Economic 
Growth: A Classical Perspective‘, Edward Elgar, UK. 
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expands the market size (from domestic to global), and thus companies can enjoy economies of 
scale; second, from the knowledge spillover effect of international trade; third, by increasing 
general competition levels in the economy, the market is pushed to provide better quality 
products at cheaper prices; fourth, the distribution of global product manufacturing changes as 
trade restrictions are reduced. This is because firms would prefer to manufacture a product in a 
country where factors of production are cheaper. Finally, the trade liberalization process 
encourages governments and firms to race for innovation in order to reap the benefits of trade. In 
all of these above-mentioned ways, trade affects economic growth positively through 
technological improvement.
224
 
d) Economic Growth leads to Financial Development 
Patrick identified two patterns in the causality relationship between the development of the 
financial sector and economic growth. The first pattern states that economic growth exerts 
pressure on the financial system to expand in order to cater for the needs of the economy.
225
 This 
view is referred to as "demand-following" expansion of the financial system. It further maintains 
that where a financial system is not growing, this means that in that economy, the demand for 
financial services is still low. Therefore, when the real side of the economy grows, it creates a 
                                                 
224
WTO (2008), World Trade Report p.64. Available at: 
www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report08_e.pdf; Barro R. J. and Sala-i-Martin, X., 
(1995) ‗Economic growth‘, McGraw-Hill, Inc, New York; Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E., (1991) ‗Innovation 
and Growth in the Global Economy‘, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Grossman, G. M., and Helpman, E., (1991) 
‗Quality Ladders in the Theory of Growth‘, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58, p. 43-61. Grossman, G. M. and 
Helpman, E., (1991) ‗Endogenous Product Cycles‘, The Economic Journal, Vol. 101, p. 1229-1241; Aghion P. and 
Howitt, P., (1992) ‗A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction‘, Econometric, Vol. 60, p. 323-51. 
225Patrick, H.T., (1966) ‗Financial Development and Economic Growth in Underdeveloped Countries‘, Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 14, No. 1, p.174–89 
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demand for financial services, and in order to match these demands, the financial sector also 
expands.
226
 
The second pattern in the causal relationship of financial development and economic growth is 
known as the ―supply-leading‖ expansion of the financial sector. According to this view, the 
expansion of the financial sector takes place before the demand for those services is created. This 
happens when the financial system channels individuals‘ savings to the investors in order to 
provide them with better investment opportunities and in doing so, the financial sector stimulates 
economic growth. The supply-leading causality relationship trend is mostly documented in less 
developed economies rather than the developed economy.  
One point which emerges in this causality scenario between financial sector development and 
economic growth is that of determining the possible direction of the causality. Patrick gives an 
explanation for the bidirectional causality wherein the direction of causality changes over the 
course of the economic development of an economy. He asserts that financial sector 
development is able to stimulate real economic growth through innovative types of investment 
before the economy has achieved prolonged modern economic growth. In other words, supply- 
led financial development is effective until a certain level of economic growth is achieved and 
after that, supply-led financial developmental impetus slowly becomes less effective. At this 
stage, demand-led financial development impetus becomes dominant.
227
 
                                                 
226
 Murinde, V. and Eng, Fern S. H., (December 1994) ‗Financial Development and Economic Growth in Singapore: 
Demand-following or Supply-leading?‘ Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 4, Issue 6, p. 391 – 404. 
227
 Expand more the demand lead financial development. [Patrick, H.T., (1966) ‗Financial Development and 
Economic Growth in Underdeveloped Countries‘, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 14, No. 1, 
p.174–89]. Besides the two countries discussed by Patrick, Japan and the United States, D. Stammer conducted a 
case study of Hong Kong (Stammer, D., (January 1972) ‗Financial Development and Economic Growth in 
Underdeveloped Countries: Comment,‘ Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 20, p. 318-29). 
Odhiambo, Nicholas M., (2007) ‗Supply-leading versus Demand-following Hypothesis: Empirical Evidence from 
Three SSA Countries‘, African Development Review, Vol. 19, Issue 2, p. 257 – 280. Jung, Woo S., (1986) 
‗Financial Development and Economic Growth: International Evidence‘, Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, Vol. 34, p. 333–346. 
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There are a number of studies that contend that economic growth causes financial development 
e.g. Young, Boulila and Tramelsi
228
. They conducted empirical research to find out the causality 
relationship between economic growth and financial sector development. Their empirical 
findings supported the notion that, as the real side of the economy grows, it creates demand for 
financial services which expand to meet this growing demand.  
Furthermore, as specialisation in the economy increases, the income of the economy also 
increases (by exploiting economies of scale) which in turn raises the stock of both real and 
financial wealth.
229
 This aspect of specialisation and financial wealth was studied by Gurley and 
Shaw who explain this relationship of economic growth and financial growth in terms of demand 
and supply in real and financial markets.  
Keeping Gurley and Shaw‘s empirical findings in mind, then it could be said that the income 
elasticity of savings (percentage change in the savings divided by percentage change in income) 
is greater than one at low levels of income, and the savings elasticity of demand for financial 
assets (percentage change demand for financial assets divided by percentage change in savings) 
remains more than one as income rises.
230
 Therefore, as income increases due to growth in the 
real economy (as a result of technological changes, the economy exploiting economies of scale, 
                                                 
228
Boulila, G. and Trabelsi, M., (2002), ‗Financial Development and Long-run Growth: Granger Causality in a 
Bivariate VAR Structure—Evidence from Tunisia (1962–1997)‘, Working Paper, Facult´e des Sciences 
Economiqueset de Gestion de Tunis. 
229
Gurley and Shaw also support the demand followed hypothesis of Patrick.  Gurley, J. and Shaw, E., (1967), 
‗Financial Structure and Economic Development‘, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 34, p. 333-46. 
 
230
 Income elasticity of savings means that as people at lower levels of income get more money, they will save more 
(as it is difficult for them to improve their standard of living suddenly, e.g. If a person was earning GBP 500 a week 
and suddenly he starts getting GBP 600 a week, so he would save most of that additional GBP 100), therefore, 
elasticity is greater than 1. Savings elasticity of demand for financial assets merely means that as people start to save 
more, they will demand more financial assets or products to save in, thus more savers in an economy higher will be 
the demand for financial assets. So in short, if people have more income they will save more, and hence they will 
demand more financial assets to save and invest their money in. 
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etc.), savings and the demand for financial assets also increases. In short, a rise in income is 
associated with real development which in turn stimulates financial development.  
e) Formation of Economic Cycle  
As mentioned above, there are many scholars who support the idea that financial development 
through liberalization leads to economic growth and there is substantial literary and empirical 
evidence that economic growth enhances competition in the economy, which puts pressure on 
firms and organisations to come up with innovative ideas and technology. Innovation (or the 
technological difference between countries) is considered by many scholars as a stimulus for 
international trade, thus economic growth promotes international trade. On the other hand, 
international trade reinforces competition, innovation and economies of scale which 
automatically promotes economic growth. When the real side of the economy grows, then it 
creates demand for the financial side (Patrick‘s demand-followed financial development 
hypothesis).  
By summarising the above discussion, we can form a financial sector development, international 
trade and economic growth cycle and name it an ―Economic Cycle‖, according to which, 
financial development leads to economic growth, economic growth promotes international trade, 
international trade reinforces economic growth which again promotes financial development 
leading to a balanced and stable economy.  
The only purpose for discussing the probable causality between the components of the Economic 
Cycle is to use this possible causal relationship as an economic fact and then analyse the IEIs‘ 
institutional framework using certainty and predictability in stimulating components of the 
Economic Cycle. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
C. Conclusion 
Looking into our recent history, membership of the IEIs has increased considerably and this 
could only have happened if these countries were convinced that being a member of these 
organisations they can reap more advantages than opting to staying out or not having any other 
options. If countries want to be part of globalization and want to reap the possible benefits of 
welfare gain, then they become part of the IEI network.  
There could be many reasons for sovereign states becoming part of a global regime and 
compromising their independent decision-making. States join IEIs of their own free will. They 
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only do it because they think that the overall advantages of staying in an organisation are more 
than those of staying out.
231
 
Four of explanations are often theorised for the existence of these IEIs
232
: firstly, limiting the 
dominant powers. According to Ikenberry, they facilitate to control the behaviour of the most 
dominant countries.
233
 By making and then act in accordance with rules of the game laid by the 
IEIs, the dominant countries reassure weaker countries that they will not exploit of them.  
Secondly, IEIs provide information and reduce transaction costs. International institutions 
promote agreements by increasing the expected costs of not following the agreements. IEIs are 
comparatively efficient institutions since their principles and rules form a connection between 
issues which gives states an incentive to reach mutually beneficial agreements.
234
Or, in other 
words, IEIs constrain economic behaviour in ways that rule out actions that, if widely practised, 
would be economically costly.
235
 
Thirdly, institutions promote reciprocity amongst members. The concept of reciprocity and 
mutuality is of significant importance in an institution. In other words, the IEIs promote the 
concept of cooperation for collective gain which gives each (or the majority) of its constituents a 
sense of contribution towards the collective good.  
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 As Gruber contends, if the most dominant country outline the options open to the developing countries and create 
multilateral institutions, all countries can relatively benefit by becoming part of these organisations, than in a 
situation in which no institution existed. Gruber, L., (2000) ‗Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of 
Supranational Institutions‘, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
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 Milner mentioned four common reasons to join international institutions. Milner, Helen V. (2005). 
‗Globalization, Development, and International Institutions: Normative and Positive Perspectives‘, Perspectives on 
Politics, Vol. 3 , p 833-854. 
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 Ikenberry, G. J., (2001) ‗After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major 
Wars‘, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
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 Keohane, Robert O. (1984) ‗After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy‘, chapter 
6, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
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 Nelson, Richard R. and Sampat, Bhaven N., (2001) ‗Making Sense of Institutions as a Factor Shaping Economic 
Performance‘, (Spanish Version), Revista de Economía Institucional, Vol. 3, No. 5, Second Semester, available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=923637 
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Fourthly, it facilitates countries in reforming their domestic politics. By becoming a member of 
an IEI and overtly committing to follow its rules of the game has significant impact on the 
domestic politics. It can possibly assist local leaders to modify their rigid domestic policies 
which they otherwise would not be able to do and can support them lock in ―good‖ policies. 
Thus it reduces the possibility of any state changing their economic policies arbitrarily.   
Having said all of the above, regarding the rationale and benefits for the existence of IEIs, there 
is always the other side of the coin. Currently, the IEIs may not be the most optimal entities for 
creating the rules of the game for the global economy. They have deficiencies and this fact needs 
to addressed by the IEIs or their constituents. For example, consensus rule-making in the WTO is 
good from some aspects, but practically it nearly standstills the rule-making process as the 
Contracting Parties fail to develop consensus (Doha Round is a clear example).  
In the case of the IMF and the World Bank, developing countries have no say in their operation. 
These institutions lead the global monetary and financial regime. The voting system needs to be 
addressed in these institutions. Almost all the sovereign states approach these IEIs, even when 
they don‘t like them, simply because they have no other option.  
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III. Historical Background and Evolution of IELR 
The IELR which represents and controls the rules of the game of the current global economy has 
evolved over a long period of time. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the IELR emerged as 
a result of cooperation between sovereign states with a view to tackling issues which could no 
longer be dealt with by domestic law. Moreover, it was not the first time the sovereign states had 
tried to cooperate for the collective interest, the most recent example in history being the League 
of Nations.  
To understand the essence of the current IELR, it is important to understand the historical 
background of the current regime and the way in which it evolved to its current stage. The 
historical background and evolution allow us to analyse the current regime in the context of its 
evolving nature, which provides room for criticism and adaptability within the IELR. This 
chapter talks in depth about the historical background and evolution of the current regime that is 
the IELR. It starts from World War I and then looks at the creation of the Bretton Woods system 
which is now a major part of the IELR. The focus is on the formation of the WTO as part of an 
evolutionary process which started with the ITO, then to GATT and then the WTO. The IMF and 
World Bank are not addressed in particular detail in this chapter because they did not go through 
any major structural changes. However, the practices and the scope of these two IEIs has evolved 
(or rather, has expanded) since their creation. These changing roles are discussed in Section Two 
of this thesis (which talks in detail about the IMF).         
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A. Historical Background 
To understand the origins of the IELR, this part of the chapter begins by looking at the period of 
time just before World War I, when, even with high tariffs and the desire of many countries to 
become self-sufficient
236
, the volume of international trade prior to 1913 increased 
considerably.
237
 This growth in international trade was mainly due to two factors. Firstly, prices 
were rising which made tariffs relatively less obstructive; secondly, tariffs were also moderated 
by a series of commercial treaties.
238
 Thereafter, in June 1914, World War I broke out which 
brought an abrupt end to this growth in commerce. Countries which were engaged in World War 
I concentrated on the war works and ignored their commercial trade. The non-participating 
countries of World War I were also affected as their trade came to a halt because they could not 
get the ships to carry their goods even if they could have found prospective buyers. Thus, World 
War I generated a condition of economic isolation for countries all over the world and this 
isolation can be easily explained by not having any IEI or firm rules of the game in the economic 
scenario. The reason for the current IELR locking its constituents into commitments originates 
from lessons learned from history.  
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 The concept of economic nationalism, to become self-sufficient in military and economic aspect, was quite 
popular before World War II. For details see Berend, Ivan T., (Mar., 2000) ‗The Failure of Economic Nationalism: 
Central and Eastern Europe before World War II‘, Revue économique, Vol. 51, No. 2. And also see Rappard, 
William E., (Oct., 1933) ‗Nationalism and the League of Nations Today‘, The American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 27, No. 5, p. 721-737. 
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 International trade increased by threefold since 1888-1913. See Layton, W. T., (Mar., 1927) ‗The Forthcoming 
Economic Conference of the League of Nations and Its Possibilities‘, Journal of the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 2, p.69-87. 
238
Many commercial treaties were signed by leading trading countries for the reduction of trade related tariffs. Of 
those commercial treaties some were relatively important than others. Such as; the Reciprocity Treaty between 
Canada and United States in 1854. For detail see Ankli, R., (1971) ‗The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854‘, Canadian 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 4, p.1-20. The Cobden-Chevalier Treaty between Britain and France in 1860 and Treaty 
of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and United Kingdom in 1984. See for details: Pahre, R., (2008) 
‗Politics and Trade Cooperation in the Nineteenth Century: The Agreeable Customs of 1815-1914‘, Cambridge 
University Press. 
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The Treaty of Versailles, which was signed on 28 June 1919, marked the end of World War I. 
Even after World War I, international trade showed a marked decline for some considerable 
period due to sentiments of economic nationalism
239
 which resulted in the imposition of a 
complete prohibition of trading and deliberate barriers to transportation. The League of Nations 
[hereinafter the ―League‖], which came into being on 10 January 1920 as an international 
organisation was, in fact, a result of the Treaty of Versailles. The League‘s main task was to 
ensure world peace and stability both in a political and economic sense.  
The League was an organised attempt at cooperation between the sovereign states for collective 
gain. In setting the rules of the game context, the League held a number of conferences which 
were of quite marked significance. Of those conferences, the Brussels Financial Conference in 
1920, the Genoa Conference in 1922 and the Economic Conferences of 1927 and 1933 were of 
relatively greater importance. The Brussels Financial Conference in 1920 established the 
Financial and Economic Commission
240
 in order to reconstruct the international economic 
system and the Commission worked with official committees and distinguished experts who 
undertook several initiatives to bring about financial and economic stability. Moreover, the 
Financial and Economic Commission also played a remarkable role in the reconstruction of 
Austria and Hungary.
241
 
The Brussels Conference, on the other hand, established a code and set of standards in relation to 
currency and finance matters in the international context. The Brussels Conference played a 
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 See footnote no 236 for economic nationalism.  
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http://www.unog.ch/80256EE60057D930/(httpPages)/03F1E1DD124D3276C1256F32002EE3AB?OpenDocument 
241
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significant role in bringing together, for the first time, European bankers and financiers to 
develop a common viewpoint on the problems of European finance.
242
 
The Brussels and Genoa Conferences, which were very important in the context of monetary 
stability, were convened in 1920 and 1922 respectively. The Genoa Conference was significant 
in the context of the reconstruction of the international monetary system
243
; it assembled all the 
major gold-standard
244
 countries, other than the United States America [hereinafter the ―US‖] 
who maintained the status of an observer in all the League‘s conferences.  
Unfortunately, all the initiatives of the League failed to bring about international economic 
stability. The failure of the League can be attributed to various factors, one of which was the 
self-imposed isolation of the US. Although the US emerged as the world‘s leading industrial 
power after World War I, it resisted taking responsibility for the development of international 
economic relations.
245
 One of the key reasons for the non-participation of the US in the League 
can arguably be attributed to its fear that the existing members of the League would insist on the 
cancellation of their respective war debts in order to ensure economic stability.
246
 
As discussed earlier in the theoretical framework, the regime is initiated by the hegemon. 
Moreover, the hegemon‘s involvement in the initial running of the regime is essential. Thus, the 
lack of involvement by the US (a relatively dominant power) in the League ultimately resulted in 
the weakening of the international system established after World War I. All the major initiatives 
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 See generally for the details of the Brussels Conference. Siepmann, H.A., (Dec., 1920) ‗The International 
Financial Conference at Brussels‘, The Economic Journal, Vol. 30, No. 120, p. 436-459. 
243
 For history of Genoa Conference, see Fink, C., (1984) ‗The Genoa Conference: European Diplomacy, 1921 – 
1922‘, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Also see Harris, W., (Sep., 1922) ‗The Genoa Conference‘, 
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The gold-standard is a system in which paper notes are medium of exchange which can be easily exchanged for 
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Twentieth Century‘, University of California at Berkeley and NBER] 
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CA: University of California Press. 
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 See Kenen, Peter B., (1994) ‗Managing the World Economy: Fifty Years After Bretton Woods‘, Institute for 
International Economics, p. 9.  
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instigated by the League to bring stability in the international economic scenario were in the 
form of conferences to gather together all the major elements concerned (i.e. bankers, investors, 
government officials, etc.). Unfortunately, no definite rules were laid down, as an outcome of 
these conferences, to act as a guide for the international economic policies of the 1920s. 
Moreover, no institution was established to coordinate or cooperate in the process of the 
stabilisation of currencies. According to Flandreau
247
, the inadequate cooperation of the central 
banks was due to the absence of an institution during the 1920s, which, in turn, caused the 
breakdown of the inter-war gold standard and eventually contributed towards the Great 
Depression
248
. The international monetary system, during the inter-war period, moved towards 
the gold standard initially (i.e. until 1931) and then, there was a sharp transformation from gold 
to a gold-exchange
249
 standard.
250
 The absence of an international monetary institution resulted 
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 The Great Depression started in USA when the stock market collapsed on 24 October 1929 and all the investors 
lost faith in the American economy. Almost 25% of the US's total work force was left unemployed, moreover, those 
were able to keep their jobs had to work for 43% less pay between 1929 and 1933. It is considered as the worst 
economic and social calamity in the history of US. The US had considerable economic weight in the world economy 
at that time and that is why this great contraction of US economy affected the global economy so severely. [See 
Kenwood, A.G. and Lougheed, A.L., (2000) ‗The Growth of the International Economy 1820-2000‘, p. 226] 
Economists and the economic historians are of the opinion that every feature of the international economy in the 
1920s contributed to the Great Depression. The origins of the Great Depression must be sought in internal economic 
conditions, especially in the US; the reason it spread throughout the world and was so severe can be traced to three 
factors. First, relative overproduction in some branches of agriculture following World War I led to a relative fall in 
primary product prices and weakened the demand for the manufactured goods exported by the advanced countries. 
Second, the trend towards increased protection evident in the post-1918 period, particularly in the newly created 
countries in Europe, but also present in primary producing countries overseas and in the US. This reversed the trend 
towards increasing specialisation that had been present prior to 1914 and disrupted patterns of international trade. 
The third and most important factor was the disruption of the pre-war pattern of equilibrium in international 
payments as a result of war debts and reparations, the changed relative position of the US and the UK in 
international markets, and the restoration of the gold standard with undervalued and overvalued exchange rates 
which made it increasingly vulnerable to large flows of short-term capital. [See Barber, Clarence L., (Jan., 1978) 
‗On the Origins of the Great Depression‘, Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 44, No. 3, p. 432-456, p. 434.] 
249
A gold exchange standard is a mixed system of a reserve currency standard and a gold standard. In general it 
includes the following rules. First, a reserve currency is chosen. All non-reserve countries agree to fix their 
exchange rates to the reserve at some announced rate. Second, the reserve currency country agrees to fix its currency 
value to a weight in gold. Finally, the reserve country agrees to exchange gold for its own currency with other 
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in governments all over the world stabilising their currencies individually, thereby creating 
additional uncertainty in the international economic scenario.  
 
Source: Palyi, Melchior. The Twilight of Gold 1914-1936 Myths and Realities. (1972). Table 
no. VI-1 at p. 116. 
Figure 3 
The League was not a successful institution both from a political and economic perspective, and, 
finally, it became practically ineffective when it could not prevent the invasions by Japan and 
Italy of Manchuria and Ethiopia, respectively, inaction which contributed to World War II. By 
this time, countries had lost all confidence in the League and were not willing to delegate 
authority regarding their commercial policy to any of its departments. 
                                                                                                                                                             
central banks within the system, upon demand. One key difference in this system from a gold standard is that the 
reserve country does not agree to exchange gold for currency with the general public, only with other central banks.( 
In a reserve currency system, another country‘s currency takes the role that gold played in a gold standard. In other 
words a country fixes its own currency value to a unit of another country‘s currency.) 
http://internationalecon.com/Finance/Fch80/F80-4.php 
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After the failure of the League, a vacuum was created for the emergence of a new regime and the 
dominant powers of that time took the lead and developed a new regime. These developments, 
which are discussed below, became the foundation for the evolution of the IELR.  
B. Evolution of IELR 
During World War II, the two leading economies and most dominant powers, the US and the 
United Kingdom [hereinafter the ―UK‖], started putting their efforts into building a new world 
trading order. Both countries, in August 1941 and February 1942, signed two very important 
agreements, the Atlantic Charter
251
 and the Lend-Lease
252
 respectively, in the context of 
international trade. In both these agreements, the governments agreed to include the principles of 
non-discrimination and free trade in their post-war commercial policies. 
Following the end of World War II, the planners of the new international economic order (the 
US and the UK) primarily focused on establishing international institutions which would 
promote policies that would avert repetition of the inter-war economic scenario. As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, one of the main reasons for world political and economic instability during 
the inter-war time was the self-imposed isolation of the US. This instability resulted in World 
Wars I and II and the Great Depression. However, the US had learnt its lesson from the past and 
was now actively taking part in the international economic scenario. In this context, the US held 
a conference in July 1944 at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, US [hereinafter the ―Bretton 
Wood Conference‖]253, the main objectives of which was to design a stable international 
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 For details see Brinkley, D. and Facey-Crowther, David R. (eds.), (1994) ‗The Atlantic Charter‘, New York: St. 
Martin's Press. And also visit: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/history/atlantic.shtml 
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 For details see Spencer, R. and Wood, Laurence I., (Jun., 1944) ‗The Lend-Lease Program and Post-War Patent 
Claims‘, University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register, Vol. 92, No. 4, p. 372-390. 
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 Matsushita, M., Schoenbaum, Thomas J. and Mavroidis, Petros C., (2006) ‗The World Trade Organisation : Law, 
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monetary system, the reconstruction of World War II affected counties, the reduction of tariffs 
and the removal of quantitative controls on international trade.
254
  
The Bretton Woods Conference was the origin of the current regime, i.e. the IELR, since it 
resulted in organised cooperation between sovereign states which later evolved into the IELR. 
The sovereign states signed agreements to set up the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development [hereinafter the ―World Bank‖] to enable the reconstruction and recovery of 
Europe after World War II so as to achieve full employment, and also to establish the 
International Monetary Fund [hereinafter the ―IMF‖] to attain a stable international monetary 
system. These two IEIs later proved to be significant in the global economic order. 
The IMF and the World Bank are very significant contributors in the setting of the rules of the 
game within the present global economy. These institutions have not undergone any major 
organisational/institutional changes since their creation; however, these institutions did go 
through changes in their institutional roles. These institutional roles (as discussed in the 
theoretical framework) are the essence of the IELR. Whilst the institutional role of both these 
IEIs is discussed in detail in Section Two of this thesis, a brief historical summary of the 
evolutionary role of these IEIs is discussed below.  
1. Main events in the history of the IMF255  
As a result of the Bretton Woods Conference, the IMF was created in 1945, and in 1947 it started 
its work. Initially, 29 countries joined the IMF but over a short period of time, its membership 
increased substantially. 
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 See O‘Rourke, Kevin H. (ed.) ‗The International Trading System, Globalization and History‘, Vol. 1, p. 130. 
255
 For further details about the IMF history visit: http://www.imf.org/external/about/history.htm and for detail IMF 
chronology visit: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/chron/chron.asp  
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The system introduced at this time by the IMF was the Par value system
256
 for exchange rates. 
Under this system, the USD was made the reserve currency. All the countries pegged their 
currencies with the USD and the US pegged its currency with gold. This system is also referred 
to as the Bretton Woods system. As already discussed, the US was the most dominant power 
after World War II and so everything revolved around the US.
257
 In 1971, the US temporarily 
suspended the USD‘s convertibility into gold and in 1973, the par value system collapsed and a 
floating exchange rate system was introduced. In this system, countries pegged their currencies 
with another currency or currencies. 
The realist attitude of the US in terms of the functioning of the IMF has been quite evident ever 
since its inception. The IMF evolved according to the direction decided by the US treasury. This 
realist approach of the US is still present in the IMF; the global economy has evolved into a 
liberally institutionalised economy but the IMF is still constitutionally a realist IEI. One 
important question arises at this stage: how has the IMF remained realist in a liberal global 
economic scenario? The answer to this question can easily be found in the history of the global 
economy. Events (mainly the crisis) in economic history kept the IMF alive and needy sovereign 
states ignored its realist aspect. 
The oil crisis in the 1970s
258
 resulted in an international debt crisis. Most of the oil-importing 
countries borrowed from commercial banks, and the interest rate surged in those industrial 
countries trying to control inflation which, in turn, led to a worldwide debt crisis. As the crisis 
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 Katz, Samuel I. (1971). "The case for the par-value system, 1971," International Finance Discussion Papers 4, 
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257
 See generally, Woods, Ngaire (2006), The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank and Their Borrowers, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca.  
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 For a good discussion about the oil crisis see generally,  Barsky, R.; Kilian, L. (2004). "Oil and the 
Macroeconomy Since the 1970s". CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4496 1001: 48109–1220; also see, Hammes, David 
and Douglas Wills (2005). "Black Gold: The End of Bretton Woods and the Oil-Price Shocks of the 1970s," The 
Independent Review, v. IX, n. 4. pp. 501-511. 
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emerged, many countries approached the IMF for financial assistance which enormously 
increased the importance of IMF, and counties did not question its expansionary functioning 
based on implied powers. Furthermore, needy countries ignored the hegemonic influence of the 
US and its allies (mainly EU).  
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the IMF‘s membership increased and the former Soviet bloc 
became clients of the IMF in terms of assistance (policy advice, technical assistance, and 
financial support) with regards to their transformation into market driven economies.
259
 
Then came the Asian Financial Crisis
260
 which further enhanced the importance of the IMF in 
the global economic scenario. The IMF, with the passage of time, expanded its functioning 
through its implied power and filled the gaps in the global economic structure. During this time, 
the IMF remained very active in helping member countries and in doing so, developed a 
speciality in an area that was not matched by any other IEI.  Thus, no country openly challenged 
the realist approach of the IMF. Moreover, it appears that the IMF has been used in support of 
US‘s foreign relations.261   (Moreover, the IMF has been used as a US foreign policy tool.) 
At the time of inception of the Bretten Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank) USA and 
Europeans developed an understanding on the bases of Gentleman‘s Agreement that Europe 
occupying the MD post of the IMF and the US having the lead in the World Bank. Although the 
                                                 
259
 For a details discussion about the transition of Soviet Bloc see generally, Aslund, Anders (2002). Building 
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 For Asian Financial Crisis see generally, Goldstein, Morris (1998),The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures, 
and Systemic Implications Policy Analyses in International Economics 55. Also see, Radelet, Steven, and Jeffrey D. 
Sachs, (1998) "The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects,"Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, (1), 1-74. 
261
 See generally, Thacker (1999), who presents statistical evidence that suggests that the IMF  is more likely to lend 
to countries whose foreign policies shift towards U.S. foreign  policy preferences. [Thacker, Strom C.  (1999).  ―The 
High Politics of IMF Lending,‖ World Politics 52, 38-75]; see also, Oatley, T., & Yackee, J. (2000). Political 
determinants of. IMF balance of payments lending: The curse of the carabosse? IMF Working Paper 2000. IMF; see 
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US was the most dominant power after the WWII, but in order to keep the interest of other 
important partners the US was not able to retain the top most post of both the Bretten Woods 
institutions. US opted for the World Bank because the majority of the World Bank funds were 
provided by the US private capital market. Therefore, in order to keep confidence of the US 
investors and it opted for the top post of the World Bank.     
However, US dominance could be judged by the fact that the US kept its US dollar as reserve 
currency in the IMF. Moreover, the post of deputy MD of the IMF was created in 1949 and the 
nomination for this post was left with the US.  
After the creation of EU the US is not the only one to have the veto power because collective 
votes of EU members are also more than 15% of the total votes of the IMF. Thus, in current 
international economic scenario, the Bretten Wood institutions are constitutionally dominated by 
the US and its allies (mainly EU). 
The Gentlemen’s Agreement is the longstanding convention between the US and Europe which 
divide the World Bank presidency and the IMF managing directorship between US and Europe. 
According to this convention Europe takes the top most post of the IMF and the US nominates 
the World Bank‘s president. The Europeans, specifically Germany, construes the convention as 
symmetric: the US is not questioned about its nominee for the World Bank presidency; Europe is 
entitled the same treatment for its candidate at the IMF.
262
   
The only guidance for selection of the managing director in the Articles of Agreement of the 
IMF is given in Article XII, Section 4: ―The Executive Board shall select a Managing Director 
who shall not be a Governor or an Executive Director. . . . The Managing Director shall cease to 
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hold office when the Executive Board so decides.‖263 The World Bank and the IMF are not 
administered by formal consensus decision making. In practice, informal weighted voting 
calculation, which is also referred as straw voting, is done to find out level of support.
264
 Once 
sufficient support of a candidate is evident then the other candidates withdraw and formal voting 
is circumvented.  
US backing for the nomination of a European as MD did not preclude the US‘s dominance at the 
IMF. The post of deputy managing director was created in 1949 and a new convention created 
that the post would be occupied by a US contender in order to make sure a keen eye on IMF 
functioning. Moreover, the US was notably active in the selection process of the early MDs. 
Although IMF‘s MDs were Europeans, they should be Europeans approved by the US.265 Due to 
intra-European competition,
 
in recent selections,
 
the decisive choice rests with
 
non-European 
members of the IMF. However, the result was quite uniform that is every MD was a European 
national.
266
 
2. World Bank 
The World Bank was created to finance the reconstruction of countries affected by World War II. 
However, over a period of time, it has evolved into a development institution, working in close 
cooperation with its other partners all of whom are part of the World Bank Group. These 
independent institutions, other than the World Bank, include the International Development 
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Association (IDA)
267
, the International Finance Corporation (IFC)
268
, the Multilateral Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA)
269
, and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID)
270
.  
Historically, the World Bank did not undergo any structural changes. However, the tug of war 
between the US‘s influence in the running of the World Bank and that of the rest of the world 
required special attention.
271
 This thesis only takes into account the World Bank (formally the 
IBRD)‘s historical evolutionary role and the main approach involved in its running (realist or 
liberal). The other institutions under the World Bank Group are also important but are separate 
institutions in themselves, and therefore fall outside the scope of this thesis. 
As mentioned in the preceding discussion on the evolving function of the IMF, the World Bank 
and the IMF were established mainly by the US and the UK. However, history speaks loudly that 
the World Bank was largely an American creation.
272
 Moreover, the realist involvement of the 
US in the functioning of the World Bank is clearly evident from history.  
Some scholars assert that the World Bank ―was not created neutral.‖273 The World Bank 
functioned to uphold the views of the US as to how the world economy should be organised, 
where to allocate resources, and in decisions about investment. Even though the earliest directors 
insisted upon moving the World Bank‘s head office from the US, they kept quiet once the US 
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made it clear that this would never happen.
 274
 Moreover, all files regarding World Bank loans 
initially went to the Director from the US and then to the World Bank staff.
275
 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was a major shift from the reconstruction of countries 
affected by war to the development of less-developed countries. This shift was not an easy one 
but circumstances led the way to the formation of two affiliates of the World Bank, the IDA and 
IFC. The US used these as an instrument for its foreign policy and in the Cold War time, the US 
used these institutions to keep countries away from Soviet influence. After the fall of the Soviet 
Union, the World Bank invested considerably in the former Soviet Bloc. In short, the functioning 
of the World Bank has been heavily influenced by the hegemonic decision-making of the US. If 
any country wishes to benefit from the World Bank, it first needs to come into the orbit of the 
US‘s foreign policy.  
The IMF and the World Bank did not go through any major institutional structural evolution, 
thus they have been briefly discussed in their historical context. However, the next part of the 
chapter discusses the evolution of the WTO which underwent major institutional structural 
change.  
3. Creation of the WTO  
The idea was also put forward at the Bretton Woods Conference of forming an international 
trade organisation. In this context, the US performed a key role and in December 1945, its State 
Department drafted the multilateral accord on the rules for international trade. These rules were 
seconded by the UK and were later proposed to other countries.  
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On 1 January 1942, the US President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, UK Prime Minister Sir 
Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill, Maxim Litvinov, of the USSR, and T. V. Soong, of China, 
signed a short document which came to be known as the United Nations Declaration [hereinafter 
the ―Declaration‖] and the very next day, representatives of twenty-two other nations added their 
signatures to this Declaration. The Declaration was formed in the light of the principles of the 
Atlantic Charter. According to the first clause of the Declaration, all the signatory nations had to 
subscribe to a common agenda of purpose and principles as stated in the Atlantic Charter.
276
  
Three years later, the US President called a conference in San Francisco (US) and invited only 
selected countries
277
 i.e. those which had announced war on Germany and Japan by March 1945 
and subscribed to the Declaration. The main purpose of this conference was the formation of an 
international organisation to facilitate cooperation in international law, international security, 
economic development, social progress and human rights. As a result of the San Francisco 
conference, on 24 October 1945, the United Nations [hereinafter the ―UN‖] came into existence.  
The existing and ongoing multilateral trade negotiations, to form an international trade 
organisation, were brought under the umbrella of the UN. The above-mentioned negotiations 
were dealt with within the framework of the UN‘s Economic and Social Council [hereinafter 
―ECOSOC‖]. ECOSOC, established under the UN Charter was the principal body for 
coordinating the economic, social, and related works of the 14 UN special agencies, functional 
commissions and five regional commissions.
278
 In 1946, ECOSOC adopted a resolution in favour 
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of forming an International Trade Organisation [hereinafter ―ITO‖] for the development and 
coordination of world trade.
279
 
In Geneva, in 1947, a meeting was held to discuss international trade. In this meeting, three main 
targets were set out: firstly, to draft a charter for the ITO; secondly, to prepare a schedule for the 
reduction of tariffs; and thirdly, to formulate a multilateral treaty related to the general principles 
of trade and tariffs [hereinafter ―GATT‖]. It was at the UN Conference on Trade and 
Employment held in March 1948 in Havana that the ITO charter was finalised as well as ratified. 
The scope of the ITO charter was wide; it included all matters relating to international trade and 
international economic activity, with rules covering not just commercial policy but also 
employment, commodity agreements, restrictive business practices, and international 
investment.
280
 The main features of the ITO included principles of non-discrimination, the 
promotion of free trade and the fact that decision-making power was with the majority of the 
members, each with one vote.
281
 
Unfortunately the ITO never entered into force as critical US support was not granted. The 
Republicans
282
 won control of Congress in 1948 and they were not in favour of the ITO, as they 
thought that the ITO would involve itself in the internal economic issues of the US. Thus, the 
ITO charter was repeatedly submitted to the US Congress for its approval but still did not see the 
light of day.
283
 The Executive Committee of the US, the Council of the International Chamber of 
Commerce, also condemned the draft of the ITO charter, as quoted by Diebold
284
,  
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"[it is a] dangerous document because it accepts practically all of the policies of 
economic nationalism; because it jeopardizes the free enterprise system by giving 
priority to a centralized national governmental planning of foreign trade; because it 
leaves a wide scope to discrimination, accepts the principles of economic insulation, and 
in effect commits all members of the ITO to state planning for full employment." 
During internal opposition to the ITO charter, the US was busy with other more important issues 
relating to its foreign affairs policy. Such as the Marshall Plan
285
 in 1948, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation
286
 in 1949, and the Korean War in 1950. So finally, Harry S. Truman (the 
US President who succeeded President Franklin D. Roosevelt) gave up and announced on 6 
December 1950 that the ITO would not be submitted for Congressional approval. The US 
officially abandoned the initiative on the ITO and the abandonment of the ITO by other countries 
was the natural corollary. As discussed earlier in this chapter,
287
 this was a result of the lack of 
US consent and backing which was necessary for the practical existence of any international 
institution which required its involvement.
288
  
The US, being the hegemon in the World at that time, led every important matter. As discussed 
in the theoretical framework, involvement of the hegemon is essential for initiating a regime, 
therefore, when the US backed out of the creation of the ITO, then it was clearly evident that the 
formation of the ITO would be completely sabotaged.    
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Fortunately, the collapse of the ITO did not extinguish the only means of liberalising world trade 
policies. Work on GATT was completed before the preparation of the ITO charter. Thus, the 
negotiating countries (23 in total)
289
 adopted the protocol of a provisional application of GATT 
which became effective on 1 January 1948. According to this protocol, the negotiating counties 
agreed to reduce tariffs amongst themselves. The GATT was primarily about mutual and 
reciprocal advantage in trade, and did not require Congressional approval, as the agreement 
(GATT) was covered under the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. 
290
 
GATT was viewed as an intermediate measure towards implementing the ITO and accelerating 
the reduction of tariffs on world trade pending the finalisation of the ITO. GATT was never 
designed to exist as an institution by itself, but was only meant to serve as a temporary 
agreement until it could be absorbed into the ITO structure. The failure to establish the ITO 
meant the absence of the ―third pillar‖291 of the Bretton Woods economic structure. Over the 
years, GATT gradually filled the gap for an international trade organisation. The signatory 
countries of GATT [hereinafter the ―Contracting Parties‖] held meetings regularly and new 
Contracting Parties joined GATT in successive years. Thus, GATT evolved into an ad-hoc 
international organisation, adopting its practices and agreements (which evolved over time) as its 
―charter‖.292 
                                                 
289
 Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, 
Lebanon, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, 
the UK, the US.  
290
 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 empowered the US President to enter into international treaties which 
were based on mutual and reciprocal advantage. Dam, Kenneth W., ‗Cordell Hull, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement 
Act, and the WTO‘, The Chicago Working Paper Series Index. Available at: 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html 
291
 First and second pillars of the Bretton Woods system were the IMF and the World Bank respectively.   
292
 The GATT charter is composed of all the GATT practices (such as MFN and national treatment principles) and 
all the existing tariff reductions and the associated agreements. Matsushita, M., Schoenbaum, Thomas J. and 
Mavroidis, Petros C., (2006) ‗The World Trade Organisation: Law, Practice, and Policy‘, Vol. 1, p. 3. Available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/utw_chap1_e.pdf   
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The rationale and objective of GATT, as stated in the preamble, was to promote rising living 
standards and to realising full employment by signing mutual beneficial agreements which aim at 
notable reduction of tariffs and other barriers of trade, and removing discriminatory treatment in 
global economy. Part I of GATT contained two articles, the first mandating unconditional Most 
Favoured Nation [hereinafter the ―MFN‖] 293 treatment for all the Contracting Parties and the 
second, being the annexed schedules of all the tariff reductions that arose during negotiations. 
Part II of GATT included the main rules on commercial policy but was applied provisionally,  
and in so doing, the Contracting Parties were only required to comply with the GATT rules to the 
maximum extent if the rules were consistent with the then existing national legislations of the 
Contracting Parties. Article III of GATT dealt with the ―National Treatment‖294 Principle. Article 
XI contained a general prohibition on quantitative restrictions; however Article XII exempted the 
Contracting Parties from following this general prohibition in the context of balance of payment 
safeguards. Article XIX stated the circumstances under which a GATT obligation could be 
annulled or withdrawn; provided the effected Contracting Parties were compensated. The other 
Articles dealt with routine issues such as customs valuation, marks of origin, and other technical 
matters. Part III of the Agreement is about the functioning of GATT. 
To achieve GATT‘s objectives, GATT held many tariff reduction negotiation rounds. Most of 
these rounds were successful and proved quite fruitful in the furtherance of achieving GATT‘s 
objectives. These negotiation rounds are very important and they illustrate the evolution of 
                                                 
293
Under the GATT, Contracting Parties cannot discriminate (under normal circumstances) between other 
Contracting Parties. If on Contracting Party gives special treatment (such as a lower customs duty rate for one of 
their products) to one Contracting Party then they have to give the same treatment to all of the GATT membership. 
For details visit: (http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm#seebox)  
294―National Treatment‖ is giving others the same treatment as one‘s own nationals, i.e. imported and locally 
produced goods should be treated equally. For details visit: 
(http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm#seebox) 
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GATT into the current IELR. The summary of these tariff reduction rounds, held under the 
umbrella of GATT, is depicted below. 
Table 3 Summary of the GATT trade rounds295 :  
Year Place/name Weighted tariff 
reduction
296 
Subjects covered Countries 
1947 Geneva -26 Tariffs 23 
1949 Annecy -3 Tariffs 13 
1951 Torquay -4 Tariffs 38 
1956 Geneva -3 Tariffs 26 
1960-1961 Geneva 
Dillon Round 
-4 Tariffs 26 
1964-1967 Geneva 
Kennedy Round 
-38 Tariffs and anti-
dumping measures 
62 
1973-1979 Geneva 
Tokyo Round 
-33 Tariffs, non-tariff 
measures, 
―framework‖ 
agreements 
102 
1986-1994 Geneva 
Uruguay Round 
-38 Tariffs, non-tariff 
measures, rules, 
services, intellectual 
property, dispute 
settlement, textiles, 
agriculture, creation of 
World Trade 
Organisation
297
, etc 
123 
2002-
(currently 
going on) 
Doha Round -- All goods and 
services, tariffs, non-
tariff measures, 
antidumping and 
subsidies, regional 
trade agreements, 
intellectual property, 
environment, dispute 
settlement, Singapore 
issues 
144 
                                                 
295
 Source: World Trade Organisation and updated by the author. 
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm  
296
 The calculation of average rates of reductions are weighted by MFN import values. (see World Trade Report, 
(2007), p. 207). 
297
 Hereinafter the ―WTO‖ 
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The eighth round, under the umbrella of GATT, was the Uruguay Round, Geneva, 1986-94. This 
round was extremely important and is discussed below.
298
 
In September 1986, the Uruguay Round was started by the ministers of the Contracting Parties. 
This round was by far the most grand and comprehensive of the multilateral trade negotiations 
held in the post-war era. It helped out both the developing and the developed countries to get out 
of recession.
299
 Previously, the developing countries did take sufficient interest in the multilateral 
trade negotiations. However, at the start and also during the Uruguay Round, the share of the 
developing countries increased notably in the world exports (trade in manufactured goods rose to 
20% from 12.5% by 1992 which was nearly 75 % of their total trade). In global market the 
developing countries emerged as significant competitors.    
Despite the many years of delay and negotiating impasses, the Uruguay Round achieved 
considerably more than half of its objectives. For example, and in order to illustrate the 
magnitude of its efforts, the Uruguay Round produced the Final Act which was signed in 
Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994, weighing 385 pounds and including over 22,000 pages. 
Just the reproduction of the basic text as part of the Final Act totalled approximately 424 
pages.
300
 
The most important objectives of the Uruguay Round were to extend the rule-based discipline of 
GATT treaties to three new subject areas: trade in services; trade in agricultural products; and the 
                                                 
298
 See generally, Golt, Sidney (1988). The GATT negotiations 1986-90, origins, issues & prospects. Publisher 
(London): British-North American Committee; see also, Diane Publishing Company (Editor) (1995). The Results of 
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Market Access for Goods and Services: Overview of the 
Results; see also Schott, Jeffrey J.  and Johanna W. Buurman (1994). The Uruguay round: an assessment.  Volume 
39 of Policy analyses in international economics. Institute for International Economics. 
299
 There was global recession during the Uruguay Round. And it is considered that Uruguay Round acted as a 
stimulus to the economy to come out of recession. 
300
 Kenen, Peter B., (1994) ‗Managing the World Economy: Fifty Years After Bretton Woods‘, Institute for 
International Economics, p. 131. 
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protection of intellectual property. Moreover, the round gave priority to the negotiation of new 
rules governing subsidies, changes in dispute settlement procedures, attention to the problems of 
textile trade, and the further elaboration of the rules relating to product standards. 
The most important result of the Uruguay Round was the establishment of the charter of the 
long-awaited WTO for the effective implementation of the trade rounds. The WTO was designed 
to be an international organisation to oversee and promote international trade liberalisation and 
on 1 January 1995, it succeeded GATT, which had been operating as a de facto international 
trade organisation since its formation in 1947. By creating the WTO as a formal international 
trade organisation, the Bretton Woods Economic structure which comprised of the IMF, the 
World Bank and ITO (as proposed at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944) was accomplished. 
The ITO could not have survived as an international trade organisation for long as it was not 
supported by some major economic powers at that time, thus leaving a gap in the Bretton Woods 
System. 
The other results of the Uruguay Round were remarkable and the original intentions of the 
ministerial conference which initiated the Uruguay Round were successfully achieved. There 
were twelve areas,
301
 discussed below, in which the Uruguay Round made important 
achievements. 
1. Services 
GATT deals with tangible goods. A wide range of the services economy, ranging from hotels 
and restaurants to personal services and many more
302
, were considered domestic activities and 
                                                 
301
 See, chapter IX ―Topics for Negotiation,‖ in Golt, Sidney (1988). The GATT negotiations 1986-90, origins, 
issues & prospects. Publisher (London): British-North American Committee. 
302
Rail transport, telecommunications, health, education and basic insurance services etc.  
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hence, were not covered by GATT. In the meantime, the global ―services sector‖303 has grown 
consistently since the 1970s, accounting for over 60% of global employment and production to 
date and representing nearly 24% of total trade (calculated on BOP basis
304
).
305
 However, many 
services, which were previously taken as domestic activities, have become gradually part of the 
international activities. This growth in the services sector has been fuelled by the invention of 
modern communication systems (such as tele-education services tele-health; electronic banking; 
etc.) and the opening up of old and strong monopolistic sectors (such as postal and 
telecommunication services) in many countries. This enhanced tradability of services created the 
need for a multilateral discipline for this sector. It was in the Uruguay Round that a decision was 
finally made to broaden talks to include trade in services. This was carried out under the 
umbrella of the WTO through the General Agreement on Trade in Services [hereinafter 
―GATS‖]306, which was set up as the framework for negotiation on ―trade in services‖307. At 
present, 150 nations have signed up to participate in GATS.
308
 
2. Intellectual Property 
The agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property [hereinafter ―TRIPS‖] was a remarkable 
success of the Uruguay Round. It created significant new global regulations for the protection of 
intellectual property. Through this agreement, the Contracting Parties endeavoured to standardise 
the rules by narrowing the gaps between the ways in which these rights were protected around 
                                                 
303
 A services sector is that part of the economy which is based on activities, rather than tangible goods, and which 
aims to satisfy a human need.  
304
IMF definition: "The BOP or balance of payments is a statistical statement that summarizes transactions between 
residents and non-residents during a period." (‗Overview of the Framework‘, IMF Balance of Payment Manual, Ch. 
2, Paragraph 2.15) also available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bop/2007/bopman6.htm 
305
For further details about the Services Sector and its liberalization visit : 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm 
306
 Annex 1B of WTO agreement.  
307
 Article I of GATS. 
308
 For further details about GATS see generally , Understanding the WTO, available at www.wto.org 
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the globe. It created the minimum levels of protection which each contracting party is obliged to 
provide to the intellectual property of other Contracting Parties.  
The topics dealt under TRIPS are as follows
309
:  
• Copyright and related rights;  
• Trademarks, including service marks;  
• Geographical indications;  
• Industrial designs;  
• Patents;  
• Layout-designs of integrated circuits;   
• Undisclosed information.  
The wider issues covered by the TRIPS are summarised as follows:
310
 
• The application of the basic principles of international intellectual property agreements;  
• How to provide sufficient protection to intellectual property rights?  
• Adequate implementation of intellectual property rights  
• Dispute settlement and intellectual property rights;  
• Special transitional measures for incorporation of TRIPS into domestic system. 
3. Investments 
The countries decided
311
 to disregard actions related to investment that restrain or influence 
particular kinds of investments i.e. to offer "national treatment" to investors from other 
Contracting Parties and to disregard quotas and other barriers.  
                                                 
309
For the detail on the scope of TRIPS see:  http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm3_e.htm 
 
310See ‗Understanding the WTO‘, 3rd ed, p. 39, previously published as ―Trading into the Future‖,the WTO 
Information and Media Relations Division. Also  available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf 
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4. Agriculture 
The Uruguay Round created the first multilateral agreement devoted to the area of agriculture i.e. 
the Agriculture Agreement
312
. The object of this agreement is to improve trade in the field of 
agriculture and to formulate more market-based policies for this sector. In this respect, the 
Contracting Parties attempt to enhance predictability and certainty for the importation and 
exportation of agriculture-related products. It was considered to be a noteworthy first move in 
the direction to achieve a regulated, fair, competitive and a less distorted field. In 1995, the 
Agriculture Agreement, along with all its committed tariffs and tariff quotas, became 
operational. The Contracting Parties, present at the Uruguay Round, also agreed that developed 
countries over a period of six year would reduce uniformly the tariffs by an average of 36%. The 
developing countries would be expected to reduce tariffs uniformly over a period of ten year up 
to 24% and the least-developed countries were not required to reduce their tariffs.
313
 
5. Subsidies and Countervailing Duties 
The Uruguay Round formed a new agreement namely, the Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measure
314
. This agreement revolves around two main things: first of all, it regulates the exercise 
of subsidies, and secondly, it oversees the measures taken by Contracting Parties to offset the 
influence of subsidies (the countervailing measures). 
6. Textiles 
                                                                                                                                                             
311
 In Uruguay Round Trade-Related Investment Measures (hereinafter the ―TRIMs‖) Agreement was also signed.  
 
312
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag_01_e.htm. And for a summary Agreement on Agriculture see: 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#aAgreement 
 
313
 See ‗Understanding the WTO‘, 3rd ed, p. 26-8, previously published as ―Trading into the Future‖,the WTO 
Information and Media Relations Division. Also  available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf 
 
314
 A full copy of the agreement is available at : 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm#subsidies 
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Textiles, part of the special textile regime known as the Multi-Fiber Arrangement
315
 [hereinafter 
the ―MFA‖] escaped the GATT provisions but was covered in the Uruguay Round in the form of 
an agreement to phase out the MFA‘s effects, over a course of a decade.  The phase-out took 
place in four stages and these phase-out stages are illustrated in the table below. According to 
this table, the phase-out was carried out in two directions; one to bring textile products under 
GATT and the second was the gradual decrease in the quotas (ultimately eliminating them).
316
 
Table 4 
Four steps over 10 years to 
bring Textile under GATT 
obligations. 
Percentage of products to 
be brought under 
GATT(including removal 
of any quotas) 
How fast remaining 
quotas should open 
up, if 1994 rate was 
6% 
Step 1: 1 Jan 1995   
(to 31 Dec 1997)  
16%(minimum, taking 
1990 imports as base) 
 
6.96% per year 
Step 2: 1 Jan 1998 
(to 31 Dec 2001)  
17% 8.7% 
per year 
Step 3: 1 Jan 2002   
(to 31 Dec 2004)  
18% 11.05% per year 
Step 4: 1 Jan 2005  
Full integration into GATT (and 
final elimination of quotas). 
Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing terminates. 
49%(maximum) No quotas left 
 
7. Standards 
In the Uruguay Round, the Contracting Parties expanded the rules for product standards 
following the achievement of the Tokyo Round. There were some major policy differences
317
, 
such as the conflict between environmental concerns and trade policy objectives. Article 20 of 
                                                 
315
 MFA regulated the textile trade since 1974 until the creation of the WTO. It basically allowed quotas limiting 
imports into countries whose local industries were being negatively affected by sharply rising imports. 
316
 For details on Textiles and its phase out plan, see ‗Understanding the WTO‘, 3rd ed, p. 32, previously published 
as ―Trading into the Future‖, the WTO Information and Media Relations Division. Also  available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf 
317
 The developed countries, as contrary to the developing countries, supported the idea of environmental protection 
over the trade goal. 
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GATT
318
 permits governments to take action so as to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health, provided they do not discriminate or use this as hidden protectionism. Moreover, two 
specific WTO agreements
319
 were negotiated in the Uruguay Round, which are directed at food 
safety and animal and plant health and safety, and with product standards in general. Both these 
agreements attempt to address the importance of product standards while stressing the 
importance of avoiding protectionism in disguise. 
8. Safeguards 
An inability to reach agreement on safeguards and the escape clause measures was the foremost 
shortcoming of the Tokyo Round. In this regard, the Uruguay Round resulted in an impressive 
and ambitious safeguard code (i.e. the Agreement on Safeguards)
320
. It provides the rules and 
criteria for regular usage of the escape clause and further, it set up rules against the intentional 
usage of the export restraints as a protectionist tool.  
9. Market Access 
Talks at the Uruguay Round focused considerable attention to progress on the question of market 
access. It was achieved through extensive cutbacks on tariff
321
 and non-tariff barriers to trade and 
on the creation of an unambiguous, enforceable international trading system. The terms of the 
Uruguay Round agreement afforded additional period to the developing countries than the 
                                                 
318
 Article XX deals with General Exceptions. 
319
 Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement [hereinafter the ―SPS‖] it is a separate agreement which sets out 
basic rules on food safety and animal and plant health standards. The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement 
[hereinafter the ―TBT‖] tries to ensure technical regulations, standards, testing and certification process do not cause 
needless hurdles in international trade. 
320
 The Agreement on Safeguards lays down the rules for usage of safeguard actions according to Article XIX of 
GATT 1994. Safeguard actions are classified as ―emergency‖ measures in relation to rise in imports of specific 
commodities, provided that these imports are creating or endangering to cause severe harm to the local industry of 
the importing Contracting Party. Example of Safeguard measures is a quantitative import restriction or increase in 
agreed duty. For further details visit:  http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/safeg_e/safeint.htm  
321
 For example GATT Contracting Parties decided to reduce import tariffs by an average of 36%. 
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developed countries for conformity; the least-developed countries were afforded much extra 
period for compliance with market access commitments. 
10. Developing Country Integration 
As an outcome of the Uruguay Round, the developing countries, which previously did not take 
an active part, were fully incorporated into the GATT system. Excluding the Least Developed 
Countries [hereinafter the ―LDC322‖], this agreement contains an obligatory prerequisite that all 
countries, including developing countries, have to stick to their tariff and services commitments. 
11. Dispute Settlement 
GATT 1947 had a very limited approach towards dispute settlement, even though it did 
expressly provide, in Articles XXII and XXIII, for consultation and the submission of disputes to 
the Contracting Parties. However, over time, this practice (consultation and submission of 
disputes to the Contracting Parties) evolved as a rule-based system. For instance, in the late 
1950s, the practice was to set up panels of individuals to identify the issues in the dispute and to 
recommend their findings to the Contracting Parties. Before the evolution of this practice, 
disputes were resolved by the representatives of governments in a broader context.
323
 
As time passed, the Contracting Parties increasingly started to use the panel process. Gradually, 
more of the reports began to focus on the clear-cut and material questions of the violation of 
GATT obligations. At the closing stage of the Tokyo Round in 1979, the participants agreed on 
certain aspects related to dispute settlement
324
 which formalised the concepts and practices 
                                                 
322
 The United Nations in 1971 declared LDCs as a category of countries that are considered extremely deprived in 
their growth patterns (mostly due to geographical factors), and facing high threat to be unsuccessful in overcoming 
poverty. Available at: http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3618&lang=1 . And also see 
http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/list.htm for the complete list of LDCs. 
323
 Kenen, Peter B. (1994) ‗Managing the World Economy: Fifty Years After Bretton Woods‘, Institute for 
International Economics, p. 140. 
324
 This understanding on the dispute settlement became the bases for the formation of a proper treaty text in this 
area in the Uruguay Round. 
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relating to dispute settlement procedures that had then developed. During the Uruguay Round a 
comprehensive adjudication system
325
 was established, which dealt with all segments of the 
Uruguay Round agreements. It also had proper legal text which served as the basis for carrying 
out the dispute settlement process. 
The Uruguay Round agreement established a more organised method with more plainly- defined 
steps in the dispute settlement process. It established an efficient rules for the settlement of cases, 
with flexible time limits set at different stages of the procedure. The agreement also stressed the 
need for the quick settlement of disputes as part of the effective performance of the WTO. It sets 
out, in substantial detail, the processes and the schedule to be pursued in adjudicative process. It 
would normally take less than one year to 15 months from the first ruling to its appeal, if a case 
stretches to its full course.
326
 
12. The WTO Charter 
One of the chief accomplishments of the Uruguay Round was the creation of an international 
charter for a new permanent international trade organisation (the WTO). The WTO, as a proper 
international institution, took the place of GATT (which was a provisional arrangement) for the 
smooth progress of the international cooperation in the trade and economic scenario.  
In addition to the general purpose of the WTO (mentioned in the above paragraph), the WTO has 
some specific tasks to perform
327
 which are; (1) to provide a forum for negotiations among the 
                                                 
325
 The Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes [hereinafter 
the ―DSU‖]. 
326
 ‗Understanding the WTO‘, 3rd ed, p. 55-6, previously published as ―Trading into the Future‖, the WTO 
Information and Media Relations Division. Also  available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf  
327
 See Matsushita, M., Schoenbaum, Thomas J. and Mavroidis, Petros C., (2006) ‗The World Trade Organisation : 
Law, Practice, and Policy‘, Vol. 1, p. 9, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/utw_chap1_e.pdf 
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―Members328‖ both for current matters and any future agreements; (2) to administer the system of 
dispute settlement; (3) to oversee the Trade Policy Review Mechanism [hereinafter the 
―TPRM‖]; and (4) to cooperate as necessary with the IMF and the World Bank, the two other 
institutions of the Bretton Woods institutions.
329
 
 
US and EU Dominance and the WTO negotiations  
The WTO as an IEI is constitutionally liberally institutionalised, however. In practice it slightly 
diverges from liberally institutionalised values
330
 as the dominance of US and EU can be 
observed within the WTO negotiations process. Some examples of imbalanced decision making 
are discussed below.  
According to some scholars,
 331
 the WTO Secretariat does not purport to be an impartial body 
and play a significant part in supporting the decision-making process at the WTO which is in 
favour of developed countries. This may be due to the imbalance of the composition of the WTO 
staff. Nearly 80% of the WTO members are developing countries but only 20% of the WTO‘s 
staff is from developing countries.
332
 
As the WTO is based on equal voting system, the large economic actors– mainly the EC and the 
US – have to significantly contest in WTO negotiations process. The developing countries with 
smaller share in international trade have equal standing as of the US and the EU. However, the 
WTO negotiation process is a tug of war and all the Contracting Parties try to negotiate best for 
themselves. In this negotiating scenario, the US and the EU frequently join hands as a strategy. 
                                                 
328
 The term ―Members‖ refers to those countries which signed the WTO charter.  
329
 WTO Agreement Article III. 
330
 REF 
331
 Fatoumata Jawara (2003) The cunning bully - EU bribery and arm-twisting at the WTO. pp2 
332
 Fatoumata Jawara (2003) The cunning bully - EU bribery and arm-twisting at the WTO. pp2 
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The first step of their strategy is by convincing different groups of countries, beginning with the 
large economies with which they have shared agenda.
333
 
The confidential consultations between the US and EC results in consultations with Canada and 
Japan, with significant participation of the WTO Secretariat (the Green Room consultations), to 
ascertain shared views. Collectively, the US, the EC, Japan and Canada compose the 
Quadrilateral group which is a strong block which overshadows the WTO negotiation 
procedure.
334
 
Another strategy opted by the US was to put non-compliant countries on a black list. Moreover, 
it was made clear to the black-listed Contracting Parties that slight resistance to Quadrilateral 
group proposal would cause a total termination of bilateral dialogues in other subjects of mutual 
advantage. Even some Ambassadors were removed by the Contraction Parties on the request of 
the US. 
335
 
Another strategy that rarely disappoints is the attraction of aid, debt relief and technical 
assistance to developing countries. It might be a coincidence but Tanzania (whose Minister was 
chair of the LDC), obtained multilateral debt assistance from the IMF/WB two weeks after Doha 
negotiation. It seems to be part of carrot and stick policy of the Quadrilateral group. Similarly, 
the countries who were strong and who opposed the agenda of the Quadrilateral group, such as 
India, were isolated and portrayed as ‗obstructionists.‘336  
Bargaining power in the WTO is a very important factor. Trade between the EU and the EU and 
their trading partners is quite significant. Large economic powers have the capacity to negotiate 
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Fatoumata Jawara (2003) The cunning bully - EU bribery and arm-twisting at the WTO.  
334
Fatoumata Jawara (2003) The cunning bully - EU bribery and arm-twisting at the WTO.  
335
 The US Trade Representative had put non-compliant countries on a blacklist weeks before Doha, as detailed in a 
leaked letter between the USTR Robert Zoellick and a Washington based Southern envoy. About six Ambassadors 
were also removed from Geneva during and after the Doha conference. Fatoumata Jawara (2003) The cunning bully 
- EU bribery and arm-twisting at the WTO.  
336
 Fatoumata Jawara (2003) The cunning bully - EU bribery and arm-twisting at the WTO.  
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for extra concessions in multilateral trade negotiations process.
337
 Whether trade bargaining is 
form of reciprocal assurances of market opening or coercions of market closure, or a mixture of 
both.  Big economies are at favourable position to bargain in the WTO negotiation process than 
countries with considerably small economies.
338
 However, as some developing countries have 
emerged as economic powers, such as China, India, and Brazil, the bargaining dominance of the 
developed countries is considerably reduced. The key to the WTO negotiations is to form 
effective coalition be it a developed or the developing country.
339
  
In short, despite divergence of WTO practices from the liberal institutional values, there is a 
hope that one day developing countries which are occasionally dominated by developed 
countries (mainly the US and EU) will gain economic strength and will be in a position to 
mitigate the dominance of the developed countries in WTO system.  Whereas in IMF and World 
Bank dominance of the developed countries (mainly US and EU) is constitutionally embedded in 
these institutions through the weighted voting system. Thus, there is less likelihood that a 
developing country can mitigate dominance of the US and EU in Bretton Woods institutions.    
C. Conclusion: 
This chapter has documented the historical background and evolution of the IELR. The IELR is 
rooted in the events arising from the World Wars period. The US emerged as the most dominant 
power after WW II and created the international regime as a hegemon. At that time, the global 
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economy was based on realism so all the institutions created at that time and which sustained had 
realist aspects in them. The best examples of such institutions are the IMF and the World Bank. 
The US used these institutions as a tool for its foreign policy. These institutions had a really 
tough time surviving in the growing liberally-institutionalised global economy mostly attributed 
to GATT than the WTO. The main reason for the survival of these institutions was due to 
historical events, such as several economic crises and the Soviet Union fallout. These events 
placed countries in a vulnerable position due to the deficiency of money and under-development, 
thus leaving the no option then to rely on these IEIs (such as IMF). 
Unfortunately, the application of the Bretton Woods System remained incomplete, as one of the 
pillars of this system, the ITO, ceased to exist as an international trade organisation. However, 
GATT, which was formed as a provisional setup until the formation of the ITO, gradually filled 
the gaps in the Bretton Woods Structure left by the failure of the ITO. 
It is widely accepted, and also shown in this chapter, that GATT played a central role in shaping 
post-WW II trade policy. Through the eight rounds of trade negotiations that followed the 
inception of GATT in 1947, the average tariffs on goods have fallen considerably, from over 
40% to less than 4%. Finally, in 1995, in result of the Uruguay Round, the WTO was created as a 
formal international trade organisation to fill the gap left in the Bretton Woods Structure. Over 
this period of time, membership of GATT (and its successor, the WTO) has risen from 23 
countries to 153, which shows how effective this international organisation is in the international 
economic scenario.   
The WTO emerged with complete and effective IEIs which covered all aspects of trade and also 
other components of the Economic Cycle. The current IELR, which is mainly based on IEIs (as 
the main non-state actors) gets its power and source from the IEIs. The most important of these 
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IEIs are the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO. All these IEIs were originally part of the 
Bretton Woods Economic structure and the current IELR arose from the Bretton Woods 
structure. The figure at the end of the chapter summarises the evolution of the IELR. 
This chapter focused on the history and evolution of the current IELR in which IEIs play a 
central role, but this regime no longer needs the hegemon to run the regime, as it is based on 
liberal institutionalism. The next two sections are dedicated to highlighting the institutional role 
of the IMF (including related discussion of the World Bank) and the WTO in the context of the 
IELR and the Economic Cycle.   
Rao Raza Hashim 
128 
School Of Law 
University Of Warwick 
Figure 4 
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SECTION TWO:  
A. Introduction 
As discussed in the theoretical framework and shown in the preceding chapter, the 
interdependence of national economies has necessitated states to cooperate with each other to 
tackle the implications of this. Sovereign states cooperate with each other to set the rules of the 
game for the global economy in order to reap collective gains. The most common and effective 
way of cooperation at international level is through international organisations. The sovereign 
states as rational units give up part of their sovereignty by allowing IEIs to tackle the 
implications of globalisation and interdependence. The IEIs, in their institutional capacities, set 
the rules of the game for the global economy and collectively these rules takes the form of a 
regime i.e. the IELR.
340
  
The foundations of the current IELR were laid down by the US who was the hegemon at that 
time.
341
 However, over time, the dominance of the US has decreased but the IELR is still 
effective and strong. As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, this thesis looks at the IELR 
through the liberal institutionalist lens. In other words, the existence of a hegemon is not vital for 
the effective functioning of the regime, and this is because rational states always calculate their 
own interest or benefit in cooperation.
342
  
This section highlights the role of the IMF in its institutional capacity in setting the rules of the 
game in its area of specialisation. Moreover, these rules of the game create certainty and 
predictability within the international economic framework. This certainty and predictability acts 
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as a stimulus in the international economic framework which leads to a more stable and balanced 
growth of the global economy.  
B. Argument  
The argument put forward in this thesis is that this global economy is liberally institutionalised 
and is governed by the IELR. The IELR‘s main source of strength is in the IEIs which have 
contributed significantly towards the success of the current regime. The IMF is one of the most 
important constituents of this regime. 
The IEIs, in their institutional capacities, set the rules of the game of the global economy. The 
current IELR is not reliant on the continuous existence of a hegemon. The main reason for the 
rational sovereign states to give up part of their sovereignty and cooperate with each is to reap 
the collective gains. This approach is the liberal institutionalists viewpoint which emphasises 
cooperation for mutual gain.
343
 However, if we look at the IMF‘s functioning, we can identify 
the existence of realist insight within it and it is still being dominated by a hegemon (US). The 
realist approach of these institutions is judged on the basis of decision-making and the 
involvement of members (other than the hegemon). 
As a result, Section Two shows that the IMF currently plays an important institutional role even 
though it does not explicitly acknowledge it.  It is highly involved in making the rules of the 
game for the international economic scenario, and thereby structuring the IELR. The argument 
put forward here is that the effectiveness of the IMF is limited by its refusal to openly 
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acknowledge this institutional role: acknowledging that it has this institutional role would allow 
it to fulfil its role more effectively. 
However, even if this institutional role was fully acknowledged, the IMF remains handicapped 
by their institutional structure, which gives excessive control to wealthier states (specially the 
US).  As a result, these IEIs are not well designed to properly fulfil their institutional role.     
Liberal Institutionalism and the IMF  
The rational free will of the sovereign states to cooperate with each other for the collective 
benefit of all is the essence of liberal institutionalism.
344
 Persistent cooperation in liberal 
institutionalism is not as a result of subjugation but instead due to collective gain. Contribution to 
the running of or decision-making within the IEI tells whether the weak members are forced 
(which also includes not having any alternative) to be part of cooperative arrangement or 
whether they are cooperating of their own rational free will. To further elaborate this point the 
next paragraph sheds light on voting and decision-making within the IMF.        
Voting and decision making in the IMF (realist aspect) 
The Board of Governors is the sovereign body of the IMF and each country is represented by a 
governor; most commonly, a country‘s central bank governor or the Minister of Finance assumes 
that role. The Board of Governors meets once a year. Therefore, for day-to-day business, the 
Board of Governors delegates its powers to the Executive Board. The Executive Board is 
comprised of twenty-four members, and each of the following eight countries has the opportunity 
to nominate a director for the Executive Board: United States, Japan, Germany, France, United 
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Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, China, and Russia. The remaining sixteen directors are selected (mostly 
elected) by groups of states.
345
 
In the IMF, decision-making is based on a weighted voting system. In principle, the larger the 
economy, the greater the voting rights. This approach allows the bigger economies to squeeze the 
smaller economies and run the IMF for their own benefit. However, even this is not wholly true, 
because emerging economies are significantly under-represented in IMF decision-making (see 
the table below). The minimum voting requirement to get anything passed is 85% of the vote and 
the US alone has 16.78% of the vote, meaning that the US‘s approval is necessary in order to get 
any decision passed by the Executive Board.  
 
Table 5  Voting Rights in the IMF, 1945–2011 (in percent) and GDP (in percent) of share in world. 
COUNTRY 
 
%Voting 
Rights 
(1945)
346
 
 
%Voting 
Rights 
(2011)
347
 
% GDP share 
of world total 
(2011)
 348
 
% GDP share of 
world total 
(2016)
 349
 
Industrialised Countries : 
United States 
Japan 
Germany 
France 
United Kingdom 
 
67.5 
32.0 
– 
– 
5.9 
15.3 
 
 
16.78 
  6.24 
  5.82 
  4.30 
  4.30 
 
 
19.382 
  5.665 
  3.875 
  2.826 
  2.882 
 
17.770 
4.953 
3.356 
2.494 
2.605 
Oil Producing Countries: 
Saudi Arabia 
1.4 
– 
 
  2.81 
 
  0.839 
 
0.838 
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DC: 
Russia 
China 
India 
Brazil 
31.1 
– 
7.2 
5.0 
2.0 
 
  2.39 
  3.82 
  2.34 
  1.72 
 
  3.001 
14.316 
  5.617 
  2.943 
 
2.941 
18.002 
6.632 
2.880 
 
 
The dominance of the US has been documented earlier in Chapter III (History and Evolution of 
the IELR). The US used the IMF and the World Bank as a tool for its foreign policy and only if a 
country was within the orbit of the US was it then welcomed. The main contributors to the 
current regime (IELR) originate from the Bretton Woods Conference; that is the IMF and the 
World Bank. The US, being the most dominant power after WWII, created the IMF and World 
Bank with the support of UK,
350
  for which it also needed to take into account the collective gain 
of other members. However, it is evident from history that the US made its dominance clear from 
the very beginning.
351
     
Over the passage of time other countries also gained economic strength. The voting power of the 
US reduced from 32% in 1945 to 16.87% in 2012. UK‘s voting strength reduced from 15.3% to 
4.3%. The EU collectively also enjoys a veto power in the IMF. Initially it was the US and UK‘s 
hegemony but over the passage of time Europeans emerged as a significant economic power. 
They didn‘t challenge US hegemony and instead participated in the US hegemonic system and 
gained strength. Therefore, it is no more only US‘s dominance but a mutual dominance of US 
and EU.  
More recently, the realist aspect of the IMF, while operating within in the liberal institutional 
framework of the IELR, can be judged by criticism made by the Meltzer Commission which was 
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351
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formed by the US Congress. It states in its report that ―[t]he United States use the IMF as a 
vehicle to achieve their political ends.‖352 This point made here is that the IMF is significantly 
involved in setting the rules of the game but at the same time, it intentionally does not want to 
highlight this role,  reason being to simply avoid criticism and discussion about the equal (or 
relevantly reasonable) involvement of less developed countries.   
This thesis does not assert that there should be complete democratic decision-making in the IMF 
because in the current international political economic scenario, it does not seem possible.
353
  
(There exists a highly optimistic view in the context of democracy in the international system 
which calls for completely democratising all IEIs.
354
) However, this chapter only calls for the 
incorporation of democratic values
355
 into the IMF institutional framework, because, then, the 
IMF can easily and comfortably focus on its institutional role. This institutional role, which the 
IMF does not explicitly state, is essential for enhancing certainty and predictability in the global 
economic scenario.  
The IMF makes and promotes global regulations and its focus is on the achievement of its goals 
without explicitly stating or emphasising its rule-making role. This may be due to a lack of the 
democratic values in its institutional framework which are essential for a rational state to 
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cooperate for mutual gain.
356
 Despite the absence of democratic values within the IMF 
framework, its rational constituents actively follow it. As discussed in chapter III (History and 
Evolution of the IELR), this is due to the absence of any other alternative in the event of 
desperate monetary need.
357
  
The big economies that have a major stake in IMF financing have a higher percentage of voting 
rights. However, over time, the IMF‘s role as an IEI has evolved. 358 Now, it is not only involved 
in financing but also in global regulations to a significant extent. Therefore, decision-making or 
involvement in the formation of global regulations should involve its members substantially. 
This would also increase the accountability of the IMF as an IEI.
359
 However, the financing role 
could still be mainly controlled by the major stakeholders.  
The IMF needs to split its institutional role from the financing role in order to function better and 
with more strength, in order to enhance certainty and predictability in the global economic 
scenario, for the simple reason that it becomes easier to improve a role or function if the IMF 
clearly admits its institutional role.       
Thus, this section maintains that, idealistically, the IMF needs to separate its financing role from 
its global regulation-making and enforcement function (through its institutional role). Moreover, 
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the involvement of all members in the formation of global regulations should be made possible, 
with democratic values embedded in this process. This way, the IMF would create the rules of 
the game (as part of the IELR) which would be, to a very large extent, free from realistic insight. 
Furthermore, the IMF requires an effective adjudicating body in order to have a comprehensive 
institutional structure and function.   
These major structural changes (mentioned above) may possibly align the IMF‘s institutional 
role with that of liberal institutionalist insight and in doing so, the IMF would become part and 
parcel of the liberally institutionalised IELR and would have a better chance of improving its 
institutional role.   
C. Section Two Format 
This section is divided into two chapters, namely; the IMF and its Legal Framework (Chapter 
IV) and the Institutional role of the IMF in achieving stable and balanced growth of the global 
economy through the International Economic Framework (Chapter V). Chapter IV is dedicated 
to the legal framework of the IMF. From a legal pluralist approach, the IMF‘s legal framework 
acts as a superior set of rules in its specialised area. The significance of discussing the IMF‘s 
legal framework in this thesis is that it is essential to know the basics for a better understanding 
of the institutional role of the IMF in achieving stable and balanced growth in the global 
economy. The next chapter of this section will talk about the IMF‘s legal framework. 
Chapter V is dedicated to characterising the IMF‘s functions as an institutional role as defined in 
the theoretical framework. The purpose of this part of the chapter is to show that the IMF has an 
institutional role and is effectively part of a global regulation-making and implementation 
process. However, the IMF does not explicitly express its institutional role and thus loses the 
opportunity to improve upon it 
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IV. IMF and its legal framework 
 
The importance of this chapter is that it provides a foundation for the next chapter, and deals 
with the legal basis of the institutional role of IMF in achieving stable and balanced growth 
within the global economy.  Under this heading, the basic legal framework of IMF is discussed, 
around which its institutional role revolves. The institutional role of the IMF is based on the 
Articles of Agreement
360
 and the way in which the IMF operates through its legal framework
361
 
to promote global stable and balanced economic growth.   
For this purpose, this chapter is divided into three sections: the first relates to the key points to 
understanding the IMF‘s legal framework; the second section highlights the purpose of the legal 
framework; and the third section discusses the main tools of the legal framework. The next 
subheading refers to the main assumptions related to the IMF‘s legal framework.   
A. Key Points underlining the IMF’s Legal Framework 
To develop a deeper knowledge of the IMF‘s legal framework and the ways in which it opts to 
address concerns surrounding stable and balanced economic growth, it is essential to take into 
account a couple of key points. The first is that the IMF‘s legal framework is mainly a part of 
public international law.
362
  The approach towards the IMF‘s legal framework is the legal 
pluralist approach.  
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 Available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm 
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technical assistance, and financial assistance. 
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This subheading focuses on the operations managed by the IMF‘s legal framework and its 
interactive relationship with its constituent member countries. Therefore, this part of the chapter 
does not delve into the domestic policies of the member countries i.e. the impact of the IMF‘s 
legal framework on the domestic legal economic systems of member countries. However, the 
IMF‘s impact on domestic systems (legal transplant) will be discussed in the next chapter.363     
A second key point to be considered while exploring the IMF‘s legal framework is the fact that 
the IMF is an IEI which came into existence due to the cooperation of sovereign states. This 
cooperation took the form of a multilateral treaty i.e. the Articles of Agreement of the IMF.
364
 
The Articles of Agreement is the main source of the IMF legal framework and lays down the 
parameters for its operation. Moreover, being an IO, it has its own rational will and executive 
function which is essential for its smooth running. Thus, there are two main sources of law for 
the IMF: its Articles of Agreement and the decision of the Executive Board
365
 of the IMF.  
The first source, the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, lays down the basic reasons for its 
creation and some of its functions which are essential for the fulfilment of the reasons for its 
creation. The Articles empower the IMF to require its members to fulfil certain requirements and 
some of those requirements
366
 are related to a balanced and stable growth which is achieved 
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through the enhancement of financial stability. The position of Articles of Agreement in the IMF 
legal structure is similar to that of the constitution in the domestic legal structure.
367
 
As mentioned in the above paragraph, the other main source of law in the IMF legal structure 
originates from the decisions of the IMF‘s Executive Board. The Executive Board is the most 
effective and powerful body of the IMF; it not only deals with routine organisational affairs but 
also decides policies which guide the IMF‘s interaction with its members and also looks into the 
implementation of the IMF‘s Articles of Agreement.  
By making the Executive Board so powerful, the main founding fathers of the IMF, the US and 
the UK, maintained their control over this institution. All power remains with the Executive 
Board. Only these two countries had power of veto at that time. This is the hegemonic aspect of 
the US and its allies (at the inception the major ally was UK) in the IMF, discussed earlier in the 
introduction of Section Two.  The following part of this chapter deals with the basic purpose of 
the IMF‘s legal framework.  
B. Purpose 
The sovereign states gave up part of their sovereignty and cooperated with each other
368
 in order 
to create the IMF as an IEI. The main purpose of this cooperation is laid down in Article I of its 
Articles of Agreement. It does not explicitly refer to balanced and stable growth but there is a 
direct relevance between the basic purpose of the IMF‘s functioning, and stable and balanced 
growth. To get a better grasp of this aspect of the IMF, it would be useful to focus on some of the 
purposes of the IMF, mentioned in Article I of the Articles of Agreement:  
                                                 
367
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 Article I (i): ―To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent 
institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on international 
monetary problems.‖ 
 Article I (ii): ―To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to 
contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real 
income and to the development of the productive resources of all members as primary 
objectives of economic policy.‖ 
 Article I (iv): ―[T]o assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect 
of current transactions and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper 
the growth of world trade‖.  
By looking into the IMF‘s purpose, it is clears that there is a direct link between the promotion of 
stable and balanced economic growth and the IMF.  
The spirit of the above-mentioned purpose of the IMF can be rephrased in the following way; the 
IMF has been created to establish an international monetary system which has free movement of 
current account payments and transfers between countries, and yet promotes exchange rate 
stability by obliging its members to opt for prudent economic and financial policies. By 
establishing such a sound international monetary system, the IMF endeavours to promote 
international trade through the development of the financial sector which will create investment 
and stimulate economic growth globally.
369
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As has been shown with the help of the Economic Cycle in Chapter II
370
 of this thesis, expanding 
international trade is significant in global financial sector development and the financial sector is 
essential for international trade to grow.
371
 Hence, according to the objectives of IMF, it can be 
reasonably conceived that it has a significant role to play in achieving stable and balanced 
growth, as mandated by its constitution.  
Moreover, the purpose of the IMF also sheds light on exchange rate stability as an important task 
of the IMF. Exchange rate stability is essential for financial stability which, in turn, is crucial for 
the financial sector. For instance, if there is instability in the financial sector of one member 
country, that country‘s monetary policy will lose its effect, and will incur large fiscal costs in 
saving distressed financial institutions, cause capital flight, and intensify economic recession.
372
 
As the stability and soundness of the financial side of the economy is essential for its 
development, exchange rate stability objectives become relevant to the stable and balanced 
growth of the global economy. Therefore, to ensure stability in the international monetary 
                                                                                                                                                             
Michael Parkin (ed.), Essays in Modern Economics, Longman, London; De Gregorio, Jose & Guidotti, Pablo E., 
1995. "Financial development and economic growth," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 433-448, 
March; Choe, Chongwoo & Moosa, Imad A., 1999. "Financial System and Economic Growth: The Korean 
Experience," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 1069-1082, June; Habibullah, M.S. and Y. Eng 
(2006), ‗Does Financial Development Cause Economic Growth? A Panel Data Dynamic Analysis for the Asian 
Developing Countries‘, Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 377–93]. The second view 
maintains that it is economic growth that leads to financial development [The demand for financial development 
hypothesis in Patrick, H.T. (1966), ‗Financial Development and Economic Growth in Underdeveloped Countries‘, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 14, No. 1, 174–89. And also see Robinson, Joan (1952). The 
Generalization of the General Theory, in The Rate of Interest and Other Essays (London: Macmillan) and Romer, 
P.M. (1990). ―Endogenous Technological Change‖. Journal of Political Economy, 98, S71-S102] in the context of 
impact of economic growth on financial development.] The third view, however, contends that both development in 
financial sector and economic growth cause one another [Granger, C. W. J. 1969. ―Investigating Causal Relations by 
Econometric Methods and Cross-Spectral Methods‖. Econometrica, 37, 424-438; Granger, C. W. J. 1980. ―Testing 
for Causality: A Personal Viewpoint‖. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2,329-352. And also see Lyons, 
S.E. and Murinde, V. (1994) Cointegration And Granger-Causality Testing Of Hypotheses On Supply-Leading And 
Demand-Following Finance, Economic Notes, 23(2), 308- 316]. 
370
 Chapter II.B.3.e) on page 90 
371
 Supra note 369 
372
 See generally, Carlson, Mark A., King, Thomas B., and Lewis, Kurt F. (2008), ―Distress in the Financial Sector 
and Economic Activity‖. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Washington, DC 20551.  available at: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/200843/revision/200843pap.pdf 
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system, the IMF first needs to stabilise the financial systems of the member countries.
373
This is 
because the financial sectors of countries are interdependent on each other, due to globalisation. 
Instability will cross borders and hamper the stability of other members‘ financial systems.374 
The globalisation and interdependence of markets has made it necessary to resolve matters 
pertaining to stable and balanced growth at global level.
375
 
The IMF has learned a great deal from the many crises in the past which were mostly due to 
financial instability. In practice, the IMF is clear that it is in its domain to look into the stability 
and development of the financial sectors of its member countries, in order to avoid the repetition 
of past difficulties (due to the deficiency of any other effective IEI to take on this task). Thus, 
achieving stable and balanced growth through financial sector stability and development has 
become closely connected with the purpose of the IMF.
376
 
The following section discusses the relevant functions of the IMF in the context of financial 
sector stability and development.   
C. Functions 
The above section talked about the relevance of stable and balanced global economic growth and 
the objectives of the IMF. This part will focus on the legal bases of the main functions of the 
                                                 
373
 IMF‘s Factsheet, How the IMF Promotes Global Economic Stability, April 5, 2010. Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/globstab.htm; see also, Claessens, Stijn and Thomas Glaessner (1997). 
―Are Financial Sector Weaknesses Undermining the East Asian Miracle,‖ Directions in Development, World Bank. 
374
 Mendoza, Enrique G. and Quadrini, Vincenzo (2010). Financial globalization, financial crises and contagion 
Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 57, Issue 1, Pages 24-39 
 
375
 See generally for further details about the financial globalization and how the maximum benefits can be reaped 
in, Johnson, Simon (approved by) (2007), Reaping the Benefits of Financial Globalization, IMF Discussion Paper, 
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/docs/2007/0607.htm); see also, Bordo, Michael and Christopher M. Meissner, 
2007, ―Foreign Capital and Economic Growth  in the First Era of Globalization,‖ Working Paper, University of 
Cambridge. 
376
 For an introductory guide to the IMF, its history, and its role in the international financial system. See generally, 
What is the International Monetary Fund? IMF publication, September 14, 2006. Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/what.htm  
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IMF which enable it to achieve its objectives. The main functions, as stated in the Articles of 
Agreement and performed by the IMF in the furtherance of stable and balanced growth by 
focusing on financial sector stability and development, are surveillance, technical assistance, and 
financial assistance.
377
 It is essential to understand these tools of the IMF in order to explore the 
IMF‘s institutional role as an IEI in the balanced and stable growth of the global economy.  
1. Surveillance under Article IV378 
Article IV of the IMF‘s Articles of Agreement talks about the most significant function of the 
IMF: surveillance. Surveillance is carried out by the IMF‘s relevant department both at bilateral 
level (which consists of recommendations relating to each member country‘s policies) and 
multilateral level (the overseeing of the global economy). The following part of this chapter is 
dedicated to surveillance at bilateral level. 
a) Bilateral Surveillance 
The goal of surveillance is mentioned in Article IV Articles of Agreement. It is to assist the IMF 
in supervising the international monetary system to assure its smooth functioning (usually 
referred to as ―multilateral surveillance‖) and also supervising members‘ conformity with the 
commitments stated in Article IV (which amounts to ―bilateral surveillance‖). Bilateral 
surveillance is compulsory and all IMF members are obliged to cooperate with the IMF when 
                                                 
377
 For details visit generally, http://www.imf.org/external/about/ourwork.htm  
378
 http://www.imf.org/external/about/econsurv.htm and also see Factsheet of IMF Surveillance, June 24, 2010, 
available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/surv.htm , also see, The Fund‘s Mandate—The Legal 
Framework, Prepared by the Legal Department of the IMF,  Approved by Sean Hagan, 2010, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/022210.pdf; see also, Mussa, Michael (1997), IMF Surveillance, The 
American Economic Review Vol. 87, No. 2; Chossudovsky, Michel (1995), 'Effective Global Surveillance': IMF's 
New Role Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 30, No. 23; Fratzscher, Marcel and Reynaud, Julien (2011), IMF 
surveillance and financial markets--A political economy analysis, European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 
27, Issue 3, Pages 405-422; see also, Truman, Edwin M. (2010). Strengthening IMF Surveillance: A Comprehensive 
Proposal, Peterson Institute for International Economics; see also, Alexander, Kern, Dhumale, Rahul, and, Eatwell, 
John, (2005). ‗Global Governance of Financial Systems, The International Regulation of Systemic Risk.‘ Published 
to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007, p87. 
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required. Moreover, members need to provide relevant information to the IMF under Section 
3(b) of Article IV, and Section 5 of Article VIII of Articles of Agreement. The 2007 Decision
379
 
gives detailed guidance on the operating of bilateral surveillance. 380 
As is clearly stated above, the basic purpose of IMF-led surveillance is to facilitate the IMF in 
achieving one of the purposes of its creation. In this context, Article IV appears to be quite 
significant because it talks about IMF-led surveillance to achieve a sound exchange rate system 
of currencies between the IMF member countries. In order to achieve this aim of Article IV, it 
obliges the member countries to follow certain requirements relating to their domestic economic 
and financial policies. From the legal perspective, IMF-led surveillance is a process of legal 
pluralism. The purpose of all obligations placed by the IMF on its members (through legal 
transplant) is to assure a more stable global system of exchange rates (See Box below). 
Box 1 
Article IV - Obligations Regarding Exchange Arrangements  
 
Section 1. General obligations of members  
―Recognizing that the essential purpose of the international monetary system is to provide a 
framework that facilitates the exchange of goods, services, and capital among countries, and that 
sustains sound economic growth, and that a principal objective is the continuing development of 
the orderly underlying conditions that are necessary for financial and economic stability, each 
member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund and other members to assure orderly exchange 
arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange rates. In particular, each member shall:  
 
i) endeavor to direct its economic and financial policies toward the objective of 
fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability, with due regard to 
its circumstances;  
  
  
ii) seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic and financial 
conditions and a monetary system that does not tend to produce erratic disruptions;  
  
                                                 
379
 Factsheet, IMF Surveillance — The 2007 Decision on Bilateral Surveillance, April 5, 2010, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/surv07.htm 
380
 Bilateral Surveillance Guidance Note, Prepared by the Strategy, Policy, and Review Department of the IMF, 
Approved by Reza Moghadam, (2009), p 3,  available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/102709.pdf 
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iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to 
prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive 
advantage over other members; and  
  
  
iv) follow exchange policies compatible with the undertakings under this Section.‖  
 
----------- 
 
Section 3. Surveillance over exchange arrangements  
 
(a) ―The Fund shall oversee the international monetary system in order to ensure its effective 
operation, and shall oversee the compliance of each member with its obligations under 
Section 1 of this Article.‖  
(b) ―In order to fulfill its functions under (a) above, the Fund shall exercise firm surveillance 
over the exchange rate policies of members, and shall adopt specific principles for the 
guidance of all members with respect to those policies. Each member shall provide the 
Fund with the information necessary for such surveillance, and, when requested by the 
Fund, shall consult with it on the member's exchange rate policies. The principles 
adopted by the Fund shall be consistent with cooperative arrangements by which 
members maintain the value of their currencies in relation to the value of the currency or 
currencies of other members, as well as with other exchange arrangements of a member's 
choice consistent with the purposes of the Fund and Section 1 of this Article. These 
principles shall respect the domestic social and political policies of members, and in 
applying these principles the Fund shall pay due regard to the circumstances of 
members.‖  
 
  
 
 
 
Bearing in mind the above-mentioned purpose of Article IV, the IMF carries out surveillance by 
checking whether members‘ economic and financial policies are in conformity with the 
members‘ commitments to the IMF. Article IV asserts that the IMF should bring all members 
into the policy compliance process; however, practically speaking, this compliance process has 
entailed many new exercises in order to achieve its objectives. For example, the practice of 
surveillance has developed from compliance and now takes the form of a policy discussion 
whereby the IMF urges the authorities of the member countries concerned to adopt policies (both 
Rao Raza Hashim 
146 
School Of Law 
University Of Warwick 
internal and external) which the IMF thinks would strengthen the global economy.
381
 This 
practice of the IMF can be regarded as a compliance plus
382
 approach towards achieving its 
purpose by employing the implied power
383
 concept of an IO.   
The IMF-led surveillance process has three important attributes which need to be considered.
384
 
First, the logic for surveillance of its member countries is mainly to prevent financial crises 
which would lead to a distortion of the financial sector or vice versa. The IMF strives for this, 
with the help of surveillance, by convincing the authorities of the member countries concerned to 
develop their financial sectors by altering their economic and financial policies, prior to falling 
into a macroeconomic crisis. 
Secondly, the IMF-led surveillance exercise is obligatory in its nature and applies to the entire 
membership. All members are obliged to take part in this surveillance exercise, to seek advice 
from the IMF and also supply them with all the information needed in order to achieve 
surveillance objectives.
385
  
Thirdly, in the surveillance process, the IMF has discretion over the issues it raises about the 
policies of the members concerned, i.e. the content of the IMF‘s surveillance (consultation 
process) might vary from member to member, depending on the need for policy compliance in 
order to ensure a sound financial sector leading to a sound economy.   
Generally, the bilateral surveillance process mainly takes into consideration the examination of 
financial sector and balance sheet vulnerabilities, conclusions reached regarding problems 
                                                 
381
 For a discussion about the expanding functioning of the IMF in context of the financial sector see, Singh, 
Dalvinder (2007). 'The Role of the IMF and World Bank in Financial Sector Reform and Compliance: An Outline,' 
18 European Business Law Review, at 1407-9.  
382
 It simply means to comply more than the commitments made. 
383
 Rama-Montaldo, M. (1970). International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of International Organizations, 
44 BYIL 111, at 139 (1970) 
384
 Ross Leckow, The Fund‘s Legal Instruments to Promote Financial Stability. Legal Department, International 
Monetary Fund (2006) para 20, available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2006/mfl/rl.pdf 
385
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relating to the macro economy and capital flows, and the capacity for and probability of internal 
and external spillovers. The next section talks about multilateral surveillance under the umbrella 
of the IMF.  
b)  Multilateral Surveillance386 
The collective will of the members of the IMF to benefit from collective gains has given the IMF 
the responsibility for and mandate to safeguard the stability of the international monetary system. 
In this context, Article IV(3)(a) of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF says that the IMF “shall 
oversee the international monetary system in order to ensure its effective operation.” This role, 
to oversee the international monetary system, requires the IMF to conduct multilateral 
surveillance. Examples of the IMF‘s multilateral surveillance exercises are the World Economic 
outlook and the Global Financial Stability Report.
387
  
The main aim of multilateral surveillance is to ensure overall stable and balanced economic 
growth can be achieved through a properly functioning and well-protected global financial 
sector. As discussed earlier, a well-developed financial sector is significant in achieving stable 
and balanced growth within the international economic framework. 
                                                 
386
 The Fund‘s Mandate—The Legal Framework, Prepared by the Legal Department of the IMF,  Approved by Sean 
Hagan, 2010, available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/022210.pdf; for a good discussion about 
multilateral surveillance see generally, Bird, Graham and Thomas D. Willet (2007). "Multilateral Surveillance: Is 
the IMF Shooting for the Stars?" World Economics, 8 (4)  
387
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2. Technical Assistance388 
Surveillance is the most effective tool used by the IMF for achieving its objectives in the global 
economy and the reason for its effectiveness is that surveillance is universally applied to all of its 
membership, unlike its counterparts
389
.
390
 However, it is not free from shortcomings, the most 
significant of which is that it is mostly superficial and does not explore in detailed all traits of its 
members‘ financial sectors, other than broad macroeconomic policy and its developments.391 
This is because it is not practical for the IMF to explore and study all aspects of its members‘ 
financial sectors. Thus, at this stage, the IMF uses its second tool under Article IV to achieve its 
objectives, that of technical assistance (TA). 
TA is discussed under Section 2(b) of Article V.
392
 The IMF may provide TA to its members in 
its expert areas and it extends TA to its concerned members mostly through specialised advice in 
order to strengthen the institutional capacity of that member in the IMF‘s area of interest i.e. 
predominantly the financial sector. TA is not at all mandatory and not universally applied; it is 
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 For technical assistance see generally, IEO (2005), Evaluation of the Technical Assistance Provided by the IMF, 
Volume I & II, team headed by Marcelo Selowsky, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2005/ta/eng/013105.htm; International Monetary Fund (1999), ―Review of Fund 
Technical Assistance: From Technical Assistance to Technical Consultation and Cooperation‖ (Washington: 
International Monetary Fund); International Monetary Fund (2000), ―Ensuring Alignment of Technical Assistance 
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Available at: http://www.imf.org/External/pubs/ft/exrp/techass/techass.htm; International Monetary Fund (2008). 
Enhancing the Impact of Fund Technical Assistance. Prepared by the Office of Technical Assistance Management 
and Approved by Alfred Kammer; IEO (2007). The Governance of IMF Technical Assistance. Independent 
Evaluation Office of the International Monetary Fund Prepared by Mariano Cortes. Document no. BP/08/13 
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 The other two are Technical Assistance and Financial Assistance.  
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 Article IV (3) (a): ―The Fund shall oversee the international monetary system in order to ensure its effective 
operation, and shall oversee the compliance of each member with its obligations under Section 1 of this Article.‖ 
391
 Ross Leckow, The Fund‘s Legal Instruments to Promote Financial Stability. Legal Department, International 
Monetary Fund (2006) para 25, available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2006/mfl/rl.pdf 
392
 The IMF‘s authority to provide TA is set forth in Article V, Section 2(b) of the Articles of Agreement under 
which the IMF ―may‖, upon request, provide technical assistance harmonious with the objectives of the IMF. Article 
V, Section 2(b) reads in pertinent part: ―If requested, the Fund may decide to perform financial and technical 
services, including the administration of resources contributed by members, that are consistent with the purposes of 
the Fund.‖  
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purely up to members to ask for TA from the IMF whilst, on the other hand, it depends on the 
IMF whether they want to extend TA to a member.
393
  
The IMF mostly looks for the stable and balanced growth of economy by providing TA which is 
mainly dedicated to the building of the institutional capacity of the member concerned in the area 
of their financial sector. Under the TA programs, the IMF staff mainly assist the authorities of 
the member countries by working closely with them to support them in strengthening their 
organisational structure in the area of their financial sector, the central bank and financial 
supervisory agencies‘ operations and the transfer of knowledge regarding these operations.394  
Most commonly, member countries request assistance from the IMF in identifying and 
suggesting solutions to financial sector weaknesses in their systems. In this context, the IMF and 
World Bank have started a joint project to evaluate vulnerabilities in the financial sectors of 
member countries at their request. This program is called the Financial Sector Assessment 
Program
395
 which promotes international standards and codes
396
 for financial, fiscal, and 
statistical management. Moreover, it takes measures to strengthen initiatives against money 
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 DISSEMINATION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE INFORMATION, Prepared by the Office of Technical 
Assistance Management and the Legal Department of the IMF, Approved by Alfred Kammer and Sean Hagan 
(2008), para 8,  available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/040308b.pdf 
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395
 IMF Factsheet, The Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), 2010, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/fsap.htm and for details about the FSAP programs visit 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/fsap.asp; see also, Kupiec, Paul (2005), ―The IMF–World Bank financial sector 
assessment program: A view from the inside,‖ in Systemic Financial Crisis: Resolving Large Bank 
Insolvencies, D. Evanoff and G. Kaufman (eds.), Singapore: World Scientific Publishing.  
396
 IMF Factsheet, Standards and Codes: The Role of the IMF, 2010. Available at: 
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Regulatory Harmonization and the Globalization of Finance. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2919. 
Rao Raza Hashim 
150 
School Of Law 
University Of Warwick 
laundering and the funding of terrorism
397
. The following section will talk about the TA 
activities provided by the IMF, as mentioned above.    
a) Financial Sector Assessment Program398 
The Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) is the most significant aspect of the IMF‘s TA 
operation. The FSAP is a combined initiative of the IMF and the World Bank and was taken on 
board after the Asian financial crisis in 1999.
399
 As is clear from its name, it is an assessment 
program of the financial sectors of its member countries. FSAP encourages its membership 
towards a deeper collective effort to monitor their own financial systems with the help of the 
IMF. Its basic aim is to assess in detail the financial sectors of its members and identify on behalf 
of the national authorities concerned the weaknesses in their financial systems. In addition to the 
assessment of the member countries‘ financial sectors, FSAP provides assistance to members in 
order to develop measures to reduce or overcome the weaknesses they have identified in their 
financial systems.
400
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 IMF Factsheet, The IMF and the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, 2010. 
Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/aml.htm ; see also, Masciandaro, D. (ed.) (2004) Global 
Financial Crime: Terrorism, Money Laundering andOffshore Centres. Aldershot: Ashgate; see also, Alexander, K. 
2002. ―Extraterritorial U.S. Banking Regulation and International Terrorism.‖ Journal of International Banking 
Regulation 3, no. 4: 307–326. 
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 IMF Factsheet, The Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), 2010, available at: 
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Background Paper, Prepared by the Staff of the Monetary and Financial Systems Department of IMF, Approved by 
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Financial Sector Reform and Compliance: An Outline,' 18 European Business Law Review.  
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 Alexander, Kern, Dhumale, Rahul, and, Eatwell, John, (2005). ‗Global Governance of Financial Systems, The 
International Regulation of Systemic Risk.‘ Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007, p74. 
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FSAP stresses the connectivity and interdependence between the functioning of the financial 
sector and the macro economy. Mostly, it studies the institutional framework of the financial 
sector and also assesses it in the context of a risk and vulnerability analysis through different 
types of indicators and stress tests.
401
  
FSAP is quite a popular TA program of the IMF, as it has been requested and received by more 
than 120 member countries of the IMF. FSAP also helps the IMF with the improved operation of 
its other tools, such as surveillance. As it assesses the financial sector of the member country in 
detail, it gives the IMF an opportunity to study the information for the purposes of 
surveillance.
402
   
With the same purpose of providing certainty in the framework of the global economic scenario, 
the IMF has initiated the practice of making and implementing international codes and standards. 
The next section talks about these international standards and codes.  
b) International Codes and Standards 
The IMF and the World Bank have also encouraged its membership to comply with international 
standards and codes related to the financial sector. This encouragement can be better understood 
with the insight of legal transplant. For harmonisation purposes, the IMF transplants standards 
and codes into domestic legal systems. In fact, these IEIs have taken on a number of standards 
                                                 
401
 However, over the passage of time new features have been included in the TA activity. For example, more candid 
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http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/fsap.htm 
402
 IMF Factsheet, The Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), 2010, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/fsap.htm 
Rao Raza Hashim 
152 
School Of Law 
University Of Warwick 
and codes that denote good practice and further, advises its members to absorb these practices 
into their institutional frameworks for the better functioning of their financial sectors.
403
 
The IMF only sets some of these best practices itself
404
; most are developed by different 
international bodies that hold some specialisation in their respective areas. Some of the IOs 
involved in the formation of standards and codes as best practice in their respective fields are;
405
 
 Basel Committee‟s Core Principles on Banking Supervision;406 
 International Organization of Securities Commission‟s Objectives for Securities 
Regulation;
407
 
 International Association of Insurance Supervisors‟ Insurance Supervisory Principles;408 
 Committee on Payments and Settlements Systems‟ Recommendations for Securities 
Settlement Systems;
409
 
 Financial Action Task Force‟s Recommendations in the area of Anti-money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism.
410
 
                                                 
403
 IMF Factsheet, Standards and Codes: The Role of the IMF, 2010. Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sc.htm ; see also, Delonis, Robert P., (2004).International Financial 
Standards and Codes: Mandatory Regulation Without Representation, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 563. 
404
 Standards in the areas of data (http://dsbb.imf.org/ ), fiscal transparency 
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/index.htm ), and monetary and financial policy transparency 
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405
 IMF Factsheet, Standards and Codes: The Role of the IMF, 2010. Available at: 
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407
 For details about International Organization of Securities Commission‘s Objectives for Securities Regulation 
visit: http://www.iosco.org/  
408
 For details about International Association of Insurance Supervisors‘ Insurance Supervisory Principles visit: 
http://www.iaisweb.org/index.cfm?pageID=41 
409
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Besides the above-mentioned standards and codes, there exists a significant degree of best 
practice in the areas of, for example, corporate governance, monetary and financial policy 
management, auditing, and accounting.
411
 After evaluation of a member‘s conformity with these 
best practices, the IMF and the World Bank releases a report, called a Report on the Observance 
of Standards and Codes (ROSC).
412
 The basic aim of this reporting procedure is to spot 
weaknesses in the institutional framework, wherein those weaknesses might be dealt with later 
by a TA program of the IMF. 
In the context of the development of standards, the IMF has also developed standards such as the 
Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) and the General Data Dissemination System 
(GDDS) for the purpose of reporting economic data to the markets.
413
 The benefit to members in 
adopting these standards is that they attract more investors since they more easily understand the 
economic statistics of the investing country. Moreover, if the economic development standards 
are clear and understandable to both the investor and the other market player, then the probability 
of them overreacting lessens, which adds considerably to the stability of the economy.  
                                                                                                                                                             
410
 For details about Financial Action Task Force‘s Recommendations in the area of Anti-money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism visit: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/0,2987,en_32250379_32235720_1_1_1_1_1,00.html  
411
 In this context, standards have been formed by various international entities, including the World Bank. These are 
usually assessed by the World Bank; Corporate Governance: Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development's Principles of Corporate Governance; Accounting: International Accounting Standards Board's 
International Accounting Standards; Auditing: International Federation of Accountants' International Standards on 
Auditing; and,  Insolvency and Creditor Rights: A standard based on the World Bank's Principles for Effective 
Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law is being finalized. http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sc.htm  
412
 Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs). Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/rosc/rosc.asp; also visit, http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_aa.html; International 
Monetary Fund (2000). Experimental Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs). Washington, DC: 
IMF.   
413
 Visit Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board at: http://dsbb.imf.org/ ; see generally, Cady, John (2004), Does 
SDDS Subscription Reduce Borrowing Costs for Emerging Market Economies? IMF Working Paper, Vol. , pp. 1-
14.   
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The next IMF tool for achieving the purpose of its creation is financial assistance which the 
ensuing part of this chapter highlights.  
3. IMF Financial Assistance414 
Surveillance and TA are two instruments which are very useful in the prevention of a financial 
crisis. However, if a financial crisis emerges, then these preventive measures are placed on the 
back burner and the crisis-affected country needs an immediate cure. In this scenario, the IMF 
considers the whole picture and helps the crisis-affected country to stabilise its external position 
and also the health of its internal financial system. This involves the IMF‘s third tool in the 
context of the promotion of financial stability (restoring the financial sector); that is, financial 
assistance to the country in crisis.  
According to the Articles of Agreement, the IMF has the discretion to extend financial assistance 
to a member country in order to resolve the member‘s balance of payments difficulties.  
Article I of the IMF's Articles of Agreement maintains that the object of loaning by the 
IMF is "...to give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund 
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with 
opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to 
measures destructive of national or international prosperity." 
However, there are strings attached. The reason for this is that the IMF wants to make sure that 
financial difficulties are fully resolved through comprehensive economic reform.
415
 These strings 
are known as conditionalities and the member country concerned needs to agree and implement 
these conditionalities in order to obtain financial assistance from the IMF.  The IMF provides 
                                                 
414
 For basic knowledge about lending by IMF visit: http://www.imf.org/external/about/lending.htm  
 
415
 Moreover, the IMF is not a developmental organisation and thus needs to make arrangement for the recovery of 
the money lent to the crisis-sick member country.  
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money in instalments which are spread over the duration of the assistance program; however, the 
imbursement of the money depends on the member‘s implementation of the IMF‘s 
recommendations and on the achievement of specific economic targets (which is part of the 
conditionality).  
At this stage, I am not going to focus on the types of financial assistance provided by the IMF to 
its members.
416
 However, the focus will be on the rationale for attaching conditions to the 
financing, the types of conditions attached, the nature of conditionality and its overall effect.   
a) Rationale for Conditionality 
It is highly logical that a lender would want to know and make sure that whoever is in recipient 
of his loan is capable of returning his money. Otherwise, how can recovery be assured? This is 
the case with the IMF; it is a financial institution which lends money to member countries with 
balance of payment difficulties. As the lender, the IMF tries to make sure that the member 
country has recovered from financial distress and is capable of returning the IMF loan. In this 
context, the IMF‘s conditionality is perfectly justified and is also helpful to the member 
concerned (which is a view very often challenged by many scholars).
417
 
                                                 
416
 For a good discussion about IMF financing see generally, Alexander, Kern (2005). The Fund‘s Role in Sovereign 
Liquidity Crises, in Current developments in monetary and financial law. International Monetary Fund.  
417
 Guidelines on Conditionality, Prepared by the Legal and Policy Development and Review Departments of the 
IMF, 2002, para 1. Available at: http://www.imf.org/External/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/guid/092302.pdf ; see also, 
Buira, Ariel (2003). An Analysis of IMF Conditionality, G-24 Discussion Paper No. 22, p3; see also, Alexander, 
Kern, Dhumale, Rahul, and, Eatwell, John, (2005). ‗Global Governance of Financial Systems, The International 
Regulation of Systemic Risk.‘ Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007, p88.  
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b) Scope of conditionality 
The scope of conditionality is mentioned in the guidelines on conditionality provided by the 
IMF. The text below illustrates the governing principles which outline the scope of the 
conditionality.  
Box 2 
Decision 1, paragraph 7, of Guideline on Conditionality: Scope of conditions 
―Program-related conditions governing the provision of Fund resources will be applied 
parsimoniously and will be consistent with the following principles: 
 
(a) Conditions will be established only on the basis of those variables or measures that are 
reasonably within the member‘s direct or indirect control and that are, generally, either (i) of 
critical importance for achieving the goals of the member‘s program or for monitoring the 
implementation of the program, or (ii) necessary for the implementation of specific provisions of 
the Articles or policies adopted under them. In general, all variables or measures that meet these 
criteria will be established as conditions. 
(b) Conditions will normally consist of macroeconomic variables and structural measures that are 
within the Fund‘s core areas of responsibility. Variables and measures that are outside the Fund‘s 
core areas of responsibility may also be established as conditions but may require more detailed 
explanation of their critical importance. The Fund‘s core areas of responsibility in this context 
comprise: macroeconomic stabilization; monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies, including 
the underlying institutional arrangements and closely related structural measures; and financial 
system issues related to the functioning of both domestic and international financial markets. 
(c) Program-related conditions may contemplate the member meeting particular targets or 
objectives (outcomes-based conditionality), or taking (or refraining from taking) particular 
actions (actions-based conditionality). The formulation of individual conditions will be based, in 
particular, upon the circumstances of the member.‖ 
According to this, conditionality can require a member country to achieve certain targets or 
objectives or it may be required to perform or, in some cases, not perform certain activities.
418
 
However, these conditions are vital to the success of the IMF financial assistance program and 
significant for the implementation of the IMF Articles of Agreement and its related policies.
419
  
                                                 
418
 Guidelines on Conditionality, Prepared by the Legal and Policy Development and Review Departments of the 
IMF, 2002, para 7(c). Available at: http://www.imf.org/External/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/guid/092302.pdf 
419
 Guidelines on Conditionality, Prepared by the Legal and Policy Development and Review Departments of the 
IMF, 2002, para 7(a). Available at: http://www.imf.org/External/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/guid/092302.pdf  
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The last part of Paragraph 7 (a) of Guideline on Conditionality by the IMF (―In general, all 
variables or measures that meet these criteria will be established as conditions.”) makes the 
scope of the conditionality very wide. However, the following paragraph i.e. 7 (b) of the 
Guideline tries to limit its scope by elaborating that the conditionality is normally related to the 
core areas of the IMF‘s responsibility but that other things can be included in it with detailed 
reasoning to do so.
420
  
In short, IMF conditionality is of significant importance to enable the IMF to exist as an effective 
IO. As discussed earlier in this chapter, an IO‘s power to enforce its decisions on a member 
country is, in fact, the most critical attribute of an IO. Thus, with the help of conditionality, the 
IMF tends to be an effect IO. The reason why conditionality is so important to the IMF is that it 
lacks a comprehensive institutional structure, because it lacks an effective adjudicating body.  
D. Conclusion  
This chapter looks at the legal framework of the IMF which is based on its Articles of 
Agreement and the decisions of the Executive Board. The IMF endorses stable and balanced 
global economic growth which is an essential goal of the liberally institutionalised (rational) 
international community. This goal is achieved by the IMF by means of its primary activities, 
which comprise surveillance, technical assistance, and financial assistance. The legal bases of 
these activities have been documented in this chapter. However, a significant trait of the IMF‘s 
                                                 
420
 For example IMF can use conditionality as a tool to get implementation of standards and codes by the member 
countries. [Access to the CCL (contingent-credit lines) is subject to the adherence of, at least: ―(1) subscription to 
and use of the IMF's Special Data Dissemination Standards, which guide countries making economic and financial 
data available to the public; (2) compliance with the Basle Core Principles for Banking Supervision; (3) use of the 
IMF-designed code on fiscal transparency; and (4) use of the IMF-designed code on transparency in monetary and 
financial policies. A more comprehensive analysis of adherence would be possible where a Report on Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC) has been prepared. ROSCs include assessment of adherence to seven other sets of 
standards and codes.‖ IMF Executive Board Meeting 17 November, 2000.] [FSF, Report of the follow-up group on 
incentives to foster implementation of standards, September 2000]. See generally, Dr. Benu Schneider (2002). Issues 
in Implementing Standards and Codes, Paper presented at the ODI conference on International Standards and Codes: 
The Developing Country Perspective. 
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methodology in achieving the above-mentioned goal is its emphasis on advice, persuasion, and 
eventually cooperation (which mostly involves conditionalities for needy countries).  
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V. The Institutional role of the IMF in achieving stable and balanced 
growth in the global economy through the International Economic Cycle 
The ideal institutional role of an IEI has been discussed in detail in the theory chapter.
421
 This 
chapter is dedicated to highlighting the institutional role of the IMF. This institutional role of the 
IMF, which the IMF itself does not explicitly admit to, actually does exist and contributes 
significantly (as part of the IELR) to enhancing the certainty and predictability of the rules of the 
game in the international economic scenario.  
As discussed in the theoretical framework, the Economic Cycle constitutes a causal relationship 
between financial sector development and the expansion of international trade.
422
 Thus this 
chapter tries to characterise the IMF‘s functioning in an institutional role (as described in the 
theoretical framework) in the context of both constituents of the Economic Cycle (the financial 
sector and international trade). The purpose of this exercise is to show that the institutional role 
of the IMF does exist and that the IMF needs to explicitly pay more attention to its institutional 
role. This institutional role has a direct link with the stable and balanced growth of the global 
economy through the Economic Cycle, therefore, improvement in the institutional role would 
lead to better opportunities for achieving a more stable and balanced growth of the global 
economy.       
In this context, this chapter is divided into two parts, A and B. Part A is dedicated to the IMF‘s 
contribution to the development of the global financial sector and part B is devoted to the IMF‘s 
                                                 
421
Chapter II.A.3 on page 38 
422
 Chapter II.B.3.e) on page 90 
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contribution to the promotion of international trade.  As a whole, this chapter highlights the 
IMF‘s contribution as an IEI in promoting the certainty and predictability of the rules of the 
game within the IELR. The following part of the chapter will examine the IMF‘s international 
institutional role in achieving economic growth through the development of the global financial 
sector (Patrick‘s supply lead hypothesis423). 
A. IMF and Financial Sector Development 
The purpose of this subheading is to explore the role played by the IMF in promoting economic 
growth through the development of the global financial sector. The role of the IMF is viewed in 
its institutional capacity as an IEI (which is discussed in chapter II). The institutional role of the 
IMF rests on its functioning in its legislative and normative capacity; and executive and 
administrative capacity. The IMF lacks a judicial and quasi-judicial function, which is a 
significant part of the institutional role. Even with this significant deficiency, the IMF has 
managed to contribute towards the Economic Cycle.   
As discussed in the preceding chapter on the IMF‘s legal framework, the development of the 
financial sector comes within the direct domain of the IMF. The reason for this is to ensure 
financial stability and balanced economic growth for which financial sector development is quite 
crucial.
424
 Thus, the following part of the chapter discusses the role of the IMF in its legislative 
and normative capacity in the development of the global financial sector. This legislative and 
normative functioning is part of the institutional role of the IMF which is also part of the IELR.  
                                                 
423
 Chapter II.B.3.a) on page 73 
424
 Chapter IV part (B) Purpose of IMF on page 139 
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1. Legislative and normative capacity of the IMF and development of 
the financial sector 
The legislative and normative functioning of the IMF is part of its institutional role, which 
contributes positively to the IELR by enhancing the certainty and predictability of the rules of 
the game in its area of specialisation. This part of the chapter will discuss all the acts of the IMF 
which increase certainty and predictability within its area of speciality; any act which produces 
the effect of a law will be discussed under this subheading.  
The IMF acts which come under this category are quite limited. They are, for example, the 
creation of certain standards and codes, best practice, the decisions of the Executive Board and 
policy advice.
425
 All the above-mentioned acts are non-binding norms or rules, which the IMF 
creates and supports in order to fulfil the purpose of its creation. These norms and rules fall 
under the category of “soft law”. However, when these norms are backed by IMF 
conditionality,
426
 then they have a binding effect on the member country upon which the 
condition is imposed.
427
  
Before turning to look at the effects of the IMF‘s soft laws, it is essential to elaborate upon the 
term ―soft law‖. It should be mentioned here, also, that there is no clear cut and largely- accepted 
definition of soft law by scholars.
428
  
 
                                                 
425
 The IMF legal framework allows the IMF to carry on functions which are necessary to achieve its goals.  
426
 This point is discussed in the later part of the chapter. See Chapter V.B.4.b)(3) on page 210 
427
 See generally, Brinsmead, Simon (2007), Rulemaking in ICAO, the ILO and the IMF: The Rise of Standards. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1002758 
428
 SHELTON, D.( 2003), International Law and ―Relative Normativity‖, in EVANS M.D. (ed.), International Law, 
, p. 166. See also, Borgia, Fiammetta (2010), New Governance Mechanisms in International Economic Law: The 
Role of Soft Law. Society of International Economic Law (SIEL), Second Biennial Global Conference, University 
of Barcelona, July 8-10, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633984 
See also, Definition by Professor Harris that ―soft law consist of written instruments that spell out rules of conduct 
that are not intended to be legally binding, so that they are not subject to the law of treaties and do not generate the 
opinio juris required for them to be state practice contributing to custom. See HARRIS, D.J., 2004. Cases and 
materials on international law. 6th. London: Sweet & Maxwell, p. 62. 
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In particular, soft law is comprised of the acts, such as rules, guidelines, standards, and other 
arrangements, of all the players within the international community which are of regulatory 
nature and which have a non-binding effect.
429
 These soft laws cannot be termed traditional legal 
law; however, these soft laws are based upon the concept of traditional legally-binding norms, 
which again are based on the logic whereby repeated practice makes things right and proper. The 
intensity of the duty imposed by these soft laws is less than that of a legally-binding obligation. 
This is due to the fact that the institution which creates these soft laws has no authority to create 
obligatory rules of the game and because these soft laws are not backed by sanctions. 
430
 
These soft laws are deficient of the essential normative element to produce enforceable rights 
and obligations, yet they can produce a legal effect.
431
 As these soft laws cannot be termed as 
proper laws on the one hand and non-law on the other, these soft laws come somewhere in- 
between as they are not proper enforceable laws but can have considerable influence on the 
existing binding obligations of international law.
432 
 
Recently, it has been observed that scholars place more emphasis on compliance with these soft 
laws rather than exploring their nature and effect.
 433
 This is because these soft laws are more 
often taken as facts, even though very often they are not laws themselves but a technique to bind 
                                                 
429
 (―[t]he international rules, guidelines, standards, and other arrangements that govern financial regulation are not 
of a legally binding nature and are therefore generally referred to as ‗international soft law.‘‖ Alexander, Kern, 
Dhumale, Rahul, and, Eatwell, John, (2005). ‗Global Governance of Financial Systems, The International 
Regulation of Systemic Risk.‘ Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007, chapter 4: International 
Soft Law and the Formation of Binding International Financial Regulation, at p134. 
430
 Borgia, Fiammetta (2010), New Governance Mechanisms in International Economic Law: The Role of Soft Law. 
Society of International Economic Law (SIEL), Second Biennial Global Conference, University of Barcelona, July 
8-10, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633984 
431
 Francioni F. (2007), International ―Soft Law‟: A Contemporary Assessment, in LOWE V., FITZMAURICE M. 
(eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice, Essays in Honor of Sir Robert Jennings, Cambridge, p. 168. 
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 Van, Hoof G.J.H. (1983), Rethinking the Sources of International Law, p. 187. See also, Borgia, Fiammetta 
(2010), New Governance Mechanisms in International Economic Law: The Role of Soft Law. Society of 
International Economic Law (SIEL), Second Biennial Global Conference, University of Barcelona, July 8-10, 2010. 
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 CHAYES, A. (1995), The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements. 
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countries without making binding rules.
434 
However, this technique (the process of soft law) is 
highly successful in the global financial regulatory system due to the flexible nature of these 
laws. Moreover, for an optimal effect of the soft laws, the key is the right mix between hard and 
soft law in a specific issue area.
435
   
In short, soft law is anything which has the effect of a law but is not actually a law, as it lacks the 
basic element for anything to be termed as law i.e. enforcement. The following section is 
dedicated to the IMF‘s role in the creation of soft law. First, we will look at standards and codes, 
followed by the IMF as the source of conventions and the decisions of the Executive Board.  
a) Standards and Codes 
The most common form of soft law created by the IMF is standards and codes. Standards and 
codes are the rules of the game set by the institutions so that policies can be drafted in 
accordance with these rules. Once polices are made in conformity with these rules of the game 
and created by an institutional set-up, then their implementation becomes quite easy. Moreover, 
it is long been recognised that a good institutional set-up with standards and codes has a positive 
effect on the economic functioning of a country. With the passage of time, it is observed that if a 
country implements standards and codes, both domestic and international, then this adds to the 
economic performance and efficiency of that country by reducing the transaction costs.
436
 
                                                 
434
 VELLAS, P. (1990), Aspects du droit international économique, Pedone, Paris, p. 18. See also, Borgia, 
Fiammetta (2010), New Governance Mechanisms in International Economic Law: The Role of Soft Law. Society of 
International Economic Law (SIEL), Second Biennial Global Conference, University of Barcelona, July 8-10, 2010. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633984 
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 A very good discussion on the soft laws and financial regulations see, Alexander, Kern, Dhumale, Rahul, and, 
Eatwell, John, (2005). ‗Global Governance of Financial Systems, The International Regulation of Systemic Risk.‘ 
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007, chapter 4: International Soft Law and the Formation of 
Binding International Financial Regulation, at p134,137,138. 
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The IMF has been active in the process of formation of standards and codes; for example, for 
economic data-reporting to markets, Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) and the 
General Data Dissemination System (GDDS).
437
 The IMF has also formed standards in the fields 
of fiscal transparency, and monetary and financial policy transparency.
438
 These standards and 
code add certainty to economic data-reporting and predictability through a bottom-up approach 
in fiscal and monetary policies. This whole process is part of the IMF‘s institutional role as part 
of the IELR.  
The following section within this subheading will review the standards and codes developed by 
the IMF as an IEI in its normative capacity.  
(1) Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) 
One of the causes of financial crisis in 1990s was information deficiencies which highlighted the 
need for data standardisation. In this context, the IMF instigated the data standards program to 
improve member countries‘ data transparency and to support their advancement of reliable 
statistical systems.
439
 From the perspective of data standardisation, the IMF formed the Special 
Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) in 1996 to enable it to guide countries when they access 
capital markets, by disseminating important data. This is both important and helpful to all the 
market participants in the evaluation of the economic condition of the countries concerned. This 
process increases the predictability of the international economic system. Moving along the same 
                                                                                                                                                             
Systemic Risk.‘ Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007, chapter 4: International Soft Law and the 
Formation of Binding International Financial Regulation, at p143. 
437
 Visit Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board at: http://dsbb.imf.org/  
438
  http://www.imf.org/external/standards/index.htm 
439
 During Mexico crisis in 1994, the international financial community realised the important contribution of data 
transparency, macroeconomic and financial data, for facing the setbacks of globalization and lowering the chances 
of acute financial instability. See generally, Gil-Diaz, Francisco (1998). THE ORIGIN OF MEXICO'S 1994 
FINANCIAL CRISIS, An Interdisciplinary Journal of Public Policy Analysis Volume 17, Number 3. 
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lines, in 1997, the IMF launched the General Data Dissemination System (GDDS) which 
provided an enhanced framework (one step further on from the SDDS) to countries that 
endeavoured to build up their statistical systems.
440
 
(2) The Code of Good Practices on Fiscal 
Transparency
441
  
The code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency is an initiative by the IMF which recognises 
a collection of standards and codes in order to facilitate governments in ensuring a transparent 
picture of the governments‘ financial position. These codes of Good Practices on Fiscal 
Transparency are adopted completely voluntarily by governments (but if backed by 
conditionality, then it becomes somehow binding). This code is a bottom-up approach adopted 
by the IMF whereby it provides basic principles based on reason. Moreover, if adopted by 
governments, then it is observed that public confidence (which also includes investors) in the 
accuracy and strength of fiscal policy is increased.   
The code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency was created in 1998 and in 2007, it was 
revised by the IMF (Executive Board). The purpose of the above-mentioned code is to streamline 
and support the development of the international financial architecture. The following are the 
basic principles on which the Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency is developed. 
                                                 
440
 International Monetary Fund (2007), The Special Data Dissemination System: guide for subscribers and users, 
[Washington, D.C.]  
441
 For details about the Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency (2007) visit : 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/code.htm  
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Clarity of roles and responsibilities: The above-mentioned code states that there should be a 
clear-cut distinction between public and private domains. Moreover, the policies and 
administrative functioning of the public sector should be unambiguous and open to the public. 
Open budget processes: The second principle provides a guideline regarding the budget process. 
It asserts that the information provided in the budget should be easy to analyse and 
accountability-oriented. A budget should clearly state the goals of the fiscal policy and the 
supposition draw on in devising the budget, and should also mention the main fiscal risks and  
revenue collection method. 
Public availability of information: Information relating to the budget should be published 
periodically so that it is easily available to public, whether it is for the past, present or coming 
year‘s budget.  
Assurances of integrity: The whole budgetary process should be carried out within recognised 
standards and should be subject to independent examination. 
The above principles are based on simple reasoning and any country following the Code would 
eventually benefit, as there is a direct link between fiscal policy and development of the financial 
sector.
442
 Thus, this initiative by the IMF is a notable contribution in its normative capacity 
towards the development of the global financial sector which is essential for the stable and 
balanced growth of the global economy.  
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 See generally, Caballero, Ricardo J., and Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2004, ―Fiscal Policy and Financial Depth,‖ 
NBER Working Paper No. 10532 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research). Catão, 
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(3) Code of Good Practices on Transparency in 
Monetary and Financial Policies
443
 
In order to support the framework of the international financial and monetary system, the IMF, in 
1998, developed a code of good practices on transparency in monetary and financial policies. In 
this context, the IMF relied upon the cooperation of the Bank for International Settlements, a 
representative group of central banks, financial agencies, and other international and regional 
organisations involved in the development process.  
This code basically asserts that governments should streamline their current practices with good 
practices proposed by the IMF in the context of monetary and financial policies. These soft law 
contributions by the IMF (in the form of codes) are a clear contribution in its institutional 
capacity towards the IELR.   
b) IMF as a forum for the adoption of conventions 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, an IO, in its norm-making capacity, often emerges as a 
forum for conventions which sometimes results in an normative effect.
444
 The following part of 
the subheading is dedicated to the IMF as a forum for the adoption of conventions.  
(1) Financial Soundness Indicators (FSI) Metadata 
Conventions
445
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 For details about Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies visit: 
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The IMF, together with the help of the international community (which includes international 
institutions)
446
, developed Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs), the purpose of which was to 
assist macro-prudential analysis and the evaluation of the strong points and weaknesses of the 
financial systems of the countries concerned. The FSIs are very important in the surveillance 
program of the IMF and the World Bank. If the weaknesses of any country‘s financial system are 
identified in good time, then there is a greater chance of avoiding a crisis situation, which is 
highly negative for global economic stability and growth.   Thus, these Metadata conventions on 
FSI fall under the category of soft law creation by the IMF.    
(2) Assumptions and Data Conventions447 
Below are mentioned some of the very basic conventions used by the World Economic Outlook. 
However, these data conventions and assumptions are clarified by the IMF, thereby creating 
certainty in the context of their usage.   
 Domestic economy series are expressed in billions of national currency units. 
 External accounts series are expressed in billions of U.S. dollars. 
 "Billion" means a thousand million; "trillion" means a thousand billion. 
 Missing data are indicated by "n/a". 
 Blank row means that data are not available or not applicable. 
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 Experts from 17 member countries and 6 international and regional agencies met on October 29–30, 2003 to 
discuss the latest draft of the IMF‘s Compilation Guide on Financial Soundness Indicators. Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/2003/111703.pdf#fsi 
 
447
 Assumptions and Data Conventions, World Economic Outlook. Available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/data/assump.htm 
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 "/" means between years or months (for example, 2008/2009) to indicate a fiscal or 
financial year. 
 In the reports, shaded areas indicate IMF staff projections. 
 Minor discrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals shown reflect 
rounding. 
c) Decisions/Guideline of the Executive Board:  
In the IMF‘s organisational framework, the Executive Board is the most effective and powerful 
body. The highest decision making body of the IMF is the Board of Governors
448
 but with the 
exception of certain powers, the remainder are delegated to the Executive Board. The Executive 
Board is consist of 24 Directors and a Managing Director, who serves as its Chairman of the 
Executive Board. The Executive Board is responsible for the daily routine functioning of the 
IMF. In this context, the Executive Board meets a couple of times a week in order to run the 
IMF.
449
 
In accordance with Section 15 of the By-Laws of the IMF, “the Executive Board is authorized by 
the Board of Governors to exercise all the powers of the Board of Governors except those 
conferred directly by the Articles of Agreement on the Board of Governors.”450 
Moreover, according to section 16, “the Executive Board is authorized by the Board of 
Governors to adopt such Rules and Regulations, including financial regulations, as may be 
                                                 
448
 ―The Board of Governors, the highest decision-making body of the IMF, consists of one governor and one 
alternate governor for each member country. The governor is appointed by the member country and is usually the 
minister of finance or the governor of the central bank. All powers of the IMF are vested in the Board of Governors. 
The Board of Governors may delegate to the Executive Board all except certain reserved powers. The Board of 
Governors normally meets once a year.‖ [http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm]  
449
 http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.htm 
450
 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bl/bl15.htm  
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necessary or appropriate to conduct the business of the Fund. Any Rules and Regulations so 
adopted, and any amendments thereof, shall be subject to review by the Board of Governors at 
their next regular meeting.”451 
In light of the above by-laws of the IMF, it is very clear that the Executive Board has a 
prominent role in the rule-making process of the IMF.  The scope of this rule-making process is 
limited to that mentioned in Article I of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. However, in very 
rare incidences in the past, the Executive Board imposed its decisions on its members even with 
the institutional acts for which they had not committed for. The exchange rate stability system 
was completely destroyed in 1971 and was replaced by a new exchange rate mechanism based 
on floating currencies. To formally bind its members, it was necessary for the IMF to amend the 
Article of Agreement, but in order to temporarily bind its members before the alteration in its 
Article of Agreement, the Executive Board approved the guiding principle for floating exchange 
rate system.
452
 
Another example of the Executive Board‘s decision-making453 process leading to a set of rules of 
great importance is the Executive Board‘s decision on bilateral surveillance.454 In 2007, the IMF 
                                                 
451
 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bl/bl16.htm 
452
 Sands, P., and Klein, P. (eds), (2001) ‗Bowett's law of International Institutions‘, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th 
ed. p 288. See also, footnote 97. 
453
 For details about the Executive Board‘s programs visit: http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=89  
454
 IMF Executive Board Adopts New Decision on Bilateral Surveillance Over Members' Policies Public 
Information Notice (PIN) No. 07/69 June 21, 2007. Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2007/pn0769.htm 
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implemented a new Decision on Bilateral Surveillance over Members' Policies, which 
replaced its own Decision on Surveillance Over Exchange Rate Policies
455
 passed in 1977.  
This subheading has discussed rule-making by the IMF‘s Executive Board through its decision-
making process; however, the decisions are limited to the scope of the IMF function and powers 
mentioned in its Articles of Agreement. The legislative and normative capacities of the IMF have 
also been considered and the ways in which IMF enhances financial sector development in its 
legislative and normative capacities. The next subheading looks at the IMF‘s executive and 
administrative functioning as an IEI in the development of the financial sector, promoting 
certainty and predictability of the rules of the game in the global economic scenario.  
2. Executive and administrative authority of the IMF and 
development of the sector 
The IMF, with its executive and administrative authority, has a highly significant and effective 
role in the development of the financial sector. In the financial sector development scenario, the 
main focal point of the IMF‘s role is on FSAP and governance issues. But first of all, this 
subheading refreshes our previous knowledge of the executive and administrative role of an 
IEI.
456
   
The effectiveness of an IEI depends on the implementation of institutional acts.
457
 Thus, to 
ensure the implementation and execution of institutional acts is effective, IEIs are sometimes 
empowered with executive and administrative authority. However, exercise of this authority is 
                                                 
455
 ―Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies,‖ Decision No. 5392-(77/63), April 29, 1977. See also Review of the 
1977 Decision on Surveillance Over Exchange Rate Policies Preliminary Considerations. Prepared by the Policy 
Development and Review Department of the IMF and Approved by Mark Allen (2006). 
456
 See,  chapter II.A.3.b) on page 46  
457
 Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein (eds) (2001),. Bowett's Law of International. Institutions. London: Sweet & 
Maxwell. 5th ed. , p 314; and also see, G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker (1995), International Institutional Law: 
Unity Within Diversity. 3rd edn, The Hague, M. Nijhoff, chapter 10. 
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curtailed by the concept of legality. It only aims to empower IEIs to provide assistance and 
supervision of members for the implementation of institutional acts and, in some cases, also 
empowers the IEIs to exercise sanctioning.
458
  
The IMF, for its effective operation, possesses executive and administrative authority. These 
powers are vital for the implementation of the decisions of the IMF so that it can function 
smoothly to achieve its goals. In this context, the IMF has a proper institutional structure with an 
administrative arm which plays a central role in the management of the IMF and its activities. 
Through this institutional structure (secretariat), the IMF performs its executive or administrative 
functions to enable it to manage the realisation of institutional acts and supervise compliance 
with those acts by members. 
The use of sanctions by the IMF is not that common; rather it uses conditionality as a tool for the 
enforcement (compliance) and implementation of its policies. Conditionality, as an enforcement 
mechanism, will also be discussed in this subheading. However, it is argued by many scholars 
that the IMF‘s Executive Board has been extensively empowered with executive authorities. 
Moreover, the dominance of the US in the Executive Board makes the US the ultimate executive 
in the IMF.
459
 If the US dominance factor is ignored, and the executive authority used by the 
IMF observed in the context of development of the global financial sector, then it would not be 
difficult to come to the conclusion that it has a positive contribution.     
                                                 
458
 For sanction as means of enforcement see generally; George W. Downs (1998), Enforcement and the Evolution 
of Cooperation, 19 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 319; Doxey, Margaret P. (1996), 
International sanctions in contemporary perspective. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 2nd edition; Abram Chayes, Antonia 
Handler Chayes (1998), The new sovereignty: compliance with international regulatory agreements /. Harvard 
University Press; and also see, Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein (eds) (2001), Bowett's Law of International. 
Institutions. London: Sweet & Maxwell. 5th ed., p 324. 
459
 See generally, Woods, Ngaire (2006). Whose institutions? in The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank and 
Their Borrowers, Cornell University Press, Ithaca. 
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This following part begins by looking at FSAP and then the governance issues dealt with by the 
IMF in its executive authority in order to promote financial sector development which is an 
essential element in achieving the stable and balanced growth of the global economy within the 
international economic cycle.  
a) FSAP 
FSAP is the most noteworthy and the most popular
460
 aspect of the IMF‘s TA operation. It is the 
combined initiative of the IMF and the World Bank and an assessment program of the financial 
sectors of its member countries. FSAP allows its membership, in a deeper collective effort, to 
monitor their own financial systems with the help of the IMF. Its basic aim is to assess in detail 
the financial sectors of its members and identify for concerned national authorities the 
weaknesses in their financial systems. In addition to assessment of member countries‘ financial 
sectors, FSAP provides assistance to the members concerned in order to develop measures to 
reduce or overcome the weaknesses identified in their financial systems.
461
  
FSAP mostly studies the institutional framework of financial sectors and also assesses it in the 
context of a risk and vulnerability analysis using different types of indicators and stress tests.
462
 
In this vulnerability analysis scenario, FSAP is considered as the most important program for 
                                                 
460
 FSAP is quite popular TA program of the IMF, as it has be requested and received by more than 120 member 
countries of the IMF. IMF Factsheet, The Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), 2010, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/fsap.htm 
461
 IMF Factsheet, The Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), 2010, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/fsap.htm; see also, Chapter IV.C.2.a) on page 150. 
462
 However, over the passage of time new features have been included in the TA activity, such as more candid and 
transparent assessments; improved analytical toolkit; more adaptable sectional reviews, personalised to specific 
member‘s requirements; improved cross-country outlooks; and improved directing of standards assessments. For 
details visit http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/fsap.htm; see also, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 
and THE WORLD BANK (2003). Analytical Tools of the FSAP. Prepared by the Staffs of the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund Approved by Cesare Calari and Stefan Ingves, at p5-20; see also, see Blaschke W., 
Matthew T. Jones, G. Majnoni, and S. M. Peria, Stress Testing of Financial Systems: An Overview of Issues, 
Methodologies, and FSAP Experiences, 2001, IMF Working Paper, WP/01/88. 
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financial sector examination by the IMF.
463
 In light of FSAP, the IMF is able to use its tools 
(surveillance, TA and financial assistance) effectively to develop the financial sector.   
Objectives of FSAP: There are two main objectives of the FSAP program; firstly, it is a 
supportive program which facilitates countries in detecting and putting an end to financial sector 
weaknesses and thus supporting the prevention of crises; and secondly, the endorsement of 
financial sector development and efficacy, thus supporting economic growth.
 464
 
IMF publications related to FSAP‘s policy and reviews have, in addition, identified some of its 
intermediate objectives before it achieves its final objectives, mentioned above. Some of the 
intermediate objectives of FSAP are as follows: 
  Regular evaluation and screening of financial systems to spot a system‘s strong points, 
weak points, and potential threats to the system. This also covers the implementation of 
standards and codes. 
 Making polices for the enhancement of financial sector development.  
 Spotting technical assistance and development requirements. 
 Regular coverage and assessment of global financial system.465 
The standards typically assessed in FSAP:
466
 As FSAP is an assessment program, it generally 
assesses countries‘ financial sectors in the light of certain standards; however, which standards 
are used for assessment differs from case to case. The following are some of the common 
standards used for assessment purposes:  
                                                 
463
 Evaluation of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), Issues Paper, Prepared by the Independent 
Evaluation Office, 2004. 
464
 Ibid 
465
 In practice this meant the development of a common template for FSAP assessment of both vulnerability and 
development issues. The generic template was to serve as starting point and initial guideline - not to be applied 
mechanically - and the FSAP team was to develop a country specific focus based on the structure of the country‘s 
financial system and evaluation of priorities for both stability and sectoral development. (IMF-World Bank Financial 
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), SM/99/116). 
466
Supra note 463 footnote 17. 
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 IMF Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial 
Policies (MFP Code);
467
  
 Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCP); 468  
 Core Principles for Systematically Important Payment Systems 
(CPSIPS);
469
  
 International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Objectives 
and Principles of Securities Regulation (IOSCO Principles); 
470
 
 International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) Insurance Core 
Principles (ICP);
 471
 and  
 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations for Anti-
Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
(AML/CFT).
 472
 This last standard is to be considered in all cases.  
In addition, there are other standards and guiding principles commonly utilised in the FSAP 
study. These comprise: (i) the OECD‘s Corporate Governance Principles;473 (ii) World Bank‘s 
                                                 
467
Chapter V. A. 1. a) (3) at page 167 
468
For details about Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision visit: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/  
469
For details about Core Principles for Systematically Important Payment Systems visit: 
http://www.bis.org/cpss/index.htm  
470
For details about Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation visit: http://www.iosco.org/  
471
For details about International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) Insurance Core Principles visit: 
http://www.iaisweb.org/index.cfm?pageID=41  
472
For details about The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations for Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism visit: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/0,2987,en_32250379_32235720_1_1_1_1_1,00.html  
473
 For details about OECD‘s Corporate Governance Principles visit: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/49/0,3343,en_2649_34813_31530865_1_1_1_1,00.html  
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Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditors Rights;
474
 (iii) CPSS-IOSCO‘s 
Recommendations for Securities Settlement System (RSSS);
475
 and (iv) International Accounting 
and Auditing Standards.
476
 
The institutional framework of the IMF takes advantage of the FSAP program by using its 
assessments in the process of conducting surveillance and providing TA and financial assistance 
to its member countries. For instance, FSAP makes an assessment of a member country and 
concludes that it is not complying fully with the norms created or supported by the IMF. In this 
case, the IMF will have three fronts to operate on; first, this information will be used in the 
context of mandatory surveillance under Article IV; second, this information can be used to 
provide better, more detailed TA to the member countries who request it; third, before extending 
financial assistance to a member country, the IMF can attach conditions to it and these conditions 
can be based on information obtained from the FSAP.  
The figure below477 illustrates FSAP functioning in a very straightforward way. FSAP makes an 
assessment of the financial risks and vulnerabilities
478
 of its member countries. Moreover, it 
analyses institutional, structural and market features, as well as compliance with the standards 
and codes by its member countries.  
                                                 
474For details about World Bank‘s Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditors Rights visit: 
http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_icr.html   
475
 For details about CPSS-IOSCO‘s Recommendations for Securities Settlement System visit: 
http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss46.htm  
476
 For details about International Accounting and Auditing Standards:  
http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/LessonsLearned_ROSC_AA.pdf  
477
 For FSAP Framework see, IMF (2004) Independent Evaluation Office Annual Report. Available at:  
http://www.imf.org/External/NP/ieo/2004/ar/figure.pdf 
478
 The assessment of vulnerabilities comprise the review of prudential regulation and supervision, liquidity 
management (financial policies, instruments, and market arrangements), arrangements for crisis management 
(financial safety nets, frameworks for bank and corporate restructuring and bankruptcy), maturity and development 
of market infrastructure, systemic risk in payment systems, and vulnerabilities from macroeconomic shocks. The 
analytical tools include stress testing for macro-financial linkages stemming from macroeconomic shocks and the 
use of financial soundness indicators (FSI) for evaluation and monitoring. It also comprises in-depth evaluation of 
observance of international standards and codes in three broad areas: financial sector regulation and supervision, 
institutional and market infrastructure, and policy transparency. See Evaluation of the Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP), Issues Paper, Prepared by the Independent Evaluation Office, 2004. p8. 
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This valuable and technical information is used in the process of surveillance and consultation by 
the IMF under Article IV. The output of this assessment is also helpful in the TA process of the 
IMF. Once the weaknesses of a member country are identified, then it becomes easier for the 
IMF to provide TA to the member concerned upon request.   
This whole process is in cyclic form, i.e. once the action on the FSAP assessment is taken, it is 
re-assessed by FSAP in order to identify any other weaknesses in the financial system of the 
member concerned. This FSAP framework, along with the IMF‘s organisational function in its 
executive authority, yields two final outcomes: first, contribution towards financial crisis 
prevention, and secondly, financial sector development.  
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Figure 5 FSAP Framework
479
  
 
The above figure elaborates the FSAP framework with two final objectives: contribution towards 
crisis prevention and the development of the global financial sector. These two objectives of 
FSAP are extremely important in the international economic framework. As FSAP is a joint 
initiative of the World Bank and the IMF, it involves a considerable degree of administrative and 
                                                 
479
 For FSAP Framework see, IMF (2004) Independent Evaluation Office Annual Report. Available at:  
http://www.imf.org/External/NP/ieo/2004/ar/figure.pdf 
Technical assistance 
and capacity building. 
Inputs 
• Assessment of financial sector risks and vulnerabilities: analysis of 
institutional, structural, and market features; stress testing; financial 
soundness indicators; standards and codes. 
• Reassessments and follow-ups of recommendations and actions. 
Outputs 
Vulnerability assessment, policy recommendations, and prioritization of 
action plans. 
• Aide-mémoire, detailed assessments, and technical notes to country 
authorities. 
• FSSA to Executive Board. 
• Identification of TA needs. 
Intermediate outcomes 
• Policy and institutional change. 
• Reduction of financial vulnerabilities. 
Final objectives 
• Contribution to crisis prevention. 
• Financial sector development. 
IMF surveillance and 
IMF-supported 
programs. 
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executive functioning in this process. However, it is the most successful program of the IEIs in 
their executive function, in the context of the economic cycle.    
Another aspect of FSAP needs to be highlighted; that in which the IMF, in its executive authority 
(through its tools, surveillance, TA and conditionality), operates in order to ensure financial 
sector development, i.e. by tackling governance issues. The IMF supports good governance 
through its wide range of approaches, such as technical assistance, policy advice, and program 
conditionality. The policy transparency codes (both codes of Good Practices on Transparency in 
Monetary and Financial Policies, and Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency) developed by the 
IMF comprise a highly significant effort made by the IMF in order to endorse good governance, 
which in turn leads to the development of the financial sector
480
.
481
 The following section will 
consider governance and the role of the IMF in that context. 
b) The IMF’s role in the context of governance issues 
In general terms, governance means extensive interaction between citizens and government. 
Governments mainly interact with their citizens through policies and these policies, if economic 
or related to the economy, become the concern of the IMF, as those policies can affect the 
stability of the financial sector, both domestic and global. Here, the IMF enters the picture to 
look for two main policy concerns relating to its expertise; firstly, the extent and nature of 
                                                 
480
 The IMF is concerned about poor governance because it is an obstacle to growth and a threat to economic 
stability. It contributes to good governance through its policy advice, technical assistance, and program 
conditionality. It does so within its areas of expertise that covers the effective and transparent handling of public 
wealth and up holding of a stable, economic, regulatory and legal environment. See, Udaibir S. Das and Marc 
Quintyn, Crisis Prevention and Crisis Management: The Role of Regulatory Governance. IMF Working Paper No. 
02/163. p13 
481
 Anton Op de Beke, IMF Activities to Promote Good Governance and Combat Corruption --An Overview, IMF, 
Policy Development and Review Department, 2002.  
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transparency and the accountability of policies and policy makers; and, secondly, the degree of 
compliance with policies concerned with global best practice and standards.
482
  
The 1997 Guidance Note on the IMF’s role in the context of governance issues asserts that 
the IMF is the most effective institution to tackle governance issues with the help of two tools: 
technical assistance and policy advice.
 483 
These tools are applied with a two-pronged approach, 
that is: the development of public sector resource management and administration
484
; and by 
endorsing the expansion and continuance of transparency and stability in the regulatory regime 
for private sector efficiency.
485
  
However, there is a limit to the IMF‘s role in the context of governance issues, wherein it should 
only look into an issue‘s economic aspects when the issue concerned can considerably influence 
macroeconomic functioning.
486
 
                                                 
482
 Moreover, the IMF is also concerned with the corruption issue as well. The economic consequences of corruption 
can be serious. It reduces investment and the rate of economic growth [Udaibir S. Das and Marc Quintyn, Crisis 
Prevention and Crisis Management: The Role of Regulatory Governance. IMF Working Paper No. 02/163.] 
Governance and corruption has direct relation. Evidently, bad governance entails more inducements and further 
space for corruption. The advancement of good governance, hence, supports to avert corruption. See, Anton Op de 
Beke, IMF Activities to Promote Good Governance and Combat Corruption --An Overview, IMF, Policy 
Development and Review Department, 2002. See also, Woods, Ngaire (2000). The Challenge of Good Governance 
for the IMF and the World Bank Themselves. University College, Oxford, UK. 
483
 Since 1997, the IMF‘s contribution in endorsing good governance has increased notably. The core idea has been 
to promote accountability and transparency in economic policies via endorsement of globally accepted standards, 
and codes of good practices in fiscal, monetary and financial policy transparency; data dissemination; and banking 
regulation and supervision. See, Anton Op de Beke, IMF Activities to Promote Good Governance and Combat 
Corruption --An Overview, IMF, Policy Development and Review Department, 2002.  
 
484
 Development of public sector resource management and administration is achieved via public sector  reforms, 
such as, reforms directed as the central bank, treasury, civil service, public enterprises, expenditure control, the 
official statistics function, budget management, and revenue collection.[THE ROLE OF THE IMF IN 
GOVERNANCE ISSUES--GUIDANCE NOTE (1997). Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/1997/nb9715.htm#I2 ] 
 
485
 This can be achieved by stability and transparency in the price mechanism, banking systems, and exchange and 
trade regimes and their associated rules. [THE ROLE OF THE IMF IN GOVERNANCE ISSUES--GUIDANCE 
NOTE (1997). Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/1997/nb9715.htm#I2 ] 
 
486
 THE ROLE OF THE IMF IN GOVERNANCE ISSUES--GUIDANCE NOTE (1997). Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/1997/nb9715.htm#I2  
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Below are mentioned the roles performed by the IMF
487
 in its organisational capacity to promote 
governance in order to provide a healthier environment for the development of the financial 
sector.  
 Governance in IMF policy advice: As part of the surveillance program, the IMF 
furnishes its membership with relevant policy guidance, and in most situations, this 
policy guidance includes governance problems. 
 Governance in IMF-supported programs: As already discussed in the earlier part of this 
chapter, the IMF extends financial assistance to those member countries suffering 
balance-of-payments problems whereby they can reinstate an environment for economic 
growth. However, the extent of financial assistance significantly depends upon the good 
governance level of the country concerned. So, in order to access prompt and reasonable 
financial assistance from the IMF, countries support good governance in their respective 
countries.  
 Governance in IMF technical assistance: In conjunction with financial assistance, 
surveillance, and TA is also one of the key tools of the IMF. The IMF, via TA, plays a 
significant role in the endorsement of good governance. This goal is achieved through TA 
in two ways; firstly, by enhancing the capacity of the member countries to implement 
standards and codes based on good practice; and secondly, to help them to develop 
appropriate policies to achieve good governance. 
                                                 
487
 Anton Op de Beke, IMF Activities to Promote Good Governance and Combat Corruption --An Overview, IMF, 
Policy Development and Review Department, 2002. 
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3. Conclusion  
This subheading illustrates how the IMF has an effective institutional role (legislative and 
normative, and, executive and administrative) which the IMF does not explicitly refer to. The 
reason that the IMF avoids explicit acceptance of its institutional role is because it wants to avoid 
discussion regarding the realist aspects of the IMF. However, this part of the chapter has clearly 
documented that the IMF as an IEI contributes significantly, through its institutional role, to the 
development of the global financial sector (see the table below). 
  
Table 6 
IO’s Institutional role IMF’s Institutional Role 
promoting certainty in global 
economic scenario  
Effect on Development of 
Global Financial Sector 
Legislative or Normative   Conventions 
 Standards and Codes 
 Decisions of Executive 
Board 
Positive: By setting of the 
rules of the game IMF 
increases certainty and 
predictability of rules of the 
game which have positive 
effect on the development of 
financial sector.  
Executive and 
Administrative 
 Surveillance  
 Technical Assistance 
 Enforce Compliance 
(Conditionality) 
 FSAP 
 Governance Issue 
Positive: The executive and 
administrative functioning 
helps to implement the rules, 
which again increases certainty 
and predictability of rules of 
the game which have positive 
effect on the development of 
financial sector. 
Judicial or Quasi-Judicial  N/A  
 
The table above summarises the partial institutional role of the IMF
488
 in context of the financial 
sector development. In its legislative and normative capacity, the IMF through the decisions of 
the Executive Board, being forum for conventions and via its involvement in the standards and 
                                                 
488
 The institutional role of the IMF is incomplete because it‘s institutional structure lacks an adjudicative organ 
which is important for a complete institutional role.   
Rao Raza Hashim 
183 
School Of Law 
University Of Warwick 
codes; contributes positively towards the development of the global financial sector. Moreover, 
the IMF also contributes positively towards financial sector development through its executive 
and administrative functioning which includes the surveillance, TA, conditionality, FSAP and 
governance issues. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, financial sector development is 
crucial for the stable and balanced growth of the global economy.  
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B. IMF and International Trade 
This chapter looks at the role of the IMF in its institutional capacity in achieving a more stable 
and balanced growth of the global economy through the international economic cycle. In this 
context, the preceding subheading emphasised the IMF‘s contribution as an IEI, using the 
certainty of rules in the development of the international financial sector which in turn leads to 
economic growth. Working along the same lines, this subheading will focus on the institutional 
role of the IMF in the endorsement of international trade in the international economic cycle.  
As discussed in the theoretical framework, the international institutional role contributes 
positively towards the IELR which creates certainty and predictability of the rules of the game 
within the global economic scenario.
489
 Thus, this subheading focuses on the institutional role of 
the IMF in the promotion of the international trade of its member countries.  
1. Introduction  
The IMF has a direct link with international trade.
490
 It deals with trade matters for two reasons: 
first, it is a part of its core macroeconomic scheme; and, secondly, the economic conditions of 
any economy, which includes financial conditions as well, are heavily influenced by trade policy, 
provided trade amounts to be a major part of that economy.
491
  
In addition, the IMF‘s activities in the context of trade issues are directed at endorsing economic 
growth and financial sector stability. Trade environments which lack rules of the game in trading 
scenarios give undue space for trading parties to use too much discretion. Too much discretion 
leads to uncertainty which in turn leads to inadequate conditions for proper economic 
                                                 
489
 See chapter II.A.3 on page 38 
490
 Rose, Andrew K. (2005), Which International Institutions Promote International Trade? Review of International 
Economics, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 682-698. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=806319 
491
 For Board guidance on trade-related priorities, see Concluding Remarks by the Acting Chair, Trade Issues— 
Role of the Fund (BUFF/01/143, September 20, 2001) and Concluding Remarks by the Acting Chair, Market Access 
for Developing Country Exports—Selected Issues (BUFF/02/165, September 18, 2002). 
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functioning, financial assistance usefulness, and good governance. Moreover, trade reforms can 
be extremely helpful in economic growth policies as trade policies lock parties into international 
commitments and are also helpful for locking countries into obligations within other fields.
492
 
Trade policies and balance of payments issues are directly linked to each other
493
;trade policies 
influence balance of payments and countries‘ revenues, which in turn affects the stability of 
global financial sector.
494
 
Balance of payment issues are dealt reasonably by the IMF, which provides financial assistance 
to countries when they need money for trade adjustments. The IMF tackles the certainty of 
balance of payment financing through the Trade Integration Mechanism ―TIM‖, which 
endeavours to enhance the certainty of the availability of resources provided by the IMF.
495
  
The IMF, through its second key tool, TA, extends its expertise in the field of international trade 
to addressing member countries‘ data standardisation, and customs, tax and tariff reform.496 
These reforms, supported by the IMF, also endeavour to reduce the (adverse) consequences (if 
any) of liberalization on government revenue.
497
 The IMF also contributes to the enhanced 
Integrated Framework
498
 through TA, which is directed towards enhancing the inclusion of 
                                                 
492
 For example, regulatory reforms through external commitments, strengthening market disciplines on enterprises 
and banks, or reducing the scope for corruption. 
493
 For an econometric analysis of trade policy on BOP see generally, Dasgupta, Partha and Joseph E. Stiglitz 
(1974). Benefit-Cost Analysis and Trade Policies. Journal of Political Economy Vol. 82, No. 1, pp.1-33. Also see, 
Thirlwall, A. P., and Amelia Santos-Paulino (2004), The impact of trade liberalization on exports, imports and the 
balance of payments of developing countries. The Economic Journal, Volume 114, Issue 493. 
494
 IMF (2005). Review of Fund Work on Trade. Prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department, para 
3. 
495
 IMF (2010). Selected Decisions and Selected Documents of the IMF, Thirty- Fifth Issue -- Trade Integration 
Mechanism. Prepared by the Legal Department of the IMF As updated as of December 31, 2010 
496
 See generally, IMF (2005). Dealing with the Revenue Consequences of Trade Reform (Background Paper for 
Review of Fund Work on Trade), Prepared by the Fiscal Affairs Department, Approved by Teresa Ter-Minassian; 
see also, Keen, Michael (ed.), 2003, Changing Customs: Challenges and Strategies for the Reform of  Customs 
Administration ( Washington DC: International Monetary Fund). 
497
 See generally, Ebrill, Liam P., Janet Stotsky, and Reint Gropp (1999). Revenue implications of trade 
liberalization. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
498
 It is discussed in the latter part of this subheading. Chapter V.B.4.b)(2) on page 209 
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international trade reforms, while keeping in view domestic poverty reduction policies. The main 
purpose of the enhanced Integrated Framework and Aid for Trade is to enable countries to make 
the best of the international trading system.  
The IMF, through its surveillance mechanism under Article IV, identifies the strengths and 
weaknesses of the member countries‘ prevailing economies and also works out suitable strategies 
in order to face challenges emerging from global integration. In addition, the IMF supports 
countries in taking up trade reforms, unilaterally or multilaterally, based on non-
discrimination.
499
 
2. Legal Aspect in the context of IMF and Trade 
Before moving on to the role played by the IMF in its institutional capacity in the context of 
matters related to international trade, it would be appropriate to discuss the legal basis on which 
the IMF can be involved in trade matters. This is important because mostly, in layman‘s terms, it 
is assumed that the IMF only deals with monetary and financial issues. The IEI responsible for 
tackling trade issues is the WTO. The following section talks about the legal basis by which the 
IMF involves itself in trade issues. 
According to Article I (ii) of the IMF‘s Articles of Agreement, one of the main purposes of the 
IMF is ―to facilitate500 the expansion and balanced growth of world trade.‖ So, the IMF‘s 
involvement with trade issues is clearly covered by the above-mentioned Article. More precisely, 
Article IV and V of the Articles of Agreement require the IMF to look into trade issues.
501
 Under 
                                                 
499
 IMF (2011). FACTSHEET, The IMF's Trade Integration Mechanism (TIM). 
500The term ―facilitates‖ denotes the effect on the growth of international trade that results indirectly from the work 
of the Fund. As stated by former General Counsel Sir Joseph Gold: ―The nuance of the word ‗facilitates‘ in [Article 
IV] and of the word ‗facilitate‘ in Article I expresses the idea of encouraging or easing and not controlling.‖ Gold, 
Some Legal Aspects of the IMF‘s Activities in Relation to International Trade, Oster. Z. Offentl. Recht Und 
Volkerrecht Vol. 36, pp. 157–217, 1986 at 159. 
501
 See, Chapter IV.C.1 on page 143 
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Article IV, the IMF needs to carry out mandatory surveillance in order to check member 
countries‘ compliance with their international commitments, which also includes trade 
commitments if they affect any of the purposes of the IMF.
502
  
In same way, when the IMF extends financial assistance to any member country, under Article 
V, then it needs to make sure that it will be able to recover its money. So, at this stage, the IMF 
can impose conditions to secure the recovery of its money, and these conditions can be imposed 
on matters related to trade. Therefore, according to the above Article and the Executive Board 
discussion in the context of the 2004 Biennial Surveillance Review, trade policies fall under the 
IMF‘s legal authority when they affect member countries‘ fiscal conditions, exchange rates, and 
the economic stability and growth scenario.
503
 In the same way, the Conditionality Guidelines of 
2002 assert that trade policy issues should be subject to conditionality in order to fulfil the IMF‘s 
objectives.
504505
 
506
 
The IMF and the WTO have their own jurisdiction according to their specialisations; that is, the 
exchange rate and trade policies and practices. If member countries contravene their 
commitments, then the above-mentioned IEIs have a legal mandate to deal with issues within 
their jurisdiction.
507
 However, there are sometimes issues which are complicated and fall within 
the jurisdiction of both of these IEIs. In that case, both IEIs deal with the issue by enforcing the 
                                                 
502
 See, Rose, Andrew K. (2005), Which International Institutions Promote International Trade? Review of 
International Economics, Vol. 13, No. 4, p. 683. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=806319 
503
 The Chairman‘s Summing Up, Biennial Review of the Implementation of the Fund‘s Surveillance and of the 
1977 Surveillance Decision (SUR/04/80, August 2, 2004). 
504
 In so doing, Moreover, the Conditionality Guidelines of 2002 also stress on trade-related surveillance and 
program work, but also describes the work in other areas, including research, technical assistance and outreach and 
communication. 
505
 Para 2, Review of Fund Work on Trade (2005) 
506
 Annex 1 discusses legal aspects of the Fund‘s trade-related surveillance and program work. The main author of 
this Appendix is Ms. D. Siegel (LEG).  
507
 Para 2 of Annex I of  Review of Fund Work on Trade (2005). 
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obligations in their own way.
508
 In any case, the legal jurisdictional relationship of the IMF and 
the WTO is quite complicated and this chapter does not go into detail.
509
 The following section 
talks about some of the legal aspects of the IMF‘s operational tools and international trade. 
a) Surveillance 
Surveillance is dealt with in detail by Article IV of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, which 
makes surveillance an obligatory practice for both members and the IMF. Article IV Section 3 
requires the IMF to supervise and carry out consultative discussions with its members in order to 
warrant the effectual functioning of the international monetary system. Article IV Section 3(i)), 
and Section (3)(ii) obliges the IMF to keep an eye on its members to check whether their 
commitments conform with the general obligations mentioned in Article IV Section 1.
510
 The 
general obligations mentioned in section 1 of Article IV require members to follow the IMF in 
core and non-core areas of financial and economic policies leading to more stable and balanced 
growth, and, exchange and exchange rate policies.
511
 Moreover, the Executive Board in the 
Biennial Surveillance Reviews in 2000
512
 and 2002
513
 elaborates upon the terms ‗core‘ and ‗non-
                                                 
508
 Under the Fund‘s Articles, the Executive Board determines compliance with members‘ obligations under the 
Articles. A noncomplying member may be subject to sanctions under Article XXVI, ranging from disqualifying to 
utilise Fund money to stay of voting rights and, eventually, enforced removal form membership. In contrast, the 
WTO does not itself impose sanctions. Rather, it is the aggrieved member that initiates the dispute resolution 
procedure and may eventually pursue remedies in the form of countermeasures. This approach reflects the reciprocal 
nature of the trade concessions that characterized the GATT. The WTO as an organization facilitates the 
implementation of the agreements in various ways, including providing the mechanism for formal dispute resolution 
if a complaint is brought by an aggrieved member. The World Trade Organization—Institutional Aspects, 
SM/94/304, Dec. 20, 1994. 
509
 See The Relationship of the World Trade Organization with the Fund—Legal Aspects, SM/94/303, Dec. 20, 
1994; D. Siegel, Legal Aspects of the IMF/WTO Relationship: The Fund‘s Articles of Agreement and the WTO 
Agreements, AJIL, Vol. 96, No. 3, p. 561, July 2002.  
510
 Chapter IV.C.1 on page 143 
511
 The legal aspects of surveillance under Article IV were recently discussed in ―Biennial Review of the 
Implementation of the Fund‘s Surveillance and of the 1977 Surveillance Decision—Modalities of Surveillance,‖ 
SM/04/212, Supp. I, Appendix I. 
512See ―Biennial Review of the Implementation of the Fund‘s Surveillance and of the 1977 Surveillance 
Decision‖ (SM/00/40, February 18, 2000)  
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core‘ areas mentioned in section 1 of Article IV, both of which are discussed in the next 
paragraph.
514
 
The IMF can include trade related matters in its consultative discussions with its members under 
certain conditions, discussed below. First, as mentioned by the Executive Board in the Biennial 
Surveillance Review
515
in 2000, core themes for the IMF consultative discussions for the purpose 
of surveillance under Article IV include matters related to exchange rate policies and their 
consistency with macroeconomic policies, balance of payments, capital account flows, financial 
sector concerns, and all related fields. Trade issues become part of the core sphere for 
surveillance if any member imposes trade restrictions for balance-of-payments reasons or 
engages in exchange rate complications.
516
 
Secondly, non-core subjects can be included in the surveillance process under Article IV if they 
are capable of influencing members commitments mentioned in subsection (i) and (ii) of Article 
IV section 1, which relates to financial and economic policies. For example, it happens when a 
member country who is under surveillance is engaged in trade subsidies which have significant 
influence on the financial sector or its development process or stability.
 517
 In the context of trade 
subjects, the Executive Board, in its review on surveillance in 2002, noted that “coverage of 
                                                                                                                                                             
513
 Biennial Review of the Implementation of the Fund‘s Surveillance and of the 1977 Surveillance Decision: 
Framework and Conduct of Surveillance in 2000-01. Prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department 
of IMF, 2002. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/surv/2002/index.htm   
514
 Annex I of  Review of Fund Work on Trade (2005). 
515See ―Biennial Review of the Implementation of the Fund‘s Surveillance and of the 1977 Surveillance 
Decision‖ (SM/00/40, February 18, 2000)  
516
 Such restrictions might indicate the need for ―special consultations‖ with the member. Surveillance Over 
Exchange Rate Policies, Principles of Fund Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies, para 2(iii), Dec. No. 5392- 
(77/63), April 29, 1997, as amended, Selected Decisions, 28th Issue, p. 12. See also, Annex I of  Review of Fund 
Work on Trade (2005). 
517
 Biennial Review of the Implementation of the Fund's Surveillance and of the 1977 Surveillance Decision—
Overview, Modalities of Surveillance, Content of Surveillance, and Public Information Notice on the Executive 
Board Discussion (2004). Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/surv/2004/082404.htm , See also, Annex 
I of  Review of Fund Work on Trade (2005). 
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trade policies is critical in countries where serious trade distortions hamper macroeconomic 
prospects….”518 
Thirdly, any trade issue which does not fall within both the core area and the non-core areas of 
surveillance can be dealt by the IMF through its ―policy advice‖.519 It is up to the members to 
avail themselves of the IMF‘s policy advice and there is no obligation in this regard. 520 Policy 
advice is a consultative consideration between the IMF and the member concerned.
521
 The need 
for policy advice arises if a country‘s economic policies, which might be fine for its economy, 
have global or regional connotations, that is, when a trade policy of a large economy can deeply 
influence small economies in a region, or where a large economy influences market access for 
small economies.
522
  
In short, the IMF can certainly become involved in situations when trade issues fall within the 
IMF‘s area of specialisation or can influence them. Next we look at the legal aspect of the IMF 
in the context of trade and the usage of conditionality.  
b) Conditionality 
The use of conditionality in trade related matters is legally empowered by Article V Section 3 of 
the Articles of Agreement, which talks about using conditionality in order to obtain IMF funding. 
Basically, Article V (3) allows the IMF to impose conditions on its membership which are 
                                                 
518
 Biennial Review of the Implementation of the Fund‘s Surveillance and of the 1977 Surveillance Decision: 
Framework and Conduct of Surveillance in 2000-01. Prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department 
of IMF, 2002, para 9. See also, Annex I of  Review of Fund Work on Trade (2005). 
519
 See Role of the Fund in Governance Issues, Guidance Note, Statement by the General Counsel, BUFF/97/75, 
July 23, 1977. 
520
 Annex I of  Review of Fund Work on Trade (2005). 
521
 Article XII, Section 8 of the Fund‘s Articles permits the Fund, at any time, ―to communicate its views informally 
to any member on any matter arising‖ under the Articles. This is consistent with the Fund‘s 
purposes, in particular, as stated in Article I(i) ―to promote international monetary cooperation through a 
permanent institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on international monetary 
problems.‖ 
522
 Biennial Review of the Implementation of the Fund‘s Surveillance and of the 1977 Surveillance Decision: 
Framework and Conduct of Surveillance in 2000-01. Prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department 
of IMF, 2002, para 9. See also, Annex I of  Review of Fund Work on Trade (2005). 
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pursuant to the IMF‘s Articles of Agreement and are imposed to ensure recovery of the financial 
assistance extended to its member.
523
 Moreover, according to Article I (v) it is one of the 
purposes for the creation of the IMF: IMF financial assistance is extended to its membership “to 
give confidence to members by making the general resources of the IMF temporarily available to 
them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with the opportunity to correct 
maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of 
national or international prosperity.” However, the latter part of the same section (Article I (v)) 
makes financial assistance conditional in that it must be “subject to adequate safeguards” from 
default.  
The IMF needs to secure the recovery of its money and in order to do so, it directs 
conditionalities to policies related to the areas concerned, in this case, trade related policies. For 
instance, it is the IMF‘s job to use all legal means to address a trade measure taken by any of its 
members if it is ―destructive of national or international prosperity‖.524 While addressing trade 
policy reform
525
, the IMF needs to take into consideration the economic consequences of the 
recommended trade policy reform via conditionalities. For instance, if the IMF imposes a 
conditionality related to exchange rate policy, it should also address the consequences of this 
recommended measure, that is, by finding out whether a restrictive trade policy can disturb a 
new rate of exchange achieved via a flexible exchange rate mechanism.
526
 
                                                 
523
 See, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2005) Review of the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines Prepared 
by the Policy Development and Review Department In consultation with other Departments Approved by Mark 
Allen, para 9. 
524
 Annex I of  Review of Fund Work on Trade (2005). 
525
 Trade policy issues generally includes, arbitrary tariff exemptions or other import subsidies that impact fiscal 
revenue or the business environment more generally. 
526
 Gold, The Stand-by Arrangements of the International Monetary Fund, 1970, p. 144. See also, Annex I of  
Review of Fund Work on Trade (2005). 
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The use of trade-related conditionality is also approved by the Executive Board in its Guideline 
for Conditionality, which provides a standard for application of conditionality. 
527
 The main 
point for application of conditionality is that the conditionalised measure by the IMF is highly 
significant for the realisation of the objectives of the member‘s program.528 However, there are 
limitations to the usage of conditionality; when the IMF imposes conditionality-related reforms, 
it should make sure that the conditionalised reforms do not clash with the member‘s other 
international commitments such as, for example, under the WTO.
529
  
The next subheading is dedicated to the legislative and normative functioning of the IMF in the 
promotion of international trade.  
3. Legislative and Normative functions of the IMF in the 
endorsement of International Trade  
The IMF is an effective IEI with a comprehensive institutional role supporting the IELR which 
leads to certainty and predictability of the rules of the game within the international economic 
cycle. As discussed earlier in the theoretical framework, the Economic Cycle is based on two 
main components; the financial sector and international trade. The preceding part of this chapter 
has documented the institutional role of the IMF in financial sector development. In the same 
way, this part of the chapter will show that the IMF has a considerable institutional role in the 
enhancement of international trade. Thus, by illustrating the IMF‘s institutional role in 
stimulating both components of the Economic Cycle, it will be evident that the IMF‘s 
                                                 
527
 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2002).  Guidelines on Conditionality, Prepared by the Legal and 
Policy Development and Review Departments  (In consultation with other departments)  Approved by Timothy F. 
Geithner and François Gianviti; see also, The Independent Evaluation Office -IEO (2008). The IMF‘s Approach to 
International Trade Policy Issues, para 6.  
528
 Guidelines on Conditionality, Dec. No. 12864-(02/102), Sept. 25, 2002, Selected Decisions, 28th Issue, paras 
7(a) & (b), p. 235–36. 
529
 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2002).  Guidelines on Conditionality, Prepared by the Legal and 
Policy Development and Review Departments  (In consultation with other departments)  Approved by Timothy F. 
Geithner and François Gianviti, para 11. 
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institutional role is a significant factor in achieving the stable and balanced growth of the global 
economy.  
However, the IMF does not explicitly admit its institutional role as part of the IELR. Section 
Two is dedicated to proving that despite being realist, the IMF has an institutional role. Thus, in 
this context, this subheading tries to establish that the IMF has substantial normative functioning 
in the field of international trade, which is one of the elements of its institutional role.        
The following part of this subheading talks about the legislative and normative role of the IMF. 
Therefore, any act of the IMF which is related to trade and has the effect of a law will be 
discussed under this subheading. The IMF‘s acts which come under this category are quite 
limited and include, for example, the creation of certain codes, the guideline decisions of the 
Executive Board and policy advice. All of these are non-binding norms or rules created by the 
IMF in order to fulfil the purpose of its creation, and fall under the category of soft law.   
The following part of the chapter highlights the function of the IMF in its legislative and 
normative capacity in the area of trade. In this institutional capacity, the IMF enhances certainty 
and predictability in the international trading scenario: furthermore, certainty and predictability 
acts as stimulus within the economic cycle which then leads to more stable and balanced growth.  
a) Balance of Payments Coding System530 
The Balance of Payment system was created by the IMF with the help of other organisations 
such as the Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT), the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the European Central Bank (ECB). This 
                                                 
530
 Guide to the Balance of Payments Codes for Standard Components and Additional Items, Prepared by:  Balance 
of Payments and External Debt Divisions I and II Statistics Department of IMF (1999), Available at:  
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/bopcode/guide.htm  
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coding system is intended to assist the exchange of data on balance of payments, liquidity of 
foreign currency, international trade in services, and international investment positions in the 
global economic scenario.
531
 
The basic traits of this code are the reason for its success and acceptability. It is based on 
complete coverage, it is concise, straightforward, easily automation-compliant, and easily 
modified. 
532
 
Even though this code has vast acceptability, its scope is somewhat limited. For example, it uses 
the standard components for international investment positions and balance of payments data as 
classified in the Balance of Payments Manual, the 5th edition
533
; as defined in the Extended 
Balance of Payments Services (EBOPS)
534
, as mentioned in the Manual on Statistics of 
International Trade in Services
535
; and the categorisation of foreign currency liquidity, as shown 
in the Data Template on International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity: Operational 
Guidelines
536
.
 537
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 http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/bopcode/index.htm  
532
 Guide to the Balance of Payments Codes for Standard Components and Additional Items, Prepared by:  Balance 
of Payments and External Debt Divisions I and II Statistics Department of IMF (1999), Available at:  
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/bopcode/guide.htm 
533
 Fifth Edition of the IMF's Balance of Payments Manual, IMF. P4 Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/bop/bopman.pdf  
534
 Extended Balance of Payment Services Classification (EBOPS). Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/34/2507956.pdf  
535
 The Manual on Statistics of International Trade in Services is a joint publication of six agencies: the UN, EC, 
IMF, OECD, UNCTAD, and WTO. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/45/2404428.pdf  
536
 International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity Guidelines. Available at: 
http://dsbb.imf.org/Pages/SDDS/SDDSGuide.aspx  
537
 Guide to the Balance of Payments Codes for Standard Components and Additional Items, Prepared by:  Balance 
of Payments and External Debt Divisions I and II Statistics Department of IMF (1999), Available at:  
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/bopcode/guide.htm 
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b) Trade related conditionality (conditionality itself being a 
soft law) 
Conditionality being mostly a soft law and sometimes a hard law is itself a legislative act of the 
IMF in the context of international trade. Trade-related conditionality is discussed in detail as an 
executive and administrative function of the IMF in the promotion of trade.  
c) Executive Board’s Staff Guidance on Trade Policy Advice538 
The Executive Board is the IMF‘s most powerful decision-making body. Its decisions and 
guidelines have the impact of a soft law within the global economic scenario. In 1999, the IMF 
drafted its trade policy advice guideline which was approved by the Executive Board.
539
 This 
guideline was simply a guidance note for IMF staff in the context of their expert advice to 
member countries. However, this guideline practically directs the IMF‘s policy towards trade, 
and therefore has the effect of a soft law.
540
 This policy advice is not at all binding on member 
countries;
541
 however, staff guidelines amount to a normative act of the IMF. Application of this 
guidance note by staff members eventually led to a more trade-liberalised membership within a 
stable macro economy.  
This Executive Board‘s guidelines for the IMF allow it to effectively deal with trade-related 
issues. These guidelines increase the predictability of the nature of IMF policy advice which, if 
                                                 
538
 Annex II of Review of Fund Work on Trade (2005). 
539
 IMF (1999), ―Guidelines on Designing and Implementing Trade Policy Reforms‖ (unpublished Washington: 
International Monetary Fund). 
540
 See, Annex Table 1. Guidance on the IMF‘s Approach to International Trade Policy Issues, 1996–2007, in IMF 
(2009). Guiding the IMF‘s Involvement in International Trade Policy, background paper 3, in IMF involvement in 
international trade policy issues / [prepared by an IEO team of Susan Schadler,  Ling Hui Tan and Seok-Hyun 
Yoon] – Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund. 
541
 Joseph Gold (Legal Counsel during 1946–79) held that, while  the IMF has no regulatory authority over trade 
practices, its ―soft‖ responsibility encompasses policies  that encourage or ease the expansion of international  trade. 
As sited in, What Is the Nature of the IMF‘s Mandate to Cover Trade Policy? in IMF involvement in international 
trade policy issues / [prepared by an IEO team of Susan Schadler,  Ling Hui Tan and Seok-Hyun Yoon] – 
Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, para 6 at page 4. 
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backed by conditionalities, has a hard law effect. The following part of this subheading will 
discuss the guidelines provided by the IMF for its staff in the area of trade, the purpose of 
discussing these guidelines being to see the way in which they act as soft laws.  
 IMF-recommended reform should first aim at the most obvious problem-creating 
element. These include the most restrictive and least transparent factors in the economy 
concerned, and include mainly non-tariff barriers (NTBs), quantitative restrictions, trade 
monopolies, restrictive foreign exchange practices that influence trade, quality controls, 
and customs dealings that take the form of trade restrictions. 
 The application time for the recommend reforms should be adjusted according to 
the country’s circumstances. In other words, the recommended reform should consider 
the administrative capability of the country concerned, the initial degree of 
restrictiveness, and probable modification costs. 
 Quantitative restrictions should be substituted by tariffs of a provisional nature; 
however, these new tariffs should not create an extra burden other than those of 
quantitative restrictions or WTO commitments. On the other hand, export restrictions 
should be substituted by policies to solve the issues which originally necessitated export 
restrictions.  
 The focus of IMF-led tariff reforms should be to achieve a straightforward, 
transparent system, with reasonably low standardised rates.  In an ideal world, the 
IMF‘s aim should be to impose tariffs of between 5% and 10% and can provisionally 
impose import surcharges in order to solve revenue deficits or balance of payments 
issues. However, import surcharges for longer periods should not be allowed. 
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 Customs arrangements and assessment methods should be crystal clear, with a non-
discriminatory approach.  
 IMF-recommended trade reform should be followed by harmonising 
macroeconomic and other relevant policies. The reason for doing so is because there is 
a robust connection between trade policies, real exchange rates levels, and a liberal 
exchange system. Moreover, trade and fiscal policies have considerable associations.   
 Other planning is needed to reduce the cost of trade reforms. For example, safety nets 
and fiscal reforms to counter a temporary rise in sectoral unemployment, or a reduction in 
revenue through tariff collection.  
The guideline provides instructions to the IMF regarding the approach towards regional trade 
agreements (RTA). The IMF encourages most-favoured-nation (MFN)-based liberalisation, even 
it is a regional arrangement. However, the RTAs should comply with relevant member‘s  WTO 
commitments and the RTAs should be crystal clear and liberalisation-oriented with unambiguous 
and steady rules of origin. 
Moving in the same direction as the above discussion, the Executive Board issued a list of 
considerations for staff in order to cover all issues related to trade during surveillance. These 
considerations also have the effect of soft law as they are a source of guidance to IMF staff in the 
coverage of all trade-related IMF issues. The important factor underlining these considerations 
was that it covered all direct and indirect core areas of concern for the IMF.  
In short, the IMF has a legislative and normative role, but one which is limited, in its institutional 
capacity towards the enhancement of international trade. The discussion above shows that the 
IMF successfully adds some degree of certainty and predictability of the rules of the game within 
the international trading scenario.  
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4. Executive and Administrative functions of the IMF in the 
endorsement of International Trade 
The IMF, in its executive and administrative capacity, has a reasonable role in the endorsement 
of international trade. In the international trade scenario, the main focal point of the IMF‘s role in 
this context is on surveillance, TA and IMF-led programs for the endorsement of trade (such as, 
Aid for Trade). But first of all, this subheading refreshes our earlier exploration of the executive 
and administrative role of an IO.
542
   
The effectiveness of an IO depends on the execution and implementation of its decisions and 
policies.
543
 Thus to make implementation effectual, IOs require executive and administrative 
authority. However, the exercising of this authority is curtailed by the concept of legality and it 
aims to allow IOs to extend assistance and supervision to members for the implementation of 
institutional acts and, in some cases, also empowers IOs to exercise sanctions.
544
  
As already mentioned earlier in this chapter, the IMF, for its completeness as an IO, possesses 
executive and administrative authority. These powers are vital for the implementation of the 
decisions of the IMF so that it can function smoothly to achieve its goals. In this context, the 
IMF has a proper institutional structure with an administrative arm which plays a central role in 
the management of the IMF and its activities. Through this institutional structure (secretariat) the 
IMF performs its executive and the administrative functions so that it can manage the realisation 
of institutional acts and the supervision of compliance with those acts by the members.  
                                                 
542
 Chapter II.A.3.b) on page 46  
543
 Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein (eds) (2001),. Bowett's Law of International. Institutions. London: Sweet & 
Maxwell,. 5th ed., p 314; and also see, Schermers, G. and Niels M. Blokker (1995), International Institutional Law: 
Unity Within Diversity (3rd edn, The Hague, M. Nijhoff) chapter 10. 
544
 For sanction as means of enforcement see generally; George W. Downs (1998), Enforcement and the Evolution 
of Cooperation, 19 MICHIGAN JOFURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 319; Doxey, Margaret P. (1996). 
International sanctions in contemporary perspective. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2nd edition; Chayes, Abram and 
Antonia Handler Chayes (1998), The new sovereignty: compliance with international regulatory agreements /. 
Harvard University Press; and also see, Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein (eds) (2001),. Bowett's Law of 
International. Institutions. London: Sweet & Maxwell,. 5th ed., p 324. 
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The use of sanctions by the IMF is not that common; instead, it uses conditionality as a tool for 
the enforcement (compliance) and implementation of its policies. Conditionality as an 
enforcement mechanism for compliance with the trade-related policies of the IMF will also be 
discussed in this subheading. However, there has been a reduction in trade-associated IMF 
conditionality; this is because the majority of the IMF membership has aligned their trade 
policies with those encouraged by the IMF. Moreover, the IMF focus is more on surveillance, 
program work (such as Aid for Trade), research and TA. The following section will begin by 
looking at surveillance as an executive and administrative tool of the IMF in the promotion of 
trade.  
The executive functioning of the IMF is bound by its legal framework, which is based on the 
Articles of Agreement and the decisions of the Executive Board.
545
 However, the decisions of the 
Executive Board are very wide-ranging and as such, give the IMF reasonable space to achieve its 
goals.  
The following part of the chapter looks at the executive and administrative functioning of the 
IMF as part of its institutional role in the endorsement of international trade. In this context, the 
IMF‘s main executive and administrative functions are divided into surveillance, TA and IMF-
led programs which support international trade. 
a) Surveillance 
The IMF‘s involvement in trade-related matters is legally backed by the IMF‘s Articles of 
Agreement and the decisions of the Executive Board.
546
 The surveillance process is discussed in 
                                                 
545
 IMF Legal Framework chapter IV.A on page 137 
546
 See The Chairman‘s Summing Up, Biennial Review of the Implementation of the Fund‘s Surveillance and of the 
1977 Surveillance Decision (SUR/04/80, August 2, 2004). Earlier guidance is contained in Concluding Remarks by 
the Acting Chair, Trade Issues—Role of the Fund (BUFF/01/143, September 20, 2001) and Concluding Remarks by 
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detail elsewhere in this chapter and the preceding chapter.
547
 However, the following section of 
this subheading talks about trade-related bilateral and multilateral surveillance as an 
administrative act of the IMF.   
Bilateral Surveillance 
Surveillance is a very important tool of the IMF which serves to keep the IMF and its member 
countries up-to-date about a variety of issues related to their economy. Bilateral surveillance is 
surveillance at micro or individual country level. Administrative functioning by the IMF staff in 
the form of surveillance has contributed somewhat to solving issues pertaining to trade which has 
considerably helped the trading environment.  
In order to perform this administrative function effectively, the Executive Board issued 
considerations
548
 to the IMF staff in relation to trade-related surveillance. These considerations 
enable the IMF to cover 75% of trade-related issues during surveillance.
549
 The important factor 
underpinning these considerations was that it covered all direct and indirect core areas of concern 
for the IMF.  
Multilateral Surveillance 
Surveillance comes under the administrative function of the IMF and is part of its institutional 
role: surveillance at macro level is called multilateral surveillance. This is a long process 
undertaken by IMF staff in order to assess the macro-economic conditions of the global 
economy.  
                                                                                                                                                             
the Acting Chair, Market Access for Developing Country Exports—Selected Issues (BUFF/02/165, September 18, 
2002). 
547
 Chapter IV.C.1 on page 143 and Chapter V.B.2.a) on page 188 
548
 Footnote Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. 
549
 IMF (2005). Review of Fund Work on Trade. Prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department. 
SM/05/57, Para 27. 
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In the context of trade, the IMF carries out multilateral surveillance in two chief ways. The first 
form of multilateral surveillance carried out is the World Economic Outlook (WEO). IMF staff 
analyse and predict economic conditions in the international economic scenario, which also 
includes trade topics. The WEO takes a broader approach towards international trade issues, such 
as concerns relating to the WTO‘s Doha Round, examining the link between trade and financial 
integration, and gauging the influence of upcoming trade powers on the international economic 
scenario.
550
  
The second method opted by the IMF for multilateral surveillance is by backing the WTO-led 
multilateral trade negotiation rounds, e.g. the Doha Round. For this purpose, the IMF has 
undertaken activities to endorse the Doha Round: conducting technical research papers in its 
areas of speciality which are mostly requested by the WTO secretariat; Executive Board and 
Board Committee reviews of the trade issues; publicly supporting WTO-backed trade 
liberalisation by encouraging its membership to participate actively in the Doha Round;
551
 and 
assisting its members with trade integration
552
   
Besides its contributions towards trade liberalization led by the WTO, the IMF has persistently 
highlighted the significance of the promising Doha Round agreement and its timely acceptance. 
553
 Right after the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations began in 2001, the IMF issued 
various statements emphasising the development benefits pertaining to these policies in the 
                                                 
550
 For details about WEO visit: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/index.htm   
551
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0,,contentMDK:21028421~
menuPK:64319206~pagePK:36726~piPK:36092~theSitePK:29506,00.html . For IMF Communiqués about the 
WTO visit: 
http://www.imf.org/external/news/default.aspx?gType=News&DType=Communiqu%C3%A9s&selCountry=Select
+Country&selSubject=World+Trade+Organization&selMonth=Month&selDay=Day&selYear=Year&selMonth1=
Month&selDay1=Day&selYear1=Year . For press releases by the IMF in support of the WTO visit: 
http://www.imf.org/external/news/default.aspx?gType=News&DType=Press+Releases&selCountry=Select+Countr
y&selSubject=World+Trade+Organization&selMonth=Month&selDay=Day&selYear=Year&selMonth1=Month&s
elDay1=Day&selYear1=Year&submitx.x=23&submitx.y=9   
552
 Financing policy aimed at mitigating certain concerns about the Round (Trade Integration Mechanism). 
553
 Para 38, Review of Fund Work on Trade (2005). 
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OECD conferences and at the WTO meeting. The benefits of multilateral trade were one of the 
key features discussed in letters and speeches made by the Management of the IMF.
 554
 
A considerable amount of research has been carried out by members of staff, especially on issues 
pertaining to market access for the exports of developing countries. The research conducted 
included topics such as analyses of balance of payments safeguards; export subsidies; the 
financing of losses from preference erosion; fiscal aspects of tariff reform; and a major study of 
exchange rate volatility and trade.
 555
 
The IMF governing bodies, such as the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) 
have also expressed their conviction in the DDA. The Executive Board Committee has been 
holding meetings regularly to further their cause before the WTO.
 556
 
Not only has the IMF provided its full backing to the DDA, it has also worked to highlight the 
importance of the economic rationale for free trade. This has been achieved via speeches directed 
at the significance of the agricultural policies of industrialised countries as well as the ability of 
trade to reduce poverty. Civil society organisations have also been involved in policies pertaining 
to market access and agricultural subsidies.
 557
 
Surveillance is one of the most significant tools of the IMF in the context of international trade, 
and it requires considerable administrative and executive functioning. This executive functioning 
is part of the institutional role of the IMF which is not highlighted by the IMF, in order to veil its 
realist insight within the liberally-institutionalized IELR.  
                                                 
554
 For details see box 3, Review of Fund Work on Trade (2005). 
555
 For details see box 3, IMF (2005). Review of Fund Work on Trade. Prepared by the Policy Development and 
Review Department. SM/05/57 
556
 ibid 
557
 ibid 
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The next subheading deals with the IMF programs which support international trade. These 
programs fall into the category of the executive and administrative functioning of the IMF which 
is part of its institutional role.   
b) IMF Programs for the endorsement of international trade 
The IMF, in its executive and administrative capacity, has remained engaged in several programs 
for international trade support and development, such as the Trade Integration Mechanism 
(TIM), Integrated Framework, trade policy reforms (including trade-related conditionality), and 
trade-related Technical Assistance (TA) programs and institutional building. These efforts are 
discussed below. 
Most of these programs come under the IMF‘s contribution towards the Aid for Trade program 
and the IMF‘s collaboration with other IEIs for the greater effectiveness of efforts made by all 
the IEIs for trade development. Therefore, before moving towards the efforts contributed by the 
IMF in its institutional capacity for the endorsement of international trade, the following part of 
this subheading will briefly discuss the IMF‘s contribution to Aid for Trade and its collaboration 
with other IEIs.  
Aid for Trade 
Due to the decrease in communication and transport costs, international trade has grown 
significantly over the past few decades, as it is now quite cheap and much easier to access 
overseas markets. This expansion of international trade is considered a significant factor in 
global economic growth. However, not all the countries involved in international trade gain from 
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it; numerous developing countries lack the basic infrastructure and other supply-side limitations 
to reap the benefits of international trade.
558
  
It has been observed worldwide that the expansion of exports is a highly significant factor in a 
flourishing development process. It quite difficult for an economy to grow without expanding 
exports and this includes both types of countries with exports as cause or consequence of 
economic growth.
559
 Approximately sixteen developing countries, which were not oil exporting 
countries, achieved an economic growth rate of 4.5% or above, with the help export 
expansion..
560
 Moreover, their share in the international market rose approximately threefold.
561
 
There are many reasons why countries are not able to gain from international trade, including 
political and structural factors, domestic policies, macroeconomic policies
562
 and many others. 
Therefore, the IMF and other responsible international institutions
563
 are working to assist 
developing countries (which also includes the least developed countries) to support them in the 
                                                 
558
  Dorsey, Thomas, What Is Aid for Trade? IMF Policy Development and Review Department, May 23, 2007. 
Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2007/POL0523A.htm  
559
 The direction of causality is not confirmed between positive link between trade ‗openness‘ and incomes of 
countries. See, J. D. and Warner, A. M. (1995) Economic reform and the process of global integration. Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, 1-118; see also, Rodriguez, Francisco & Dani Rodrik, (2001). "Trade Policy and 
Economic Growth: A Skeptic's Guide to the Cross-National Evidence," NBER Chapters, in: NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15, pages 261-338 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc; see also, 
Wacziarg, Romain & Welch, Karen Horn, 2003. "Trade Liberalization and Growth: New Evidence," Research 
Papers 1826, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. 
560
 Countries includes of different size, human capital, and market access opportunities— ranging from Botswana to 
Sri Lanka and Pakistan to China and India. Others are Indonesia, Chile, Mauritius, Uganda, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Taiwan, Cambodia, Singapore, Burkina Faso, and South Korea. 
561
 Aid for Trade: Harnessing Globalization for Economic Development Prepared by the Staffs of the World Bank 
and IMF, 2007. Para 8, Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/080107.pdf  
562
 Poor macroeconomic policies lead to real exchange rate appreciations and currency overvaluation that reduces 
competitiveness.[Gelb, A. (ed). 2000. Can Africa Claim the 21st Century? Washington DC, World Bank, also see, 
Selassie, A.A., B. Clements, S. Tareq, J. K. Martijn, and G. di Bella. 2006. ―Designing Monetary and Fiscal Policies 
in Low-Income Countries‖, IMF Occasional Paper 250, and also see, Berg, A. S. Aiyar, M. Hussain, S. Roche, T. 
Mirzoev, and A. Mahone. 2007. ―The Macroeconomics of Scaling Up Aid: Lessons from Recent Experience‖, IMF 
Occasional Paper 253.] 
563
 Such as the World Bank, the WTO, etc. 
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trade arena so that they can reap the benefits of international trade. This assistance or Aid for 
Trade is aimed at solving the supply-side bottlenecks of developing countries so that their 
exports can expand. Generally, it includes any assistance that finances trade-associated 
infrastructure, trade-associated technical assistance, and any help in the development of 
productive capability.
564
  
One of the most effective approaches of Aid for Trade is in supporting institutions which help 
trade through export expansion so allowing countries to benefit from comparative advantage. 
Such institutions are those associated with tax administration, customs, and the rule of law-
oriented institutions so as to form a reliable trading scenario. The trait of institutions can itself 
act as a comparative advantage because most importers/buyers are only interested in interacting 
with countries with a minimum standard of institution to ensure a reasonable quality of products 
and service.
565
 
The IMF contributes towards Aid for Trade via its contributions in the Integrated Framework
566
 
and the Enhanced Integrated Framework but mostly, its main role is that of technical advisor. 
However, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the IMF actively supports trade development 
                                                 
564
 These categories of aid accounted for 24 percent of total official development assistance ($23 billion) in 2004. 
Aid for infrastructure, such as roads and ports, accounted for over half the total, with aid for productive capacity 
(such as support for industry, agriculture, and tourism) accounted for most of the rest. Trade-related technical 
assistance accounted for about 10 percent, according to estimates from the OECD's Development Assistance 
Committee. 
565
 See Levchenko, A. (2004). ―Institutional Quality and International Trade,‖ IMF Working Paper 04/231; see also, 
Anderson, J. and D. Marcouiller. (2002). ―Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: An Empirical Investigation,‖ The 
Review of Economics and Statistics; see also, Francois, J. and M. Manchin. (2007). ―Institutions, Infrastructure and 
Trade,‖ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4152; see also, Islam, R. and A. Resheff. (2006). ―Trade and 
harmonization: if your institutions are good, does it matter if they are different?‖ World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 3907; see also, Ranjan, P. and J.Y. Lee. (2007). ―Contract Enforcement and the Volume of 
International Trade in Different Types of Goods,‖ forthcoming in Economics and Politics. 
See also, Aid for Trade: Harnessing Globalization for Economic Development Prepared by the Staffs of the World 
Bank and IMF, 2007. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/080107.pdf 
566
 See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/20651864/DC2005-0016(E)-Trade.pdf.  
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through trade-associated reforms and imposing alterations on other trade policies through 
technical assistance, financial support
567
, and policy advice.  
Collaboration with other International Institutions 
As discussed in the theoretical framework, states cooperate with each other for collective gains. 
This cooperation led to the formation of the IELR at global level in order to tackle issues related 
to the interdependence of national economies. The most common method for cooperation is 
through IEIs, and these IEIs, which are mostly based on collective will, which cooperate with 
each other for better results. Thus the IMF carries out both formal and informal collaboration in 
its institutional capacity with other IEIs (mainly the World Bank and the WTO) in order to 
achieve its goals related to international trade.
568
 The cooperation of these institutions makes 
them more effective as greater coherence in global economic policies can better help global 
problems.  
This pledge of cooperation takes the form of staff collaboration and institutional consultations, 
producing pertinent meetings and the exchange of relevant information and documents. 
Moreover, the IMF has emphasised collaboration and coherence with the WTO on trade issues 
since the start of the Doha Round.
569
  
The goals regarding trade issues are more or less the same for all three international economic 
institutions (the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO); however, the way in which these 
                                                 
567
 IMF financial support for trade liberalization. The IMF provides financing through arrangements under its 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, stand-by arrangements, and extended arrangements to help address the 
overall balance of payments need, including need resulting from adjustment to trade-related reforms and other trade 
policy-related shocks. Specific instruments that can be tailored specifically to trade liberalization include the Trade 
Integration Mechanism (TIM) and the Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF). [Para 77, Aid for Trade: Harnessing 
Globalization for Economic Development Prepared by the Staffs of the World Bank and IMF, 2007. Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/080107.pdf] 
568
 IMF‘s goals related to international trade are mentioned inArticle I (iv) of the IMF‘s Article of Agreement. see 
Chapter IV.B on page 139 
569
 IMF (2005). Review of Fund Work on Trade. Prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department. 
SM/05/57 
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institutions achieve the same objectives differs. These institutions are specialists in their relevant 
areas and deal with trade aspects accordingly. For example, the IMF focuses on the general 
global economic policy structure, the World Bank on development concerns, and the WTO on 
legal trade obligations.
570
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, this part of the chapter will discuss the 
contribution of the IMF in its executive and administrative authority, as part of its institutional 
capacity. Thus, this institutional role of the IMF in its executive and administrative capacity for 
the development of international trade is discussed below 
(1) Trade Integration Mechanism (TIM)571  
TIM is a program through which the IMF helps out its member countries when they face short-
term financial repercussions due to non-discriminatory trade adjustments. The most common and 
recent trade liberalization based on non-discrimination has taken place in the past few decades 
and lies mainly under the umbrella of the WTO/GATT.  
Trade liberalization is considered a major step towards the uplift of the world economy through 
enormous economic growth.
572
 In the past five decades, the global economy has grown many 
times over due to the expansion of international trade which is mostly attributed to the 
                                                 
570
 ibid 
571
 Factsheet, The IMF's Trade Integration Mechanism (TIM), 2010. Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/tim.htm , The Executive Board of the IMF approved the TIM in 2004, for 
press release visit: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2004/pr0473.htm  
572
 See generally, Kneller, Richard, Morgan, C. W. and Kanchanahatakij, Sunti, (2008). Trade Liberalization and 
Economic Growth. World Economy, Vol. 31, Issue 6; see also, Thirlwall, A.P. (2000). Trade, Trade Liberalisation 
and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence. African Development Bank, Economic Research Papers 63. 
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WTO/GATT trade negotiation rounds.
573
 Nevertheless, there is still space for further 
liberalization in order to reap the best out of the gains from trade concept.
574
  
However, there could be short-term negative repercussions on some members‘ economies, due to 
adjustment costs. These adjustment costs may take the form of short-term export income 
reductions swelling import bills, thus resulting in balance of payments problems.
575
  
The IMF, through TIM, tries to specifically help developing countries balance of payments 
scenarios by assuring them of the availability of financial assistance from the IMF in the case of 
balance of payment problems arising from the WTO-led multilateral trade liberalization process 
(currently due to the Doha Round).  
Under the TIM program, the IMF helps member countries in balance of payments distress by 
providing them with finance in the following ways: firstly, by being prepared to discuss 
additional lending options with balance of payment-distressed members, such as, Stand-by 
Arrangements
576
, the Extended IMF Credit Facility
577
, or facilities under the Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Trust
578
; secondly, by taking into consideration the probable effect on members‘ 
balance of payments after the trade adjustments, so as to ascertain suitable lending requirements; 
and finally, by being prepared to extend additional financial assistance in continuance of the 
previous lending for the same purpose.  This additional lending is made in the case of related 
unanticipated adjustment costs which occur later on. In other words, the IMF is prepared to assist 
                                                 
573
 Chapter III.B.3 
574
 In the multilateral trade liberalization context, the WTO is currently busy in its ongoing Doha Round which has 
capacity of benefiting all participating countries. 
575
 See also, Supra Note 569 
576
 For Stand-by Arrangements visit: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sba.htm  
577
 For Extended IMF Credit Facility visit:  http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/ecf.htm   
578
 For the facilities under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust visit:  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sd/index.asp?decision=8759-%2887/176%29  
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its member countries in the case of financial repercussions (BOP problems) arising from the non-
discretionary trade liberalization process.   
However, there is a limit to IMF financing under TIM whereby TIM does not entertain a balance 
of payments shortfall if it is the result of the member country‘s own liberalization action; for 
instance, a balance of payments shortfall due to a member‘s reduction in its own import duties.579  
Overall, the executive functioning of the IMF in the form of extending financial assistance 
through TIM is a notable contribution towards the development of international trade. The IMF 
as an IEI boosts the confidence of its member countries to go for trade liberalization by assuring 
them of financial assistance in the case of temporary fallout from the trade liberalization process. 
However, TIM has not yet been frequently used by IMF members; so far, only three member 
countries (Bangladesh, the Dominican Republic, and the Republic of Madagascar) have obtained 
financial assistance through TIM. 
(2)  Integrated Framework 
LDCs have always been on the IMF‘s priority list. The IMF, in its administrative capacity, 
contributes to the wellbeing of LDCs by extending its expert advice to the Integrated Framework 
(IF). The IF is an international initiative in which many international partners are involved.
580
 
The main goal of the IF is to use international trade to reduce poverty by developing trade-
associated capacity.
581
 The IMF‘s contribution in the IF has been reasonable. It mainly 
                                                 
579
 IMF (2011). FACTSHEET, The IMF's Trade Integration Mechanism (TIM). 
580
 Core Agencies of the Integrated Framework are IMF, ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP, World Bank, and WTO. 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2003/pr03110.htm  
581
 IMF (2003). Joint Communiqué by the Six Core Agencies of the Integrated Framework—IMF, ITC, UNCTAD, 
UNDP, World Bank, and WTO. Press Release No. 03/110  July 10, 2003. Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2003/pr03110.htm 
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contributes to the IF through the Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies (DTIS).
582
 The DTIS is a 
World Bank initiative for the development of LDCs and in the DTIS, the macroeconomic portion 
is very important and is mostly added by the IMF.  Moreover, it provides in-depth reviews of the 
trade scenarios which are quite helpful to the authorities and donors in project and policy 
formation.
 583
 
Thus, expert advice in the context of the IF is part of the administrative function of the IMF and 
part of its institutional role. As the IF and development of trade are closely related, the IMF‘s 
institutional role contributes towards the development of trade.  
(3) Trade policy reforms (including trade-related 
conditionality) 
The IMF, in its executive authority, introduces trade policy reforms to member countries. These 
trade reforms are mostly aimed at open trade and exchange rate systems in order to achieve good 
governance and economic growth. Mostly these trade policy reforms involve focusing on 
medium-term programs to achieve their goals rather than short-term. However, trade policies can 
be highly instrumental in the short term for achieving governance and fiscal goals; for example, 
by improving customs administration and dealing with duty exemptions.
584
 
These trade policies put forward by the IMF as part of its program are regularly reviewed by 
IMF staff (in their administrative capacity)
585
 and, backed by the IMF, vary from country to 
country and are determined according to the requirements needed to attain the set goals of that 
                                                 
582
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/TRADE/0,,contentMDK:20615178~menuPK:1574524
~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:239071,00.html  
583
 Supra note 569, Para 32  
584
 See also, Supra note 569, Para 41 
585
 Para 1, Trade Conditionality Under Fund-Supported Programs, 1990–2004 (Background Paper to the Review of 
Fund Work on Trade), Prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department, Approved by Mark Allen, 
2005.  
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very program. Thus the reason for the introduction of a specific trade policy reform is 
determined by the goals which the IMF is looking for that member to achieve in a support 
program.
586
 The main reasons for the introduction of trade policy reforms are expressed in the 
chart below.  
According to this chart, the most common reason for introducing a reform in trade policy is to 
bring the member countries‘ trade policies administration to conform with international best 
practice (streamlining). The efficiency factor comes next in trade policy, followed by revenue, 
balance of payments and governance issues. Streamlining trade policy with that of the IMF is the 
most common motive because, by doing so, the member countries have to face less imposition of 
trade-associated conditionalities.
587
 
 
Figure 6 Objectives of Trade Policy Reforms 
                                                 
586
 Ibid  
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 Para 6, Trade Conditionality Under Fund-Supported Programs, 1990–2004 (Background Paper to the Review of 
Fund Work on Trade), Prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department, Approved by Mark Allen, 
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Trade policy reforms usually take the form of ―general commitments‖. These commitments are 
usually medium-term trade-related commitments which the member countries can easily take up. 
The more the members commit to in a trade policy, the fewer the conditions imposed upon them 
by the IMF and the better the options for them to obtain financing through IMF supported 
programs. 
588
 
According to IMF research
589
, nearly 75% of the programs under IMF review under surveillance 
comprise general obligations in context of trade liberalization. In many cases, these 
liberalization-oriented trade policy reforms were based on detailed liberalization planning and 
the countries which were subject to these reforms included Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Mexico, Mongolia, Peru, Tanzania, and Yemen.
590
  
Moreover, many trade reform programs comprised detailed direction to enhance trade openness 
via various methods in accordance with the member country‘s conditions. Some of the methods 
involved committing members to introduce tariff ceilings,
591
 the substitution of NTBs and an 
improvement in customs administration (see figure below). 
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 Para 9, Trade Conditionality Under Fund-Supported Programs, 1990–2004 (Background Paper to the Review of 
Fund Work on Trade), Prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department, Approved by Mark Allen, 
2005.  
589
 Trade Conditionality Under Fund-Supported Programs, 1990–2004 (Background Paper to the Review of Fund 
Work on Trade), Prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department, Approved by Mark Allen, 2005.  
590
 For instance, in 1991 Egypt used IMF‘s Stand-By Arrangement-supported program. In result of this program the 
Egyptian government publically showed its intention to decrease tariffs gradually and decrease quotas in exports. 
Moreover, it also discard all non-tariff import barriers within two years.  
591
 In some cases, programs allowed provisional rise in import tariffs—for example, in 1997-2000 Thailand used the 
Stand-By Arrangement-supported program.  
Rao Raza Hashim 
213 
School Of Law 
University Of Warwick 
 
 
Figure 7 Nature of Program Commitments, 1990-2004 in percentage of program including type of measure. 592 
 
 
In the IMF-supported programs, trade policy adjustments are quite frequent and mostly the IMF 
in its executive authority attaches conditions to its financial assistance for the enforcement of 
these reforms. Thus, for the effective implementation of IMF trade policy reforms, sometimes 
the IMF uses conditionality as an executive tool in its institutional capacity. The IMF has legal 
jurisdiction over trade matters if they are related to the IMF‘s area of expertise. These are no 
special rules to be followed in cases of trade-associated conditionality and they are dealt with by 
the IMF in the same way in which it deals with all other issues linked with its financial assistance 
                                                 
592
 Para 10, Trade Conditionality Under Fund-Supported Programs, 1990–2004 (Background Paper to the Review of 
Fund Work on Trade), Prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department, Approved by Mark Allen, 
2005.  
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programs.
593
 Thus, trade-related conditionalities are also governed by the principles laid down in 
the Guidelines on Conditionality.
594
 The most important condition to be met for the application 
of conditionality is that it should be highly significant in the adequate accomplishment of the 
member‘s IMF-supported reform policy. Mostly, these trade policy reforms involve focusing on 
medium-term programs to achieve its goals rather than short-term. However, trade policies can 
be highly instrumental in the short term for achieving governance and fiscal goals, for example, 
in improving customs administration and dealing with duty exemptions.
595
 
According to a review on trade-related conditionality, which is part of the IMF‘s administrative 
function, the implementation of trade-related conditionalities was reasonable and was equal to 
whole conditionality implementation in all sectors. In this review, a sample of countries was 
selected by the IMF and their implementation of trade-related conditionalities for the period 
between 1995 and 2003 noted. As mentioned in the table below, 71% of trade-associated 
conditionalities were implemented on time.
596
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
593
 As discussed under the subhead chapter V.B.2.b) at page no 190.  
594
Guidelines on Conditionality, Dec. No. 12864-(02/102), Sept. 25, 2002, Selected Decisions, 28th Issue, paras 7(a) 
& (b), p. 235–36. 
595
 See, supra note 569, Para 41 
596
 Para 30, Trade Conditionality Under Fund-Supported Programs, 1990–2004 (Background Paper to the Review of 
Fund Work on Trade), Prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department, Approved by Mark Allen, 
2005.  
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Table 7 Trade Conditionality Implementation 597 
 Total On 
Time 
Late 
 
(percent 
of 
measures) 
Not 
Implemented 
(percent of 
measures) 
Reschedule
d 
Implementati
on Index
1 
Total Measures 100 71 16 9 3 1.62 
By Program Type 
EFF
598
 
ESAF/PRGF
599
 
SAF
600
 
Stand-By
601
 
 
 
23 
57 
1 
19 
 
81 
65 
25 
81 
 
10 
23 
25 
5 
 
9 
8 
50 
12 
 
0 
5 
0 
2 
 
1.73 
1.57 
0.75 
1.69 
By Measure Type 
Benchmark 
Performance Criteria 
Prior Action 
Review Clause 
 
41 
17 
35 
7 
 
57 
61 
93 
68 
 
24 
19 
4 
27 
 
13 
7 
3 
5 
 
 
6 
4 
0 
0 
 
1.45 
1.44 
1.91 
1.64 
By Condition Type 
Comprehensive Reform 
Customs Reform 
Quantitative 
Restrictions 
State Trading 
Tariffs & Surcharges 
Licensing 
Exemptions 
Others 
 
5 
20 
10 
3 
31 
9 
9 
14 
 
94 
61 
65 
75 
79 
67 
67 
79 
 
6 
29 
26 
0 
7 
22 
15 
19 
 
0 
10 
10 
0 
10 
11 
19 
2 
 
0 
0 
0 
25 
3 
0 
0 
0 
 
1.94 
1.52 
1.55 
1.75 
1.69 
1.56 
1.48 
1.77 
 
1 The Index assigns a weight of 2 to measures implemented on time, 1 to measures implemented late or rescheduled, 
and 0 to measures not implemented.  
 
According to the table below; 71% of the total trade related conditionalities were implemented 
on time and only 9% of the total trade related conditionalities were not implemented. According 
to the trade implementation index the overall index was 1.62. The Index assigns a weight of 2 to 
measures implemented on time, 1 to measures implemented late or rescheduled, and 0 to 
                                                 
597
 Para 30, Trade Conditionality Under Fund-Supported Programs, 1990–2004 (Background Paper to the Review of 
Fund Work on Trade), Prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department, Approved by Mark Allen, 
2005.  
598
 For information about Extended Fund Facility (EFF) visit: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/eff.htm  
599
 Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). The ESAF was replaced by the Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF) in November 1999. http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/esaf.htm 
600
 Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF).   
601
 For details about IMF Stand-By Arrangement, visit: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sba.htm  
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measures not implemented. The implementation of trade related conditionalities were 
satisfactory as the index was close to 2.  
This table comprehensively illustrates the implementation of trade related conditionalities in 
percentage. Moreover, it characterizes the implementation of the conditionalities by; program 
type, by measure type and condition type.  
 According to the program type, the most of the conditions were attached with ESAF/PRGF 
which was 57% of the total trade related conditions. 65% of the conditions attached with 
ESAF/PRGF were implemented on time and 8% were not implemented. Least conditions were 
attached with SAF program that was 1% and only 25% of those conditions were implemented on 
time.  
The type of measures which were most frequently part of the trade related conditionalities were 
bench marks and prior actions. However, conditions attached as prior actions were implemented 
93% with an index of 1.91.     
Comprehensive reforms were the most implemented conditionality and its implementation index 
was 1.94. Most of the conditions were attached in relation to tariffs & surcharges and 79% of 
them were completed on time.  
Other examples of the IMF‘s administrative function‘s contribution towards trade development, 
as part of the review process, are illustrated below.  
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Box 3 Recent Studies on IMF Trade Conditionality602 
Four trade-related reviews were conducted during 1992–2001.  
 
The 1994 review studied the level of trade reform in Fund-supported programs in 
59 countries during 1990–93. Results showed that there had been considerable amount of trade 
reform, majority of which was through quantitative restrictions (QRs) instead of tariff reforms. 
Trade reforms were hardly seen to be reversed since the real exchange rates appreciated, the 
domestic tax reform was slow, or the domestic protectionist lobbies made it difficult to resist. 
Since conflicts were seen between short-term fiscal goals and medium-term trade reform 
objectives, it was concluded that exchange rate flexibility, liberalization of exchange systems and 
timely reform of local tax were essential for the sustainability of trade reform.  
 
A later study in 1997 included multiyear Fund arrangements between 1990 and mid- 
1996. Through the study of case studies it was concluded that majority of the programs focused 
on reducing trade restrictiveness. It was also shown that clearly specified objectives in the 
medium term and public announcements led to the goals being met. The rate at which the trade 
reform was implemented and exercised was hugely determined by financial issues. Where 
regional trading agreements had a somewhat smaller role in determining the type of trade reform, 
the World Bank‘s collaboration was considered to be a major factor. 
 
The 2001 review was done with the perspective of a general analysis of structural 
conditionality and concentrated on programs during 1997–99. Specific focus was laid on the 
restrictiveness of trading scenario at the start of programs. Conditionality was attached in context 
of the most obstructive sides of countries‘ trade regime. There were only a few cases in which 
trade policy reform proved to be vital to the program. The tariff reforms that had been introduced 
had structural conditions that were broad-based, whereas non-tariff barriers (NTBs) were specific 
to certain sectors and exports. On average, there was less than one condition implemented on the 
trade flow in a year, which increased slightly during late 1990s due to the increase in the usage of 
benchmarks. Structural benchmarks, prior actions and program reviews were the main tools used 
to apply trade conditionality while performance criteria was not used as often, which led to high 
implementation rates. The WTO accession negotiation as well as the Uruguay Round reforms 
helped in increasing the member states‘ acceptance of these trade reforms. The IMF depended on 
the World Bank to formulate sector-specific policies, despite its decreased participation in 
operations related to trade in the 1990s.  
--------- 
Sources: Issues and Developments in International Trade Policy, World Economic and Financial Surveys, 
1992; International Trade Policies: The Uruguay Round and Beyond: Volume II., World Economic and 
Financial Surveys, 1994; Trade Liberalization in Fund-Supported Programs, 1997, and Trade Policy 
Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs, 2001. 
 
                                                 
602
Trade Conditionality Under Fund-Supported Programs, 1990–2004 (Background Paper to the Review of Fund 
Work on Trade), Prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department, Approved by Mark Allen, 2005. 
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In short, this subheading characterised the executive and administrative functions of the IMF in 
the context of policy reforms and conditionalities for trade enhancement. These functions are a 
part of the institutional role of the IMF as an IEI.    
(4) Trade-related Technical Assistance (TA) programs 
and institutional building  
As already discussed earlier in this chapter, TA is covered under Section 2(b) of Article V,
603
 
according to which, the IMF may provide TA to its members in its area of expertise. The IMF 
extends TA to the members concerned, mostly through specialised advice, in order to improve 
the institutional capacity of members in the IMF‘s area of interest, that is, primarily the financial 
sector or any other sector which can influence the financial sector. Moreover, TA is not at all 
mandatory and not of universal application; it is purely up to the members to ask for TA from the 
IMF. Similarly, it depends on the IMF whether they want to extend TA to that member.
604
  
As trade issues can affect the financial sector of an economy, the IMF, in its institutional 
capacity, contributes towards the institutional development of the member concerned within the 
trade sector through TA. Under the TA programs, the IMF staff, via the Fiscal Affairs 
Department (FAD), mainly assist the authorities of the member countries by closely working 
with them to support them in strengthening their organisational structure in the area of trade, for 
example, contributing towards trade concerns by developing Trade Restrictiveness Index, Aid 
for Trade, and other activities to develop institutional capacity in the area of trade (such as 
                                                 
603
 The IMF‘s authority to provide TA is set forth in Article V, Section 2(b) of the Articles of Agreement under 
which the IMF ―may‖, upon request, provide technical services in conformity with the objectives of the IMF. Article 
V, Section 2(b) reads in pertinent part: ―If requested, the Fund may decide to perform financial and technical 
services, including the administration of resources contributed by members, that are consistent with the purposes of 
the Fund.‖  
604
 DISSEMINATION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE INFORMATION, Prepared by the Office of Technical 
Assistance Management and the Legal Department of the IMF, Approved by Alfred Kammer and Sean Hagan 
(2008), para 8,  available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/040308b.pdf 
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customs administration).
605
 The aforementioned institutional contributions by the IMF through 
TA in the trade sector have also been discussed above; however, the Trade Restrictiveness Index 
is discussed below.  
(a) Trade Restrictive Index  
The IMF‘s Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) came into being in 1997 in order to analyse Trade 
Liberalization in IMF-Supported Programs (EBS/97/163)
606. The TRI evaluated the IMF‘s 
contribution to the trade liberalization process in countries where the IMF carried out its 
programs. The TRI stems from a previous IMF index introduced by Kirmani et al
607
 which also 
examined the IMF‘s trade-related programs. Unlike the TRI, which is based on a ten point index 
(where 10 = most restrictive, 1 = most open), Kirmani‘s index assessed member countries‘ 
economies in the light of a three category index: open, moderate and restrictive.
608
 The TRI was 
intended to assess the restrictiveness of the trade-related policies of the member countries and 
this gave the IMF good grounds for effective policy discussions with member countries. In fact, 
it evaluated members‘ engagement in IMF-supported trade reforms by looking at the change in 
the level of TRI over the program period.
 609
 
                                                 
605
 The IMF extends its technical services in areas of its speciality, for example; in tax policy, macroeconomic 
policy, revenue administration, monetary policy, expenditure management, financial sector sustainability, the 
exchange rate system, and financial and macroeconomic statistics. IMF Factsheet of Technical Assistance, 2010, 
Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/tech.htm For core areas of expertise visit 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/psta/index.htm#annex  
606
 Trade Liberalization in Fund Supported Programs. August, 27, 1997. Prepared by the Policy Development and 
Review Department. EBS/97/163. 
607
 Kirmani, Naheed and others, 1994a. .Trade Policy Reform in the Countries of the Former Soviet Union., IMF 
Economic Review No.2. Washington, International Monetary Fund. And also see, Kirmani, Naheed and others, 
1994b. .International Trade Policies: The Uruguay Round and Beyond. Volume 1. Principal Issues and Volume 2, 
Back- ground Papers. World Economic and Financial Surveys. Washington, International Monetary Fund. 
608
 Krishna, Kala, Background Paper on the IMF's Trade Restrictiveness Index. National Bureau of Economic 
Research, The Pennsylvania State University (2009). MPRA Paper No. 21316. Available at: http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/21316/  
609
 Review of the IMF's Trade Restrictiveness Index (Background Paper to the Review of Fund Work on Trade) 
Prepared by the IMF‘s Policy Development and Review Department, 2005. Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2005/021405r.htm  
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The TRI is a significant contribution by the IMF towards trade enhancement as it gives a true 
picture of the current openness of the member countries‘ economies. Further, it is used to 
measure the effectiveness of policy reforms introduced by the IMF. In other words, the TRI is a 
technical instrument to gauge the performance of both the member and the IMF in the 
application of institutional reforms and is essential for the institutional development of members.  
5. Conclusion 
This part of the chapter documented the institutional role of the IMF in the context of the 
international trade sector. It is a common misconception that the IMF does not deal with trade 
matters. In fact, the IMF deals regularly with trade issues as it comes under its direct mandate. 
This part of the chapter characterised the IMF‘s operations relating to the trade sector in terms of 
its international economic institutional role. In this context, see the table below summarising the 
discussion included in this part of the chapter. Moreover, as mentioned a number of times in this 
thesis, the above-mentioned institutional role, as an IEI, is not explicitly portrayed by the IMF.    
Table 8  610 
IEI’s Institutional 
role 
IMF  Effect on International 
Trade 
Legislative or 
Normative  
International Architecture for trade 
(Article VIII) 
 Conventions 
 Standards and Codes 
 Decisions of Executive Board 
Positive: By setting of the 
rules of the game IMF 
increases certainty and 
predictability of rules of the 
game which have positive 
effect on the development of 
international trade.  
Executive and 
Administrative 
 Surveillance (Article IV Staff Reports, 
Selected Issues Papers, World 
Economic Outlook) 
Positive: The executive and 
administrative functioning 
helps to implement the rules, 
which again increases certainty 
                                                 
610
 Material for this table is taken from two table and then modified by the author. Doha Development Agenda and 
Aid for Trade, Prepared by the Staffs of the IMF and the World Bank, 2006. p17 Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pp/longres.aspx?id=3886 . And also, see Table on Vehicles of IMF, World Bank, and 
WTO Trade Policy Advice, Review of Fund Work on Trade (2005) 
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 Technical Assistance/Capacity 
Building (Tax and tariff reform, 
Customs reform) 
 Support Programs (Regular Fund 
facilities: Trade Integration 
Mechanism (TIM) as part of regular 
Fund facilities, Floating tranches,
611
 
Exogenous Shocks Facility
612
 
 Research (clustered around trade-
macro linkages, such as Preference 
erosion,
613
Tax Revenue and Trade 
Liberalization,
614
Trade-related 
Balance of Payments 
Vulnerabilities
615
 
 Enforce Compliance (Conditionality) 
and predictability of rules of 
the game which have positive 
effect on the international 
trade. 
Judicial or Quasi-
Judicial  
N/A  
  
                                                 
611
 Under this financial assistance method, the disbursement of money depends on meeting some tragets rather than 
time and dates. For details see, Khan, Mohsin S. and Sharma, Sunil (2001). IMF Conditionality and Country 
Ownership of Programs, IMF Working Paper No. 01/142, p23. 
612
 IMF FACTSHEET (2011). The Exogenous Shocks Facility- High Access Component (ESF-HAC). Available 
at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/esf.htm 
613
 ―Preference erosion‖ denotes a decrease in the competitive advantage that some exporters have in foreign 
markets as a consequence of PTA. Preference erosion can happen when the importing country; remove preferences, 
increase the recipients of preferential treatment, or cut their MFN tariff without changing the preferential tariffs 
respectively. See generally, Alexandraki, Katerina and Hans Peter Lankes, ―The Impact of Preference Erosion on 
Middle-Income Developing Countries,‖ IMF Working Paper 04/169 (Washington).  
614
 Such as, Baunsgaard, Thomas and Michael Keen (2005). Tax Revenue and (or?) Trade Liberalization. Fiscal 
Affairs Department, IMF Working Paper no. WP/05/112 . 
615
 Such as, Allen, Mark (Approved by) 2004, Fund Support for Trade-Related Balance of Payments Adjustments.  
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, Prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department  
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C. Conclusion 
This chapter documented the way in which the IMF plays an effective institutional role in the 
development of the financial sector and international trade. The IMF executes this institutional 
role reasonably in its executive and administrative authority, and legislative and normative 
functioning. As discussed in the theoretical framework, this international economic institutional 
role is part of the IELR.  
Moreover, the IMF, through its institutional role, stimulates the Economic Cycle by developing 
the financial sector and by supporting international trade. The Economic Cycle explains the 
causal relationship between financial sector development and international trade. Financial sector 
development leads to economic growth, economic growth promotes international trade, 
international trade reinforces economic growth, which in turn promotes financial development, 
leading to a balanced and stable economy.   
Therefore the argument presented in this chapter is that if the international community (state and 
non-state actors) were to focus more on the relationship between the IMF‘s institutional role 
(which is part of the IELR) and the Economic Cycle, then there would be a greater chance of 
achieving stable and balanced growth of the global economy.  
By focusing more on this institutional role, I really mean that this relationship needs to be 
explored more, so that it can be improved accordingly. Currently the IMF, as an IEI, is 
functioning according to its goals. In other words, the IMF has certain objectives and to 
accomplish those objectives, the IMF functions as per its requirements. However, if it defines its 
functioning as an institutional role, then it will better achieve its goals.  
 The IMF does not explicitly define its institutional role, it only defines its objectives. The reason 
for focusing only on its objectives and not on its institutional role is as discussed earlier. At the 
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beginning of section two in part one of Chapter IV, it was alleged that the IMF deliberately does 
not define its institutional role because it does not want to address legitimacy (of legislative and 
normative functions) and accountability (of executive and administrative functioning) issues 
related to the IMF.
616
 This is because discussion of these issues will explicitly reveal the IMF‘s 
realist insight to the liberally institutionalised IELR.
617
    
As discussed, the importance of democratic values, legitimacy, and accountability in the IELR is 
paramount. Sovereign states cooperate with each other for collective gains within the IELR 
which is liberally institutionalized. This IELR is mainly made up of IEIs (as non-state actors), 
thus the IMF tries to maintain its realist aspect (benefitting the US) whilst being an important 
part of the liberally institutionalized IELR.     
  
                                                 
616
 For a good discussion about legitimacy and accountability see generally, Ch 2: Global governance and 
international standard setting, in Alexander, Kern, Dhumale, Rahul, and, Eatwell, John, (2005). ‗Global Governance 
of Financial Systems, The International Regulation of Systemic Risk.‘ Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: 
September 2007, p43, 44. See also, Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich (ed.) (2005). Reforming the world trading system: 
legitimacy, efficiency, and democratic governance / with the assistance of James Harrison. New York : Oxford 
University Press. 
617
 For a good discussion about IMF, surveillance, conditionality, voting and its realist aspect see generally, Chapter 
3: International legal framework for international financial regulations, in Alexander, Kern, Dhumale, Rahul, and, 
Eatwell, John, (2005). ‗Global Governance of Financial Systems, The International Regulation of Systemic Risk.‘ 
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007, p112. 
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Section Three: WTO 
 
A. Introduction:  
This thesis maintains that IEIs are the main framework of the IELR and of those IEIs, the most 
effective are the IMF, World Bank and the WTO. The IELR creates certainty and the 
predictability of the rules of the game in the global economic scenario which then acts as a 
stimulus in the economic cycle, leading to a stable and balanced growth of the global economy.  
In connection with this, the previous section (Section Two) identifies the IMF‘s institutional role 
(both legislative/normative and executive and administrative roles) in the IELR and its effects on 
the Economic Cycle. The purpose of identifying this institutional role is because the IMF itself 
does not explicitly admit to this institutional role. The main reason for not explicitly 
characterising the IMF‘s functioning in an institutional role is that the IMF does not want to 
reveal its realist approach. However, if this institutional role was clearly identified, then it would 
become easier to improve upon it, which would then enable the IMF to contribute more 
effectively towards a more stable and balanced growth of the global economy. 
This unidentified institutional role of the IMF evolved over a period of time,
618
 thus it has some 
key structural deficiencies which are significant hurdles for the IMF in becoming the optimal IEI 
in the context of IELR.
619
 These structural deficiencies are; decision-making with realistic 
insight; focusing more on legal transplant than on legal harmonisation; and the lack of an 
                                                 
618
 The IMF has evolved as an important IEI in context of financial global regulation. This evolution of the IMF‘s 
role took place because there was and still there is a vacuum or need for global financial regulations and there is no 
other IEI to do this job. Thus even with realist approach and lacking democratic values, it is followed widely 
(possibly due to legal transplant) in a liberally institutionalized global economy because there is no viable 
alternative. 
619
 See, the main argument of Section Two on page 130 
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effective adjudicating system. Section Two argues that if these key deficiencies are addressed 
and structural institutional changes made, then idealistically the IMF could contribute in a much 
better way towards the IELR and the Economic Cycle. However, realistically, such major 
institutional changes in the IMF are not possible because the dominant powers (mainly the US) 
would be unlikely to give up their dominant position in the global regulatory architecture so 
easily.   
Evidently, the IMF needs a number of structural changes made to it as an IEI in order for it to 
become liberally institutionalized and more effective in the context of the economic cycle. As 
mentioned above, the main structural changes include, for example, decision-making without the 
realistic insight; a greater focus on legal harmonization rather than on legal transplant, and an 
effective adjudicating system. However, the US, which is strong enough to influence the global 
economy, is not particularly interested in changing the IMF structure, since it holds the most 
dominant position (hegemon) in the IMF system. In other words, the dominant countries 
(especially the US) are not keen to lose their dominance within the global economy and in fact, 
they have increased IMF functioning/powers over decades through the concept of implied 
powers. 
This section is a response to the previous section on the IMF and asserts that as the IMF is not 
interested (in fact incapable without consent of the US) to overcome its structural deficiencies. 
On the other hand, the WTO does not have the deficiencies like the IMF. Moreover, this section 
also shows that the WTO is capable to perform similar functions like the IMF in the area of 
financial sector. That is the WTO can set the rules of the game for global financial sector.    
B. Argument: 
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As discussed above, there are practical implications for the modification of the institutional 
structure of the IMF. Thus, this section (Section Three) argues, on the basis of practicality, that 
the WTO, which is so far the most effective IEI in the IELR to affect the international economic 
cycle, can practically enhance its role in financial sector development. By doing this, the WTO 
could become the optimal IEI in the IELR and could, in fact, lead the IELR.  
For this purpose, this section documents the comprehensive institutional role of the WTO as part 
of the IELR. As the international economic cycle takes into account both the financial sector and 
international trade, so this section will highlight the WTO‘s institutional role 
(legislative/normative, executive/administrative authority and quasi-judicial functioning) in the 
development of both. In addition, this section tries to overcome the common misconception that 
the WTO deals only with trade and has little to do with the development of the financial sector. 
This misconception is refuted by highlighting the WTO‘s involvement in the development of the 
global financial sector. The WTO‘s involvement in financial sector development is limited as 
compared to the IMF. But whatever the WTO contributes is based on relatively legitimate 
process and is accountable to the Contracting Parties while respecting democratic values.  
So, the WTO has the institutional capacity to assume the role of the IMF by enhancing its role in 
financial sector development. This way, more stable and balanced growth of the global economy 
can be achieved, keeping all the liberally institutionalized values (cooperation with free will for 
collective gains) intact.   
An obvious question arises here; why can the WTO be reformed yet the IMF cannot? Given that 
the US has an interest in not allowing the WTO to be used as a way of getting around its control 
of the IMF, the answer to this is simple. The US is the hegemon in the IMF‘s institutional 
structure and has the power to veto anything. Therefore, any move to undermine its dominance 
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can be vetoed by the US, whereas the WTO is a liberally institutionalized IEI and respects 
democratic values. So the collective free will of the WTO membership could push for 
enlargement of the WTO‘s role in financial sector development. The US has no veto in the WTO 
so if the member countries so wish, they can call for an increase in the role of the WTO. 
In short, Section Three focuses on the WTO‘s institutional contribution in the IELR and its 
enormous effect on the Economic Cycle. This section considers the institutional set-up of the 
WTO to be more comprehensive than that of any other IEI in the IELR. Its institutional role is 
highly diverse and does not lack the institutional deficiencies of the IMF, in that the WTO is 
liberally institutionalized, respects democratic values and has an effective adjudicating system. 
Moreover, this section maintains that, realistically or practically speaking, the realist/dominant 
powers in the IMF (especially the US) would not easily relinquish their influence on global 
regulation.  
Institutional and structural changes to the IMF seem nearly impossible to achieve, whereas slight 
modification to the role of the WTO in the context of financial sector development is a more 
realistic and practical approach, as compared to major structural changes to the IMF. This way, 
the soft laws (global regulations)
620
 would not lack democratic values and would also be subject 
to the WTO adjudication process. The WTO‘s Committee on Trade in Financial Services 
contributes towards global financial regulation in the form of soft laws, but on a very small scale. 
It needs to contribute more to the financial sector and this does not require major structural 
change. Therefore, this section calls for the enhancement of the WTO‘s institutional role in the 
context of financial sector development which is a more viable, practical and realistic solution to 
                                                 
620
 The expansion of the role of the FSC of the WTO in the creation of soft laws in short run and could also be made 
part of the hard binding commitment in the long run.  
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the current dilemma within the IELR, i.e. the legitimacy and effectiveness of the rules of the 
game.      
C. Section Three Format: 
The first part of this section (Chapter VI) discusses in detail the legal framework of the WTO, 
which has a high normative effect within the IELR and which lays down the parameters for the 
institutional role of the WTO. The second part (Chapter VII) deals with the institutional role of 
the WTO in the promotion of international trade. The chapter VII, in order to avoid repetition, is 
brief and only emphasis on the issues which are not raises in other chapters. The third part 
(Chapter VIII) of this section focuses on the institutional role of the WTO in the development of 
the global financial sector and calls for the expansion of its institutional role in this area. Thus, 
part two (Chapter VII) and three (Chapter VIII) of this section highlight the institutional role of 
the WTO as a stimulus in the international economic cycle, leading to a more stable and 
balanced growth of the global economy.    
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VI. WTO and its legal framework 
This chapter will look into the norm-making function of the WTO in order to promote stable and 
balanced growth of economy global economy. The institutional role of the WTO is based on the 
WTO Charter and its framework agreements (discussed below).The WTO operates in the 
international economic framework, promoting the stable and balanced growth of the global 
economy through its legal framework.  
This chapter begins by discussing the WTO Charter and then moves on to the Dispute Settlement 
System (DSS) and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). The WTO Charter and its 
framework agreements create certainty in the rules of the game and the  DSS and TPRM increase 
predictability within the global economic scenario. Overall, the WTO stimulates the Economic 
Cycle which leads to achieving more stable and balanced growth of the global economy.  
The WTO legal framework is based on liberal institutionalism and is an important part of the 
IELR. It is highly essential to the WTO‘s legal framework to understand the way in which the 
WTO, through its institutional framework, affects the international economic cycle. The 
institutional role of the WTO, in the context of financial sector development and international 
trade, are discussed in Chapters VII and VIII respectively. Therefore, this chapter provides a 
foundation for the next two chapters.  
A. The WTO Charter621 
As discussed earlier in Section one, Chapter III (evolution of current global economic scenario), 
GATT was a temporary setup for the ITO in the Bretton Woods system.
622
 However, the ITO did 
not come to fruition and GATT partially took the place of the ITO.  The WTO Charter, which 
                                                 
621
 The WTO Charter (WTO Agreement) is the agreement which formed the WTO.  
622
 Chapter III.B page 100 
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created the WTO, provided a better institutional setup than GATT
623
 and it filled the gaps left in 
the Bretton Woods economic structure (by cooperating with the IMF and the World Bank).  
This part of the chapter discusses the general characteristics of the WTO charter, decision-
making within the WTO and its basic principles.  
1. Characteristics of the WTO Charter 
First, the WTO carries on the conventional ideas and practices of GATT.
624
 All the basic 
principles are the same but its application is enhanced by not limiting it only to goods (it also 
applies to intellectual property and the services sector). In other words, the WTO not only 
incorporated GATT but also added new subjects to it.  
Secondly, the WTO charter itself is limited to creating the institutional procedural structure for 
the smooth progress and effective execution of the rules agreed in the multilateral trade 
negotiation rounds.
625
 Moreover, the WTO charter incorporates in its annexes
626
 all the 
agreements which were a result of the Uruguay Round. Thus, the WTO Charter is a framework 
of agreements.  
                                                 
623
 GATT was never created as an international organisation, thus it had many ―birth defects‖. Some of them were: 
(1) The lack of an agreement giving the GATT a legal personality and creating its institutional structure; (2) It was 
created for temporary usage; (3) in built grandfather rights (which allowed the Contracting Parties not to implement 
GATT provisions where those provisions were in conflict with the national legislation that  had already been  in 
place at the time of accession of  GATT); (4) Uncertainty and misunderstanding about the GATT‘s power, decision 
making capacity and legal standing [see Matsushita, M., Schoenbaum, Thomas J. and Mavroidis, Petros C., (2006) 
‗The World Trade Organisation : Law, Practice, and Policy‘, Vol. 1, p. 3, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/utw_chap1_e.pdf; also see Jackson, John H., (1998) ‗Designing 
and Implementing Effective Dispute Settlement Procedures: WTO Dispute Settlement‘, The WTO as an 
International Institution, Editor: Krueger, Anne O., p.161-3] 
624
 The WTO Charter reaffirms the pre-existing trade regime of the GATT, as the GATT 1994 is part of the WTO 
Charter, Annex 1A. See Footer, Mary E. (2006). An Institutional and Normative Analysis of the World Trade 
Organisation (Leiden and Boston: Martinus. Nijhoff Publishers), p3.   
625
 Permeable WTO Charter: ―[T]herefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading 
system encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts,  
and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.‖ 
626
 Annexes are discussed in the latter part of this chapter. 
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Thirdly, the WTO charter is an effectual realisation of the Uruguay Round. The new ―GATT 
1994‖ takes the place of the old ―GATT 1947‖627 and in doing so, the Contracting Parties 
circumvented the constraints of the amending clauses of the old GATT, which made things more 
convenient.   
The WTO charter set up, for the first time, an institutional structure with fundamental legal 
authority for its Secretariat, a Director General, and other affiliated bodies such as the General 
Council. Like many other international organisations, the WTO also obliges Contracting Parties 
to avoid intruding into the internal affairs of the organisation. Thus, this institutional structure is 
vital for the WTO to perform its executive and administrative function.
628
    
Fourthly, the WTO charter puts forward considerably better prospects for the future growth and 
development of institutional-based international economic cooperation. This institutional 
cooperation reflects liberal institutionalism. This cooperative approach, based on an institutional 
setup, provides better opportunities for future negotiation and the development of global 
economic rules or methods to solve the ever-emerging problems of the world economy.  
The next subheading highlights the modalities of the WTO Charter.   
2. Constituents/ Modalities of the WTO Charter629 
The WTO charter itself is limited to institution formation and operational measures, but its 
constituent annexes contain detailed and substantial rules. The structure of these annexes is of 
importance and they are part of the WTO legal framework. These annexes have a very wide 
                                                 
627
 The GATT 1994 consists of the GATT 1947 plus twelve separate agreements on trade in goods (sectoral and 
additional rules/disiplines), six understandings and the GATT schedule of tariff bindings; see The results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts (Geneva: WTO, 1999) 17-32; see also, infra 
note 630 
628
 Chapter II.A.3.b) on page 46  
629
 See Matsushita, M., Schoenbaum, Thomas J. and Mavroidis, Petros C., (2006) ‗The World Trade Organisation : 
Law, Practice, and Policy‘, Vol. 1, p. 8. And also, see Kenen, Peter B., (1994) ‗Managing the World Economy: Fifty 
Years After Bretton Woods‘, Institute for International Economics, p. 136-8. 
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scope and cover almost all areas related to international trade. These annexes are mentioned 
below and will be referred to where necessary.  
Annex 1 contains the substantial texts, or ―multilateral agreements,‖ which are comprised of the 
considerable results of the Uruguay Round. All these are an obligatory, single package set of 
rules, in the sense that they impose compulsory commitments on all members of the WTO. The 
Annex 1 text consists of:  
 Annex 1A: This includes GATT 1994, the revised and all-inclusive GATT 
agreement with its ancillary agreements
630
, and the immense schedules of tariff 
concessions that form a large part of the official treaty text.  
 Annex 1B: This includes GATS and also assimilates a series of schedules of 
concessions. 
 Annex 1C: This includes the TRIPS agreement. 
Annex 2 consists of the dispute settlement rules, which are mandatory for all members, and 
which form a unitary dispute-settlement system encompassing all the agreements listed in 
annexes 1, 2 and 4. 
Annex 3 consists of the TPRM procedure, under which the WTO will evaluate and report on the 
overall trade policies of each member country on a regular basis.  
Annex 4 consists of four ―plurilateral agreements,‖ acceptance of which is optional for members. 
This is a sight departure from the single package acceptance technique. The agreements currently 
included in Annex 4 are: 
 The agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft 
                                                 
630
 GATT 1994 appended agreements are; the Agreement on Agriculture, the Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
the Agreement on Antidumping, the Agreement on Valuation, the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, the 
Agreement on Rules of Origin, the Agreement on Import Licensing, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures and the Agreement on Safeguards. 
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 The agreement on Government Procurement 
 The International Dairy Agreement 
 The International Bovine Meat Agreement 
The WTO legal framework is based on a comprehensive institutional foundation. This legal 
framework which is comprised of WTO agreements can be classified into three broad categories. 
These broad categories are; normative (all WTO framework of Agreements), executive 
(especially Annex 3 related to TPRM) and adjudicative (Annex 2 on DSS).  
3. Decision-making in the WTO/ Organisational Hierarchy631 
Decision-making is indeed the most significant process of any international institution. The main 
reason for this is that it is a method by which the individual will of each member is coordinated 
and becomes the collective will of the members of that organisation. This collective will of the 
members is also the independent will of the organisation.
632
 Decision-making, here, is referred to 
as the conclusion of any debate within an organisation, therefore, it might relate to normative, 
executive or even adjudicative matters.
633
  
The WTO is managed by Contracting Parties (member governments) and all important decisions 
are made by the members collectively. The member governments can be represented by 
ministers (who meet at least once every two years) or by their ambassadors or delegates (who 
meet regularly in Geneva). Normally decision making is done by consensus.
634
 This decision-
                                                 
631
 For further details on the WTO decision making hierarchy visit:  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org1_e.htm 
632
 Schermers, G. and Blokker, Niels M. (2003), International Institutional Law: Unity Within Diversity. 4rd edn. M. 
Nijhoff publishers, para 703-704. 
633
 Footer, Mary E. (2006). An Institutional and Normative Analysis of the World Trade Organisation (Leiden and 
Boston: Martinus. Nijhoff Publishers), Chapter III on decision making in the WTO.  
634
 Article IX (1) of the WTO Agreement.  
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making within the WTO makes it poles apart from the IMF and World Bank (both of which are 
based on a weighted voting system
635
) as a liberally institutionalized IEI.  
The decision-making process is the most important indicator for determining whether an 
organisation is a liberally institutionalised or realist body. WTO decision-making is clearly 
liberally institutionalized and each member has one vote, irrespective of the size of its economy. 
Every member has a say and a right to initiate discussion in the WTO (at all forums)
636
. This 
discussion then leads to conclusions which then require decisions.  
This trait of the WTO enables it to counter the illegitimacy issue which is normally ignored 
within the IMF. By illegitimacy, I mean the deficit of democratic values and a collective will for 
collective gains.
637
 Moreover, the whole WTO institutional structure is liberally institutionalized 
in the context of the above discussion.        
The WTO has a proper pyramidal organizational structure. The higher body‘s decision 
supersedes the decision of the lower body. Thus, there are different decision-making levels in the 
WTO setup. The following section discusses the hierarchy in decision-making in the WTO 
structure but before that, the structural hierarchy of the WTO is illustrated in the figure below.  
                                                 
635
See, Weighted voting in the IMF on page 130 
 
636
 Schermers, G. and Blokker, Niels M. (2003), International Institutional Law: Unity Within Diversity. 4rd edn. M. 
Nijhoff publishers, page 494. And also see, Footer, Mary E. (2006). An Institutional and Normative Analysis of the 
World Trade Organisation (Leiden and Boston: Martinus. Nijhoff Publishers), p133. 
 
637
Ibid 2  
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Figure 8 WTO Structure
638
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638‗Understanding the WTO‘, 3rd ed, p. 103, previously published as ―Trading into the Future‖, 
the WTO Information and Media Relations Division. Also  available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf   
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a) Level One: The Ministerial Conference 
This is the highest authority in the WTO representing its members. The member countries take 
decisions through the various councils and committees, which comprises all the WTO members. 
Topmost in the hierarchy is the Ministerial Conference which has to meet at least once every two 
years and can take decisions on all matters relating to any of the WTO constituent agreements. 
b) Level Two: General Council 
The General Council is second in the hierarchy and deals with the routine work which is carried 
out between Ministerial Conferences. To handle day-to-day issues, the General Council takes 
three forms:  
 The General Council639 
 The Dispute Settlement Body640 
 The Trade Policy Review Body641 
According to the WTO agreement, all three have the same members as the General Council, but 
their name changes according to the purpose for which they are meeting. For example, The 
General Council assembles as the Dispute Settlement Body and the Trade Policy Review Body 
to supervise procedures for settling disputes between the Contracting Parties and to analyse 
                                                 
639
 The General Council looks after daily routine work in the absence of the Ministerial Conference and for further 
details about the scope and functions of the General Council visit:   
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gcounc_e/gcounc_e.htm 
640
 When the General Council is adjudicating disputes between the WTO members, it takes the form of the DSU. For 
details visit:  http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm 
641
 When the General council is reviewing the trade policies of the WTO members, it takes the form of the Trade 
Policy Review Body. For further details visit: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tpr_e.htm 
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members‘ trade policies. All three of them are comprised of the WTO members and they are 
answerable to the Ministerial Conference. 
c) Level Three: 
At the third level, there are three councils which consist of WTO members and are also 
answerable to the General Council; each of the councils deals with a different aspect of trade and 
are as follows: 
 The Council for Trade in Goods (hereinafter the ―Goods Council‖)  
  The Council for Trade in Services (hereinafter the ―Services Council‖)  
  The Council for TRIPS (hereinafter the ―TRIPS Council‖)  
As indicated by their names, all three are accountable for the WTO‘s functioning in their relevant 
fields.  
In addition, there are six committees, with limited scope, at level three of the hierarchy and 
which also report to the General Council, still comprised of all the Contracting Parties. They deal 
with issues such as the environmental concerns, trade and development, administrative matters, 
and regional trading engagements. In addition, at the Singapore Ministerial Conference in 
December 1996, new committees were created to deal with transparency in government 
procurement, investment and competition policy, and trade assistance. 
d) Level Four: 
At the fourth level lie the subsidiary bodies of the three level three councils of the hierarchy. 
They are as follows: 
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The Goods Council is comprised of 11 sub-committees dealing with their specialised areas.
642
 
Again, all these committees are comprised of the WTO members and they report to the Goods 
Council. Besides these 11 committees, two more bodies are answerable to the Goods Council; 
they are the Textiles Monitoring Body and State Trading Enterprises.  
The Services Council‘s subordinate committees deal with specific commitments, domestic 
regulations, financial services, and GATS rules. 
At the second hierarchical level, the Dispute Settlement Body also has two subordinate bodies: 
the dispute settlement ―panels‖ of experts selected to decide unsettled disputes, and the Appellate 
Body that looks into appeals.  
As mentioned at the beginning of this subheading, WTO decisions are made on the basis of 
consensus. However, if consensus is not made at the lower level of the organisation, then the 
matter is referred to the higher body for a decision.
643
 If the higher body cannot achieve 
consensus, then the majority vote applies.
644
 However, negative consensus is required in order to 
block dispute-settling system rulings.
645
  
                                                 
642
 These committees are: Market access, Agriculture, Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures, Technical barriers to 
trade, Subsidies and countervail, Anti-dumping, Customs valuation, Rules of origin, Import licensing, Investment 
measures, Safeguards 
643
 According to the Rule 33 of the Rules of the Procedure for Sessions of the Ministerial Conferences and Meetings 
of the General council, WT/L/161 (25/07/1996) together with the Rules of the Procedure as adopted by the other 
WTO councils and committees, are reproduced in OMC/WTO Rules of the Procedure of the Meeting of the WTO 
Bodies (Geneva: WTO Secretariat, 1997). Also see, Also see, Footer, Mary E. (2006). An Institutional and 
Normative Analysis of the World Trade Organisation (Leiden and Boston: Martinus. Nijhoff Publishers), p36. 
644
 Article IX (3) of the WTO Agreement. However, 2/3 majority (qualified majority) is required if for accession of 
new member. Article XII (2) of the WTO Agreement. For a detailed discussion see, Footer, Mary E. (2006). An 
Institutional and Normative Analysis of the World Trade Organisation (Leiden and Boston: Martinus. Nijhoff 
Publishers), p136 and p152. 
645
 GEORGIEV, DENCHO, The Decision Making Process in the World Trade Organisation, in GEORGIEV, 
DENCHO and KIM VAN DER BORGHT eds.  (2006): Reform and Development of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System; London: Cameron, May. Also see, Footer, Mary E. (2006). An Institutional and Normative Analysis of the 
World Trade Organisation (Leiden and Boston: Martinus. Nijhoff Publishers), p143. 
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Decision-making, as documented above, is the main spirit of the WTO and is clear evidence of 
its being liberally institutionalized. This is the reason why there is more room for the WTO to 
adapt and modify itself in the light of complex issues of the IELR. The collective will of the 
members has the tendency to adapt itself for greater collective gain.   
The next part of this chapter highlights the basic principles of the WTO as reflected in all the 
WTO frameworks of agreement.  
4. Fundamental Principles of the WTO646 
The WTO agreements consist of bulky legal texts which deal with the wide range of activities 
conducted under its umbrella. The text covers wide-ranging areas such as agriculture, textiles 
and clothing, banking, telecommunications, government purchases, industrial standards and 
product safety, food sanitation regulations, intellectual property, and many more. However, all 
the texts of the WTO have one thing in common: the fundamental principles of a multilateral 
trading system on which the whole WTO is based. Reasonable knowledge of these principles is 
essential for a better understanding of the WTO legal framework. 
The main principles of the WTO institutional framework are briefly discussed below. 
a) Trade without discrimination 
The most important of the fundamental principles of the WTO is trade without discrimination 
and this principle of non-discrimination is found in the WTO charter in two forms; namely, 
MFN, and the National Treatment. Both of these aspects of the principle of non-discrimination 
are discussed below. 
                                                 
646
 For further details about the fundamental/ basic principles of WTO visit:    
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm 
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(a) MFN: Under WTO framework, Contracting Parties cannot normally discriminate between 
other Contracting Parties. A trade advantage given to any member has to be extended, without 
any discrimination, to all other WTO members. This principle is called MFN treatment.   
According to this principle a trade benefit means advantage, favour, privilege or immunity in the 
form of: (1) any type of charges related to imports and exports; (2) the system of imposing 
tariffs; (3) the rules and procedures related with imports and exports; (4) local taxes and other 
local charges; and (5) the rules and prerequisites influencing sales, purchase, distribution, 
transportation of the product.  
MFN principle is so significant that it is the first article of GATT, the second of GATS and the 
fourth article of TRIPS, although, within each agreement, the same principle is dealt to some 
extent in a different way. Collectively, these three agreements encompass all three foremost 
areas of trade within the WTO.  
There are certain exceptions allowed with respect to the MFN principle. For instance, (1) a 
member can give special treatment to developing countries under the Generalized System of 
Preferences
647
 [hereinafter the ―GSP‖] and, under the GSP, there can be regional or global 
arrangements among the developing countries themselves for the reduction of mutual tariffs; (2) 
benefits and concessions can be extended to neighbouring countries so as to assist border 
traffic;
648
(3) Custom Unions
649
; (4) restrictive measures against any member on the basis of 
                                                 
647
 GSP is a ―preferential tariff system extended by developed countries (also known as preference giving countries 
or donor countries) to developing countries (also known as preference receiving countries or beneficiary countries). 
It involves reduced MFN Tariffs or duty-free entry of eligible products exported by beneficiary countries to the 
markets of donor countries.‖ For details visit: http://www.eicindia.org/eic/certificates/genralized-bg.htm  
648
 Article XXIV.3.a of GATT 1994  
649
 Article XXIV.5 of GATT 1994 
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Article XX of GATT 1994; (5) restrictions on any member on the basis of security reasons under 
Article XXI of GATT 1994. 
In services, countries are also allowed some exceptions to the general rule but in very limited 
circumstances. The WTO agreements only authorise these exceptions under strict conditions.  
(b) National Treatment: According to this principle, a member country has to treat foreign and 
local commodity alike. This principle applies only after the imported product has entered the 
local market. The National Treatment principle is also extended to local and foreign services, and 
to foreign and local patents, trademarks and copyrights. This principle is integral part of all three 
main WTO agreements (Article 3 of GATT, Article 17 of GATS and Article 3 of TRIPS); 
however, its applicability is slightly different in each of these agreements. 
The National Treatment principle is only applicable post entry into the domestic market. 
Therefore, if custom duty is charged on the import of a product, then this is not an infringement 
of the National Treatment principle. 
b) Gradual Freer trade via negotiations 
Bringing down trade restrictions is one of the best possible methods of promoting free trade. The 
trade restrictions in this context are of two types; tariff and non-tariff barriers. Tariff Barriers 
include, for example, customs duties, and non-tariff barriers, including actions such as import 
bans or selective quantitative restriction through quotas.  
Since GATT‘s formation in 1947–48, there have been eight rounds of trade negotiations. A ninth 
round, the Doha Round is currently in progress. The primary focus of the initial rounds was the 
reduction of customs duties on imported products. This gradual tariff reduction process through 
trade negotiations produced fruitful results. By the mid-1990s, industrial countries‘ custom 
duties on industrial products had reduced progressively to less than 4%. 
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However, by the 1980s, the Contracting Parties had diversified multilateral trade negotiations 
and included non-tariff barriers in their agenda.  
Abruptly opening up markets can lead to unavoidably serious consequences, thus this needs to be 
carried out in a more gradual manner. The WTO agreements encourage member countries to 
bring in adjustments gradually, via progressive liberalization. In this context, developing 
countries are usually given more time than developed countries to adjust themselves according to 
their scheduled commitments. 
c) Predictability 
Stability and predictability is essential for the efficient running of an economic system. It 
encourages investment, creates jobs and increases overall competition (which eventually benefits 
the consumer as he gets more choice at lower cost). The Contracting Parties, by creating the 
WTO, have attempted to strengthen the multilateral trading system, based on clear and 
unambiguous rules and commitments, which makes the business atmosphere more predictable 
and stable. 
The WTO does this by binding the member countries to the fulfilment of their commitments. All 
of the WTO members have agreed to a commitment (bound rates) which is known to everyone; 
for example, putting a ceiling on the customs duties rate. The members can charge less than the 
bound rates but cannot exceed them. Mostly, the rates actually charged by the countries are the 
same as the bound rate. However, a Contracting Party can modify its committed rates but only 
through negotiations with other Contracting Parties concerned. One of the successes of the 
Uruguay Round was to bring the maximum amount of trade under binding commitments. The 
purpose of doing this was to increase certainty and stability in the multilateral trading scenario.  
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The WTO, in other ways, has also attempted to enhance predictability and stability in the trading 
system. One way in which it has achieved this is by discouraging its members to use quotas and 
other non-tariff barriers: another is by obliging member countries to make unambiguous and 
transparent trade rules (by disclosing their policies and practices overtly within the country or by 
informing the WTO). This transparency is further enhanced, both domestically and 
multilaterally, when the national trade policies are reviewed by the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism of the WTO. 
d) Promoting fair competition 
The WTO, to a layman, is known as a ―free trade‖ organisation, but this is not precisely true. The 
WTO does permit tariffs and, in restricted conditions, other methods of protection. More 
precisely, it is a rule based system which promotes fair, open and competition trade. 
The rules on non-discrimination (MFN and National Treatment) are designed to secure fair 
conditions of trade, but sometimes, countries misuse non-discrimination rules by exporting 
products below cost to gain market share (dumping) and or by subsidising a product to make it 
relatively cheaper. The WTO deals with all these sorts of scenarios and has established rules to 
ascertain criteria for fairness and unfairness, and the way governments should react, precisely in 
case of imposing extra import tariffs as compensation for the harm resulted by unfair trade. 
e) Encouraging development and economic reform 
The WTO system encourages development towards a better multilateral trading regime. The 
majority of the nations of the world (thus also the majority of WTO members) are still 
developing, therefore, the WTO, with this in mind, has successfully engaged most of the 
developing countries in the multilateral trade negotiations process. It has achieved this by 
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adopting the GATT approach towards developing countries (i.e. by giving them more flexibility 
to fulfil their commitments). In addition, the WTO provides special assistance and trade 
concessions to developing countries, through its various agreements. 
Special attention is given to LDCs. The WTO stresses that industrialised countries should speed 
up market access for products exported by less-developed countries, and also increase technical 
assistance to them. With regards to all of this, the WTO along with its members are still 
undergoing a learning process. The existing Doha Development Agenda takes into account 
developing countries‘ apprehension and the problems they face in implementing the Uruguay 
Round agreements. 
These above-mentioned principles define the spirit of the WTO legal framework. All WTO rules 
and related practices must uphold these principles. The next part of this chapter highlights the 
legal basis of the institutional role of the WTO.  
B. Legal Basis for Institutional Role 
The WTO Agreement provides a legal basis to the WTO as an IEI to perform its institutional 
role. Article III is based on the theoretical division between the various attributes of public 
authority. Under this concept, the public authority has internal and external engagements. The 
internal engagements are dealt with by three public functions: legislative, executive and 
adjudicative.
650
By keeping to the above-mentioned concept of public authority, the ideas put 
forward by Article III become clear. Article III:1 talks about the executive function of the WTO, 
followed by Article III:2, the legislative, and Article III:3 deals with the adjudicative function. 
                                                 
650
 See Article I, II and III of the US Constitution. 
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The extended part of the executive functioning is dealt with in Article III:4 which is about the 
TPRM. Lastly, Article III:5 deals with the external affairs.
651
   
The remaining part of this subheading will briefly discuss the institutional basis of the WTO 
which is based on its institutional role (executive, legislative, and the adjudicative functioning). 
Moreover, the TPRM and the relationship with the other organisations are also briefly discussed.  
1. Executive Function 
The importance of the executive and administrative functioning of an IEI was discussed in the 
theoretical framework.
652
 The WTO Agreement in Article III:1 legally empowers the WTO to 
perform an executive function in order to move the law into action. Article III:1 states that the 
WTO ―shall facilitate the implementation, administration and operation‖ of the WTO framework 
of Agreements. The executive and administrative functioning of the WTO is carried out by the 
WTO Secretariat, the Ministerial Conference, General Council, and various other bodies of the 
WTO, some of whom were discussed earlier.
653
  
The executive and administrative functioning of the WTO will be discussed in detail in Chapters 
VII and VIII in the context of the Economic Cycle. However, in connection with the institutional 
role of the WTO, the next subheading will highlight the legal basis of the legislative functioning 
of the WTO.    
2. Legislative Function 
The WTO framework of Agreements forms a large part of the IELR and encompasses a code of 
conduct for the global economy, especially international trade. Moreover, it is the result of the 
                                                 
651
 Wolfrum, Rudiger; Stoll, Peter-Tobias; and Kaiser, Karen /Editors (2006). WTO - Institutions and Dispute 
Settlement (Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law), p30. 
652
 Chapter II.A.3.b) on page 46 
653
 Chapter VI.A.3 on page 233.  
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horizontal and vertical expansion of international law in the Uruguay Round because the WTO 
framework of Agreements includes not only an increase in verity and the number of norms but 
also an increase in the scope and coverage of the subject matter.
654
  
These agreements have a huge normative effect on the global economic scenario and are a 
substantial part of the IELR. They are discussed in detail in the next two chapters, which 
highlight the institutional role (which includes the normative) of the WTO in the context of the 
Economic Cycle. However, the current scope of the legislative functioning of the WTO is quite 
limited and is discussed below.     
The normative and legislative functioning of the WTO is quite important. Article III:2 deals with 
the legislative functioning of the WTO as part of its institutional role. The WTO‘s legislative 
functioning is limited (as compared to the normative effect of the WTO framework of 
Agreements) because it itself cannot enact laws as legislator. It, as an IEI, provides the forum for 
law creation.
655
  
The legislative function of the WTO takes two forms: the creation of primary treaty rules and the 
creation of secondary treaty rules. Primary treaty rule-making involves rules which control the 
behaviour of its members and have a prescriptive and prohibitive effect. The secondary treaty 
rules emerge from the primary treaty rules and involve the revision, modification, interpretation, 
and application of the primary treaty rules. 
656
  
                                                 
654
 This idea was put forwarded by Wolfgang Friedman (1964), The changing structure of the International Law 
(new York: Columbia University Press) p5, 6 and 9. Also see, Footer, Mary E. (2006). An Institutional and 
Normative Analysis of the World Trade Organisation (Leiden and Boston: Martinus. Nijhoff Publishers), p182. 
655
 Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich (1996-97). Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 18, 398, 438. 
656
 See generally, Wellens, K.C. (1995). Some Reflections on Current Trends, in Diversity in Secondary Rules and 
the Unity of International Law 3, 27 (L.A.N.M. Barnhhorn & K.C. Wellens eds.) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Also 
see generally, Footer, Mary E. (2006). An Institutional and Normative Analysis of the World Trade Organisation 
(Leiden and Boston: Martinus. Nijhoff Publishers), chapter IV. 
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Overall, the legislative and normative functioning of the WTO is extremely important. This 
thesis calls for the expansion of this norm-making institutional role of the WTO. Legislative and 
normative functioning results in the creation of norms and these norms can be categorised as 
principles, rules and standards. 
Principles are the highest ranking; they are the foundational assumptions for a legal regime.
657
 
Then there are rules which reflect the principles and control the behaviour of members at 
operational level.
658
 Last of all are the standards which relate to the expected behaviour, resulting 
from the rules.
659
  
3. Adjudicative Function 
The Uruguay Round agreement established a more organised method with more plainly-defined 
steps in the dispute settlement procedure. It established an efficient discipline for the settlement 
of cases, with flexible time limits set within the different stages of the procedure. Article 
III:3calls for the WTO to have an autonomous adjudicative system in order to resolve disputes 
related to issues falling under the WTO‘s jurisdiction.   
The agreement also stressed the need for the quick settlement of disputes for the effective 
performance of the WTO. It lay down in substantial detail the processes and the schedule to be 
adhere in adjudication. It would normally take less than one year, but up to 15 months, if a case 
were to stretch to its full course from the first ruling to appeal.
660
 
                                                 
657
 Arend, A.C. (1999). Legal Rules and Institutional Society. Oxford University Press, p14. 
658
 Ibid, p13, 15. 
659
 Footer, Mary E. (2006). An Institutional and Normative Analysis of the World Trade Organisation (Leiden and 
Boston: Martinus. Nijhoff Publishers), p186. 
660‗Understanding the WTO‘, 3rd ed, p. 55-6, previously published as ―Trading into the Future‖, the WTO 
Information and Media Relations Division. Also  available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf 
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According to the Uruguay Agreement, the Dispute Settlement Body has exclusive authority to 
set up panels of specialists to review the cases, and to agree or disagree with the panels‘ and 
appellant body‘s conclusions. It supervises the execution of the rulings and recommendations of 
the panels, and has the authority to allow a country to retaliate if another country does not act in 
accordance with its decision. The procedure followed under DSU is given below: 
 First stage: The first stage is the consultation stage; the countries in dispute have to talk to each 
other to find out if they can resolve their differences between themselves. If they fail to resolve 
the matter by themselves, then help and mediation can be requested from the WTO Director-
General. This consultation process can last up to 60 days, before taking any other action. 
 Second stage: In cases where the consultations fail, the complaining country can ask for the 
formation of a panel. The country against whom the panel formation was requested can only 
block its formation the first time and if the Dispute Settlement Body
661
 [hereinafter the ―DSB‖] 
meets for a second time for the same matter, then panel formation cannot be blocked. It takes up 
to 45 days for a panel to be selected, plus 6 months for the panel to decide. 
                                                 
661
 When the General Council is adjudicating disputes between the WTO members, it takes the form of the Dispute 
Settlement Body.  http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm 
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Figure 9 The Panel Process662 
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(Art. 4)
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(Art. 4)
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Composition (Art. 8)
Panel examination
Normally 2 meetings with parties (Art. 12),
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sent to parties for comment (Art. 15.1)
Interim report sent to parties for comment (Art. 
15.2)
Panel report issued to parties
(Art. 12.8; Appendix 3 par 12(j))
Panel report issued to DSB
(Art. 12.9; Appendix 3 par 12(k))
DSB adopts panel/appellate report(s)
including any changes to panel report made by 
appellate report (Art. 16.1, 16.4 and 17.14)
Implementation
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implementation within ‗reasonable period of 
time‘ (Art. 21.3)
In cases of non-implementation
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(Art. 22)
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(Art. 22.3)
Expert review group
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The panel is basically set up to assist the DSB with its decisions regarding the dispute. 
However, the report of the panel is difficult to overturn because it can only be set aside by 
consensus in the DSB. The panel‘s decisions have to be supported by the cited agreements. 
Usually, within six months the Panel passes its decision the Contracting parties concerned. 
Although in urgent situations such as matter pertaining to perishable commodities, the Panel 
submits its report within three months. 
4. TPRM 
As part of the executive and administrative authority of the WTO, one of its main functions is 
that of surveillance of the national trade policies of all the contracting parties. At the heart of this 
surveillance functionality lies the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). 
The TPRM is conducted by the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) which is actually the WTO 
General Council and is composed of all the Contracting Parties. The review process is more or 
less like a peer review; however, the bulk of the leg-work, which is essential for coordination, is 
done by the WTO Secretariat.
663
 
The TPRM, as an interim measure, was formed in Montreal, at the half-way review of the 
Uruguay Round, in December 1988.
664
  Later, in 1994, in the Marrakesh Agreement (Article III), 
the Ministers decided to give TPRM a permanent place in the WTO system and in 1995, TPRM 
came into force and, this time, the service trade (which includes trade in financial services) and 
intellectual property were also brought within its scope.  
                                                 
663
 TRADE POLICY REVIEWS: BRIEF INTRODUCTION, Overseeing national trade policies: the TPRM 
Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_int_e.htm 
664
 In December 1988, ministers met in Montreal, Canada. At this meeting, ministers agreed to conclude early results 
in relation to some issues. For details visit:  http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm 
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The objective of the TPRM
665
 is to play a role in enhancing compliance with WTO rules, 
disciplines and commitments (related to the financial services trade) by all Contracting Parties. It 
encourages transparent policy-making in the financial services trade sector. It acts as a forum for 
the Contacting Parties to study and analyse the trade polices (including policies related to 
financial services) of the Contracting Party whose trade policy is under review. The number of 
reviews a Contracting party is required to undergo depends on the Contracting Party‘s share in 
world trade. The EC, the US, China and Japan, having the largest share in world trade, are 
reviewed every two years. The 16 next- largest economies are reviewed every four years and the 
remaining members have to undergo a review every six years. A total of 324 reviews of 140 
Contracting Parties had been conducted
666
 by the end of 2010.
667
 
The content of the review by the TPRB has remained more or less the same for a decade. The 
report of the review by the Secretariat has four sections. The first section reviews the economic 
environment of the Contracting Party concerned and takes into consideration trade, exchange 
rates, output, investment, public finances, employment, and matters pertaining to the macro 
economy. The second section of the TRPB report relates to the trade policy in detail. It takes into 
account, for example, the institutional framework in the context of trade policy, trade policy 
objectives, and PTA.  
The third section reports the examination of trade practices and policies in light of the measures 
taken by the Contracting Parties and issues related to rules of origin, technical regulations, 
custom procedures, etc. which have a direct impact on imports. Similarly, it  reports on measures 
related to documentation, restrictions, taxes, subsidies, etc. which have a direct impact on the 
                                                 
665
 The purposes of the TPRM, as stated in Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement, consist of assisting the efficient 
working of the multilateral trading system by improving the transparency in trade policies of the Contracting Parties.  
666
 REPORT OF THE TPRB for 2010, WTO document no. WT/TPR/269. 
667
 http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/2002_trade_policy_review.html 
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relevant contracting party‘s exports. In addition, this section looks into the Contracting Party‘s 
measures related to production and trade, for example, competition policy, government 
procurement, intellectual property rights, and state-owned enterprises. The fourth section looks at 
trade policies by sector. 
The Trade Policy Review process can be broken up into three steps.
668
 These three steps are 
discussed below. 
1. Preparation of reports:  
The first step is the preparation of reports by the WTO Secretariat. For this purpose, the 
Secretariat sends questionnaires to the Contracting Party under review and also gathers some 
basic information regarding the concerned Contracting Party‘s status in relation to the content of 
the review report.
669
 Then, members from the Trade Policy Review Division of the WTO 
Secretariat visit the Contracting Party concerned in person and talk through unanswered 
questions with them. After this meeting, the Secretariat sends a draft report to the Contracting 
Party concerned for verification of the content of the report. Once that is done, then a final report 
is produced and is distributed to other Contracting Parties (this must be done at least five weeks 
before the TPRB sits). Interested Contracting Parties deliver their written questions to the 
Secretariat (this should be done two weeks before the TPRB convenes), and finally, the 
Secretariat highlights the important issues and circulates the report one week before the TPRB 
meets.  
2. Review meeting:  
                                                 
668
 See Annex 3 of the WTO Agreement and the TPRB‘s rules of procedure – WTO 2008. Rules of Procedure for 
Meetings of the Trade Policy Review Body: WT/TPR/6/ Rev.2. Also see, The WTO‘s Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism: How to Create Political Will for Liberalization, ECIPE Working Paper No. 11/2009. 
669
 Examples of different sources accessed by the secretariat are the Contracting Party‘s official web pages, reports 
by other international institutions, NGOs, academic work, etc.  
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The TPRB is open to all the Contracting Parties and headed by a chairperson elected by each 
member. The review meeting lasts for nearly two half-days. 
3. Dissemination:  
The policy statement from the Contracting Party concerned and the Secretariat‘s final report are 
made public at the end of the meeting in the form of a press conference and details of the 
meeting are published online. In addition, the Contracting Party under review is required to 
respond to all unanswered questions within one month. 
5. External Relations 
Article III:5 and Article V of the WTO Agreement talk about the WTO‘s external relations with 
the other IEIs. These Articles call for cooperation with the other relevant IEIs so as to attain 
better coherence in global economic policymaking which is essential for the collective gain. In 
this connection, the WTO has developed a preferential relationship with the IMF and the World 
Bank.   
C. Conclusion:  
This chapter documented the general characteristics of the WTO charter, decision-making within 
WTO and its basic principles. Moreover, this chapter discussed the legal basis for the WTO‘s 
institutional role. This institutional role is discussed in detail in the next two chapters in the 
context of the Economic Cycle.   
 
Rao Raza Hashim 
254 
School Of Law 
University Of Warwick 
VII. The WTO’s Role as an IEI in Promotion of a Stable and Balanced 
Growth of the Global Economy through Enhancement of International Trade 
in the Economic Cycle 
 
A. Introduction  
The section three argues that the WTO is the most effective IEI within the IELR. The reason 
being that it comprehensively affects the Economic Cycle the most. This chapter will focus on 
the institutional role of the WTO in the endorsement of international trade within the 
international economic framework. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, this institutional 
role lies at the heart of the certainty and predictability of the rules of the game. Therefore, this 
chapter will highlight the institutional role of the WTO (i.e. the role of the WTO in its legislative 
and normative capacity, executive and administrative capacity and adjudicative capacity) in the 
promotion of international trade, which then completes the Economic Cycle by stimulating 
economic growth, followed by the development of the financial sector (Patrick‘s demand side 
development of the financial sector).  
As the WTO‘s institutional role in context of international trade expansion is not much 
challenged in the global economic scenario and in order to avoid the repetition of the substance 
of other chapters, this chapter will very briefly discuss the WTO‘s institutional role. However, 
WTO‘s contribution towards the intellectual property is something which is not discussed in 
other chapters and is therefore discussed reasonably in this chapter. The significance of the 
intellectual property and the international trade is very high in the international trading scenario 
and is also discussed in this chapter.  
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Article II (1) of the WTO Agreement states clearly that “[t]he WTO shall provide the common 
institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its Members in matters related 
to the agreements and associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement.” 
As evident from the above article, the WTO has a clear and uncontested mandate in relation to 
international trade. Moreover, the institutional contribution of the WTO, in the context of the 
promotion of international trade, is highly significant.  
In order to avoid repetition, this chapter will briefly discuss the institutional role of the WTO in 
general, in terms of the enhancement of international trade. The institutional role is reviewed in 
general; that is, it also includes the financial services sector. It briefly takes an overview of the 
whole trade sector. However, this chapter also talks specifically about the WTO‘s contribution in 
the context of research and development, since innovation is a key one of the main stimuli of 
international trade. In this context, this chapter examines the Trade Related-Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement. 
The following part of this subheading reviews the role of the WTO in its legislative and 
normative capacity in the promotion of international trade. 
1.    Legislative and Normative Functioning  
The WTO framework of agreements, as discussed in the previous chapter, has a significant 
normative effect on the international economic framework. Therefore to avoid repetition, this 
chapter will focus on the legislative functioning of the WTO as an IEI, which also has a 
normative effect and which creates certainty and predictability of the rules of the game in the 
global trading scenario.  
The WTO is a rules-based, member-driven organisation thus all rule-making processes involve 
negotiation between members. In connection with this, there are three types of legislative 
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instrument within the WTO framework which contribute significantly to international trade law 
in creating certainty and predictability within the global trading scenario. These three legislative 
or normative instruments are the principles, rules and standards produced by the WTO system.
670
   
There are two types of rule under WTO treaty law: primary treaty rules and secondary treaty 
rules. Primary rules comprise multilateral treaty and they regulate the rights and responsibilities 
of the WTO Contracting Parties. These primary treaty rules instruct the Contracting Parties to 
take a particular action or alternatively, prohibit them from certain acts. On the other hand, 
secondary treaty rules
671
 are subsidiary to primary treaty rules and derive their legality from the 
primary treaty rules. In addition, secondary treaty rules deal mostly with the functioning, 
interpretation and modification of primary treaty rules, and usually, the process of secondary 
treaty rule-making leads to the development of primary treaty rules. 
a) Primary rule-making under the WTO legal framework 
The WTO primary treaty rules are comprised of rights and commitments which the Contracting 
Parties are obligated to adhere to as part of an IO. It includes the formation and modification of 
legally binding and non-binding (‗soft` law)672 principles, rules and standards: these three types 
of norms created by the WTO are briefly discussed below.  
The highest in the normative hierarchy in terms of primary rule-making are the ‗Principles‘. 
They are the basic assumptions that act as the foundation of any legal regime, its rules and 
standards.
673
 As Fitzmaurice affirms: ‗[B]y a principle, or general principle, as opposed to a rule, 
                                                 
670
 This concept  was also discussed in chapter VII.  
671See K.C, Wellens (1994) ‗Diversity in Secondary Rules and the Unity of International Law: Some Reflections on 
Current Trends, XXV NYBIL, 3-37 at 7. 
672
 Chinkin, Christine (2000),Normative Developments in the International Legal System' in Dinah Shelton (ed.), 
Commitment and Compliance, the Role of Nan-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000) 21-42.  
673
 Arend, Anthony Clark (1999), Legal Rules and International Society (New York, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press) 14. 
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even a general rule, of law is meant chiefly something which is not itself a rule, but which 
underlies a rule, and explains or provides the reason for it.‘674 The principles of National 
Treatment, MFN and market access are all good examples of principles acting as the foundation 
of all WTO rules, regulations and standards.
675
 
The next in the WTO normative hierarchy are the ‗Rules‘, which are based on the general 
principles and they closely regulate the behaviour of the Contracting Parties in accordance with 
WTO principles. All the Contracting Parties are required to follow the rules.
676
 An example of a 
rule emerging from the principle of MFN is Article II (1) of GATS: “[E]ach Member shall 
accord immediately and unconditionally.” 
Last in the WTO normative hierarchy are the ‗Standards` which deal with the behaviour that 
each of the Contracting Parties is expected show towards another and thus involves assessment. 
The standards create the legitimate expectations of each Contracting Party regarding the actions 
of the other Contracting Parties.
677
 They are usually in conjunction with rules; however, they 
should not be confused with rules.  An example of a standard with the conjunction of a rule and 
emerging from the principle of MFN is Article II (1) of GATS: “[E]ach Member shall accord 
immediately and unconditionally (rule) to services and service suppliers of any other Member 
treatment no less favorable (standard) than that it accords to like services and service suppliers 
of any other country.” 
                                                 
674
 Fitzmaurice, G. (1957), ‗The general principles of international law considered from the stand-point of the rule of 
law` 92 Receuil des Caurs 1-227, at 7.  
675
 See Footer, Mary E. (2006). An Institutional and Normative Analysis of the World Trade Organisation (Leiden 
and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), p185. 
676
 See Danilenko. Gennady M. (1993). Law-making in the international Community (Dordrecht: Nordhoff 
Publishers, l993) 8. 
677
 Supra note 675 at 186. 
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b) Secondary rule-making by the WTO 
Secondary rule-making is mainly carried out for the purpose of revising the primary treaty rules. 
In most cases, the mandate for the secondary treaty rules originates from the main treaty to be 
amended.
678
 Article XX of the WTO Agreement deals with the amendments of agreements under 
the WTO framework, therefore, in this way, the WTO has a comprehensive methodology for 
ensuring its normative effectiveness is up-to-date, for more certain and predictable rules of the 
game.  
The next part will consider the role played by the WTO, as an IEI in its administrative and 
executive capacity, in strengthening the global trading scenario. 
B. Executive and administrative authority 
As mentioned elsewhere in this thesis,
679
 the executive and administrative functioning of an IEI 
is crucial for the effectiveness of any IO. This particular attribute of the IEI enables it to 
implement its decisions: failure to implement its decisions would result in a useless IO. Thus, to 
make the implementation and execution of institutional acts operative, IOs need to be vested 
with executive and administrative authority.  
The executive and administrative functioning of the WTO as an IEI in the development of 
international trade has already been discussed in the previous chapters.
680
 Thus, this chapter, in 
order to avoid repetition, does not go into the detail of the executive functioning of the WTO as 
part of its institutional role. The next subheading will briefly examine the adjudicative 
functioning of the WTO as an IEI in the development of international trade.  
                                                 
678
 Supra note 671 
679
 See chapter headings no.II.A.3.b) V.A.2 V.B.4 VI.B.1 VIII.B 
680
 See generally, chapter subheadings; II.A.3.b), VI.B.1, VIII.B, VI.B.4 
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C. Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Functioning of the WTO in the 
endorsement of International Trade 
The improvement of certainty and predictability in terms of the rules of the game within a system 
helps the system to develop. The adjudicative functioning of the WTO is notable in its 
jurisdiction to improve the certainty and predictability of the rules of the game within the 
international trading scenario. The adjudicative process is carried out by the DSS of the WTO 
and has been discussed in detail in the preceding chapters.
681
  
One of the most noteworthy accomplishments of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade 
negotiations was making the DSS as a mandatory part of the WTO system. This adjudicative 
functioning makes the WTO the most effect IEI with in the IELR. Eric White said: 
―The WTO Dispute Settlement system is a remarkable achievement. The WTO has succeeded in 
creating a frequently used compulsory dispute settlement system producing binding results that 
can be enforced. Nowhere else in international law are all these characteristics combined.‖682 
Even though the WTO DSS‘s overall contributions are significant in settling disputes within its 
jurisdiction,
683
 there is still there is room for improvements.
684
  By room for improvements I 
mean that nothing is absolutely perfect and flawless. Therefore, despite being overall an effective 
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 Chapter VI.B.3 and Chapter VIII.C 
682
 White, E. (2003), quoted in Stoler, A.L., ‗The WTO dispute settlement system: did we get what the negotiators 
wanted?‘, paper presented at the International Bar Association Conference, Future Directions in WTO Dispute 
Settlement, Geneva, 16 March, mimeo. As cited by Read, R. (2005). Trade dispute settlement mechanisms: the 
WTO dispute settlement understanding in the wake of the GATT. Lancaster University Management School 
Working Paper 2005/012. 
683
 Davey, William J. (2005).The WTO dispute settlement system. Journal of International Economic Law Vol. 8 
No. 1 
684
 Shaffer, Gregory (2005). Weaknesses and proposed improvements to the WTO Dispute Settlement System: an 
economic and market-oriented. (Prepared for WTO at 10: A Look at the Appellate Body, Sao Paulo, Brazil, May 16-
17, 2005). Available at: http://www.ppl.nl/bibliographies/wto/files/5300a.pdf ; see also, Faisal A.S.A. Albashar & 
A.F.M. Maniruzzaman (2010), Reforming the WTO Dispute Settlement System: A Rethink of the Third Party Right 
of Access to Panel and Appeal Processes from Developing Countries' Perspectives. Journal of World Investment & 
Trade Volume 11, Number 3. 
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institution, the DSS is slightly more advantageous to the developed countries. This may be due to 
lack of resources to finance adjudicating process or due ineffective remedies (from a small 
economy‘s perspective) or some other reason but the fact is that developing countries are in 
majority and still there are very few case initiated by them. 
J.H. Jackson acknowledged some the main achievements of the WO DSS as follows:
685
 ―It 
established a unified dispute settlement system covering all of the WTO Agreements. It 
enshrines the precedent of plaintiff governments to initiate a panel process and prevents 
defendants from blocking the process. It established a new appellate procedure, including a 
negative consensus requirement for the acceptance of an appellate ruling.‖686 
In short, DSS of the WTO is an effective institution. Majority of the scholars consider it to be a 
successful system which has contributed quite positively towards the international economic law. 
However, it is not free from criticism which is discussed in the later part of the thesis.
687
   
The next subhead is about the WTO‘s contribution towards the promotion of innovation. This 
aspect of the WTO is separately discussed because the innovation has a significant role in 
creating comparative advantage and thus making room for trade. By promoting innovation the 
WTO directly promotes the international trade.   
                                                 
685
 Jackson, J.H. (1998b), ‗Designing and implementing effective dispute settlement procedures: WTO dispute 
settlement, appraisal and prospects‘, in Krueger, A.O. (ed.), The WTO as an International Organization, pp. 161-80.  
686
 See Read, R. (2005). Trade dispute settlement mechanisms: the WTO dispute settlement understanding in the 
wake of the GATT. Lancaster University Management School Working Paper 2005/012. 
687
 Room for ImprovementVIII.C.5, p337. 
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D. TRIPS 
1. Introduction 
The link between innovation and promotion of international trade is directly proportional. 
Innovation is considered as the most important factor in most of the trade theories. For this 
reason this part of the thesis sheds lights on the institutional role played by the WTO in 
promotion of innovation which then stimulates the international trade. 
Literature related to economic growth puts enormous stress on the role played by the 
international economic institutions in the growth process; for example, protecting and promoting 
Intellectual Property (―IP‖) rights. The importance of the role of the economic institutions is 
often discussed, as these institutions can influence to a significant extent the productivity of 
organisations (by supporting and promoting innovation) and can, ultimately, affect the growth 
rate of a country. This is because the IP rights and ability (and interest) of organisations to 
innovate are directly proportional to each other.
688
 
This sub-section is dedicated to analysing the role of the WTO in the promotion and protection 
of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). For this purpose, I shall discuss in general IP and IPRs, 
the need for IPR protection, the structure of Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
and the role of the TRIPS Council in the implementation and enforcement of TRIPS. 
What is property? Property, in simple words, is a collection of legal rights to exert control over 
some thing.
689
 The legal system (in its jurisdiction) classifies the different types of things that can 
be characterised as property, along with the scope of rights associated with them. For example, a 
                                                 
688
  Acemoglu, Daron & Kostas Bimpikis & Asuman Ozdaglar, (2008). "Experimentation, Patents, and Innovation," 
NBER Working Papers 14408. 
689
Honore, A. (1977), 'Ownership', in P. Smith (ed.), The Nature and Process of Law (Oxford University Press, New 
York), pp. 370-375. See also Dreyfuss, R. (1989), 'General Overview of the Intellectual Property System', in V Weil 
and J. Snapper (eds.), Owning Scientific and Technical Information (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ), 
pp. 17-40. 
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car owner has legal rights to possess, use, destroy, transfer, sell, or rent his car. However, 
different legal systems impose certain limits on those rights, such as obligating him to drive the 
car safely (as defined by the legal system), and to follow the rules set by the legal system when 
selling, transferring, renting or destroying the car. In other words, property is a collection of legal 
rights (as defined by the legal system) according to which a person (also including artificial 
persons) exercises his rights to control some thing.
690
 
Along the same lines, the concept of property includes a collection of an individual‘s rights 
towards an object with relation to society.
691
 For instance, if there were no people, then there 
would be no need for the concept of property, as it is a collection of the rights of persons 
(including artificial persons as well). Objects are classified as property so that they can be 
identified and represented socially and legally as a collection of a person's rights and duties with 
regard to that object. Hence, the notion of property portrays a three sided relationship between an 
object, an individual and the society.
692
 
Property law has evolved over the course of time for the protection and promotion of individual 
rights within evolving technological, social, and economic scenarios. A brief reference to the 
history of the evolution of the property law will enable a better understanding of the concept of 
property. During Medieval Europe
693
, land was considered as the most prominent type of object 
that people might possess, use, rent, buy, or sell. Thus property laws, at that time, were mainly 
comprised of a collection of rights related to land i.e. real property (to possess, use, rent, buy, or 
sell) in order to protect the economic interests of individuals. Similarly, during the Renaissance 
                                                 
690
 D. B. Resnik, A Pluralistic Account of Intellectual Property. Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Sep., 
2003), pp. 319-335. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25075110 
691
 Feinman, J. (2000), Law 101: Everything You Need to Know About the American Legal System (Oxford 
University Press, New York). 
692
 Resnik, D. B. (2003). A Pluralistic Account of Intellectual Property. Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 46, No. 4, 
pp. 319-335. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25075110 
693
 In that era feudalism was the dominant political economy. 
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era
694
, feudalism was abolished and a new class of businessman surfaced. So, in order to cater to 
the economic interests of these businessmen, such as the trade of moveable items (e.g. harvested 
crops, livestock, etc.), laws were developed to recognise moveable items as property.
695
 In the 
same way, during the Industrial Revolution
696
, the economic players (both natural and artificial 
persons participating in the economy) became more dependent on the utility of information and 
ideas, and so the legal system recognized IP.
697
 
―Intellectual property refers to creations of the mind: inventions, literary and artistic works, and 
symbols, names, images, and designs used in commerce.‖698 As IP relates to intangible 
properties, it demands special legal protection because they are non-exclusive and non-
exhaustive in nature i.e. more than one individual can possess and use the same item of 
intellectual property without preventing another from possessing or using it.
699
 For instance, 
more than one individual can, at the same time, possess and use the same computer program, 
poem, or the same song. Thus, to cater for the need to protect the economic interests of the 
economic players concerned, IP laws allow persons to possess exclusive rights to control things 
that are non-exclusive in nature.
700
 
What is the need for the protection of IPRs at international level? The new growth theory 
emphasises the contribution of technological enhancement in the economic growth process, and 
as discussed earlier in the ‗Economic Cycle‘, that economic growth is the key to achieving 
                                                 
694
 14th–17th centuries.  
695
May, C. (1998). Thinking, Buying, Selling: Intellectual Property Rights in Political Economy', New Political 
Economy 3(1), 59-78. 
696
 The Industrial Revolution was a period in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. 
697
In this context, England passed its first patent statute in 1623 and its first copyright statute in 1710. The U.S. 
adopted its first copyright and patent statutes in 1790. For further discussion see, Miller, A. and M. Davis ( 2000). 
Intellectual Property: Patents, Trademarks, and Copyright (West Publishing, St. Paul, MN). And see also, Foster, F. 
and R. Shook (1993) Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, 2nd ed. (John Wiley and Sons, New York). 
698
http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/ 
699
Hettinger, E. (1989). 'Justifying Intellectual Property', Philosophy and Public Affairs 18, 31-52.  
700
The reason why intellectual properties are non exclusive is that information and ideas have no particular location 
in time and space: they are abstract objects. For further discussion see, Supra note 695and  also see, supra note 692  
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financial development, ultimately leading to a stable financial system. In this way, therefore, 
there is a possible link between IPR protection and economic stability. Research and 
development (R&D) is considered to a major source of innovation, improving existing products 
or developing new ones. Therefore, to maintain the interest of those players involved in R&D, 
TRIPS came into force during the Uruguay Round, setting the minimum IPR protection 
standards for WTO members.  
As IP is non-exclusive and non-exhaustive, it requires special attention since a lack of IPR 
protection could undermine the incentive to invest in R&D; IPR protection is vital for the 
restoration of that incentive to participate in the R&D process.
701
 The relationship of R&D and 
innovation is highlighted in the new growth theory
702
. The economic growth models used in the 
new growth theory rely on the notion that entrepreneurs invest in R&D with the expectation of 
profiting from their inventions. Moreover, innovation also contributes to the public stock of 
knowledge which reduces the time and cost associated with further R&D in the future. IPR 
protection not only protects IP but also motivates further innovation, as the knowledge inherent 
in patent right is then accessible to other prospective inventors (when they buy a patent from the 
creator).
703
 Therefore, it is strongly argued that the rate of innovation and rate of economic 
growth are directly proportional to each other.
704
 
Enhanced IPR protection can also affect the volume of trade. For instance, through technology 
transfer (through technology licensing and inwards investment flow), the productivity of local 
                                                 
701
 There may exist natural motivations to invent. See, Maskus, Keith E. (2000) Intellectual Property Rights in the 
Global Economy. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics. 
702
 For a detailed discussion of new trade theory see, for example, Romer, P.M., (1990) ‗Endogenous Technological 
Change‘, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, S71-S102; Supra note 206 
703
 Supra note 701 
704
 Falvey, Rod; Neil Foster, and David Greenaway (2006), Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth, 
Review of Development Economics, 10(4), 700–719 
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industry can be enhanced significantly and the volume of imports potentially affected.
705
 On the 
other hand, companies can also increase the export of their patented goods into foreign markets 
with strong IPR protection (in view of the fact that IP protection decreases the possibility of 
piracy) and, as a result, foreign companies‘ market power would be enhanced as the ability of 
local companies to imitate the patent good is reduced.
706
  
There is no crystal clear relationship between FDI and IPR protection; however, economic 
literature argues that a poorly-protected IPR system negatively affects the general investment 
scenario, which further discourages FDI.
707
 
Empirical data shows that IPR protection and innovation (due to increased R&D investment) are 
directly proportional to the GNP of an economy. Therefore, stronger IPR protection helps 
stimulate innovation and technological progress, both of which ultimately have a positive impact 
on economic growth. With the significance of IPR protection in mind, it was during the Uruguay 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations that TRIPS came into force, setting minimum IPR 
protection standards for WTO members.
708
 
The TRIPS Agreement amounts to a significant effort made by the WTO members to reduce 
discrepancies in the global IP protection level. It sets out the minimum standards of IP protection 
to be provided by each member to his fellow WTO member‘s IP. The purpose of establishing 
minimum IPR protection is to achieve long-term benefits for society, i.e. the protection of IPR in 
order to promote innovation (which, as discussed above, leads to economic growth) whereby 
                                                 
705
 For verification of growth helping knowledge spillovers via trade, see Coe, David T. and Helpman, Elhanan 
(1995). International R&D Spillovers. NBER Working Paper Series 
706
 In their experimental findings, Maskus and Penubarti discovered that higher IPR protection has a positive effect 
on imports. [However, their research puts forward that enhanced IP protection will encourage imports, they qualify 
this with respect of imports into developing countries. Thereby, probably resulting in displacement of domestic 
producers and adversely affecting their economic growth and industrialization.] See, Maskus, Keith E. and Mohan 
Penubarti, 1995, ―How Trade-Related Are Intellectual Property Rights?‖ Journal of International Economics, vol. 
39, 227-248  
707
 Supra note 704 
708
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when the protected period expires, then IP enters the public domain. The next subheading will 
review the structure of the TRIPS agreement in order to gauge its contribution towards achieving 
IPR protection.    
2. Overview of the TRIPS Agreement 
The TRIPS agreement is built upon the legal base provided by earlier conventions of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), including the Paris and Berne Conventions. It was 
the first time international law relating to IP imposed a minimum protection level obligation on 
WTO members. The TRIPS agreement takes into account an extensive range of IP: copyright 
and related rights
709
; trademarks
710
including service marks; geographical indications including 
appellations of origin; industrial designs; patents including the protection of new varieties of 
plants; the layout-designs of integrated circuits; and undisclosed information including trade 
secrets and test data.  
a) Basic Principles 
Similar to GATT and GATS, TRIPS also accounts for non-discriminatory provisions, such as 
National Treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment (MFN): Article 3 deals with National 
Treatment and Article 4 takes into account MFN treatment.  
                                                 
709
Copyright is the legal right to control the production and selling of a book, play, film, photograph or piece of 
music. [http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=17095&dict=CALD]. 
710
 Trademark is a name or a symbol which is put on a product to show that it is made by a particular producer and 
which cannot be legally used by any other producer. 
[http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=84276&dict=CALD]  
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b) Intellectual Property Conventions 
The relationship between TRIPS and other WIPO conventions is elucidated in Article 2.2 of 
TRIPS, which states that nothing in the TRIPS agreement shall diminish the existing obligation 
levels established under the Paris, Berne and Rome Conventions and the Washington Treaty. 
These conventions did not cover some aspects of IP; however, TRIPS takes care of these areas 
and thereby adds a notable number of new or higher standards. 
c) Main Features 
For a better understanding of TRIPS, its main features are discussed below: 
(1) Standards  
The TRIPS agreement obliges all WTO members to provide minimum required standards to 
fellow members to protect all chief areas of IP. For all of the chief areas of IP, the scope, 
duration, exceptions and subject matter to be protected are made quite clear in the TRIPS 
agreement.  
The basic standards imposed by TRIPS are the existing standards set out by the main 
conventions of the WIPO, such as the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention in their most 
recent versions, which need to be complied with as a starting point for the TRIPS IP protection 
standards. There is one exception: the obligation of the Berne Convention on moral rights is not 
included in TRIPS. Other than that, all the provisions of these conventions are included in the 
TRIPS agreement, thus are applicable to all WTO members. In this context, Articles 2.1 and 9.1 
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of TRIPS deal with the provisions of the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention, 
respectively.  
In addition, the TRIPS agreement adds a number of additional standards to be followed; these 
provisions were added because the standards set out in the pre-existing conventions were not 
sufficient. It is for this reason that the TRIPS agreement is also referred as the Berne and Paris-
plus agreement.  
(2) Enforcement  
Enforcement refers to the procedures laid down in the TRIPS agreement that entail action and 
remedy to affected IP holders. The enforcement provisions of the TRIPS agreement have two 
basic purposes: firstly, to ensure that IP holders are provided with an effective means of 
enforcement of their rights and secondly, to ensure that the enforcement mechanism does not 
create barriers to genuine and lawful trade and further, extends protection against the abuse of 
their IPRs.
711
 
In addition, TRIPS also aims to ensure that the provisions on the protection of IPR in the TRIPS 
agreement can be enforced by the right holders themselves.
712
 Thus, the provisions directly look 
into the ability of the right holders to defend their IPRs effectively on a global scale.   
In this way, the enforcement part of TRIPS takes into account the domestic methods and 
solutions for the implementation of IPRs. The enforcement section (Part III of TRIPS) comprises 
                                                 
711
 Otten, A. and H. Wager (1996). Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World View, 29 Vanderbilt J. 
Transnational Law., 391, 393, at p403.  
712
 Smith, Pamela J. (1997), ―Are Weak Patent Rights a Barrier to U.S. Exports?‖ Journal of International 
Economics, forthcoming, at p 30. 
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general principles which are applied to all IPR implementation processes
713
. Furthermore, TRIPS 
sets out obligations on civil and administrative processes and remedies
714
, provisional 
measures
715
, special obligations related to border measures
716
 and criminal course of action
717
. 
(3) Dispute settlement  
In the case where any WTO member is dissatisfied with the enforcement and implementation by 
a fellow member, then TRIPS refers such a case to the WTO's dispute settlement procedure.  
As with the WTO‘s general policy, the TRIPS agreement gave adequate time to its members to 
align their national laws according to its obligations. In this context, developed countries were 
expected to comply with TRIPS in the shortest possible time and less developed countries were 
allowed more time . As discussed above, TRIPS sets out only a minimum level of standards for 
IPR protection, so leaving room to employ the maximum level of standards for IPR protection.  
d) Enforcement of TRIPS and the role of the Council on TRIPS 
The WTO obliges all its members to align their national legislative and administrative practices 
and judicial arrangements with the TRIPS agreement in order to ensure the effective 
implementation of IPR protection. For this purpose, the WTO has provided an institutional 
arrangement in the form of the TRIPS Council which is designed to promote compliance.
718
 The 
                                                 
713
 Article 41, obliges members to ensure fair and equitable enforcement procedure without unreasonable delays 
which has option of judicial review in it as well. 
714
 Article 42 to 49 of TRIPS deals with civil and administrative procedures and remedies. 
715
 Article 50 of TRIPS deals with provisional measures.  
716
 Aticle 51 to 60 of TRIPS deals with special requirements related to border measures. 
717
 Article 61 of TRIPS deals with criminal procedures. 
718
 Braithwaite, John, and Peter Drahos. 2000. Global Business Regulation. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Ch. 10, pp. 175-221, p64. 
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TRIPS Council, situated at the heart of the WTO arrangements, ensures transparency of 
implementation and enforcement through scrutiny and surveillance.
719
 
(1) The TRIPS Council, scrutiny and surveillance  
The TRIPS Council is responsible, on behalf of the WTO, for scrutinising and monitoring 
national measures taken for the implementation of TRIPS.
720
 Article 63.2 of the TRIPS 
agreement describes the TRIPS Council‘s above-mentioned role. It obliges all WTO members to 
notify the TRIPS Council of the relevant national laws and regulations so that all other members 
are given an opportunity to review each other‘s implementation and enforcement legislation and 
mechanisms for IPR protection.  
Once the transitional period for the compliance with TRIPS expires, then the process of scrutiny 
by the TRIPS Council begins. All WTO members concerned (those whose transitional period has 
expired) are obliged to submit two documents to the TRIPS Council for scrutiny. The first 
document is related to Article 63.2 and notification, in which the member country concerned 
notifies the TRIPS Council of compliance of their national laws with the TRIPS agreement. Then 
the TRIPS Council sends a questionnaire relating to their compliance, and from the answers , the 
second set of documents required by the TRIPS Council is devised so that it can monitor 
enforcement. After the submission of these documents, the scrutinisation process starts, in which 
all WTO members are given an opportunity to ask further questions in relation to the compliance 
of the national laws of the country under scrutiny. 
                                                 
719
 See generally, Matthews, Duncan (2002). ―Trade-Related Aspects Of Intellectual Property Rights:  Will The 
Uruguay Round Consensus Hold?‖ CSGR Working Paper No. 99/02. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and 
Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick. 
720
 For a fuller discussion of the role of the TRIPS Council see Geuze, M. & Wager, H. (1999). WTO Dispute 
Settlement Practice Relating to the TRIPS Agreement, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 2, No. 2 
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There are additional benefits of the TRIPS Council‘s scrutinisation process, such as the fact that 
it encourages members to clarify misunderstandings which, if not clarified, would lead to 
disputes. It also helps members to identify each other‘s deficiencies in the laws and regulations 
notified (peer review). Moreover, the interpretation and implementation strategies of different 
countries are revealed, so that other countries can also benefit from them.
721
 
In the TRIPS mechanism of IPR protection, the TRIPS Council occupies a vital position, and it 
has contributed significantly in the promotion, protection and enforcement of IPR. For an 
account of the day-to-day activities of the TRIPS Council, visit the WTO official website
722
.  
e) Conclusion  
In short, the WTO has successfully established a regime of improved standards for IPRs 
globally. This has been achieved mainly via the TRIPS mechanism, along with the dispute 
settlement system of the WTO. However, difficult problems remain, particularly in terms of 
implementation in developing countries: some of the common features of the LDCs‘ legal 
systems are that IPRs are subject to inconsistent coverage, uncertain terms of protection, 
arbitrary transferability, and inadequate enforcement.
723
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, economic growth is the main driver of the ‗Economic 
Cycle‘. This subsection documents the importance of innovation in the economic growth process 
and the WTO‘s role in the promotion and protection of innovation, which stimulates 
international trade and ultimately leads to a more stable and balanced growth of the global 
economy. 
                                                 
721
 Otten, Adrian (1998). "Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and Prospects for its Further Development", 1 
Journal of International Economic Law 525. 
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E. Conclusion 
This chapter briefly documented the institutional role of the WTO in promotion of the 
international trade. The reason for a shallow discussion was; firstly to avoid repetition and 
secondly the WTO‘s institutional contribution is not generally contested by scholars. Never the 
less, this chapter discussed the legislative and normative function with a different style (as 
compared preceding chapter), briefly touched the executive and administrative functioning, and 
DSS. Moreover, the last part of this chapter reasonably highlighted the link between innovation 
and the international trade, and the WTO‘s institutional role in this context.   
Working on the same lines, the next chapter discusses substantially contribution made by the 
WTO in the area of financial sector. These contributions are not much but has the potential to 
expand.  
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VIII. Institutional Role of the WTO in the Development of the Global 
Financial Sector  
 
Section Three argues that the WTO is the most effective IEI in the IELR and that the WTO needs 
to expand its institutional role in the context of financial sector development. The reason for the 
expansion of the WTO‘s institutional role in financial sector development is the IMF‘s failure to 
explicitly adapt its institutional role in line with liberal institutionalism. As discussed in the 
theoretical framework, the current regime, i.e. the IELR is based on liberal institutionalism and 
to become an effective part of this regime, the IMF needs to modify its institutional structure. 
724
 
The major element of financial sector development is contributed by the IMF which is not a 
liberally institutionalized IEI (in contrast with the current global economy).
725
 Being a realist 
body, the IMF underperforms due to its lack of explicit institutional functioning as part of its 
institutional role. The main reason for the IMF‘s inadaptability in real terms within the current 
regime is the hegemonic attitude of the US which holds the power of veto in the IMF. Taking 
into account the US‘ interest in maintaining its dominance within global financial regulation, it 
seems highly unlikely that the IMF would embark upon structural changes.
726
  
On the other hand, within the WTO, all members have equal status and they cooperate with each 
other freely for collective gain. The collective gain in the current regime equates to achieving a 
more stable and balanced growth of the global economy. Thus, the WTO has the option to 
                                                 
724
 Supra note 619 
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 This thesis assumes that the current IELR is based on liberal institutionalism. For detailed discussion see, chapter 
II.B.1.b)(2) on page 62   
726
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increase its role in financial sector development, in order to assume the rules of the game-setting 
function of the IMF.
727
  
In this connection, this chapter is dedicated to highlighting one aspect of the comprehensive 
institutional role of the WTO in the context of the Economic Cycle; that is, the development of 
the financial sector. As discussed in the theoretical framework, the development of the global 
financial sector (Patrick‘s supply lead hypothesis) leads to the expansion of international trade 
through economic growth. The other aspect of the Economic Cycle was discussed in the previous 
chapter and which shows the WTO‘s institutional role in the promotion of international trade, 
leading to the development of the financial sector (Patrick‘s demand followed hypothesis of 
financial sector development) thus completing the whole cycle. If either one or both aspects of 
the Economic Cycle are stimulated, then it leads to a more stable and balanced growth of the 
global economy.
728
  
The role of the WTO is viewed in its institutional capacity as an IEI. The development of the 
financial sector comes within the direct domain of the WTO and the reason for this is to ensure 
financial sector liberalization and economic growth. The following section of this subheading 
considers the role of the WTO in its legislative and normative capacity in the development of the 
global financial sector. 
A. Legislative and normative capacity  
This section will highlight the legislative and normative capacity of the WTO, as an IO, in 
creating legal certainty and predictability in the global financial sector.  In order to do that, the 
following part of the subheading will look at the relevant rules and member‘s commitments 
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obligated by the WTO Charter and its constituent annexes.  As the financial sector is covered by 
GATS, the most relevant of the WTO agreements is therefore GATS, along with its Annexes on 
Financial Services, Protocols on GATS and Understanding on commitments in Financial 
Services.  
As discussed in the preceding chapter (Chapter VI: WTO‘s Legal Framework), the WTO has a 
vast normative framework which is based on the WTO framework of Agreements and the 
decisions of the various WTO bodies. These decisions include decisions in the context of rule-
making, DSB decisions and decisions in the context of executive functioning. However, this 
subheading will only deal with the WTO framework Agreements affecting the financial sector 
and the rule-making process adopted by various WTO bodies in the context of the financial 
sector. This rule-making process is currently very limited but this thesis calls for the expansion 
of this function of the WTO in the context of financial sector development.  
The following subhead will shed light on the normative effects of the GATS in context of the 
financial services sector.
729
   
1. GATS 
a) Introduction   
The formation of GATS during the Uruguay Round and its entry into force on 1 January 1995 
was one of the milestone accomplishments of the Contracting Parties.
730
 GATS was mainly 
inspired, in essence, by the same ideas as its counterpart in goods trade, GATT. Both GATT and 
GATS have a propensity to (1) establish a reliable and consistent system of international trading; 
                                                 
729
 This section of chapter is drawn from, Wolfrum, Rudiger; Peter-Tobias Stoll & Clemens Feinaugle eds. (2008), 
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(2) guarantee fair and impartial dealing
731
 with all Contracting Parties; (3) enliven economic 
growth through clear-cut policy obligations; and (4) endorse trade and development by 
expanding liberalization.
732
 
GATS, along with its annexes, is the most relevant agreement in the WTO legal framework of 
agreements in the context of the financial sector. It does not endeavor to regulate the content and 
scope of the financial regulations. However, it mainly attempts to make certain that these 
regulations do not needlessly acts as obstacles in the international trade.
733
 Moreover, it enhances 
the certainty and predictability of the rules of the game through its normative effect on the 
financial sector side of the Economic Cycle, which in turn leads to a more stable and balanced 
growth of global economy.   
The services sector, which includes financial services, is governed by GATS and its associated 
agreements. The significance of GATS in the context of financial services matters rests primarily 
in its principles for controlling cross-border trade in financial services and its discipline of 
domestic regulations.
734
 Therefore, to understand the normative effect of the institutional role of 
the WTO, it is important to understand GATS: its purpose, scope, structure, functioning and 
types of obligations, all of which are discussed below. 
                                                 
731
Principle of non-discrimination is embodied in MFN and National Treatment clauses in both the GATS (Article II 
and Article XVII respectively) and the GATT (Article I and III respectively).  
732
 See, The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): objectives, coverage and disciplines. Available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm 
733
 See Alexander, Kern (2008). The GATS and Financial Services: Liberalisation and Regulation in Global 
Financial Markets, in Andenas, Mads and Kern, Alexander (eds). The World Trade Organisation and Trade in 
Services . Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p561. 
734
 Ibid p569. 
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b) Basic Purpose 
The basic intention of the Contracting Parties in the formation of GATS as stated in its preamble 
[hereinafter the ―Preamble‖] is to play an important role in trade development "under conditions 
of transparency and progressive liberalization and as a means of promoting the economic growth 
of all trading partners and the development of developing countries".
735
 Hence, according to the 
Preamble, trade expansion and growth is not intended to be a final objective in itself but a 
method to enhance development and growth. Further, the Preamble clearly emphasises the use of 
trade expansion as a basic tool for growth and development. In this context, one of GATS‘ goals 
is to increase the involvement of developing countries in the services trade (including financial 
services) so that they can further develop in this area.  
According to the Preamble, the financial sector development process is based on two broad 
concepts: firstly, to ensure the enhanced transparency and certainty of applicable rules and 
regulations (in the financial sector); and secondly, by using a stage-by-stage process to develop 
the (financial) services sector, for example, by progressively expanding market access and 
broadening National Treatment in relation to foreign financial services and financial service 
suppliers (discussed in detail in the earlier part of the chapter)
736
. In this way, the creation of any 
rule and its application should be based on these two concepts.  
Before getting to the detail of this chapter, it is necessary of grasp the definition of the financial 
services trade under GATS and the next heading deals with the definition of the services trade 
and its modes of supply. 
                                                 
735
 Paragraph 2 of the Preamble express the intention behind the basic purpose for the creation of the GATS. 
736
 ChapterVI.A.4.a)on page 239; see also footnote 750; also see, Chapter VIII.A.1.e)(1)(c) on page 291 
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c) Definition of Services Trade and Modes of Supply 
The definition of the services trade under GATS is considerably more extensive than the BOP 
concept
737
 of the services trade. The GATS‘ definition of the services trade covers all aspects of 
trade in the services sector and is divided into four types, subject to the territorial presence of the 
supplier and consumer at the time of the transaction. According to Article I:2
738
 of GATS, the 
four modes in which services can be supplied are as follows: 
(a) Mode 1 (Cross-border trade): 
In this mode, a service is supplied from the territory of one Contracting Party into the 
territory of another Contracting Party, (e.g. where a financial consulting company 
operating in the UK provides services to customers in Pakistan).  
(b) Mode 2 (Consumption abroad): 
 In this mode, a service is supplied in the territory of one Contracting Party to a service 
consumer of another Contracting Party (i.e. when a service is consumed by a national of 
one Contracting Party in the territory of another Contracting Party), for example, where a 
national of country A has moved abroad as a tourist, student, or patient to consume the 
respective services.  
(c) Mode 3 (Commercial presence): 
In this mode, a service is supplied by the supplier of one Contracting Party
739
, through 
commercial presence, in the territory of another Contracting Party. The service is 
                                                 
737
 The BOP definition of the Services focuses on residency rather than nationality, that is when a service is being 
exported if it is traded between residents and non-residents. [Balance of Payment Manual, paragraphs. 158-168, 
185,186 http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/bop/BOPman.pdf] 
738
 Article I:2 of GATS:  ―For the purposes of this Agreement, trade in services is defined as the supply of a service: 
(a) from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member; (b) in the territory of one Member to 
the service consumer of any other Member; (c) by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence 
in the territory of any other Member; (d) by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons 
of a Member in the territory of any other Member.‖ See also, Supra note 733 p571 
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provided within the territory of country A by a locally established subsidiary, affiliate or 
representative office of a foreign-owned and controlled company (e.g. a Pakistan-owned 
and -controlled bank provides banking services to a UK resident, through its branch 
located in the UK).  
(d) Mode 4 (Movement of natural persons): 
In this mode, services are provided through the presence of the service providers from the 
territory of one Contracting Party to another Contracting Party. This can be done by 
services provided through the presence of natural persons of a Contracting Party in the 
territory of any other Contracting Party (e.g. a financial consultant from India provides a 
service within the UK as an independent (consultant) supplier or employee of a service 
supplier company i.e. in this case a financial consultancy firm). 
From a practical and commercial perspective, there may often be a link between all four modes 
of supply. For instance, a Pakistani company (e.g. a financial consultancy firm which is 
controlled and owned within Pakistan) established in the UK [under Mode 3 which refers to a 
commercial presence of a foreign company in another country] may employ nationals from India 
[under Mode 4 which refers to the movement of natural persons from one Contracting Party to 
another in order to provide services] to export financial consultancy services cross-border [via 
mode 1, which deals with services supplied from the territory of one Contracting Party into the 
territory of any other Contracting Party] into the US, Canada, and so on. Similarly, business 
visits to the UK by a foreign national involved in the business (in this case, the above-mentioned 
financial consultancy firm) may also consume services in the UK under mode 2 [which refers to 
                                                                                                                                                             
739
 The supplier from a Contracting Party means that the company which is supplying the services is owned and 
controlled within the territory of that Contracting Party. 
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the services consumed by a national of one Contracting Party in the territory of another 
Contracting Party]. 
This heading clarifies the meaning of services under GATS and the modes within which it can be 
supplied: the next heading is about the scope and application of GATS as an agreement.  
d) Scope and Application740 
The scope and application of GATS is vast and it takes into account all the ‗measures‘ taken by 
the Contracting Parties in relation to trade in the services sector.
741
 The measures which are 
discussed in Article I:1 are all those measures that are taken by the Contracting Parties at all 
levels such as central, regional or local government level, or even by non-governmental 
authorities (when they exercise powers delegated to them by governmental authorities).
742
 
Further, reference is made in Article XXVIII (a) to GATS, regarding the possible types of 
―measures‖ (mentioned in Article I.1 of the GATS) taken by the Contracting Parties. It includes 
all measures carried in the shape of a law, regulation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative 
action, or in any other action of the Contracting Parties which has the same effect as of the 
above-mentioned measures
743
 i.e. those which can influence trade in the financial services sector.  
                                                 
740
 Li, Guojun (2010). NATIONAL TREATMENT UNDER THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN  
SERVICES. Published in Cambridge Student Law Review, vol. 6, no. 1 Summer (2010), pp. 74-93; see also, Munin, 
Nellie (2010). Legal Guide to GATS (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law & Business, 2010), chapter VI: GATS 
Scope of Application; see also Alexander, Kern (2008). The GATS and Financial Services: Liberalisation and 
Regulation in Global Financial Markets, in Andenas, Mads and Kern, Alexander (eds). The World Trade 
Organisation and Trade in Services . Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008.    
741Article I:1 of GATS:  ―This Agreement applies to measures by Members affecting trade in services.‖ 
742
 Aricle I:3 (a) of GATS: ―"measures by Members" means measures taken by: (i) central, regional or local 
governments and authorities; and (ii) non-governmental bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by central, 
regional or local governments or authorities.‖ 
743
 Article XXVIII (a) of GATS: ―"measure" means any measure by a Member, whether in the form of a law, 
regulation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative action, or any other form.‖ 
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However, Article XXVIII (c) of GATS limits the scope of the term ―measures‖ used in Article 
I.1 of GATS.
744
 According to this article, the ―measures‖ under discussion are only related as 
follows: firstly, to the purchase, payment or use of a service; secondly, to the access to and use of 
services which are required by the Contracting Parties to be offered to the public generally
745
; 
thirdly, to the presence of persons
746
 from a Contracting Party for the supply of a service in the 
territory of another Contracting Party. 
Bearing in mind the huge applicability and scope of GATS, the Contracting Parties in this 
context have classified the services sector into 12 core areas.
747
  However, for the purposes of the 
current discussion, the financial services sector is most relevant. These 12 core sectors are further 
divided into a sum of some 160 sub-sectors.
748
 The Contracting Parties many impose limitations 
on any of the services sectors or sub-sectors, in the light of the market access
749
 and national 
                                                 
744
 The Article XXVIII(c) of GATS also limits the scope of the GATS. See generally, Altinger, Laura and Alice 
Enders (1996). The Scope and Depth of GATS Commitments. The World Economy Volume 19, Issue 3, pages 307–
332. 
745
 Example of the services offered to the public are mostly big network industries, e.g. in the transport, postal, 
energy and communication sectors, but the term also covers any other economic activity subject to public service 
obligations [Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Services of General Interest, Brussels, Com 
(2003) 270 final.]. In addition, the following White Paper of the Commission explicitly acknowledges the general 
(non-economic) interest in social services such as health, long-term care, social security and social housing 
[Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on Services of General Interest, Brussels, Com (2004) 374 
final, at 16.]. 
746
 Including commercial presence. 
747
 Business services, Communication services, Construction and related engineering services, Distribution services, 
Educational services, Environmental services, Financial services, Health-related and social services, Tourism and 
travel-related services, Recreational, cultural and sporting services, Transport services.  Document 
MTN.GNS/W/120 contains the Services sectoral classification list, which is available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_sectors_e.htm 
748
List of 160 sub-sectors in the Services Sector under the WTO are given in the Annex 1. The list is available at the 
WTO website at:  http://tsdb.wto.org/Includes/docs/W120_E.doc 
749All Contracting Parties have full access to the other Contracting Parties‘ markets. However, a contacting Party 
may impose perfectly legitimate limitation on market access in the light of Article XVI of the GATS.  Market 
Access Commitments according to GATS‘ Article XVI are :‖(1) With respect to market access through the modes of 
supply identified in Article I, each Member shall accord services and service suppliers of any other Member 
treatment no less favorable than that provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in 
its Schedule [If a Member undertakes a market-access commitment in relation to the supply of a service through the 
mode of supply referred to in subparagraph 2(a) of Article I and if the cross-border movement of capital is an 
essential part of the service itself, that Member is thereby committed to allow such movement of capital. If a 
Member undertakes a market-access commitment in relation to the supply of a service through the mode of supply 
referred to in subparagraph 2(c) of Article I, it is thereby committed to allow related transfers of capital into its 
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treatment provisions under GATS.
750
 In this context, each of the WTO members has provided 
details in their schedule of commitments under GATS.
751
 
As is clear from the above examples,
752
 the modes of financial services cover a reasonably broad 
sphere of the financial sector. However, the Annex on Financial Services defines financial 
services as those which are comprised of ―insurance and insurance related services‖ and 
―banking and other financial services.‖ 753 Thus, in the context of the banking sector, this 
definition has a broad application, covering:  
 “[A]cceptance of deposits, lending of all types, financial leasing, payment and 
money transmission services, Guarantees and commitments, trading money market 
                                                                                                                                                             
territory. In sectors where market-access commitments are undertaken, the measures which a Member shall not 
maintain or adopt either on the basis of a regional subdivision or on the basis of its entire territory, unless otherwise 
specified in its Schedule, are defined as: (a) limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form of 
numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an economic needs test; (b) 
limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets in the form of numerical quotas or the requirement of 
an economic needs test; (c) limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity of service 
output expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form of quotas or the requirement of an economic 
needs test[ Subparagraph 2(c) does not cover measures of a Member which limit inputs for the supply of services.]; 
(d) limitations on the total number of natural persons that may be employed in a particular service sector or that a 
service supplier may employ and who are necessary for, and directly related to, the supply of a specific service in 
the form of numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test; (e) measures which restrict or require 
specific types of legal entity or joint venture through which a service supplier may supply a service; and (f) 
limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding or 
the total value of individual or aggregate foreign investment.‖ 
750
 In the light of National treatment clauses under the GATS, a Contracting Party should give same type of 
treatment to other Contracting Parties and should not discriminate between foreign and local services or services 
suppliers. However, if a Contracting Party has held some limitations on the National Treatment clauses under GATS 
Article XVII then that unfavorable and different treatment is perfectly legitimate. For example to a Contracting 
Party requiring a foreign bank to establish its braches in every village, a condition to enter its economy, is perfectly 
legitimate.  
According to Article XVII of GATS National Treatment is: ―(1) In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject 
to any conditions and qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of 
any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favorable than that it 
accords to its own like services and service suppliers [Specific commitments assumed under this Article shall not be 
construed to require any Member to compensate for any inherent competitive disadvantages which result from the 
foreign character of the relevant services or service suppliers.]. (2) A Member may meet the requirement of 
paragraph 1 by according to services and service suppliers of any other Member, either formally identical treatment 
or formally different treatment to that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers. (3) Formally identical 
or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less favorable if it modifies the conditions of competition in 
favor of services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service suppliers of any other 
Member.‖ 
751
 All schedule of commitments by all the Contracting Parties are available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_commitments_e.htm 
752
 Chapter VIII.A.1.c) at page no. 278 
753
 Annex on Financial Services, para 5(a).  
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instruments, foreign exchange, derivative products, exchange rate and interest rate 
instruments, securities and financial assets, money broking, asset management, 
settlement and clearing services for financial assets, provision and transfer of 
financial information, advisory or intermediation services and insurance services.”754  
 
However, there are exceptions to the application of GATS and its annexes. These exceptions are 
discussed below. 
Exception in the context of financial services:  
Measures affecting the supply of financial services which have exemption from the application 
of GATS are those which are exercised by governmental authorities.
755
 The logic for excluding 
governmental measures from the GATS‘ ambit has two angles; firstly, the Contracting Parties 
did not want to give up sovereignty over their domestic policy objectives and secondly, for the 
application of the broader GATS objectives, the Contracting Parties need some sort of flexibility 
to take measures according to their own domestic policy parameters.  
However, GATS makes it explicitly clear that governmental authorities‘ measures which are 
exempted from the application of GATS are not to be connected with services supplied on a 
commercial basis or in competition with one or more service suppliers
756
. A typical example of 
financial services exempted under Article I: 3 (b) is where the operations of a central bank or 
monetary authority are excluded from the application of GATS.
757
 
                                                 
754
 Annex on Financial Services, para 5(a); see Alexander, Kern (2008). The GATS and Financial Services: 
Liberalisation and Regulation in Global Financial Markets, in Andenas, Mads and Kern, Alexander (eds). The 
World Trade Organisation and Trade in Services. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008. P570. 
755
 Article I:3 (b) of the GATS: ―For the purposes of this Agreement: (b) ‗services‘ includes any service in any 
sector except services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority;‖ 
756
 Article I:3 (c) of GATS: ―For the purposes of this Agreement: (c) ‗a service supplied in the exercise of 
governmental authority‘ means any service which is supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with 
one or more service suppliers.‖ 
757
 Li, Xuan (2002-03). Interactive Role of Gats Commitment and Dynamics of Chinese Economic Reform in the 
Context of Banking Liberalization, World Trade Institute, P 18. 
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Furthermore, the jurisdictional scope of GATS does not cover the state‘s regulations related to 
cross- border capital flows and capital account liberalisation.
758
  
The application and scope of GATS can be much better understood if the structure of GATS is 
clear in our minds. The next heading explains the structure of GATS and how it works.  
e) The structure of GATS and obligation  
GATS lay down multilateral rules and commitments which deal with the Contracting Parties‘ 
measures which can influence trade in services. It has two parts; first, the framework agreement 
containing the rules (which includes a Preamble, 29 Articles  and the Annexes) and second, the 
national schedules of commitments in which each Contracting Party lay down the extent of 
access it is ready to promise to the foreign service suppliers.
759
 
GATS obligations can be classified into two main categories. These categories are the general 
obligations of GATS (which are applied to all the Contracting Parties), and the specific 
commitments/conditional obligations of the individual Contracting Party to remove or reduce 
existing tariff levels and other barriers to trade in services.
760
 The existence of these sector-
specific commitments of the Contracting Parties makes room for the negotiation process to take 
place between the other Contracting Parties. The Contracting Parties are free to negotiate 
whatever they like (freedom to determine their own level of obligation or freedom to determine 
the level of the opening up of their services sector) with their counterparts (other Contracting 
                                                 
758
 See, Bernard M. Hoekman, Michel M. Kostecki - ThePolitical Economy of the World Trading System: The 
WTO and Beyond.  (Oxford: OUP), p 259. Also see, Alexander, Kern (2008). The GATS and Financial Services: 
Liberalisation and Regulation in Global Financial Markets, in Andenas, Mads and Kern, Alexander (eds). The 
World Trade Organisation and Trade in Services . Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008. P571. 
759
 For a better understanding of the structure see figure below. Figure 10 GATS Legal Structure in context of 
Financial Services on page 309. See also, Supra note 733 p570. 
760
 Other barriers may include subsidies, licensing, safeguards etc.  
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Parties) in context of specific commitments. This flexible nature of the negotiation process has 
made GATS one of the least controversial areas under the umbrella of the WTO.
761
  
The above-mentioned obligations under the umbrella of GATS/WTO are discussed below.  
(1) Obligations under GATS 
The two types of commitments/obligations under GATS are: 
(a) Unconditional General obligations  
These are the obligations which are universally applicable to all sectors of services, such as MFN 
treatment
762
and transparency. These unconditional obligations are discussed below. 
(i) Most-Favored-Nation Treatment:763 
GATS, like its counterpart in mercantile trade, GATT, states that a Contracting Party must be 
treated by another Contracting Party with no less favourably than any other Contracting Party.
764
 
However, in certain situations (where specific measures are mentioned in the Annex on Article II 
Exemptions), GATS permits Contracting Parties to take exemption from the MFN principal.
765
  
According to some scholars, the MFN principle can exclude some agreements which are based 
on mutual recognition and reciprocity. For example, the Basel Committee allows its members to 
ascertain the appropriateness of a foreign bank‘s home country regulatory system as a 
                                                 
761Zutshi, B.K. ―Services Sector Negotiations: Issues and State of Play.‖  
www.unescap.org/tid/publication/chap4_2278.pdf at p44.  
762
 MFN treatment has some exceptions as mentioned in the Annex on Article II Exemptions. However, the 
exemptions are subject to a 5 year periodical review by the Council for Trade in Services. 
763
 See generally, Horn, Henrik & Mavroidis, Petros C., 2001. "Economic and legal aspects of the Most-Favored-
Nation clause," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 233-279.  
764
 Article II of the GATS. 
765
Annex On Article II Exemptions. However, the exemptions are subject to a 5 year periodical review by the 
Council for Trade in Services. Moreover, the right (MFN) was given but it was limited to the first round only and 
now only when a new country becomes a Contracting Party, it can negotiate the MFN principal with other already 
existing Contracting Parties, as a part of the accession package. 
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requirement for permitting it to work in the host country‘s markets. Thus, there is a possibility 
that the Basel Committee‘s principles of supervision might conflict the home-host country‘s 
measures with those of the MFN principle.
766
 However, this viewpoint is countered by the 
argument that all the above-mentioned measures are part of the prudential carve-out under the 
Annex of Financial Services.
767
  
(ii) Transparency: 
One of the main hurdles for conducting business in a foreign jurisdiction is the deficiency of 
information regarding relevant laws and regulations in that jurisdiction. Especially in the 
financial services trade, domestic regulation acts as the main barrier.
768
 GATS has tried to solve 
this problem by making transparency an unconditional obligation. Article III and Article III 
bis
769
 of GATS deals with this issue.  
According to this obligation, all measures taken by the Contracting Parties in relation to the 
services sectors ought to be published or otherwise made publicly accessible. Further, all the 
aforesaid measures must be notified to the WTO authority concerned (in the case of services, the 
Services Council is the competent authority). In addition, the Contracting Parties (who may have 
taken some measures affecting the operation of GATS) ought to make sure that they respond to 
                                                 
766
 The example and the discussion are taken from the Alexander, Kern (2008). The GATS and Financial Services: 
Liberalisation and Regulation in Global Financial Markets, in Andenas, Mads and Kern, Alexander (eds). The 
World Trade Organisation and Trade in Services. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008. P573. Also see, 
Marchetti, Juan (2003) ‗What Should Financial Regulators Know About the GATS?‘, unpublished paper for the 
World Trade Organisation. As sited by Kern Alexander. Moreover, for a good discussion about the GATS and 
transparency, see generally, Alexander, Kern (2007) "The GATS and financial services: the role of regulatory 
transparency." Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 20(1): 111-132. 
767
 The prudential carve-out highlights out rightly the right and ability of the governments to take prudential 
measures, though, prudential carve outs significantly bothers the global policy setters as it gives enormous discretion 
to governments do anything under the umbrella of prudential deduction. Supra note 733 at 561. 
768
 See, Keiya, Iida and Julia Nielson (2002) Transparency in domestic regulation: practices and possibilities (Paris: 
OECD) 
769
 Article III deals with the unconditional obligation imposed by the GATS, however, Article III bis gives the 
Contracting Parties immunity from the application of Article III if the information concerned is of confidential 
nature. 
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all the queries of the other Contracting Parties in relation to that specific measure‘s impact on the 
GATS functioning (this can be done by establishing proper inquiry points).
770
 
(b) General Obligations  
These obligations are an important part of the GATS structure. Some of the general obligations 
which have more relevance to the financial services sector are discussed below. 
(i) Domestic Regulation:  
GATS has given leverage to the Contracting Parties to formulate their domestic regulations in 
relation to the services sector (including financial services). However, Article VI of GATS 
places limitations on the exercise of power and requires the Contracting Parties to take 
reasonable, objective, and impartial measures (in this case, in formulating domestic regulations). 
The idea behind this obligation is that domestic regulations should not be used by the 
Contracting Parties for the purpose of creating unnecessary trade barriers. This implies that the 
―necessity test‖ could be useful to find out whether a Contracting Party‘s qualification and 
licensing conditions or technical standards do or do not circumvent the Contracting Parties 
obligations.
771
   
For example, in a Dispute Settlement case under the WTO, US: Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (WTO Dispute DS285), Antigua alleged that 
the US measures
772
 affecting the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services were 
inconsistent with GATS Articles VI:1 and VI:3 (relating to domestic regulations). However, the 
                                                 
770
 GATS Article III (4) 
771
 Alexander, Kern (2008). The GATS and Financial Services: Liberalisation and Regulation in 
Global Financial Markets, in Andenas, Mads and Kern, Alexander (eds). The World Trade Organisation and Trade 
in Services. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008. P579. 
772
 According to the US measures under dispute were taken in the light of the three US federal criminal statutes, 
known as the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act. [United States first written 
submission, para. 43;  second written submission, para. 25.] 
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panel decreed that the measures were not inconsistent with Article VI of GATS and did not 
create any unnecessary barriers to trade.  
However, if any services supplier is unsatisfied with a domestic regulation (which has resulted in 
some sort of licensing or qualification requirement), and thinks that the domestic regulation 
concerned is a discretionary and purposeful obstacle to trade, then, in that case, the services 
supplier has been given the right under Article VI of GATS to question the domestic regulator 
about the status of his application to obtain license, or ask for the justification for its rejection. In 
addition, if the service supplier is still unsatisfied, then the host Contracting Parties are required 
to provide a transparent administrative appeal process to that service supplier.
773
 
Therefore, domestic regulations can be made in the context of financial services but they need to 
meet the criteria mentioned above. Moreover, the dissatisfied financial services supplier can 
pursue a transparent administrative appeal process.  
(ii) Payments and Transfers 
The purpose of GATS‘ multilateral trade liberalization in the services sector can only be realised 
if the associated international transfers and payments are allowed.
774
  Moreover, international 
transfers and payments are also dealt with by the IMF. GATS Article XI (read with Article XII) 
                                                 
773Article VI:2 (a) of GATS states that, ―Each Member shall maintain or institute as soon as practicable judicial, 
arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures which provide, at the request of an affected service supplier, for the 
prompt review of, and where justified, appropriate remedies for, administrative decisions affecting trade in services. 
Where such procedures are not independent of the agency entrusted with the administrative decision concerned, the 
Member shall ensure that the procedures in fact provide for an objective and impartial review.‖ See also, Pierre 
Sauve (2001), Open Services Markets Matter, p10. Available at: 
www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/Papers/Sauve/OSMMRSCRev1.doc 
774
 Lehmann, Alexander; Tamirisa, Natalia T.; Wieczorek, Jaroslaw (2003), International Trade in Services: 
Implications for the Fund, IMF Policy Discussion Paper No. 03/6, p3.   
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liberalises international transfers and payments and also simultaneously recognises the role of the 
IMF in this context.
775
  
The wording of Article XI is relatively intricate; it states that ―A member shall not apply 
restrictions on international transfers and payments for (current as well as capital) transactions 
relating to specific commitments unless (i) restrictions are applied to safeguard the balance of 
payments in accordance with Article XII GATS,
776
 (ii) in case a general exception applies in 
accordance with Article XIV and XIV bis GATS,
777
 (iii) in case an exception applies in 
accordance with para. 2 (a) of the Annex on Financial Services,
778
 (iv) in the case of current 
transactions, if consistent with the rights and obligations of the members of the IMF under the 
IMF Agreement,
779
 or (v), in the case of capital transactions, at the request of the IMF
780‖.781 
In short, as a general rule, GATS prohibits any restriction on international transfers and 
payments but allows restrictions in such circumstances as those discussed above. The next 
obligation relevant to the context of financial services deals with the restriction to safeguard the 
balance of payments and is discussed below. 
                                                 
775
 Zapatero, Pablo. 2006. Searching for Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking. Penn State. International 
Law Review 24 (3): 595-627, p595 and p600. 
776
 Also see, Wolfrum, Rudiger; Peter-Tobias Stoll & Clemens Feinäugle eds. (2008), WTO-Trade in Services, Max 
Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, p261. 
777
 Ibid p289, 329. 
778
 Also see, Wolfrum, Rudiger; Peter-Tobias Stoll & Clemens Feinaugle eds. (2008), WTO-Trade in Services, Max 
Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, p618. Also see, Lehmann, Alexander; Tamirisa, Natalia T.; Wieczorek, 
Jaroslaw (2003), International Trade in Services: Implications for the Fund, IMF Policy Discussion Paper No. 03/6, 
p9, 19, 21. 
779
Siegel, D.E. (2002), Legal Aspects of the IMF/WTO Relationship: The Fund's ... and the WTO Agreements, 96 
American Journal of. International Law, p.561, 584. 
780
 See, Lehmann, Alexander; Tamirisa, Natalia T.; Wieczorek, Jaroslaw (2003), International Trade in Services: 
Implications for the Fund, IMF Policy Discussion Paper No. 03/6, p19, 
781
 Footer, Mary E. and Carol George (2005),The General Agreement on Trade in Services, in  Macrory, 
P.F.J./Appleton, A.E./Plummer, M.G. (eds.): The World Trade Organisation: Legal, Economic and Political 
Analysis, New York: Springer 2005, pp799, 842. Also see, Wolfrum, Rudiger; Peter-Tobias Stoll & Clemens 
Feinäugle eds. (2008), WTO-Trade in Services, Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, p246,249,253.  
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(iii) Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of 
Payments 
Article XII deals with restrictions to safeguard the balance of payments. According to this article, 
Contracting Parties are permitted, under certain circumstances, to limit trade in services so as to 
safeguard their balance of payments and external financial position. Balance of payments 
comprises two main elements. The first component is the capital account which records the net 
result of public and private investment flowing in and out of the country.  The second component 
is the current account which portrays the country‘s overall balance on goods and services, and 
also net income such as interests and dividends and net transfer payments.
782
 A country‘s balance 
of payments may therefore be damaged either by a deficit in capital or by a current account in 
which the overall outflows are more than the inflows. In such a scenario, the Contracting Parties 
have permission to take measures in order to solve their balance of payment and external 
financial problems. The solution commonly involves actions which try to improve the affected 
country‘s current account by reducing imports and/or increasing exports, with the consequential 
negative cost on free trade.
783
  
Balance of payment restrictions equate to a contingency plan in cases where a Contracting Party 
is suffering from BOP difficulties. BOP difficulties have an adverse effect on the financial sector 
of any country. It can also lead to crisis which is why BOP restrictions entail significant 
involvement of the IMF. The sooner the BOP conditions improve, the better it is for the financial 
sector. Therefore, GATS tries to tackle BOP issues, but with heavy involvement of the IMF. 
 
                                                 
782
 Lowenfeld, Andreas F. (2003). International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, p15-17. 
783
See, Wolfrum, Rudiger; Peter-Tobias Stoll & Clemens Feinaugle eds. (2008), WTO-Trade in Services, Max 
Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, p259.  
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Other obligations take account of the recognition of qualifications and criteria, monopolies‘ and 
exclusive services providers‘ measures in the services sector, business practices and competition, 
and general exceptions (similar to those incorporated in GATT). 
(c) Conditional Obligations (Specific commitments):  
A specific commitment is an obligation that a Contracting Party makes in the context of market 
access and National Treatment to a specific services sector (including the sub-sectors). All the 
specific commitments are put forward by the Contracting Parties in the form of a list (schedule) 
and only the services sector is subject to specific commitments which are listed in the schedule 
(positive list approach). Almost all the Contracting Parties have made horizontal 
commitments
784
, in which an obligation extends to all sectors.  
Provided that the Contracting Party has not made any sort of reservation in respect of a schedule 
of specific commitments, the Contracting Party is fully obligated by the principles of market 
access and National Treatment. So, if a Contracting Party is unable or unwilling to stick to the 
principles of market access and National Treatment, it can make reservation in that respect. For 
instance, a Contracting Party wants to limit the number of foreign companies in its market 
(allowing the free flow of companies is one of the six elements of market access
785
), but has no 
concerns regarding the other five market access elements. In that case, the Contracting Party has 
                                                 
784
 Horizontal commitment is the commitment in which obligations are applicable across all the sectors. They are 
guiding principles which are to apply throughout all members and are set out in Part II. The major horizontal 
commitments include MFN treatment, transparency and the enhanced involvement of developing countries. 
785
 Article XVI: 2 of GATS. See footnote 749 
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to make reservation to complete the market access principle. The reservations are applied in 
respect of each of the four modes of service supply concerned. 
It has been identified by some scholars that actual practice and commitment made in the context 
of the financial sector under GATS is highly divergent. This aspect of the application of the 
commitments falls under the other institutional role of the WTO in its executive functioning 
which will be discussed later in this chapter.
786
   
In connection with this, the following section discusses the principles of National Treatment and 
market access for a better understanding of GATS‘ normative functioning.  
(i) National Treatment:  
National Treatment means that a Contracting Party must apply the same type of treatment to 
other Contracting Parties and should not discriminate between foreign and local services or 
services suppliers. A typical example of a measure amounting to an infringement of the principle 
of National Treatment is when a local country, despite treating foreign and local services 
identically, changes the conditions for the competition in benefit of the local country‘s services 
and service suppliers.  
As mentioned above, if a Contracting Party uses a specific commitment of exempting itself from 
the National Treatment obligation regarding a specific services sector or sub-sector, then it is 
perfectly legal to do so. In a WTO DSU case, US: Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply 
of Gambling and Betting Services (WTO Dispute DS285), Antigua and Barbuda alleged that US 
measures
787
 affecting the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services were inconsistent 
                                                 
786
 Barth J., Marchetti J., Nolle D. and Sawangngoenyuang W. (2006), ―Foreign.Banking: Do Countries' WTO 
Commitments Match Actual Practice?‖, WTO Working Paper (Economic Research and Statistics Division). 
787
 See footnote no 772 
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with the National Treatment commitments of the US under Article XVII of GATS. However, 
Antigua and Barbuda could not demonstrate that the US‘ above-mentioned measures were 
inconsistent with its commitment under GATS and moreover, the Panel exercised judicial 
economy regarding the US measures and National Treatment commitment‘s consistency.788   
(ii) Market access:  
A specific commitment in respect of market access is invoked if any measure places a limitation 
on access to a freer market. The measures which result in limiting market access are mentioned 
in the definition of market access, and they are: ―limitations on the number of service suppliers; 
limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets; limitations on the total number of 
service operations or on the total quantity of service outputs; limitations on the total number of 
natural persons that may be employed in a particular service sector or where a service supplier 
may employ measures which restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint venture; 
limitations on the participation of foreign capital.‖ 789  
In a WTO DSU case, US: Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services (WTO Dispute DS285), Antigua and Barbuda alleged that US measures
790
 affecting the 
cross-border supply of gambling and betting services affected the market access conditions under 
Article XVI of GATS. The Panel and the Appellate Body were satisfied with Antigua and 
Barbuda‘s demonstration and held that the measures taken by the US in the context of the cross-
border supply of gambling and betting services were inconsistent with GATS Articles XVI:1 and 
                                                 
788
 See generally, Thayer, James D., (2004). The Trade of Cross-Border. Gambling and Betting: The WTO Dispute 
Between Antigua and the United States, DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 
789
Article XVI: 2 of GATS. See footnote 749 
790
 See footnote no 772 
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XVI: 2(a) and 2(c), as these measures were not covered by the exemptions (Article XIV of 
GATS) of market access in the national schedule of commitment.
791
 
Additional commitments are any commitments that are not covered by the provisions of market 
access and National Treatment. They commonly take into account non-discriminatory domestic 
regulations, particularly those relating to licensing and qualification matters.
792
 The most 
prominent example of an additional commitment is the Understanding on Commitments in 
Financial Services.
793
  
The agreement part of the GATS structure is simple and can be understood just as any other 
international trade agreement. However, the second part of GATS, which comprises the national 
schedules of commitments by all the Contracting Parties, is a comparatively more complicated 
document than the tariff schedule lists under GATT
794
. The national schedule of commitments is 
a Vertical commitment
795
 which only applies to sectors where a government has scheduled 
commitments in respect of Market Access and National Treatment and can be better explained 
with the help of an illustration (Pakistan‘s vertical commitment in the Financial Services sub-
sector, Banking Services).  
                                                 
791
 Original Panel report, paras. 6.421 and 7.2(b)(i);  Appellate Body report, para.  373(C)(ii). See also, supra note 
788 
792
 Article XVIII; deal with additional commitments under GATS. 
793
 Understanding on commitments in financial services is discussed in the later part of this chapter VIII.A.2.c) on 
page 300  
794
 The national schedule of commitments under GATS is a reasonably complex document as compared to schedule 
of tariff under the GATT. The tariff schedule under GATT, is very simple which lists one tariff rate per product, 
whereas, a national schedule of commitments comprise of at minimum eight entries per sector (that is national 
treatment and market access commitments for each of the four modes of supply). 
[http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/cbt_course_e/c2s6p1_e.htm] 
795
 The vertical commitments apply to those services sectors or sub-sectors, which a government has chosen to open 
up for competition. Each government must provide a schedule of commitments, that is, which sector it will open up 
and when: however, there are no minimum requirements as to how extensive the schedule should be. For the vertical 
commitments the National Treatment principle (Article XVII) and Market Access (Article XVI) is of particular 
importance. These commitments are made on an exclusive basis so that they only apply to the extent a member 
chooses and specifies in its schedule. This is an ‗opt-in‘ procedure. [Kennedy, Matthew. (1995). ―Services join 
GATT: an analysis of the General Agreement on Trade in Services.‖ International Trade Law & Regulation.] 
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Table 9 
Sector (or sub 
sector) 
Limitations on 
Market Access 
Limitations on National 
Treatment 
Additional 
Commitments  
Banking Services:
796
 
 
The following: 
 
1. Acceptance of 
deposits and other 
repayable funds 
from the public. 
(CPC No.81116
797
) 
 
2. Lending of 
Consumer credit, 
mortgage credit, and 
financing of 
commercial 
transactions. 
Mode (1) 
Unbound, Mode 
(2) Unbound, 
Mode (3) R3
798
 , 
Mode (4) None 
Mode (1) Unbound, 
Mode (2) Unbound, 
Mode (3) Unbound , 
Mode (4) None 
 
 
The above table/chart shows the Banking Services schedule of Pakistan. It displays the four-
column format. The first column indicates the sector or sub-sector concerned, whilst the second 
column specifies any limitations on market access that fall within the six types of restrictions 
mentioned in Article XVI:2
799
 of GATS. The third column includes any limitations that Pakistan 
wishes to impose on National Treatment under Article XVII
800
 of GATS, and in the last column, 
                                                 
796
 The entries under market access or national treatment may lay within a range with one ends with full 
commitments without limitation (―none‖) and on the other end complete freedom to take any measure falling under 
the Article concerned (―unbound‖).  Available at: http://www.wto.int/english/tratop_e/serv_e/guide1_e.htm 
797
United Nations provisional Central Product Classification (CPC) Available at: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=9&Lg=1 
798
 R3 : Subject to economic needs test and approval of Corporate law Authority of Pakistan, the central bank may 
grant licenses for establishment of locally incorporated subsidiaries. – Maximum share holding of a foreign financial 
institution in the local subsidiary not to exceed 30%. – Permission of the central bank required for investment in 
shares of a banking company in excess of 4% of paid up capital of the local company. [Dr. Mushtaq Ahmad, 
Pakistan And The GATS: An Assessment Of Policies And Future Prospects. Available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/Ahmad.pdf] 
799
 All Contracting Parties have full access to the other Contracting Parties‘ markets. However, a contacting Party 
may impose perfectly legitimate limitation on market access in the light of Article XVI of GATS.  Also see footnote 
749
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Pakistan can undertake any additional commitments under Article XVIII
801
 (in this case, 
Pakistan has not undertaken any additional commitments, therefore the column is empty).  
The specific commitments with their normative impact enhance certainty and predictability 
within the financial sector of a given Contracting Party, which further leads to the development 
of the financial sector of the domestic economy. Moreover, the cumulative effect of the 
development of individual financial sectors results in the development of the global financial 
sector.   
2. Framework Agreements  
One of the main elements of the GATS structure is its Annexes which cover different area of the 
services sector, such as movement of natural persons, air transport services, telecommunications, 
and financial services, amongst others. These annexes are applicable unconditionally to all 
Contracting Parties. However, this thesis will limit its scope to the Annexes which have some 
relevance to financial sector development.  
a) Annex on Financial Services:  
As is clear from its name, this annex is created by the Contracting Parties to deal with issues 
relating to the supply of financial services. As financial services are considered highly critical to 
the stability of any economy, it is the first sector affected by financial instability, and therefore it 
requires special treatment.
802
  Financial services are defined in paragraph 5 (a) of this annex as: 
                                                                                                                                                             
800
 The National Treatment clauses under GATS Article XVII, a Contracting Party can put some limitations on the 
other Contracting Parties and give favorable and different treatment to its own services suppliers. Also see footnote 
750
 
801
 Article VXIII of the GATS: ―Members may negotiate commitments with respect to measures affecting trade in 
services not subject to scheduling under Articles XVI or XVII, including those regarding qualifications, standards or 
licensing matters. Such commitments shall be inscribed in a Member's Schedule.‖ 
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“A financial service is any service of a financial nature offered by a financial service 
supplier of a Member.  Financial services include all insurance and insurance-related 
services, and all banking and other financial services (excluding insurance).” 
The scope of this annex is discussed in Paragraph 1(a), which explicitly excludes services 
supplied by governmental authorities in their non-commercial capacity. Further, paragraph 6 of 
this annex clearly excludes all public entities from the scope of this annex and defines ―financial 
services supplier,‖ as a public entity if it acts as a ―government, a central bank, or a monetary 
authority‖ carrying out governmental functions, but not including those entities carrying out 
financial services on commercial bases, or any private body that carries out those same functions. 
Similarly, by inference, private entities carrying out the same responsibilities as central banks are 
regarded as public entities and thus not subject to the disciplines of GATS [Paragraph 5(c) of the 
GATS Annex on Financial Services]. 
This annex not only defines financial services but also provides rules and parameters to the 
contracting parties to take prudential measures in order to protect their investors, depositors and 
insurance policy holders, and to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system.
803
 
Paragraph 2 (a) of the Annex on Financial Services gives the contracting parties absolute power 
to take prudential measures.  
“Notwithstanding any other provision of the Agreement, a member shall not be prevented 
from taking measures for prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors, 
depositors, policyholders, or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial 
service supplier, or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. Where 
such measures do not conform with the provisions of the Agreement, they shall not be used 
                                                                                                                                                             
802
 Supra note 195, Also see Alexander, K. (2003). The World Trade Organisation and Financial Stability: The 
Balance between Liberalisation and Regulation in the GATS. Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance 
Cambridge University. 
803
 Paragraph 2(a) of the GATS Annex on Financial Services. 
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as a means of avoiding the Member‟s commitments or obligations under the 
Agreement.”804 
Without doubt, these prudential measures, which are frequently mentioned to as ―prudential 
carve-out”, have been a major point of debate for all negotiators and scholars. The main reason 
for this is that there is no limit to the application of the prudential carve-out. Having said that, the 
latter part of the same paragraph puts a limit on the usage of this prudential carve-out, and it may 
not be used as a tactic to create unnecessary hurdles for other Contracting Parties.
805
 
There are no guiding principles for the qualification of a prudential measure and this, to some 
extent, undermines the concept of legal certainty under GATS in relation to financial services. 
Many scholars have proposed that the international best practices and standards developed by 
specialised international financial institutions could be used to ascertain whether a measure was 
really introduced for prudential reasons or whether it is an unnecessary obstacle to trade in 
financial services.
806
 However, this proposal received considerable criticism, as most of the 
                                                 
804
GATS Annex on Financial Services, para. 2(a). 
805
The first sentence of paragraph 2 (a) is commonly referred as prudential carve-out which allows a Contracting 
Party to take prudential regulatory acts resulting in barriers in trade in financial service. [WTO Secretariat, GUIDE 
TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 176 (Kluwer Law International 1999).] However, the second 
sentence of paragraph 2 (a) puts a condition on the first sentence, that the prudential measures shall not be employed 
as a way to circumvent Contracting Parties‘ obligation under the GATS. Some scholars assert that the scope of the 
prudential carve-out is unclear. [Kalypso Nicolaidis and Joel Trachtman (2000) ‗Policed Regulation to Managed 
Recognition‘ in P. Sauve & R.M. Stern, eds., GATS 2000 (Washington DC: Brookings Institute)(arguing that ‗[t]he 
scope of this ―prudential carve-out‖ is unclear‘) p. 255.] For further detailed discussion about prudential carve-outs 
see, Kern Alexander, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION AND FINANCIAL STABILITY: The Balance 
between Liberalisation and Regulation in the GATS. Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance Cambridge 
University. 
806
See WTO Doc. S/CSS/W/71, Communication from Switzerland (that prudential regulation should be interpreted 
according standards set by international bodies, ie. Basel Committee), and WTO Doc.S/CSS/W/27, Communication 
from United States (that GATS obligations and commitments should not prejudice a member‘s prudential regulatory 
discretion). Moreover, role of the GATS in context of financial regulation is to make sure that the domestic 
regulations are reasonable, transparent, objective and impartial and is essential to guarantee standard of financial 
services in their countries.  Necessity Test is not part of the prudential carve-out that is the Contracting Parties are 
not obliged to give clarification for the use of these regulations. See, Alexander, Kern (2008). The GATS and 
Financial Services: Liberalisation and Regulation in Global Financial Markets, in 
Andenas, Mads and Kern, Alexander (eds). The World Trade Organisation and Trade in Services. Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2008, p562. 
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standard-setting institutions, such as the Basel Committee, lack legitimacy and accountability 
because their decision-making procedure involves few rich countries.
807
 
 
Paragraph 3 of the Annex on Financial Services propagates the enhanced harmonization of the 
measures pertaining to prudential carve-outs by negotiation and acknowledging other contacting 
parties prudential regulatory standards. In this way, the members will tie,  each others practices, 
to some extent, by referring to mutually-acknowledged regulatory practices. Moreover, 
paragraph 3(b) encourages contracting parties to make bilateral and multilateral pacts or any 
other method that would look like a prudential carve-out through the eyes of mutually-
recognised minimum regulatory standards and practices.  
In the case of any dispute between contracting parties about a prudential measure or any other 
issue related to the financial services sector or trade, the issue is to be referred to the DSU of the 
WTO. However, this annex requires the selected members of the DSB to be experts in the area of 
financial services matters.
808
 
Finally, the Financial Services Annex contains a detailed list of definitions in its paragraph 5, 
which serves as the nomenclature for the purpose of making schedules of financial services 
commitments. 
In short, the Annex on Financial Services, which is an integral part of the GATS agreement, is an 
effective contribution by the WTO as an international economic organisation in its normative 
capacity. This annex enhances certainty in the financial services trade sector by defining 
financial services, providing guidance to the Contracting Parties to set some sort of standards and 
                                                 
 
807
 See, Alexander, K. (2003). The World Trade Organisation and Financial Stability: The Balance between 
Liberalisation and Regulation in the GATS. Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance Cambridge University. 
808
 Paragraph 4 of the GATS Annex on Financial Services. 
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in the case of dispute, making it compulsory for the DSB to take expert advice in connection 
with disputes related to the financial services trade. The following subheading relates to the 
Understanding on the commitments in financial services. It is not applicable to all WTO 
members, only those who have signed it, however, almost all the developed countries have 
signed, making it applicable to most of the global financial sector.     
b) Second Annex on Financial Services 
The Second Annex on Financial Services only deals with the procedure for further negotiations 
on financial services commitments, leading to the 1995 interim agreement (Second Protocol). 
Nowadays, this annex has historical status only.  
c) Understanding on commitments in financial services809 
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services (hereinafter ―Understanding‖) is a 
document binding on those members who have signed it.  This document is incorporated in the 
GATS list of the schedule of commitments in the form of additional commitments. Those 
Contracting Parties who have bound themselves to further liberate their financial sector have 
made reference to the Understanding as a cross-reference in the specific schedule of 
commitments. Under the Understanding, Contracting Parties take up advanced and more 
vigorous set of market access and National Treatment commitments that allow non-
discriminatory access to financial services providers from the rest of the Contracting Parties of 
the WTO.
810
 Thirty-one WTO members (counting the EU as one member) have taken up the 
Understanding as an additional commitment. 
                                                 
809
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/21-fin_e.htm#  Article 
810
The Understanding It is an optional document and is part of additional commitments See text of the 
Understanding on commitments in financial services at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/21-fin_e.htm# 
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The total global economic share of the financial services trade in 2009 was more than 607.3 
Billion USD
811
 and most of it is taken up by developed nations who have bound themselves to 
additional commitments under GATS via the Understanding. Therefore the effect of the 
Understanding on the global financial sector is enormous.  As the Understanding is an additional 
commitment, some of the important clauses of the Understanding are discussed below, and as an 
integral part of the GATS/WTO agreements, it has a significant normative effect on the global 
financial sector.  
Paragraph B (1) of the Understanding is related to monopoly rights. This paragraph is an addition 
to Article VIII of GATS, thus it serves as an additional step towards further liberalization. The 
purpose of this paragraph is to bind its signatories over and above their ordinary commitment 
under GATS Agreement, that is, to list in their schedule the existing monopoly rights and opt for 
ways to abolish it or curtail its scope.  
Paragraph B (2) of the Understanding is concerned with granting MFN and National Treatment 
to the financial services providers of other Contracting Parties in relation to the sale or purchase 
of financial services by public bodies of other Contracting Parties.      
Paragraph B (3) and Paragraph (4) of the Understanding binds its signatories to give National 
Treatment and allow non-resident financial services suppliers of the other Contracting Parties to 
                                                 
811
Insurance exports 77200 Million USD +Insurance imports 129465 Million USD = Total Insurance related trade  
(1) 206.665 Billion USD 
Financial Services exports 284635 Million USD + Financial Services imports 115985 Million USD = Total 
Financial Services related trade  (2) 400.62 Billion USD 
Total Financial Services trade  of 15 big economies is (1) + (2) = 607.285 Billion USD 
World Trade Organisation, International Trade Statistics 2010, page 145. Available 
at:http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2010_e/its10_trade_category_e.pdf 
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supply their services as a principle (as an intermediary or via an intermediary) in the area of 
insurance-related services
812
 and allow its residents to purchase those services.    
Paragraph B (5) of the understanding binds its signatories to allow extensive commercial 
presence (established or expanding or acquisition) of financial services providers from other 
Contracting Parties in their territories. Moreover, these financial services suppliers can introduce 
any new type of financial services (under Paragraph B (7)). This clause has been quite effective 
in the financial liberalization process. 
Paragraph B (8) of the Understanding obliges its signatories not to avert the transfer or 
processing of financial information (which includes electronic transfer plus its equipment). 
However, signatories have full freedom to assure data protection.  
Paragraph B (9) of the Understanding obliges its signatories to allow the temporary physical 
entry of the representatives of financial service suppliers to establish their commercial presence 
in their country.  
Paragraph B (10) of the Understanding obliges its signatories to do their level best to abolish or 
curtail any non-discriminatory measures related to those activities mentioned in the sub-
paragraphs of Paragraph B (10) relating to financial services supply.  
                                                 
812
B (3) of the Understanding:  ―Each Member shall permit non-resident suppliers of financial services to supply, as 
a principal, through an intermediary or as an intermediary, and under terms and conditions that accord national 
treatment, the following services:- (a) insurance of risks relating to: (i) maritime shipping and commercial aviation 
and space launching and freight (including satellites), with such insurance to cover any or all of the following: the 
goods being transported, the vehicle transporting the goods and any liability arising therefrom; and (ii) goods in 
international transit; (b) reinsurance and retrocession and the services auxiliary to insurance as referred to in 
subparagraph 5(a)(iv) of the Annex; (c) provision and transfer of financial information and financial data processing 
as referred to in subparagraph 5(a)(xv) of the Annex and advisory and other auxiliary services, excluding 
intermediation, relating to banking and other financial services as referred to in subparagraph 5(a)(xvi) of the 
Annex.‖ 
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Paragraph C of the Understanding ensures the National Treatment principle in explicit situations 
in which a signatory cannot avoid extending National Treatment to the financial services 
suppliers of other Contracting Parties.  
In the knowledge that the Understanding was adopted by almost all developed economies, the 
major proportion of the financial services trade, therefore, involves these economies only. 
Therefore, this impacts considerably on the global financial services trade scenario and 
obviously, it has a clear positive impact on the growth of the financial services sector.  
d) Second Protocol to GATS813 
The second Protocol constituted the main part of the 1995 interim agreement. It only deals with 
specific commitments and MFN exemptions.   
e) Fifth Protocol to GATS814 
The main importance of the Fifth Protocol is that it improved commitments in the context of 
market access and National Treatment, and reduced the number of MFN exemptions.
815
  
In 1997, the financial services agreement was signed.
816
 This agreement consists of three legal 
documents;
817
 first, the Fifth Protocol to GATS
818
; second, the decision to adopt the Fifth 
Protocol;
819
 and third, the Decision of December 1997 on Commitments in Financial Services.
820
   
                                                 
813
 WTO (1995): Second Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services, WTO document no. S/L/11. 
Available at:  http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/2prote_e.htm 
814
 WTO (1997): Fifth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/5prote_e.htm 
815
 Kampf, Roger (1998). Financial Services in the WTO: Third Time Lucky, International Trade Law and 
Regulation, Vol. 4 Issue 3, July 1998, Sweet & Maxwell, Oxford. 
816
 WTO: PRESS/1928 July 1995Financial services agreement confirmed: Statement by Chairman. Available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres95_e/addpr2.htm 
817
 Wang, Wei (2005). National Treatment in Financial Services in the Context of the Gats/WTO, in Norton, Joseph 
J. and Christos Hadjiemmanuil (editors), Global financial sector development. British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law.  
818
 WTO Document: S/L/45 
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So far, the above discussion has highlighted the WTO as an IEI which has played a significant 
role, in its normative capacity, in the development of the global financial sector. However, this 
role is not only limited to hard law binding commitments but has considerable influence on the 
development of soft law related to the development of the financial sector. The following part 
will focus on the soft law-making process in the area of the financial sector by the WTO, through 
its Committee on the Financial Services. This process is part of the legislative functioning of the 
WTO. 
3. Soft law making process by the Committee on Trade in Financial 
Services and decisions of different WTO bodies  
The Committee on Trade in Financial Services (hereinafter Financial Services Committee or 
FSC) is one of the subsidiary committees of the Council for Trade in Services
821
, which is itself a 
subsidiary body of the General Council of the WTO. Right after the inception of the WTO 
Agreement in 1995, the Council for Trade in Services created the FSC in its decision regarding 
institutional design and the effective application of GATS and other financial services trade-
related commitments.
822
 
The Council for Trade in Services has the mandate to create any subsidiary body through its 
institutional decisions. This mandate is give to the Council for Trade in Services under Article 
XXIV of GATS.
823
 GATS has given the Council for Trade in Services the authority to establish 
                                                                                                                                                             
819
 WTO Document: S/L/44 
820
 WTO Document: S/L/50 
821
 Other subsidiary committees are committee on specific commitments and working parties on GATS rules. Detail 
about the council for trade in services and its committees is available at:  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/s_coun_e.htm#decision 
822
 WTO: Decision on Institutional Arrangements for the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Decision no. 
S/L/1, 4 April 1995, para. 3.   
823
 Article XXIV of GATS: 1) The Council for Trade in Services shall carry out such functions as may be assigned 
to it to facilitate the operation of this Agreement and further its objectives.  The Council may establish such 
subsidiary bodies as it considers appropriate for the effective discharge of its functions. 2) The Council and, unless 
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subsidiary bodies and assign them with tasks. In this connection, the Council for Trade in 
Services passed the institutional decision which created the FSC.
824
 According to the mandate, 
the Council for Trade in Services can expand the functioning of the FSC by giving it the task of 
standard-setting and application; alternatively, it could also create a new subsidiary body to 
accomplish the above-said task.   
Paragraph 3 of the decision on institutional arrangements
825
 created the FSC and laid out its 
mandate in paragraph 2, which comprises a list of tasks in addition to any other responsibilities 
that the Council for Trade in Services may decide upon. The decision on institutional design 
clearly leaves the FSC‘s mandate open for any future ―responsibilities assigned to it by the 
Council for Trade in Services.‖ The list of the current responsibilities of the FSC is discussed in 
the latter part of this chapter.
826
  
One of the main functions of the FSC
827
 is to act as a forum for the discussion and exchange of 
views between national finance ministers and experts in the context of the regulations which 
relate to the financial services sector. This approach of involving financial experts is new to the 
GATS system because originally GATS/WTO engaged trade negotiators and representatives.
828
 
The reason for involving the financial representatives of the Contracting Parties is that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Council decides otherwise, its subsidiary bodies shall be open to participation by representatives of all Members. 
3) The Chairman of the Council shall be elected by the Members. 
824
 WTO: Decision on Institutional Arrangements for the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Decision no. 
S/L/1, 4 April 1995. 
825
 WTO: Decision on Institutional Arrangements for the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Decision no. 
S/L/1, 4 April 1995. 
826
 Chpater VIII.B on page no 310. 
827
Other important function is to acts as a monitoring body, overseeing both the implementation of legal 
commitments under the relevant Protocols and the specific progress of China under the Protocol on the Accession of 
the People‘s Republic of China. [WT/L/432, 23 November 2001, Section 18.] 
828
 For a detailed discussion on the functioning of the FSC, see Windsor, Joseph (2008). The WTO Committee on 
Trade in Financial Services: The Exercise of Public Authority within an Informational Forum. Special Issue: Public 
Authority & International Institutions in German Law Journal Vol. 09 No. 11. 
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financial sector is critical to international trade; the central nervous system of the international 
trade, in effect.
829
 
As mentioned above, the FSC‘s main activities (which are of some importance) involve the 
sharing and explanation of financial regulatory information with the financial experts of the 
Contracting Parties.
830
 The Council for Trade in Services has given the FSC substantial scope
831
 
which enables the FSC to act as a forum for technical discussion. Mainly, the FSC provides a 
forum for the clarification of GATS and its related documents in the financial sector, to the 
advantage of developing countries.  
In addition, to some extent, the FSC acts as a forum for standard-setting and notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.
832
 The FSC does not take it as its main function (although the Institutional Decision 
document does not explicitly prohibit the FSC in this context) but it performs a considerable role 
in its facilitation through the networking of soft law-making throughout the well-regulated 
financial sector.
833
 
                                                 
829
Peter Morrison, The Liberalisation of Trade in Financial Services and the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services, 5 SINGAPORE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 593, 593 (2001); J. Steven 
Jarreau, Interpreting the General Agreement on Trade in Services and the WTO Instruments Relevant to the 
International Trade of Financial Services, 25 NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & 
COMMERCIAL REGULATION 1, 8 (1999).  
830
See Schmidt-Aßmann, in this issue (―Here, even more than in national administrative law, it holds true: 
administrative law is first and foremost law on the administration of information!‖); Daniel C. Esty, Good 
Governance at the Supranational Scale, 115 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1490, 1533 (2006).   
831
 WTO: Decision on Institutional Arrangements for the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Decision no. 
S/L/1, 4 April 1995 
832
 In BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1358 (Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief, 8th ed., 2004) informal rulemaking 
is defined as: Agency rulemaking in which the agency publishes a proposed regulation and receives public 
comments on the regulation, after which the regulation can take effect without the necessity of a formal hearing on 
the record. Informal rulemaking is the most common procedure followed by an agency in issuing its substantive 
rules. -- Also termed notice-and-comment rulemaking.   
833
 Windsor, Joseph (2008).The WTO Committee on Trade in Financial Services: The Exercise of Public Authority 
within an Informational Forum. Special Issue: Public Authority & International Institutions in German Law Journal 
Vol. 09 No. 11. 
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The FSC has some role to play in the setting of standards
834
, to some extent like Basel II or the 
Core Principles of the Joint Forum of the Basel Committee, the IOSCO, and the IAIS.
835
 The 
reason for the FSC to have a potential role in soft law creation is that it provides a forum for 
finance ministers and other financial experts to sit and discuss regulatory issues. These members 
of the committee overlap with those within the international financial community who sit on 
international standard-setting bodies. In other words, the FSC provides a forum for such frontline 
standard-setters to share regulatory issues with the other participants of the FSC. This sharing or 
persuasion involved regarding financial regulatory matters with less-developed countries is 
termed the ―proselytization of minimum standards-soft law‖ by developed countries.836 
Conclusively, in view of the WTO‘s legislative and normative role regarding the development of 
the global financial sector through its provision of the certainty of the rules of the game, it is 
clear from the above discussion that the WTO has a legislative and normative role towards this 
very aspect. Not only has it hard law binding commitments in the field of the global financial 
sector but it also plays a limited role in the development of soft law in the same area. The overall 
clarity and certainty of rules in the global financial sector scenario is enhanced by the legislative 
and normative activities of the WTO. As discussed earlier, that certainty of the rules in any 
sector strengthens it, as all the players can make decisions in the light of those rules.  
                                                 
834
 For a Committee debate about what role the Committee and the WTO have in standard-setting, see S/FIN/M/42, 
12 November 2003, paras. 49-69. See also, Kern Alexander, the author argues that the WTO lacks institutional 
capacity and expertise to develop international standards. Moreover, it does not lay down parameters for the 
measures under prudential carve-outs; therefore, the prudential carve-outs should be understood in light of bench 
marks created by other IEIs. For this purpose, the WTO needs to increase its collaboration with other IEIs. 
Alexander, Kern (2008). The GATS and Financial Services: Liberalisation and Regulation in 
Global Financial Markets, in Andenas, Mads and Kern, Alexander (eds). The World Trade Organisation and Trade 
in Services . Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p564.  
835
See, supra, note 63; The Joint Forum, Core Principles: Cross-sectoral Comparison (BIS ed., 2001), available at: 
http://www.bis.org/publ/joint03.pdf.   
836
 David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 547, 585-592 (2004-2005), at 583.  See also Supra note 833 
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In addition, this chapter suggests that the FSC has the mandate and should expand its role in the 
development of the financial sector. By doing so, the FSC could assume some of the functioning 
of the IMF. In other words, global financial regulations could originate from a liberally 
institutionalized IEI rather than from a realist body.  
The FSC so far works on the basis of consensus; however, there are no clear rules for decision-
making within the FSC. It may be that this issue has not been addressed because nobody has 
raised such an issue. However, the FSC has contributed substantially to the financial sector in its 
legislative capacities. All hard law legislative functioning by the WTO is carried out by the FSC, 
such as the creation of protocols (the second and fifth) and the Understanding.     
In short, GATS, with its associated agreements and the results of the legislative functioning of 
the FSC, comprises the most influential legal documents (within the WTO framework of 
agreements) which affect financial sector development of the Economic Cycle. As already 
discussed in the theoretical framework (international economic framework), financial sector 
development is highly essential for a more stable and balanced growth of the global economy.    
However, there is still room for the FSC to expand its function and in doing so, the FSC could 
take on some of the functions of the IMF, such as setting the rules of the game for the global 
financial sector. As the WTO is liberally institutionalized and respects democratic values, its soft 
laws would not bother its constituents, plus these soft laws could be made hard laws if made part 
of the specific commitment of individual members.   
The next section examines the role played by the WTO as an IEI, in its administrative and 
executive capacity, in the development of the global financial sector. But before that, the 
comprehensive figure below illustrates the legal structure of GATS in the financial services 
sector.    
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Figure 10 GATS Legal Structure in context of Financial Services  
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B. Executive and administrative authority 
As noted earlier in this chapter, the executive and administrative functioning of an IEI is highly 
critical to the effectiveness of any organisation. The real effectiveness of an IO lies in the 
execution and implementation of institutional acts.
837
 In case, the members are given a choice in 
the implementation and execution of rules of the game then there is a high possibility that 
members might not implement the rules of the game and thus leaving the IO completely 
ineffective. Hence, for the realisation of the implementation and execution of institutional acts, 
IOs must be given adequate executive and administrative authority.  
These powers are vital for the implementation of the decisions of IOs so that they can function 
smoothly and achieve their goals. This aspect of the IOs‘ function is quite important and thus all 
the IOs have a proper institutional structure with an administrative arm, or Secretariat, which 
plays a central role in the management of the organisation and its activities. Through this 
institutional structure, the IOs perform their executive or administrative functions so that they 
can manage the realisation of institutional acts and the supervision of compliance with those acts 
by the members.
838
 
There are no hard and fast rules regarding the authority of IOs; the way an IO oversees 
compliance with its rules of the game depends upon the authority awarded to it by the treaty 
which created it and also by subsequent practices adopted for this purpose.  
The WTO, as an IO, relies heavily on its Secretariat
839
. It has 629 staff members and is headed 
by a Director-General. The Secretariat itself has no decision-making powers and only technically 
                                                 
837
 Supra note 457 
838
 Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein (eds) (2001),. Bowett's Law of International. Institutions. London: Sweet & 
Maxwell. 5th ed. , p 297 
839
 These secretariats are considered to be a highly essential organ of IOs. For instance, the GATT secretariat was 
the only organ of the GATT which became part of the WTO. For detail see Article XVI (2).  
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and professionally assists the Contracting Parties in the different councils and committees.
840
 The 
highest level in the WTO institutional structural hierarchy is the Ministerial Conference
841
.  
The General Council comes in at the second level in the hierarchy and take three forms; the 
General Council
842
, the Dispute Settlement Body
843
 and the Trade Policy Review Body
844
. The 
members are the same as the General Council in all three forms of the General Council, but their 
name changes according to the purpose for which they are meeting. For example, The General 
Council assembles as the Dispute Settlement Body and the Trade Policy Review Body to 
supervise procedures for settling disputes between the Contracting Parties and to analyse 
members‘ trade policies. All three of them are comprised of WTO members and they are 
answerable to the Ministerial Conference. In view of the executive and administrative authority 
in relation to financial sector development, the body concerned is the General Council. 
The body which is third within the hierarchy of the executive and administrative functioning in 
the development of the financial sector (which is part of the services sector) is the Council for 
Trade in Services.  
The Committee on Trade in Financial Services (FSC) comes at the fourth level and is a 
specialised body with executive and administrative authority in relation to issues regarding the 
                                                 
840
 For an overview of  the WTO Secretariat visit: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/intro_e.htm 
841
 The Member countries take decisions through various councils and committees, which comprises of all the WTO 
members. Topmost in the hierarchy is the Ministerial Conference which has to meet at least once every two years. 
The Ministerial Conference can take decisions on all matters relating to any of the WTO constituent agreements. 
Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/minist_e.htm 
842
 The General Council is responsible for doing the day to day routine work in the absence of the Ministerial 
Conference and for further details about the scope and functions of the General Council visit:   
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gcounc_e/gcounc_e.htm 
843
When the General Council is adjudicating disputes between WTO members, it takes the form of the DSU. For 
details visit:  http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm 
844
 When the General council is reviewing the trade policies of WTO members, it takes the form of the Trade Policy 
Review Body. For further details visit: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tpr_e.htm 
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trade in financial services. The main function of the WTO in financial sector development is 
undertaken through this committee. It is very rare for the recommendations of this committee to 
be reversed by the Council for Trade in Services.  The following section of the chapter looks at 
the functioning of the various WTO committees in their executive and administrative authority at 
different levels in the WTO hierarchy in the development of the financial sector.  
1. The Committee on Trade in Financial Services (FSC) 
The first and the most efficient body (in context of financial services trade) within the WTO 
institutional framework for the application of executive and administrative authority is the FSC, 
which was created following a decision of the Council for Trade in Services.
845
 This decision 
was taken according to Article XXIV of GATS which allows the Councils to form ―[a]ny 
subsidiary bodies‖ in order to establish a working framework.846 In the light of the Decision on 
Institutional design, the FSC‘s mandate (which is obviously in relation to the financial services 
sector) is as follows:
847
 
a) To review and continually survey the application of GATS and the Annex on 
Financial Services to the financial services sector;  
b) To formulate proposals or recommendations on any matter relevant to financial 
services;  
c) To consider proposals for amendment of the Annex on Financial Services and 
to make recommendations, where appropriate, to the Council for Trade in 
Services in this respect;  
                                                 
845
 Decision on Institutional Arrangements for the General Agreement on Trade in Services. S/L/1, 4 April 1995, 
para. 3. 
846
 Also see Article IV:6 WTO Agreement. 
847
See Supra note 833 
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d) To provide a forum for technical discussion and conduct studies and 
examination of national measures and of the financial services sections of 
members‘ schedules of specific commitments and lists of MFN 
exemptions;  
e) To provide technical assistance to developing countries, whether already 
members or seeking membership, regarding GATS obligations in the 
financial services sector; and  
f) To cooperate with other subsidiary bodies under GATS or any international 
organisations active in the financial services sector. 
In the light of the above mandate, the FSC arranges discussions on issues in connection with 
trade in financial services and suggests proposed solutions to the Council for Trade in Services to 
enable them to make an appropriate decision. Moreover, the FSC has to continually conduct 
reviews and carry out surveillance of the application of GATS in the field of the financial 
services sector, and provide an effective specialised forum to scrutinise and discuss issues 
relating to the regulatory developments affecting the financial services trade.
848
 In other words, 
the FSC arranges meetings and provides discussion forums for financial sector specialists and 
national finance ministers to discuss issues pertaining to the Contracting Parties‘ financial 
regulations. The FSC acts as a scrutinising body and it supervises both the realisation of legal 
obligations under the related GATS Protocols, and the improvement of China in the light of the 
Protocol on the Accession of the People‘s Republic of China.849 
                                                 
848
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/s_coun_e.htm#decision 
849
 WT/L/432, 23 November 2001, Section 18.   
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a) FSC as a Monitoring Body 
Even after the formation of GATS and the WTO, negotiations continued regarding the schedule 
of specific commitments by the Contracting Parties. A number of agreements were signed by the 
Contracting Parties in the form of Protocols to the GATS agreement; the agreements, which were 
made in context of the financial services sector, are the Second and Fifth Protocols. The Second 
Protocol has not had any legal significance post-1
st
 July 1996;
850
 however, the obligations 
attached to GATS through the Fifth Protocol are of legal significance in the present global 
financial services sector.  
The FSC monitors the progress made by all the Contracting Parties towards the acceptance of 
new financial services sector commitments under the Protocols.
851
 Almost all the Contracting 
Parties have adhered to the obligations under the Fifth Protocol except Brazil, Jamaica, and the 
Philippines, thus the FSC is still monitoring these countries with respect to the Fifth Protocol.
852
 
The FSC uses naming-and-shaming as a tool to ensure the Contracting Parties adhere to their 
obligations in respect to financial services.
853
 
b) FSC as a Reviewing Body  
On 10
th
 November 2001, China acceded to the WTO following the decision of the Ministerial 
Conference, known as the Chinese Accession Protocol.
854
 The reason for their devising a 
                                                 
850
In 1995 negotiations were held in WTO in context of financial services (Second Protocol) and in conclusion of 
these negotiations 29 Contracting Parties (taking the EU as one) upgraded their schedules of specific commitments. 
Those enhanced commitments were annexed to the Second Protocol to the GATS. It entered into force on 1 
September 1996 except for a small number of countries which were unable to ratify internally. In April the 1997 the 
negotiations started again so the legal importance of the Second protocol 
ended.http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/finance_e/finance_fiback_e.htm  
851
 Regarding the Second Protocol, see S/L/13, 24 July 1995, para. 3; regarding the Fifth Protocol, see S/L/44, 3 
December 1997, para. 3.   
852
See STATUS OF ACCEPTANCES OF THE FIFTH PROTOCOL TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON 
TRADE IN SERVICES, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/finance_e/finance_status_5prot_e.htm; S/FIN/M/53, 30 November 
2006, paras. 3-7.   
853
Supra note 833 
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separate protocol for China‘s accession was because several Contracting Parties raised concerns 
regarding the Chinese legal system‘s adjustability to WTO law.855 Thus, according to Section 18 
of the Chinese Accession Protocol, the FSC is required to carry out a review of the finance sector 
of China and submit a report to the Council for Trade in Services which then reports to the 
General Council, regarding the application of WTO law to the Chinese trade scenario.
856
  The 
FSC is one of fifteen other subsidiary bodies who are required to carry out the Transitional 
Review Mechanism with regards to China.
857
 
Paragraph 1 of Section 18 of the Chinese‘s Accession Protocol requires the FSC (as a specialised 
body of the WTO in the field of financial services) to ―review, as appropriate to [its] mandate, 
the implementation by China of the WTO Agreement‖; and China is obliged to ―provide relevant 
information‖. The FSC‘s authority to review is quite broad and covers all legal, administrative, 
and regulatory domains. However, the review mechanism by the FSC simply involves 
monitoring and reporting; it lacks the mandate to enforce WTO law.
858
 
                                                                                                                                                             
854
 WT/L/432, 23 November 2001. See also Xin Zhang, Implementation of the WTO Agreements, 23 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS 383, 408-410 (2003).   
855
 The main reason being China‘s ―socialist market economy,‖ the relatively high number of state-owned 
enterprises, and the one-party system. See Julia Ya Qin, WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) – A Critical Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 7 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LAW 863 (2004); Zhang (note 27), at 409-410. 
856
 The six reports thus far have been formulaic: S/FIN/7, 25 October 2002, S/FIN/11, 4 December 2003; S/FIN/13, 
26 November 2004; S/FIN/15, 23 September 2005; S/FIN/17, 30 November 2006; S/FIN/19, 14 November 2007. 
See also Supra note 833 
857
 Council for Trade in Goods, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Council for Trade 
in Services, Committees on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions, Market Access (covering also ITA), Agriculture, 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Technical Barriers to Trade, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Anti-
Dumping Measures, Customs Valuation, Rules of Origin, Import Licensing, Trade-Related Investment Measures, 
Safeguards, Trade in Financial Services. ACCESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, WTO 
document no: WT/L/432, 23 November 2001. 
858
 See William Steinberg, Monitor with No Teeth, 6 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DAVIS BUSINESS LAW 
JOURNAL 2, section IV (2005).  And also see, Windsor, Joseph (2008). The WTO Committee on Trade in 
Financial Services: The Exercise of Public Authority within an Informational Forum. Special Issue: Public Authority 
& International Institutions in German Law Journal Vol. 09 No. 11. 
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c) Decision-making in the FSC 
The general decision-making practice adopted by the FSC is consensus. So far, no annual report 
submitted to the Council for Trade in Services provides evidence of any formal disagreement 
between FSC members.
859
 This unanimous decision-making lends considerable weight to the 
reports submitted to the Council for Trade in Services and due to this unanimity in the decision 
process, the Council for Trade in Services has never disputed the FSC‘s reports.860 
d) Dual directional dissemination Aspects of the FSC  
The FSC disseminates information related to the financial services sector on two levels. The first 
involves information transmission from national level to international level. It happens when the 
FSC acts as a forum where all the national financial representatives and experts concerned 
discuss issues related to the schedule of specific commitments. In this process, the Contracting 
Parties, of their own accord, provide relevant information at these meetings regarding their up-
to-date developments in the financial services sector. A good example of the dissemination of 
information from national to international level is the FSC‘s monitoring obligations under the 
Fifth Protocol.
861
 
                                                 
859
 This has the effect that—at least from an external point of view—disagreement in the FSC is minimised, 
appearing only occasionally in the minutes as disagreement expressed during meetings but not as formal nays. 
Indeed, nothing like voting is apparent from the Committee‘s documents. Members are thus able to record 
objections and express concerns in the Committee‘s documents—even apparently anonymously. One example can 
be seen in the minutes of an early meeting in 1995. Negotiations in the financial services sector had been extended 
beyond GATS‘s entry into force. The months leading up to the Second Protocol on financial services were 
contentious. See, Armin von Bogdandy & Joseph Windsor, Annex on Financial Services, in VI MAX PLANCK 
COMMENTARIES ON WORLDTRADE LAW 640-666 (Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll & Clemens 
Feinäugle eds., 2008). 
860
 See, Windsor, Joseph (2008). The WTO Committee on Trade in Financial Services: The Exercise of Public 
Authority within an Informational Forum. Special Issue: Public Authority & International Institutions in German 
Law Journal Vol. 09 No. 11. 
861
 Ibid 
 
Rao Raza Hashim 
317 
School Of Law 
University Of Warwick 
The second level of dissemination of information, from international to national level, takes 
place when the FSC publishes its annual reports and other documents, detailing their decisions 
and the minutes of their meetings (which are not always made public)
862
.  
As discussed above, the FSC has a lot to do with the administrative and executive functioning of 
the WTO in the development of the global financial sector. There are other subsidiary bodies of 
the Council for Trade in Services which have a mandate to deal with matters pertaining to the 
development of the financial sectors of the Contracting Parties; however, these subsidiary bodies 
have not provided substantial evidence, from their practices, of their direct contribution to the 
development of the global financial sector.  
2. Other subsidiary bodies of the Council for Trade in Service 
The other subsidiary bodies of the Council for Trade in Service are namely the Committee on 
Specific Commitments, the Working Party on Domestic Regulation, and the Working Party on 
GATS Rules. As these subsidiaries do not have a direct impact on the global financial services 
sector, this thesis will briefly discuss their administrative and executive role in the development 
of the financial sector.   
a) The Committee on Specific Commitments 
The Committee on Specific Commitments is one of the subsidiary bodies of the Council for 
Trade in Services. As is evident from its name, this committee‘s main task relates to the specific 
commitments made by the Contracting Parties in their schedule of commitments under GATS. 
Mainly, this committee looks into rectifications or improvements in the schedule of 
                                                 
862
 This transfer of information is not identical with a transfer of the information to the public at large, because FSC 
documents, in particular the minutes of meetings, are initially circulated as ―restricted‖ among members before 
eventually being derestricted and made generally accessible. See, Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction of 
WTO documents, Decision of 14 May 2002, WTO document no: WT/L/452, 16 May 2002.    
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commitments of the Contracting Parties, by discussing with the Contracting Parties changes in 
their schedule of specific commitments. To accomplish this task, the committee has drafted a 
procedure for changes in the schedule of commitments
863
 and guidelines for the scheduling of 
specific commitments
864
  in order that the Council for Trade in Services may adopt them.  
The Committee on Specific Commitments acts an administrative tool in the WTO system for the 
making of any changes in the Contracting Parties schedule of specific commitments under the 
GATS. So, if a Contracting Party wants to make changes to its specific commitments related to 
financial services, then it has to do this via this committee. 
b) The Working Party on Domestic Regulation 
The Working Party on Domestic Regulation is a subsidiary body of the Council for Trade in 
Services and is comprised of the Contracting Parties. This body drafts disciplines
865
 relating to 
technical standards, and licensing and qualification requirements for all service sectors 
(including financial services) in the context of their domestic regulations. This working party 
merely oversees the domestic regulations of the Contracting Parties and gives its constituents the 
opportunity to define (via very loose guidelines) the parameters of domestic regulations.
866
  
                                                 
863
WTO, Procedures for the Certification of Rectifications or Improvements to Schedules of Specific Commitments, 
ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN SERVICES ON 14 APRIL 2000. WTO DOCUMENT NO: 
S/L/84. 
864
 WTO, GUIDELINES FOR THE SCHEDULING OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS UNDER THE GENERAL 
AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES (GATS), Adopted by the Council for Trade in Services on 23 March 
2001.  WTO document no: S/L/92.  
865
WTO, ARTICLE VI:4 OF THE GATS: DISCIPLINES ON DOMESTIC REGULATION APPLICABLE TO 
ALL SERVICES, Note by the WTO Secretariat, 1 March 1999. WTO document no: S/C/W/96. And also see, WTO, 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY INITIATIVES IN SERVICES, Background note by the WTO Secretariat, 1 
March 1999. WTO document no: S/C/W/97.  
866
 The Contracting Parties does not clearly define parameters in context of the domestic regulations, which also 
includes the prudential carve-out under the Financial Services Annex. In this way this committee is under utilised.   
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The Council for Trade in Services is the most relevant body of the WTO in the context of the 
financial sector. However, the WTO is a sizeable IEI with a complex structure and it has other 
bodies through which it performs its executive and administrative functioning regarding matters 
related to the financial sector. The following subheading takes a look at these bodies and their 
role in the development of the global financial sector.   
3. Other WTO Bodies 
There are other bodies within the WTO structure which, in their executive and administrative 
authority, have relevance to the financial services sector. These bodies are discussed below.  
a) WTO Trade Policy Review Body  
One of the most noteworthy executive and administrative functions of the WTO is the 
surveillance of the domestic trade policies of all the Contracting Parties. The main role in this 
surveillance process is carried out via the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). The TPRM 
has already been discussed in the preceding chapter;
867
 however, the executive and 
administrative aspect of TPRM is briefly outlined below.   
Trade policies are reviewed by the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) which is one of the forms 
of the WTO General Council
868
 and thus constitutes all the Contracting Parties. The TPRM is 
based on peer review methodology and the administrative leg-work is carried out by the WTO 
Secretariat.
869
 
                                                 
867
 ChapterVI.B.4 on page 250 
868
 The General Council becomes the TPRB when conducting the review under TPRM. Similarly the General 
Council becomes DSB when adjudicating dispute within WTO.  
869
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_int_e.htm 
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The TPRB acts as a platform for the Contracting Parties to review the trade polices of the 
Contracting Party concerned, including policies related to financial services. The purpose is to 
see whether the Contracting Party concerned is complying with the WTO rules, disciplines and 
commitments relating to the financial services trade. 
The Trade Policy Review process can be broken down into three steps,
870
 each of which has been 
discussed in Chapter VI.
871
 However, they deal with the preparation of reports (identifying issues 
of concern), meeting to conduct reviews and then finally publishing the decisions made in the 
meeting.  
The next WTO body is the committee on Balance of Payments Restriction which has an 
executive role in the context of the financial sector.    
b) Committees on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions 
(hereinafter “BOP Committee”) 
The WTO‘s executive and administrative role in issues related to the BOP difficulties of the 
Contracting Parties are dealt with by the BOP Committee. Financial sector stability and BOP 
difficulties are directly associated with each other. The BOP Committee reviews requests from 
Contracting Parties for derogations from their international commitments and for a short-term 
increase in provisional safeguards.  However, it may only be a preemptive or strategic move to 
impose restrictions for some other ulterior purpose, thus the review by the BOP Committee of 
these measures related to BOP are essential for a fair trading environment.     
                                                 
870
 See Annex 3 of the WTO Agreement and the TPRB‘s rules of procedure – WTO 2008. Rules of Procedure for 
Meetings of the Trade Policy Review Body: WT/TPR/6/ Rev.2. Also see, The WTO‘s Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism: How to Create Political Will for Liberalization, ECIPE Working Paper No. 11/2009. 
871
 Chapter VI on page 250 
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Article XII of GATS
872
 deals with the BOP restrictions in the services sector which allow 
Contracting Parties to impose restrictions when they are facing BOP problems ―[i]n the process 
of economic development or economic transition‖ in order to maintain ―[a] level of financial 
reserves adequate for the implementation of its programme of economic development or 
economic transition.‖ However, paragraph 2 of the same article places qualifications upon the 
restrictions, whereby the measure in question shall not be discriminatory; it shall not be 
inconsistent with the IMF‘s Articles of Agreement; it shall not needlessly harm the commercial, 
economic and financial benefits of any other Contracting Party; it shall amount to the least 
possible necessary to tackle the BOP situation; it shall be short-term and provisional till the BOP 
situation improves. Moreover, paragraph 5 of Article XII obliges the Contracting Parties to 
immediately consult the BOP Committee to review the measures employed and which are 
assessed according to paragraph 5(c).
873
 
The WTO, under Article XII of GATS, independently reviews and decides whether a restrictive 
measure is consistent with the WTO rules or not.
874
 However, following the logic of the India-
Balance of Payments case
875
, the GATS BOP Committee cannot supersede the jurisdiction of the 
Panel and Appellate Body.  
4. Conclusion 
This chapter documented the executive and administrative functioning of the WTO as an IEI in 
the field of the financial services sector. As discussed above, the WTO has many bodies which 
                                                 
872
 Chapter VIII.A.1.e)(1)(b)(iii)on page no.290 
873
 Article XII 5(c) Such consultations shall assess the balance-of-payment situation of the Member concerned and 
the restrictions adopted or maintained under this Article, taking into account, inter alia, such factors as:  (i) the 
nature and extent of the balance-of-payments and the external financial difficulties; (ii) the external economic and 
trading environment of the consulting Member; (iii) alternative corrective measures which may be available. 
874
 The IMF only assists in the statistics and facts. 
875
Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/90abr.pdf 
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exert executive functioning whilst the administrative functioning is carried out by the WTO 
Secretariat. On point to be noted here is that all the WTO bodies are comprised of the 
Contracting Parties, thus executive functioning is carried out by the Contracting Parties 
collectively under the umbrella of the WTO to reap collective gains (i.e. the development of 
financial services trade). As the WTO is liberally institutionalised, it takes account of democratic 
values in this whole executive functioning process, by reaching decisions via consensus.    
The executive and administrative functioning increases the certainty and predictability of the 
rules of the game within the global financial sector. As discussed in the theoretical framework, 
this certainty and predictability of the rules of the game acts as a stimulus in the Economic Cycle 
which leads to a more stable and balanced growth of the global economy.  
The next subheading will review the judicial and quasi-judicial functioning of the WTO as an IEI 
in the development of the global financial sector.  
C. Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Functioning of the WTO in 
endorsement of International Financial Sector Development  
This subheading highlights the WTO‘s institutional role, in its judicial and quasi- judicial 
capacity as an IEI, in the development of the financial services sector of its members. It seems 
quite proper that the role of WTO‘s adjudicative function can positively affect the financial 
services sector of its constituents. However, the link is the same as discussed earlier
876
, i.e. the 
enhancement of certainty and predictability within a system and its development, and, in this 
                                                 
876
 Chapter II.A.2 on page 28. Also,  for a detailed discussion about legal certainty and financial development see 
generally, Ross Levine  (1999), Law, Finance, and Economic Growth. Journal of Financial Intermediation 8, 8–35. 
Also see, King, R. G., and Levine, R. (1993). Finance, entrepreneurship, and growth: Theory and evidence, J. 
Monet. Econ. 32, 513–542. Also see, Levine, R. (1998). The legal environment, banks, and long-run economic 
growth, J. Money CreditBanking 3(Pt.2), 596–613. Demirg¨u¸c-Kunt, A., and Maksimovic, V. (1998). Law, 
Finance, and Firm Growth, Journal of Finance 53, 2107–2137. Laporta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and 
Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and finance, J. Polit. Econ. forthcoming.  
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case, the enhancement of certainty and predictability in the development of the financial services 
sector.  
It is a well-known fact that any comprehensive IO requires an enforcement and adjudicative 
mechanism to achieve its goals. Likewise, the Contracting Parties of the WTO Agreement, in 
recognition of compliance with their obligations, established the current WTO dispute settlement 
system during the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The WTO dispute 
settlement system (DSS) resolves all disputes between its constituents pertaining to its operating 
framework. It exists to thwart the negative impact of unsettled issues in the international trading 
regime and it also minimises the inequity between Contracting Parties with huge disparities in 
their economies, and instead resolves all disputes according to WTO rules.
877
 
The main objective of the WTO DSS is to facilitate the international trade regime‘s security and 
predictability
878
. International trade is understood as the exchange of goods and services between 
Contracting Parties and the WTO DSS only deals with Contracting Parties; however, mostly this 
trade is carried out by private economic participants which cannot directly approach the WTO 
DSS for adjudication of their trade concerns. Nevertheless, these market participants (which 
include state and non-state participants) require stability, certainty and predictability in the 
governing laws, rules and regulations related to their commercial activity, in financial services 
sector rules, and the regulations and laws governing the financial services sector. The more the 
laws, rules and regulation are stable, certain and predictable, the better the system develops.  
Therefore, the WTO, in its institutional capacity (in this adjudicative capacity), via the DSS 
provides a fast, efficient, dependable and rule-oriented system to adjudicate disputes pertaining 
                                                 
877
A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, WTO Secretariat Publication prepared for publication by 
the Legal Affairs Division and the Appellant Body (2004). 
878
Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU): ―The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a 
central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system…‖   
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to compliance with the WTO Agreement. Furthermore, by establishing exclusive jurisdiction to 
reinforce the rules of the game
879
, the DSS brings more certainty, predictability and security to 
the international trading regime
880
 which helps significantly in the development of the financial 
services sector.  
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is an agreement which governs the rules 
and procedures pertaining to the settlement of disputes emerging from any of the agreements 
listed in Appendix 1 to the DSU
881
, which also includes the financial services sector as part of 
GATS.
882
 The remainder of this subheading will talk about the robustness of the DSS in creating 
certainty, predictability and security in the IELR. In this context, the following section will 
discuss the different methods of settling disputes under the DSU, the WTO bodies involved in 
this process, the dispute settlement process itself and the WTO disputes related to the financial 
services trade sector.  
1. Pathways for dispute settlement:  
There are a number of ways in which disputes are settled in the DSS: mediation, conciliation and 
a Good Office, Arbitration, and Adjudicative process (Panel and Appellant Body). In domestic 
judicial systems, these out-of-court solutions are referred to as an alternative means of dispute 
resolution; however, under the WTO framework, they are part of the main DSS and are not 
                                                 
879
 Article 23 of the DSU not only excludes unilateral action but it also precludes the use of other forums for the 
resolution of a WTO-related dispute.  
880
 A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, WTO Secretariat Publication. 
881
 Appendix 1 of DSU:- AGREEMENTS COVERED BY THE UNDERSTANDING: (A) Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organisation (B) Multilateral Trade Agreements (Annex 1A Multilateral Agreements on Trade in 
Goods, Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes) (C) Plurilateral Trade Agreements (Annex 4: Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Agreement on 
Government Procurement, International Dairy Agreement and International Bovine Meat Agreement. 
882
 DSU Article 1.1: ―The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply to disputes brought pursuant to the 
consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to this Understanding..‖ 
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considered as an alternative method of resolving disputes.
883
 These methods are briefly discussed 
below. 
a) Mediation, Conciliation and Good Office 
Article 3.7 of the DSU favours the idea whereby Contracting Parties settle their disputes through 
mutual understanding
884
; however, the mutually-agreed solution must be consistent with the 
WTO framework agreements. Moreover, mutually-agreed solutions should also be notified to the 
DSB and the relevant Councils and Committees
885
 so that other Contracting Parties have 
reasonable access to information relating to settlements between other Contracting Parties.  
Sometimes, an independent person assists to resolve the dispute between Contracting Parties and 
help them arrive at a mutual understanding. If the parties to the dispute agree, then the DSU 
provides good office, conciliation and mediation facilities to enable parties to come to a 
conclusion.
886
 The Director-General of the WTO offers the services of the independent person 
for the purpose of good office, conciliation and mediation.
887
 
Basically, the good office provided by the DSU amounts to logistical support to assist the parties 
at dispute to resolve their grievances in a productive environment. On the other hand, in 
conciliation, a third person becomes involved in the settlement negotiations between the parties. 
The mediation process is one step ahead of the conciliation process. In this process, the mediator 
                                                 
883
A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, WTO Secretariat Publication prepared for publication by 
the Legal Affairs Division and the Appellant Body (2004) p 92. 
884
 Article 3.7 of DSU: ―A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered 
agreements is clearly to be preferred.‖ 
885
 Article 3.6 of the DSU: ―Mutually agreed solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute 
settlement provisions of the covered agreements shall be notified to the DSB and the relevant Councils and 
Committees.‖ 
886
 Article 5.1 of the DSU: ―Good offices, conciliation and mediation are procedures that are undertaken voluntarily 
if the parties to the dispute so agree.‖ 
887Article 5.6 of the DSU: ―The Director-General may, acting in an ex officio capacity, offer good offices, 
conciliation or mediation with the view to assisting Members to settle a dispute.‖ 
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may also propose a solution as a contribution to the settlement process; however, suggestions by 
the mediator are not binding on the disputed parties.
888
 
The WTO encourages Contracting Parties to settle their disputes mutually at any stage in the 
DSS. So, even if the parties take the issue to the Panel, Appellant Body or arbitration, they can 
still continue separately with a mutual resolution process.
889
 
b) Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU 
The Contracting Parties in dispute can resort to arbitration under Article 25.1 of the DSU.
890
 
However, the parties need to decide on the procedure and the governing rule for the arbitration 
process, including the selection of the arbitrator. Moreover, once the parties have agreed on the 
procedure, rules and arbitrator, then arbitration becomes binding on them.  
Before starting arbitration proceedings, the disputing Contracting Parties need to inform all other 
Contracting Parties of the arbitration agreement and must allow other interested Contracting 
Parties to join the arbitration process. The arbitration award, which is binding on the Contracting 
Parties involved, must be notified to the DSB and also to the Councils and Committees 
concerned. Regarding the implementation and enforcement of the arbitration award, the 
provisions of Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU apply.
891
 
c) Adjudicative pathway (Panel and Appellant Body) 
 
                                                 
888
A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, WTO Secretariat Publication prepared for publication by 
the Legal Affairs Division and the Appellant Body (2004) p 94. 
889
 Article 5.5 of the DSU: ―If the parties to a dispute agree, procedures for good offices, conciliation or mediation 
may continue while the panel process proceeds.‖  
890
 Article 25.1 of the DSU: ―Expeditious arbitration within the WTO as an alternative means of dispute settlement 
can facilitate the solution of certain disputes that concern issues that are clearly defined by both parties.‖ 
891
 Article 25.4 of the DSU: ―Articles 21 and 22 of this Understanding shall apply mutatis mutandis to arbitration 
awards.‖ 
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In the adjudicative process of the DSS, disputes are settled by the Panels and the Appellant 
Bodies. The panels are in charge of the adjudication of disputes between Contracting Parties in 
the first instance. If either of the disputing Contracting Parties involved is unsatisfied with the 
ruling of the panel, then they can appeal against it to the Appellant Body. The adjudicative 
process, type of complaints, and the bodies involved in the DSS are discussed below.  
2. WTO Bodies involve in the DSS:  
This subheading provides a basic introduction of the WTO bodies involved in the DSS: the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), panels, Appellant Body and arbitrators, all of whom are 
discussed below. 
a) Dispute Settlement Body 
Composition and functions of the DSB: The General Council, which is composed of all 
Contracting Parties, takes the form of the DSB when settling disputes between its constituents.
892
 
It is a political body which is responsible for overseeing the whole dispute settlement process 
within the framework of the WTO.  It meets regularly, as envisaged by Article 2.3 of the DSU
893
, 
usually once a month.  
The DSB has the mandate to form panels and the Appellant Body
894
, adopt their rulings, and 
closely observe the enforcement and implementation of these rulings. Moreover, the DSB can 
                                                 
892
 Article IV.3 of the WTO Agreement: ―The General Council shall convene as appropriate to discharge the 
responsibilities of the Dispute Settlement Body provided for in the Dispute Settlement Understanding.  The Dispute 
Settlement Body may have its own chairman and shall establish such rules of procedure as it deems necessary for 
the fulfillment of those responsibilities.‖ 
893
 Article 2.3 of the DSU: ―The DSB shall meet as often as necessary to carry out its functions within the time-
frames provided in this Understanding.‖ 
894
 Article 2.1 of the DSU: ―The DSB shall inform the relevant WTO Councils and Committees of any developments 
in disputes related to provisions of the respective covered agreements.‖ 
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allow trade sanctions in cases where the losing Contracting Party does not comply with the 
rulings and recommendations of the panel and the Appellant Body.
895
 
According to Article 2.4 of the DSU, Decision Making in the DSB is carried out by consensus.
896
 
By consensus, as per Article 2.4 of the DSU, means that none of the members of the DSB 
explicitly opposes the proposed decision of the DSB meeting. However, once the panel or the 
Appellant Body is formed, then it is mandatory for the DSB to approve their report or 
recommendations unless there is a consensus against it (i.e. negative consensus). If any party is 
not happy with the ruling or recommendations of the DSS, then that party has to convince all the 
remaining members of the DSB to agree to consensus against that ruling or recommendation.
897
 
b) Panel 
Panels are composed usually of three panelists who are well-qualified governmental and/or non-
governmental individuals. Some previous experience in a relevant field is preferred, such as: 
previous involvement in panel cases; the representation of any Contracting Party in any WTO 
councils or committees; having worked in the WTO Secretariat; being a scholar of international 
                                                 
895
 DSU Article 22.2: ―[A]ny party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request authorization from 
the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered 
agreements.‖ See also, GATS Article XXIII:2: ‗If the DSB considers that the circumstances are serious enough to 
justify such action, it may authorize a Member or Members to suspend the application to any other Member or 
Members of obligations and specific commitments in accordance with Article 22 of the DSU.‘ 
896Article 2.4 of the DSU: ―Where the rules and procedures of this Understanding provide for the DSB to take a 
decision, it shall do so by consensus (The DSB shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter submitted 
for its consideration, if no Member, present at the meeting of the DSB when the decision is taken, formally objects 
to the proposed decision.). 
897
 Article 6.1 of the DSU: ―[U]nless at that meeting the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a panel.‖ And 
also see, Article 16.4 of the DSU: ―[T]he report shall be adopted at a DSB meeting897 unless a party to the dispute 
formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report.‖ And 
also see, Article 17.14 of the DSU: ―An Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally 
accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report.‖ 
See also, Article 22.6 of the DSU: ―[T]he DSB, upon request, shall grant authorization to suspend concessions or 
other obligations within 30 days of the expiry of the reasonable period of time unless the DSB decides by consensus 
to reject the request.‖ Also see, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, WTO Secretariat Publication 
prepared for publication by the Legal Affairs Division and the Appellant Body (2004) p 18. 
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trade law or policy; or has acted as a senior trade policy officer of a Contracting Party.
898
 
Moreover, the independence of the panelist should also be ensured.
899
 
The function of panels is to assist the DSB in settling disputes within the DSS. It is the first stage 
of the adjudication process within the DSS. The panel is required to assess the issue impartially 
in the light of current facts and the WTO framework Agreements. These impartial findings are 
reported to the DSB who then make a recommendation or ruling regarding the disputed matter. 
During this process of adjudication, panels should consult frequently with the parties in dispute 
in order to develop a mutual understanding.
900
 
c) Appellant Body 
The Appellant Body is a permanent body of seven members responsible for revisiting the legal 
aspects of the reports of panels at the request of either party to a specific dispute. It is the second 
and final stage of the adjudication process in the DSS.  
The Appellant Body was created by the DSB in 1995.
901
 Its members are appointed unanimously 
by the DSB for a term of four years. These members do not represent their countries but the 
whole of the WTO membership. It has its own Secretariat for administrative purposes.    
3. Types of Complaints under GATS 
Cause of action is quite important in any type of dispute. Under GATS, the Contracting Parties 
have recourse to the DSS for ‗violation‘ and ‗non-violation‘ of WTO agreements. These two 
                                                 
898
Article 8.1 of the DSU. 
899
Article 8.2 of the DSU. 
900
Article 11 of the DSU.  
901
 Decision to creating Appellant Body was taken by the DSB on 10/02/1995. See WTO document no. WT/DSB/1 
dated on 19/06/1995. 
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causes of action are basically similar to those in GATT Article XXIII.
902
 Under GATS (Article 
XXIII), any Contracting Party can approach the DSS if it ascertains that its rights under the 
WTO Agreements have been violated due to either (1) the failure of another Contracting Party to 
carry out its commitments under GATS (‗violation complaints‘)903, or (2) the application of a 
measure by another Contracting Party, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of the 
Agreement (‗non-violation complaints‘).904 
So, for whatever reason, a Contracting Party can approach the DSS, provided it relates to the 
international trade regime. The reason why the DSS entertains non-violation complaints is that it 
aims to promote fair competition among WTO members.
905
 
4. Adjudicative process in the DSS 
The adjudicative process in the DSS involves three stages: (1) bilateral consultations; (2) 
adjudicative process before a panel, subject to appellate review; (3) implementation and 
enforcement under surveillance by the DSB.
906
 These three stages are discussed below briefly in 
the context of GATS (which includes the financial services sector)
907
 but for a better 
understanding, refer, first of all, to the flow chart illustrating the dispute settlement process 
within the WTO framework. 
                                                 
902
 GATT Article XXIII: ‗If any Member should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under 
this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being 
impeded as the result of (a) the failure of another Member to carry out its obligations under this Agreement, or (b) 
the application by another Member of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of the Agreement, 
or (c) the existence of any other situation,‘. 
903
 GATS Article XXIII:1: ‗If any Member should consider that any other Member fails to carry out its obligations 
or specific commitments under this Agreement, it may with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory resolution of 
the matter have recourse to the DSU.‘ 
904
 Article XXIII(3) of GATS provides: If any Member considers that any benefit it could reasonably have expected 
to accrue to it under a specific commitment of another Member under Part III of this Agreement is being nullified or 
impaired as a result of the application of any measure which does not conflict with the provisions of this Agreement, 
it may have recourse to the DSU. 
905
 Werner Zdouc, ‗WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to the GATS‘ (1999) 2 JIEL 295. 
906Werner Zdouc, ‗WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to the GATS‘ (1999) 2 JIEL 295. 
907
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s1p1_e.htm 
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Figure 11 Flow chart of the Dispute Settlement Process908 
 
                                                 
908
 See Chapter VI Figure 9 and also visit: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s1p1_e.htm  
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a) Consultation: 
The consultation process is the first step in the dispute settlement process wherein the 
complainant requests the Contracting Party concerned to discuss violation of its rights under the 
WTO framework by the latter. In the context of consultations, GATS lays down two different 
consultation methods in Article XXII. The first method relates to bilateral consultations which 
are governed by the procedure set down in the DSU for all disputes under the WTO 
framework.
909
 The second method relates to the ‗multilateral consultations‘ process, under which 
either the Council for Trade in Services (CTS) or the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) facilitates 
the consultation process.
910
 As the multilateral consultation process is not mentioned in the DSU, 
it can be only requested once the bilateral consultations are unsuccessful.
911
 However, so far, 
none of the Contracting Parties have requested multilateral consultation.
912
 
For the financial services sector (and other services sectors which also require expert input), 
GATS emphasises that the DSS should involve specialists in those areas.  The Financial Services 
Annex specifies that panelists should have the necessary expertise in prudential issues and other 
financial matters.
913
 
                                                 
909
 GATS Article XXII:1: ‗Each Member shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate 
opportunity for, consultation regarding such representations as may be made by any other Member with respect to 
any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement. The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) shall apply to 
such consultations.‘ 
910
 GATS Article XXII:2: ‗The Council for Trade in Services or the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) may, at the 
request of a Member, consult with any Member or Members in respect of any matter for which it has not been 
possible to find a satisfactory solution through consultation under paragraph 1.‘ 
911
 It is unclear at what point bilateral consultations may be deemed to have failed to find a satisfactory solution. 
Under DSU Article 4.7, ‗[i]f [bilateral] consultations fail to settle a dispute within 60 days after the date of receipt of 
the request for consultations, the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel. The complaining party 
may request a panel during the 60-day period if the consulting parties jointly consider that consultations have failed 
to settle the dispute.‘ 
912
 Werner Zdouc, ‗WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to the GATS‘ (1999) 2 JIEL 295. 
913
 Para. 4 of the Financial Services Annex. 
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b) Panel and Appellant Body Stage: 
Establishment of a panel: Once all consultations to resolve the dispute have been in vain, then 
the complainant can request the DSB to form a panel to decide on the dispute. According to 
Article 4.7 of DSU
914
, the complainant needs to wait 60 days after the request for consultation, 
and can request the formation of a panel if the parties jointly consider that consultations were 
unsuccessful in resolving the issue. The request to form a panel is made in writing to the 
Chairman of the DSB and as the DSB does not require consensus for the formation of panels
915
, 
the panel is formed without delay. 
Composition of the panel: As there are no permanent members, it is composed afresh for each 
individual dispute. The panel should comprise three or five members, each of whom should be 
appointed according to Article 8 of the DSU.  
The panel procedure: The panel acts as an unbiased body following its formation and 
composition. The first task undertaken by the panel is to set up a calendar for its work.
916
 The 
panel can exercise some degree of flexibility in its process, after having taken the parties to the 
dispute into their confidence. However, generally the panel process is dealt with according to 
Article 12, Appendix 3 to the DSU. Appendix 3, paragraph 12 to the DSU provides tentative 
dates and deadlines for the main steps of the panel process (see below), such as, dates for filing 
submissions, oral hearings, and of the interim and final panel reports.  
 
                                                 
914
 Article 4.7 of DSU: ―If the consultations fail to settle a dispute within 60 days after the date of receipt of the 
request for consultations, the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel.  The complaining party 
may request a panel during the 60-day period if the consulting parties jointly consider that consultations have failed 
to settle the dispute.‖ 
915
Article 6.1 of the DSU requires a negative consensus of the DSB for not establishing a panel. 
916Article 12.3 of the DSU: ―[F]ix the timetable for the panel process…‖ 
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Table 10 
1.  Receipt of the first written submissions of the parties: 
(a) Complaining party: 
(b) Party complained against:  
3-6 weeks 
2-3 weeks  
2.  First substantive meeting with the parties; third party session:  1-2 weeks  
3.  Receipt of written rebuttals of the parties:  2-3 weeks  
4.  Second substantive meeting with the parties:  1-2 weeks  
5.  Issuance of descriptive part of the report to the parties:  2-4 weeks  
6.  Receipt of comments by the parties on the descriptive part of the report:  2 weeks  
7.  Issuance of the interim report, including the findings and conclusions, to the 
parties:  
2-4 weeks  
8.  Deadline for party to request review of part(s) of report:  1 week  
9.  Period of review by panel, including possible additional meeting with parties:  2 weeks  
10.  Issuance of final report to parties to dispute:  2 weeks  
11.  Circulation of the final report to the members:  3 weeks  
Findings, conclusions and recommendations and suggestions on implementation: This is the last 
part of the panel‘s report in which they give reasons for upholding or rejecting the claimant‘s 
assertions. This is based on a detailed analysis of relevant law, bearing in mind the assertion 
made by the parties and the factual situation as it emerged from evidence presented to the 
panel.
917
 
Interim review: The interim review is mandated by Article 15 of the DSU. It is a formal and a 
comprehensive report concerning the whole dispute. As is evident from its name, it is not yet 
declared final. This is an important stage as it provides the parties with a complete picture of the 
final report and gives them a chance to request the panel to look into issues before circulation of 
the final report.  
                                                 
917
Article 12.7 of the DSU: ―[T]he panel shall submit its findings in the form of a written report to the DSB.  In such 
cases, the report of a panel shall set out the findings of fact, the applicability of relevant provisions and the basic 
rationale behind any findings and recommendations that it makes.‖ 
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Issuance and circulation of the final report: Approximately two weeks after the interim review, 
the final report is issued and distributed among the parties.  
Adoption of panel reports: Contracting Parties are not obligated by the panel‘s report unless 
submitted and adopted by the DSB. The DSB has to adopt the panel report unless there is 
negative consensus or the parties appeal against the findings of the panel to the Appellate Body, 
which, in turn, has the mandate to change or even reverse the final decision. However, the DSB 
is bound to adopt the decision of the Appellant Body.
918
 
 
Appellate review: This is the second and final platform which adjudicates disputes between 
Contracting Parties. The appellate review is governed by the document ‗Working Procedures for 
Appellate Review‘.919 This document prefers decision-making by consensus; however, if 
consensus is not achieved then the majority decision prevails. The report of the Appellate Body 
should take into account all legal issues and panel interpretations that have been brought to 
appeal.
920
 The Appellate review process should conclude its proceedings within 60 or a 
maximum of 90 days from the filing of the notice of appeal.  
The Appellate Body has a mandate to maintain, amend or reverse the legal findings and 
decisions of the panel.
921
The report of the Appellate Body must be adopted by the DSB unless 
negative consensus is reached in the context of this report.  
 
                                                 
918
 Article 16.4 of the DSU) ―[T]he report shall be adopted at a DSB meeting unless a party to the dispute formally 
notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report.‖   
919
 WTO, Working procedures for appellate review. WTO document no. WT/AB/WP/6 dated 16 August 2010. 
920
 Articles 17.6 of the DSU:  ―An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal 
interpretations developed by the panel.‖ and Article 17.12 of the DSU: ―The Appellate Body shall address each of 
the issues raised in accordance with paragraph 6 during the appellate proceeding.‖ 
921Article 17.13 of the DSU: ―The Appellate Body may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions 
of the panel.‖ 
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c) Implementation and Enforcement: 
Implementation and enforcement are the most important attributes for any effective IO. The 
WTO DSS not only adjudicates matters between Contracting Parties but also provides an 
effective mechanism for the implementation and enforcement of its recommendations and 
rulings. In the context of implementation and enforcement, GATS Article XXIII:2 follows the 
wording of GATT Article XXIII:2, and also refers to Article 22 of the DSU, for ‗compensation 
and the suspension of concessions‘ in cases of non- compliance.922 
Article 22 of the DSU talks about the modalities for retaliation, related arbitration procedures, 
and review by the DSB of the compliance or retaliation. In other words, the winning Contracting 
Party in the DSS can request permission from the DSB to suspend concessions if the losing 
Contracting Party does not comply with the adjudication of the DSB.
923
 Article DSU 22.3 states 
that the withdrawal of tariff reductions should first be made within the same (service) sector,
924
 
or under the same agreement, and only as a fall-back option under another agreement covered by 
the WTO.
925
 
The dispute settlement system works on the footing of contractual remedies, whereby the 
infringement of WTO rules by one Contracting Party gives adversely-affected Contracting 
Parties the right to withdraw commitments of equivalent value in order to rebalance their 
respective rights and obligations. However, the decision to retaliate is entirely up to the 
                                                 
922GATS Article XXIII:2: ‗If the DSB considers that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, it 
may authorize a Member or Members to suspend the application to any other Member or Members of obligations 
and specific commitments in accordance with Article 22 of the DSU.‘ 
923
DSU Article 22.2. 
924DSU Article 22.3(f)(ii) and ftn. 14 thereto specify that in the ‗Services Sectoral Classification List‘ 
(MTN.GNS/W/120) identifies 11 main service sectors. 
925Werner Zdouc, ‗WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to the GATS‘ (1999) 2 JIEL 295. 
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aggrieved Contracting Party itself, just as the decision to correct a violation rests with the 
sovereign decision of the violator.
926
 
Retaliation is the last resort available to the Contracting Party who won the dispute. There is 
considerable criticism of the process of retaliation and the basic concept behind it. Many scholars 
maintain that two wrongs cannot make a right, and because violation of WTO rules is considered 
as welfare loss, by retaliating, the result is double welfare loss. Moreover, there is also 
considerable criticism of retaliation in relation to developing countries; for example, how could 
Antigua‘s trade sanctions affect the US? In other words, massive inequalities between economic 
and political systems can render the last resort of retaliation useless for small economies.
927
 
However, in my opinion, if the winning contracting party is allowed to sell or transfer its 
retaliation option in return for money or some other trade benefit to another Contracting Party, 
retaliation could then be a totally effective remedy as a last resort.    
5. Room for Improvement 
As documented above, the WTO DSS is one of the major achievements of the rule based 
multilateral trade mechanism. However, it is extremely rare for anything to be flawless and 
perfect. The WTO DSS despite being considered as success need some attention on certain 
issues. The issues which create room for improvement within the WTO DSS are discussed 
below.  
First, the cost of the WTO litigation is quite high. It requires lot expertise from international 
trade lawyers. Majority of the developing countries lack specialized lawyers to contest case at 
                                                 
926
 Rufus Yerxa, ‗The power of dispute settlement system‘ in Key Issues in the WTO Dispute Settlement: The First 
Ten Years.Rufus Yerxa, and Bruce Wilson. (eds). New York City: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
927
 Joost Pauwelyn and Chad P. Bown (eds.) (2010), The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO 
Dispute Settlement, Cambridge University Press. 
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the WTO DSS. Thus, they need to high lawyers from developed countries which are quite 
costly.
928
  Moreover, if developing countries are unable to arrange the required legal resources, 
they do not have likelihood to get their rights. As Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt summarise, 
“By adding 26,000 pages of new treaty text, not to mention a rapidly burgeoning case 
law; by imposing several new stages of legal activity per dispute, such as appeals, 
compliance reviews, and compensation arbitration; by judicializing proceedings and 
thus putting a premium on sophisticated legal argumentation as opposed to informal 
negotiation; and by adding a potential two years or more to defendants‟ legally 
permissible delays in complying with adverse rulings, the WTO reforms have raised the 
hurdles facing [developing countries] contemplating litigation.”929 
Second, the developed countries use the DSS to shape the WTO law. As modification of the 
WTO rules is quite difficult, due to consensus requirement. The developed countries use the DSS 
to shape the formal interpretation of the WTO binding law. They invest significant legal 
resources in fighting for their right or contesting for a favorable interpretation of the WTO law.  
The EC and US use the DSS the most and thus are mainly in a better position to further their 
interests via the judicial process. The struggle for a favourable interpretation can be judged by 
the fact that the US was a party in 340 GATT/WTO disputes, constituting 52% of the total 
number of 654 disputes, while the EC was a party in 238 disputes, or 36% of that total.
930
 
Moreover, the EC and US were third parties in most of the cases where they are not 
                                                 
928
 Gregory Shaffer (2003), ―How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing Countries: 
Some proactive developing country strategies‖, in ICTSD Resource Paper No.5 (ICTSD, Geneva). 
929
 See Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Testing International Trade Law: Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute 
Settlement, in The Political Economy of International Trade Law: Essays in Honor of Robert E. Hudec 457, 467 
(Daniel Kennedy & James Southwick eds., 2002). 
930
 See Busch & Reinhardt, Testing International Trade Law, supra note 15, at 462. 
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complainants or defendants. As parties and third parties, the United States and EC endeavor to 
protect their interests in shaping the interpretation of WTO rules over time.
931
 
On the other hand, the participation of the developing countries‘ has relatively decreased in the 
WTO DSS as compared to the less-legalized GATT. Only large developing countries are in a 
position to participate in the DSS, such as, India, Brazil and Mexico
932
 who have participated as 
third parties in more than eight (of the first 273) WTO cases. The majority of developing country 
WTO members have never participated.
933
 
In short, the WTO DSS is a successful rule based system, however. There are some issues which 
need to be improved. Such as, developing the legal capacity, related trade, of the developing 
countries or ensure legal aid to the developing countries. Moreover, the interest of the developing 
countries in the shaping the WTO law should also be watched. It could be done by allowing 
NGOs to become third parties in the DSS system on behalf of the developing countries. 
Furthermore, the WTO remedies
934
 also need attention in context for developing countries.  
6. WTO/GATS Case Law relevant to Financial Services Sector 
Before formation of the WTO, disputes were dealt with within the GATT framework which did 
not take into account the services sector (including financial services). Since 1995, disputes 
related to the services sector have been dealt with by the DSS of the WTO. So far, case law in 
relation to the financial services trade sector has not developed significantly. Nevertheless, three 
                                                 
931
Jay Smith (2003), Inequality in International Trade? Developing Countries and WTO Dispute Settlement, Rev. of 
Int‘l Political Economy, p16. 
932
 See Richard Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the 
GATT/WTO, 56 Int‘l Org. 339 (Spring 2002). 
933
 Sometime a WTO DSS case is financed by an industry in a developing country whose stakes are involved. For 
example, the Venezuelan national petroleum company, Petroleos de Venezuela, financed a Washington DC law firm 
to support the government in fighting WTO case (Venezuelan gas case against the US). [Gregory Shaffer (2003), 
―How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing Countries: Some proactive developing 
country strategies‖, in ICTSD Resource Paper No.5 (ICTSD, Geneva).] 
934
 Ch.VIII.C.4.c) on p 336 
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WTO cases are discussed briefly below to give an idea of how the DSS resolves issues and 
promotes certainty in the international economic legal regime.   
a) United States of America — Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (Complainant: 
Antigua and Barbuda hereinafter “Antigua”)935 
In 2003, Antigua applied to the DSB to form a Panel in relation to the US‘s measures affecting 
the cross-border supply of gambling services by foreign providers.
936
 Antigua maintained that 
some of the US measures were in violation of GATS Article XVI:1, which deals with market 
access, by making the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services illegal, and that the 
US could not sustain such a ban on the basis of GATS mode 1 commitments. Additionally, it 
asserted that the US was discriminating between domestic and foreign services suppliers by 
allowing their domestic Internet operators to provide gambling services.
937
 
However, the US asserted that they had not discriminated between foreign and domestic 
suppliers in their measures and had made unlawful all types of Internet gambling. Moreover, it 
responded that it had not made specific GATS commitments with respect to cross-border 
gambling services. Regarding market access commitments, the US stressed that Article XVI of 
GATS deals with circumventing specified quantitative limitations and it does not forbid 
eliminating the electronic supply of certain services. Lastly, the US claimed that the GATS 
exemptions under Article XIV would vindicate their derogation from existing specific GATS 
                                                 
935
 Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm 
936
 WT/DS285/1 – S/L/110 (27 March 2003) and WT/DS285/2 (13 June 2003). 
937Antigua‘s first oral statement, para. 94, its first written submission, para. 118 and its reply to Panel question No. 
19, as cited in the Panel report, para. 6.585 in fn. 1037 (note that all oral statements and the written submissions of 
Antigua and the United States are cited here as referenced in the Panel and Appellate Body Reports). All related 
submissions of the US can be downloaded at www.ustr.gov/ 
Trade_Agreements/Monitoring_Enforcement/Dispute_Settlement/Section_Index.html   
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obligations due to dominant public policy apprehensions such as public morals, fraud and 
security.
938
 
The Appellate Body upheld the Panel‘s report that the US could not impose a ban on the cross-
border supply of gambling services under its schedule of specific commitments under GATS 
Article XVI (market access commitments). The Appellate Body also upheld the Panel‘s decision 
that in the light of protection of ‗public morals‘ and/or ‗public order‘ under the general exception 
to the GATS, the ban on the cross-border supply of gambling services was acceptable . However, 
contrary to the findings of the Panel, the Appellant Body ruled that the US‘s measures were not 
adequate or ‗necessary to protect public morals or maintain public order‘, which is necessary for 
the chapeau and paragraph (a) of GATS Article XIV. This is because one of the relevant laws 
(i.e. the Interstate Horseracing Act) allowed electronic gambling to domestic service 
providers.
939
 Thus, in order to protect public morals and order completely, the Appellant body 
ruled that the US should change the Interstate Horseracing Act.  
The DSB adopted the Appellate Body report and the modified Panel report in April 2005. The 
‗reasonable period of time‘ for the US to implement the rulings of the DSB expired on 3 April 
2006.
940
 The most important aspect of this case is that it adds greater legal certainty as to the 
applicability of WTO and GATS commitments to the electronic cross-border supply of services 
(which also includes financial services). 
                                                 
938
Wunsch-Vincent, Sacha, 'Cross-border trade in services and the GATS: lessons from the WTO US—Internet 
Gambling case', World Trade Review (2006), 5: 3, 319–355. 
 
939
US–Gambling, Appellate Body Report, para. 374. 
 
940
 DS, US–Gambling, Arbitration under Art. 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes, WT/DS285/13 (19 August 2005). 
Rao Raza Hashim 
342 
School Of Law 
University Of Warwick 
b) China — Measures Affecting Financial Information Services 
and Foreign Financial Information Suppliers (Complainant: United 
States of America)941 
In March 2008, the US requested consultations with China regarding measures related to 
financial information services and service suppliers.  
The US asserted that China was not providing the same treatment to foreign financial services 
suppliers in the supply of financial information services to China. All the foreign financial 
information suppliers, in order to supply their services, need to supply their services through the 
China Economic Information Service, one of the commercial entities of the Xinhua News 
Agency which prohibits any foreign financial information suppliers from directly offering 
subscriptions for their services to the public. Additionally, at the time of renewing their licences, 
China made it a requirement for foreign financial information suppliers to provide the Foreign 
Information Administration Centre, (a regulatory body within the Xinhua framework), with 
comprehensive and confidential information concerning their services, their customers and their 
suppliers. The US claimed that these restrictions and prerequisites do not apply to domestic 
services providers.  
The US also asserted that China does not allow foreign financial information service suppliers to 
have a commercial presence in China other than in a limited number of representative offices.  
The US claimed that the actions at issue were contrary to the various provisions of GATS, such 
as Articles XVI, XVII, XVIII, and Part I, para. 1.2 of China's Protocol of Accession.  
However, in December 2008, China and the US came to a mutual understanding in the form of a 
Memorandum of Understanding and the dispute was withdrawn from the DSS.  
                                                 
941
 Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds373_e.htm 
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The reason for highlighting this case was to show how all the measures of all the Contracting 
Parties can be brought to conformity with commitment and agreement under the WTO 
framework. The quest for their rights by Contracting Parties within the DSS brings certainty and 
clarity to the system.     
c) China — Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment 
Services (Complainant: United States of America)942 
In this dispute, the US claimed that China imposes restrictions and requirements on the foreign 
electronic payment services providers for payment card transactions. According to allegations, 
China only allows China UnionPay (a domestic entity) to provide electronic payment services 
denominated and paid in domestic currency (renminbi – the official currency of China) for 
payment card transactions, whilst the service providers of other Contracting Parties can provides 
these services but only in foreign currency. Moreover, in China, all card payment machines have 
to be compatible with China UnionPay's system. In addition, all foreign service providers have to 
bargain with sellers for access whereas, on the contrary, China UnionPay has a guaranteed access 
to card payment machines in China. 
The US claimed that China‘s measures are restrictive and are in conflict with its commitments 
under GATS Articles XVI (Market Access) and XVII (National Treatment). The dispute is at the 
Panel stage and yet to be decided.  
7. Conclusion 
This subheading documented the adjudicative functioning of the WTO as part of its institutional 
role. The adjudicative functioning of the WTO adds certainty and predictability to the rules of 
                                                 
942
Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds413_e.htm 
Rao Raza Hashim 
344 
School Of Law 
University Of Warwick 
the game within the global economy (in this case, the financial services sector) which in turn 
leads to the development of the financial services sector. As discussed in the theoretical 
framework, the development of the financial sector stimulates the Economic Cycle and increases 
international trade (Patrick‘s supply lead hypothesis) which eventually results in a more stable 
and balanced growth of the global economy.   
D. Conclusion  
This chapter documented that the WTO makes a reasonable contribution in the development of 
the global financial services sector through its institutional role. It addresses a common 
misconception that the WTO deals only with trade and has little to do with the development of 
the financial sector. This view is refuted by pointing out the WTO‘s involvement in the 
development of the global financial services sector.  
All three components of the institutional role of an IEI (legislative and normative, executive and 
administrative, and, judicial and quasi-judicial) have been discussed in detail in the context of the 
WTO and financial services sector. By documenting the WTO‘s comprehensive institutional 
role, this chapter showed that the WTO has an effective role as an IEI in the IELR with specific 
reference to the financial services sector.  
As part of the main argument presented in Section Three, the WTO should expand its 
functioning in the development of the financial services sector, especially in setting the rules of 
the game. Expansion is possible and practical because the WTO has the institutional capacity to 
do this. Moreover, by doing so, the WTO can substitute the role of the IMF (setting the rules of 
the game) by enhancing its role in financial sector development. This way, stable and balanced 
growth of the global economy can be achieved, by gathering all liberally institutionalised ideals 
(democratic values and cooperation with free will for collective gains) together. 
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This thesis calls for the expansion of the WTO‘s institutional role in context of the development 
of the global financial sector. However, there exists a view that questions the development of the 
WTO‘s financial services contributions. This view was mainly dominant at the Third Ministerial 
Conference at Seattle, US. The Third Ministerial Conference at Seattle, US brought a notable 
change in the stance of the developing countries towards any enhancement of commitments 
towards financial and investment related commitments. The post Seattle change in stance is 
discussed below.   
Post Seattle changes are quite important and relatively in favour of the developing countries. The 
developing countries‘ government and the international civil society are fully aware of the 
developed countries approach and strategies towards the WTO negotiation process. The TRIMS 
which favours corporate rights and freedom to operate across state boundaries, in the mobility of 
products and, eventually, of capital. Free movement of the capital and investment under TRIMS 
made the Transnational Corporations (TNC) very strong. Not surprisingly majority of the TNC 
are owned by national of developed countries. The TRIMs is perceived by developing countries 
and civil society to be highly in favour of the developed countries.
943
 Agreement like TRIMS 
made the developing countries very conscious about the negotiation process and WTO 
commitment. This blunt/brave negotiation stand by the developed countries evolved and was 
known worldwide after the Third Ministerial Conference at Seattle, US.    
During the Uruguay round the developing countries were not skilled or equipped at the 
negotiations and developed countries benefited from this weakness and brought the Uruguay 
Round balance in their favour. The developing countries realized this imbalance right after the 
                                                 
943
 Philip McMichael (2000), Sleepless since Seattle: what is the WTO about? Review of International Political 
Economy 7:3 pp466–474. 
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Uruguay Round ended and when it was not implemented the way they have thought. However, 
after learning lesson from the Uruguay Round the developing countries performed slightly better 
in the Doha Round of multilateral negotiations. They can even negotiate better if they unite and 
are well prepared.  
Some suggestions forwarded by Arvind Panagariya are quite realistic. By working on suggestion 
the developing countries can improve their relative bargaining position. The suggestions are as 
follows:
944
 Firstly, developing countries should focus on the composition of the negotiating. It 
should at least include lawyers and economists. Secondly, developing countries need to plan 
their policy before negotiations. Thirdly, developing countries must improve their research 
capacity. They should be in a position to understand and able to conduct cost-benefit analysis the 
agreements. Fourth, developing countries need bargain firmly and persistently. Fifth, promote 
development of civil society groups. Finally, and most importantly, developing countries need to 
cooperate with other developing and developed countries. For instance, developed countries 
cannot ignore if China and India together contest negotiations on any issue.  
Thus, overall the WTO system is beneficial to all the WTO members provided they fight for 
their rights. Moreover, the DSS which can shape the WTO law is very important. Developing 
countries should cooperate with each other to collectively fight for their rights. Cooperation is 
necessary to achieve desired results. As, discussed earlier, that WTO provides an opportunity to 
the developing countries to fight/negotiate for their rights. The WTO system is itself good and 
gives a chance to the developing countries to balance the dominance of the developed countries 
in the WTO system through their cooperation.  
                                                 
944
 Panagariya, Arvind (2002), Developing Countries at Doha: A Political Economy AnalysisThe World 
Economy. Volume 25, Issue 9, pages 1205–1233. 
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If the developing countries opts proper negotiation strategies (as discussed above) and invest 
some resources towards research they can benefit more from the rule based WTO multilateral 
trade system. This thesis does not argue in favour of TRIMS but calls for the expansion of 
WTO‘s role in the development of the financial sector i.e., global financial regulations. 
Currently, the soft laws with hard law effect (if attached with IMF conditions) are transplanted 
into the domestic economies of the developing countries. If the developing countries collectively 
research, and negotiate with collective resources then they might be able to negotiate better terms 
than those imposed by the IMF while extending financial assistance. 
In other words, the collectively negotiating opportunities are better at WTO platform than with 
the IMF. Moreover, the WTO DSS which is also rule based is in a position to solve disputes 
related to global financial regulations which currently are not dealt anywhere.    
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IX. Conclusion 
 
Looking at our recent history, membership of the IEIs has increased considerably and this is 
mostly due to the fact that the sovereign states are convinced that being a member of these 
organisations would benefit them more than non-membership. There may be many reasons for 
sovereign states becoming part of a global regime and compromising on their independent 
decision-making. States join IEIs of their own free will and only join because they think that it is 
overall advantageous to be part of the organisation. 
The purpose of this study, as set out in the introductory chapter of this thesis, has been to conduct 
an analysis of the institutional role of the IEIs, as part of the IELR, in achieving a more stable 
and balanced growth of the global economy in which both the real and financial side of the 
economy grows. The objective of conducting this analysis was to develop an understanding of 
the link between the certainty and predictability of the rules of the game through the IELR and 
the Economic Cycle.  
To limit the scope of the research, this thesis has taken two IEIs as a case study; namely, the IMF 
and the WTO. The reason for choosing these IEIs is very simple and is also discussed in the 
introductory chapter. The institutional role of these IEIs is relatively significant in stimulating the 
Economic Cycle. The IMF has a leading role in the process of setting the rules of the game for 
the global financial sector whereas the WTO is the most effective in dealing with international 
trade matters.  
The concept presented is this dissertation and the evolution of the IELR has been discussed in the 
first section of the thesis. The remaining two sections have demonstrated the application of the 
concept, presented in the theory chapter, in relation to the IMF and the WTO.   
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The concept of the IELR is based on liberally institutionalised rational cooperation among the 
sovereign states for collective gain in the form of IEIs. These IEIs, being the most important non-
State actors, operate within the international economic framework through an international legal 
framework or international institutional framework or both to achieve an end result; that is, the 
more stable and balanced growth of the global economy.  
The institutional role of the IEIs is defined in the theory chapter, as their role in their legislative 
and normative capacity, executive and administrative authority, and judicial and quasi-judicial 
functioning. The chapter two also stress on the principle of legal certainty that how institutional 
role can develop a set of rules and principles that are certain and predictable, which can better 
achieve overall stable and balanced growth. Moreover, thesis discusses of legal pluralism, legal 
transplant and legal harmonisation and relates the theories to the analysis of economic growth in 
the literature and how these theories explain the rise of institutions.  
This thesis also discusses classical sociology, law and development, economic sociology, and 
institutional economics. The thesis then relies on Weber‘s theory of legal certainty and maintains 
that the legal certainty in any system ensures the calculability of economic activities within that 
system, including legal certainty of the rules of the game that control international trade and 
finance.   
This thesis then explores the relationship of the institutional role of the IEIs in context of the 
Economic Cycle. The Economic Cycle as discussed in the theory chapter is based on the possible 
causal relationship between financial sector development and the international trade through the 
economic growth. According to it, economic growth is achieved through development of global 
financial sector (Patrick‘s supply lead hypothesis), which in turn stimulates international trade, 
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which then reinforces economic growth and leads to the development of the financial sector 
(Patrick‘s demand followed hypothesis).  
This thesis asserts and shows that the IEIs (through the case studies of IMF and the WTO) 
through their institutional role support a stable and balanced growth of the global economy by 
stimulating the components of the Economic Cycle. 
The analysis, of the relationship of institutional role of the IEIs and the Economic Cycle, 
conducted in this thesis is based on the regime theory which considers the web of global 
regulation as an international regime. This regime is mainly based on political, legal and 
economic factors, therefore it is referred to as the International Economic and Legal Regime. The 
main concept, as discussed in the introduction and also the conceptual framework, is examined 
from the liberal institutionalist viewpoint.  
The above viewpoint maintains that the IELR is cooperation between the sovereign states of their 
own free will for collective gain. The most common and effective way to cooperate is through 
the IEIs which have their own will and reflects the collective will of its Members. Moreover, the 
only driving force for cooperation is mutual benefit and no other force; by other force, I mean the 
active participation of the hegemon in the regime. In other words, on the basis of the current 
cooperative mechanism (with liberal institutionalist insight), the IELR should be free from the 
dominance of the hegemon.  
However, despite absence of hegemon in this current regime the collective dominance of the US 
and EU cannot be ignored absolutely. In practice it is observed that the US and the EU are to 
some extend dominant in the current economic scenario. In IMF and World Bank their 
dominance is constitutionally embedded in the weighted voting system. Whereas, it has been 
notices by some scholars in the WTO, which is constitutionally liberally institutionalised, the 
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dominance of these two economic powers can also be notices.  In the WTO multilateral trade 
negotiation rounds the practice of agenda setting in Green Room meeting and then using 
economic and diplomatic coercion to bring other counties (especially developing countries) on 
board.    
Two of the main IEIs which contribute significantly to the IELR have a strong realist insight; 
they are the IMF and the World Bank. These IEIs-created rules of the game have the taste of a 
realist approach in which the hegemon imposes rules of the game for its own benefit. The 
existence of the realist insight in these IEIs is evidenced by their decision-making and voting 
systems which very clearly tilt in favour of the US and its allies (especially EU). This aspect is 
also discussed in the evolution part of the chapter III which give a better understanding of the 
IELR and documents the historical background of the current regime and the way in which it 
evolved to its current stage. 
The IMF is a substantial contributor to the IELR and it does not explicitly acknowledge its 
institutional role; it only defines its goals. The motive for highlighting its objectives and not its 
institutional role is to avoid any discussion which could lead to the explicit unveiling of its realist 
insight to the liberally institutionalized IELR. This is a possibility because structural and 
operational modification would require all the Members to contribute and this could cause the 
collective liberal institutionalist will to converge, based on the current patterns of the IELR, and 
question the hegemonic voting rights within the IMF.  
Section two of this thesis demonstrates that the institutional role of the IMF does exist and could 
be better improved if it is explicitly acknowledged. The institutional role of the IMF is quite 
significant in the context of the Economic cycle. Both the elements of the Economic Cycle, 
financial sector and the international trade, are adequately addressed by the IMF. Moreover a 
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common perception about the IMF has nothing to do with international trade is also removed by 
showing the notable contribution by the IMF in enhancement of international trade. 
However, even if the IMF acknowledge its institutional role, the structural deficiencies such as 
the absence of an adjudicating system and absence of democratic values within the IMF are 
significant enough to hold the IMF to contribute optimally towards the IELR. Moreover, this 
thesis has asserts that the structural deficiencies and absence of democratic values in the IMF are 
realistically not possible to modify.   
The main reason for the IMF not openly recognising its institutional role is that it does not want 
to make officially public its realist characteristic within the liberally institutionalised dominated 
IELR. Regardless of deficit of democratic values within the IMF‘s, its membership widely 
follows the IMF; this is because there is not any other organisation to support in condition of 
desperate monetary need.  
A suggestion is put forward in section two that the IMF can split its institutional role (which 
result in global financial regulations) and financing role in order to function more effectively to 
achieve its objectives. The weighted voting system could be retained on the financing role of the 
IMF and liberally institutionalised values could be incorporated in the global financial regulation 
role.  
Section three is a response to the section two which asserts that practically major changes in the 
IMF is not possible because the dominant powers would not let go their dominance easily. On 
the other hand, the liberally institutionalised WTO has the tendency to modify its functioning for 
collective gains.  
Section three discussed in detail the current contribution made by the WTO towards the IELR in 
the context of the global financial sector. The contributions are made by the WTO are relatively 
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less as compared to some of other IEIs. However, if the WTO‘s institutional role is expanded, 
which is possible, it could solve the problem by substituting the IMF‘s realist rules of the game 
with the WTO‘s liberally institutionalised rules of the game. Thus section three showed how the 
IMF fails to be an effective and legitimate part of the IELR and how the WTO has the potential 
to fill in the legitimacy and accountability gaps, and effectively substitutes the IMF‘s global 
financial rule setting role.  
Section three also address the concern some scholars about the dominance of the EU and the US 
in the WTO multilateral negotiations. It has been observed and argued by some scholars that 
despite the WTO being a constitutionally liberally institutionalised and mainly every matter dealt 
by it is through consensus. But it is alleged that behind the veil of consensus the developed 
countries lead by EU and US puts economic and diplomatic coercion on the developing countries 
to achieve favourable deal for them.  
The presence of this dominance cannot be absolutely ruled out. However, WTO gives option to 
the small economies to cooperate and unite together for collective gains. For example, if India 
and China together take a stance on an issue in the WTO negotiations; it cannot be ruled out by 
the developed nations. This is because China and India are considered as emerging economic 
powers. Thus, in the WTO system there is a hope that one day a weak economy might have an 
equal say as that of the developed countries. 
Moreover, it was notices by some scholars that in the Uruguay Round developed countries tilted 
the Uruguay round negotiation results in their favour. This aspect of the developed countries was 
quite visible by the time of the Third Ministerial Conference at Seattle, US. The developing 
countries have learnt their lesson and now they try to cooperate with other countries both 
developed and developing countries to negotiate in a more coherent way. It has been noted by 
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some scholars that in Doha Round the imbalance of Uruguay Round was not restored but the 
developing countries negotiated relatively in a better way.          
The section three also highlights the WTO‘s institutional role in the promotion of innovation 
through TRIPS. The link between innovation (creating comparative advantage) and international 
trade is very strong within the international economic framework. Highlighting this very aspect 
of TRIPS avoids repeating the content of other chapters. The institutional role of the WTO in the 
promotion of the international trade is discussed, and this, in turn, completes the Economic 
Cycle. 
Overall, this thesis uses legal certainty created by the institutional role of the IEIs in achievement 
of a more stable and balanced growth of the global economy through Economic Cycle. As, a case 
study the IMF and the WTO are selected for the analysis. Both the institutions create legal 
certainty through their institutional role and support a more stable and balanced growth of the 
global economy. In analysing the institutional role of these IEIs, thesis finds that the WTO is in a 
better position to perform its institutional role than the IMF. On this bases thesis argues that the 
WTO should enhance its role in the global financial sector development. Although, the WTO 
negotiations suffer some informal dominance element from the US and the EU, but it provides 
opportunity to the developing countries to formally cooperate and reduce this informal 
dominance.  
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Useful Web Sites  
 
BIS visit: http://www.bis.org/ 
Bretton woods project http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org 
ICSID visit: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp 
IDA visit:  http://www.worldbank.org/ida/ 
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University Of Warwick 
IFC visit: http://www.ifc.org/ 
International Accounting and Auditing Standards:  
http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/LessonsLearned_ROSC_AA.pdf  
International Association of Insurance Supervisors‘ Insurance Supervisory Principles visit: 
http://www.iaisweb.org/index.cfm?pageID=41 
International Organization of Securities Commission‘s Objectives for Securities Regulation visit: 
http://www.iosco.org/  
MIGA visit: http://www.miga.org/   
NATO: http://www.nato.int 
OECD visit: http://www.oecd.org  
The Council of Europe http://www.coe.int/ 
UN visit: http://www.un.org 
UNCTAD visit: http://www.unctad.org  
World Bank visit: http://www.worldbank.org 
 
 
